Moscow on the Potomac: The Soviet Embassy and Detente, 1969-1979 by Paulauskas, Michael
 
 
 
 
 
MOSCOW ON THE POTOMAC: THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND DÉTENTE, 1969-1979 
 
 
 
 
Michael V. Paulauskas 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of History. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved By:  
 
Donald J. Raleigh 
 
Louise McReynolds 
 
Chad Bryant 
 
Christopher R. Browning 
 
Donald M. Reid
  ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2012   
Michael V. Paulauskas 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
  iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
MICHAEL V. PAULAUSKAS: Moscow on the Potomac: The Soviet Embassy and Détente, 
1969-1979  
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
 
This dissertation examines the role of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., in 
conducting superpower diplomacy during détente, the period from 1969 to 1979 when the 
superpowers attempted to normalize the Cold War.  This work revolves around four major 
themes.  First, it explores the critical role played by Soviet diplomats on the ground in 
determining the nature of Soviet-American relations.  Second, it analyzes the relationships of 
key diplomats, arguing that personal diplomacy bolstered détente in its initial years, but 
ultimately could not guarantee the long-term improvement of Soviet-American relations.  
Third, it complicates current understandings of Soviet foreign policy in this period, as it 
functioned not simply as an expression of the Kremlin’s will, but as a complex bureaucratic 
process that frequently wreaked havoc on negotiations.  In this sense, détente was not a 
monolithic policy undertaken by the Soviet government with a singular goal in mind, but 
rather a process negotiated by Soviet officials with different understandings of Soviet aims 
and strategies.  Finally, by considering the expansion of cultural exchanges and trade 
negotiations during this period, it demonstrates the vital role played by economic and cultural 
interests in setting the parameters of détente. 
 The first part of this dissertation focuses on the role played by Anatoly Dobrynin, 
who served as Soviet ambassador to the US from 1962 to 1986.  It begins with a brief 
biography of Dobrynin and a study of the methods of diplomacy that made him an effective 
  iv 
operator in Washington.  In particular, it outlines the “Dobrynin school” of diplomacy, 
assessing the atmosphere promoted by Dobrynin at the embassy and his influence over a 
generation of young Soviet diplomats.  Next, the dissertation explains the rise and fall of the 
backchannel, the site of secret negotiations for improved Soviet-American relations, and it 
describes the personal diplomacy established by Dobrynin and American National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger.  The second part of the dissertation serves as a case study of the 
embassy’s Cultural Department, showing how lower-level diplomats promoted the image of 
the USSR as a dependable great power with whom the US should develop friendlier ties.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On November 4, 1913, The New York Times announced that the Russian government 
had purchased a large house on Sixteenth Street in Washington, D.C., after several years of 
trying.  The mansion, described as “one of the finest in Washington,” was located in the “best 
resident district,” not on the outskirts of town, like the spots for the proposed French and 
German embassies.  The widow of George M. Pullman, the sleeping car baron, had built the 
home two years earlier for entertaining, but had never occupied it, and the Russian 
government made an early bid to purchase the grand building for its embassy, offering 
$350,000.  When the Russian government refused to pay for the furnishings in the home, 
Mrs. Pullman demurred, instead selling it to her friend, Mrs. John Hays Hammond.  As luck 
would have it, the Russian government finally won the prized mansion for its new embassy 
after Mrs. Hammond decided to leave Washington and sold her home to the Russian state for 
$375,000.1 
 Under the tenure of Russian Ambassador Georgii Bakhmetev, who occupied the 
embassy at the end of the year, the building quickly gained a reputation as one of the most 
opulent in the capital, throwing lavish parties for the top guests in the Washington social 
scene.  One reviewer called it “the finest and largest” embassy in Washington, with “first-
class” furnishings and a prime location on Washington’s broadest residential avenue, in a 
direct line to the White House.  Upon arrival, a “Cossack footman in native dress” opens the 
front door, and any visitor “at once feels transported miles and years away from the newest 
                                                
1 "New Embassy for Russia," New York Times, November 5, 1913. 
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of all the great capitals, and entirely at home in this picturesque and hospitable palace.”  A 
grand staircase in the back of the hall led to the second floor salon, where, during formal 
events, Madame Bakhmetev, a member of a prominent American family, stood under a 
“superb crystal chandelier” to greet the guests.  The first drawing room, which stretched 
across the front of the building, featured old Italian furnishings and a grand piano decorated 
with autographed photographs of the Russian imperial family.  A second drawing room, with 
antique Italian gold-framed furniture, held three portraits by famous artists, Madame 
Bakhmetev’s collections of crystals, jade and Tanagra figures, and books and magazines 
from around the globe.  The dining room, which seated eighty guests, featured a silver plate, 
renowned in all of the capitals in which the Bakhmetevs served, as well as three separate 
collections of silver, “each worthy of a place in a museum,” and antique Russian, French, and 
Caucasian cups. A painting of Nicholas II on horseback, “one of the best portraits of his 
Majesty in existence,” provided the only decoration for the oak-paneled walls.  A large living 
room, with a life-sized portrait of the tsar in Hussar uniform, also featured a series of 
paintings displaying different aspects of an ambassador’s reception at the court of Louis XV.  
The style here was entirely Russian, including the ambassador’s impressive arms and armor 
collection and the table where the ambassador’s uncle, the poet and essayist Count Aleksei 
Tolstoy, wrote most of his major works.  All of the décor featured a personal touch, down to 
the hand-carved lifelike birds that adorned the white picture rail in Madame Bakhmetev’s 
sitting room, and it all received a rave review from the reporter touring the premises.2     
                                                
2 "Russian Women's Part in the War," New York Times, April 11, 1915.  Madame Bakhmetev was one of the 
“Beale girls,” three socialite sisters who also included the wives of John R. McLean and Admiral George 
Dewey.  "Soviet Envoy Host at Brilliant Fete," New York Times, April 11, 1934. 
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 After the 1917 February Revolution, which resulted in the tsar’s abdication and the 
rise of the Provisional Government, the Russian ambassador fled to France with many of the 
embassy’s valuables, and he was replaced in June by Boris Bakhmetev, who had no relation 
to the previous ambassador.  When the October Revolution brought the Bolsheviks to power 
a few months later, most of the embassy staff resigned, volunteering for service in the 
American army or government.  Bakhmetev did not recognize the legitimacy of the 
Bolsheviks, and he remained at his post in Washington as an “ambassador without a country” 
until 1922, when he finally settled the embassy’s debts with American citizens using the 
Russian government’s liquidated assets in the US.3  Bakhmetev became an American citizen 
and a professor of civil engineering at Columbia University, and he left the property in the 
care of Serge Ughet, financial attaché at the embassy.4  By the early 1930s, the embassy had 
not been occupied for a decade, the majority of its records collecting dust in a New York City 
warehouse.5 
 After the American government recognized the USSR in 1933, work began to restore 
the embassy to its former glory.  The American government officially broke ties with all 
remaining representatives of the tsarist and Provisional Governments, including Ughet, who 
removed his personal files from the 800 to 900 boxes of state documents that he eventually 
turned over to the Soviet government.6  New York University Professor of Interior 
                                                
3 "Bakhmeteff stays; disowns Bolsheviki," New York Times, November 25, 1917; and "Bakhmeteff Gives 
Notice to Hughes of His Retirement," New York Times, June 5, 1922. 
4 "Bakhmeteff Leaves with Many Honors," New York Times, June 20, 1922; and "Boris Bakhmeteff of 
Columbia Dead," New York Times, July 22, 1951. 
5 "Russian Embassy Being Put In Order," New York Times, July 16, 1933; and "Litvinoff Views Embassy," New 
York Times, November 18, 1933. 
6 "Russian Embassy Being Put In Order."; and "All Ties Broken with Old Russia," New York Times, November 
18, 1933. 
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Architecture Eugene Schoen was tapped to renovate and repair the building.7  Thankfully, 
Schoen found the building in “surprisingly good shape,” with the oak paneling in the dining 
room in “perfect condition” and the original decoration preserved.  The Soviet government 
sent artwork, furniture, and rugs from Moscow museums, including several Bashir Bokhara 
antique rugs and a large bust of Lenin.8  Aleksandr Troianovskii, a veteran revolutionary who 
had previously served as ambassador to Japan and the vice-chairman of the State Planning 
Committee, assumed the ambassador’s post in November, and took control of the embassy in 
April.9 
 Once in place, Troianovskii resumed his predecessor’s tradition of lavish parties and 
courting of the Washington elite.  Regarding the embassy’s first reception after 
Troianovskii’s arrival, The New York Times gushed that it was “as brilliant as any ever held 
there by the late George Bakhmeteff.”  The reporter carefully detailed Mrs. Troiankovskii’s 
pale salmon pink gown and jewelry, and called the salon “the largest and most stately of all 
the state apartments.”  The 500 guests, including top members of President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s cabinet, enjoyed a dinner service that came on china presented to the Russian 
government by Louis XV, and kitchen facilities featuring “the excellence and abundance of 
the offerings of the most elaborate kitchen in any official household in the capital.”  The 
food, according to this report, even exceeded that available at the White House, and the décor 
placed the “richest art of old Russia” next to works by modern Russian artists.  The only 
change noted came in the room where Bakhmetev kept his antique armories, which had been 
                                                
7 "To Repair Soviet Embassy," New York Times, November 30, 1933. 
8 "Embassy Occupied by Troyanovsky," New York Times, April 7, 1934; and "Red Flags in Washington," New 
York Times, January 12, 1934. 
9 "Troyanovsky to be Envoy of Soviet; Skvirsky His Aide," New York Times, November 20, 1933. 
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replaced by Troianovskii’s office.10  Future ambassadors and their spouses repeated these 
grand “housewarmings,” including the Litvinovs, who in 1942 gave a party with sturgeon, 
duck, turkey, salads, frosted cakes, and a variety of expensive beverages.11   
 From 1933 to 1962, a range of ambassadors served in Washington, with various 
levels of success.  Konstantin Umanskii, previously the chargé d’affaires under Troianovskii, 
took the reigns at the embassy from 1939 to 1941, angering many American officials.  In one 
highly criticized incident, Umanskii took a State Department official to a restaurant outside 
of Washington two weeks after the start of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, pressuring 
him to recognize the Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic States.  This blunder raised 
American suspicions about Soviet intentions in a period when a more delicate touch was 
needed to promote Soviet-American reconciliation.12  In contrast, Maksim Litvinov, who had 
served as the people’s commissar of foreign affairs before leading the embassy from 1941 to 
1943, enjoyed a fair amount of popularity in the US.  As a revolutionary before 1917, he 
traveled widely and married an English woman.  He eventually lost his position as foreign 
commissar when General Secretary Joseph Stalin pursued a nonaggression pact with Nazi 
Germany.  Litvinov’s Jewish identity and pursuit of closer ties to Great Britain, France, and 
the US stood at odds with the Stalinist regime’s new foreign policy goals.  When he was 
brought back into the fold to improve relations with the allies during World War II, his long 
                                                
10 "Soviet Envoy Host at Brilliant Fete." 
11 "Sidelights of the Week," The New York Times, February 15 1942. 
12 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 26. 
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history of favoring Soviet-American cooperation to counter Nazism provided him with the 
highest profile of any Soviet diplomat serving in the West.13  
Litvinov’s subsequent replacements hardly inspired American confidence in Soviet 
diplomacy. When future Foreign Minister Andrei Andreevich Gromyko took over the 
embassy from 1943 to 1946, an American analyst described him as “slow-witted and 
unimaginative” and unqualified to run the embassy.14  Georgii Zarubin, in Washington from 
1952 to 1958, may have been a capable administrator, but he had a “strict and stern 
appearance of a typical representative of ‘Stalin’s school’” and his inability to speak English 
understandably frustrated American officials.15  Overall, most of the Soviet ambassadors to 
the US in this period had certain liabilities that prevented them from making a significant 
impact on Soviet-American relations, especially after the eruption of the Cold War placed the 
superpowers in a period of entrenched conflict. 
 This dissertation picks up the story of the embassy to examine the work of the most 
effective Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin, during détente, the 
period from 1969 to 1979, when diplomats on both sides of the Iron Curtain attempted to 
normalize the Cold War and lessen international tensions.  Détente represented the most 
important era in the history of the embassy, as Dobrynin helped to mold it into the central 
hub for Soviet-American relations.  Soviet embassy diplomats and American officials 
negotiated strategic arms settlements, trade deals, and expanded cultural ties, generating 
relationships with American diplomats and new ideas about international affairs that proved 
                                                
13 Steven Merritt Miner, "Soviet Ambassadors from Maiskii to Dobrynin," in The Diplomats: 1939-1979, ed. 
Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 618-19. 
14 Ibid., 619. 
15 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) 
(New York: Time Books, 1995), 26-27. 
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critical to shaping General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.16  Détente fundamentally altered the nature of postwar international relations, 
signaling the first sustained period of successful superpower negotiations.  Yet, until now, 
there has been no comprehensive study of the subject from the Soviet perspective, nor any 
detailed examination of the work performed by the Soviet Embassy in Washington. 
 
Historiography on Détente and Soviet Foreign Policy 
The majority of scholars of détente privilege the American viewpoint, examining 
Soviet efforts as a foil to American policy.17  Cold War-era scholars who studied Soviet 
policy—including Adam Ulam, Robin Edmonds, and Harry Gelman—claimed that 
international concerns, such as perceived vulnerabilities or opportunities for dominance in 
the Third World, led Soviet leaders to pursue a rapprochement with the US.  They suggested 
that inconsistencies in American policies and/or Soviet aggression in Africa and the Middle 
East eventually brought about the demise of détente.18  All of these authors wrote without 
access to archival sources and with the aim of influencing American foreign policy by 
                                                
16 This argument is most clearly articulated in Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, 
Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
17 Particularly influential works on détente from an American perspective include: William Bundy, A Tangled 
Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); Robert Dallek, 
Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007); Raymond L. Garthoff, 
Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Rev. ed. (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1994); Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  Several recent biographies of Henry Kissinger also 
contribute to this discussion: Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2009); and Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
18 Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); 
Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1984); and Adam Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983).  
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clarifying the attitudes of Soviet leaders.  The few recent authors who have used Russian 
archival sources to explore détente, including Vladislav Zubok and Odd Arne Westad, have 
continued to focus on top Soviet leaders and their immediate advisors.19 
Most post-1991 research on Cold War-era Soviet foreign policy has focused on the 
question of how ideology affected Soviet conceptions of international relations. Vladislav 
Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov provide the most thorough exploration of this subject with 
their model of a “revolutionary-imperial paradigm,” or the combination of traditional Russian 
messianic imperialism and Marxist ideology.  They argue that ideological concerns 
influenced each Soviet leader to varying degrees, whether they actively sought to spread 
communist revolution around the globe or simply believed that socialism, backed by the 
progressive forces of history, would eventually triumph on the world stage.  This focus on 
ideology, however, coexisted with a desire to defend Russian strategic interests and expand 
the Russian sphere of influence, themes that extended back well into the tsarist period.20  The 
majority of Cold War historians have adopted this model in some form, although they 
disagree about whether ideology or strategic concerns played the dominant role.  Like Zubok 
and Westad, these scholars concentrate on top Soviet leaders and their immediate advisors.  
As a result, relatively little research has been done on the Soviet foreign policy apparatus, 
particularly during détente.   
                                                
19 Vladislav Zubok, Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Odd Arne Westad, ed. The Fall of Detente: Soviet-
American Relations during the Carter Years (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press,1997); I. S. Ivanov, ed. 
Ocherki istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del Rossii, t. 2, 1917-2002 gg. (Moscow: Olma Press,2002); and 
Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
20 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Zubok, Failed Empire. 
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In this dissertation, I contend that while this emphasis on top leaders and the interplay 
of ideology and strategic thinking has made important contributions to our understanding of 
Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev period, a broader discussion of workings of the 
Soviet foreign policy apparatus is necessary to fully account for Soviet behavior on the 
international scene.  Western historians during the Cold War discussed the issue of 
factionalism in the Brezhnev-era Soviet bureaucracy, but generally broke it down to binary 
categories, such as “hawks” and “doves” or “traditionalists” and “realists.”21  To lend 
additional nuance to this picture, I outline six major rifts in the foreign policy structures that 
developed in this period.  These include fissures between individual Politburo members, 
between different bureaucracies, between different groups within individual ministries, 
between the Kremlin leadership and the rest of the country, between Moscow and diplomats 
on the ground, and between embassy officials.  This approach creates a more nuanced 
portrait of Soviet foreign policy during détente, as it functioned as a complex administrative 
process, with various entities pursuing different and sometimes contradictory objectives, 
rather than the more unified picture implied by studies that only consider General Secretary 
Leonid Brezhnev and the Politburo.   
The first rift in the Soviet foreign policy apparatus existed within the Politburo itself.  
Thanks to details emerging in memoir literature, recent historians, including Zubok, have 
given this issue appropriate attention.  He describes how, in response to the North 
Vietnamese offensive in the spring of 1972, President Richard M. Nixon resumed the 
                                                
21 For pertinent examples of this approach to the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy during the Brezhnev period, 
see: Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 
164; and John Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of US Foreign Policy: A Study of Ideology, Power, and 
Consensus (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).  Determining which Politburo members had the most 
influence over foreign policy was also a common trend in the historiography of this period.  Examples include: 
Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years; and Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of 
Detente. 
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bombing of North Vietnam in April, leading to the accidental destruction of four Soviet 
merchant ships.  This ushered in an intense debate in the Politburo about whether or not the 
Soviet leadership should go forward with the Moscow Summit in May, where Nixon and 
Brezhnev eventually concluded the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty, or SALT I.  Chairman 
of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgornyi, Ukrainian Party leader Petro Shelest, and Defense 
Minister Andrei Grechko all opposed inviting Nixon to Moscow, while Mikhail Suslov, the 
Party’s chief ideological expert, remained silent on the issue.  However, Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s support for the 
summit allowed Brezhnev to build a consensus among Party leaders to move forward with 
the meeting and détente more broadly.22  This account, drawn from memoirs and diaries, 
reflects a longstanding divide in the Party leadership over the issue of détente that can be 
corroborated through other sources. For example, transcripts of the May 1972 Party Plenum 
reveal Brezhnev’s anxious desire to explain and gain support for détente from the broader 
Party apparatus at this event.23   
The second rift prevailed between the different bureaucracies in Moscow.  Russian 
and American historians and former top policymakers highlighted this divide at the 
Brezhnev-Carter Project conferences in the mid-1990s, when they met to discuss the collapse 
of détente.  Several prominent American “veterans,” including former National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued that détente entered a decline when the Soviet 
government pursued aggressive campaigns to spread communism in the Third World, 
particularly in Angola and Ethiopia.  Brzezinski and others emphasized that, at the time, they 
                                                
22 Zubok, Failed Empire, 217-22. 
23 The transcript of the Plenum can be found in Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), f. 
2, op. 3, d. 272. 
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felt that Soviet participation in these revolutionary conflicts undermined top-level talks to 
further improve superpower relations and to pursue a second SALT accord.  In response, 
Dobrynin and other Soviet officials countered that improving relations with the US always 
took priority over these African campaigns.  This argument failed to persuade Brzezinski, 
who asked why the Soviet government invested so much energy in their pursuit if it had such 
little importance.24  Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, who served as an assistant to 
Gromyko and as an officer at the Soviet Embassy during this period, accounted for this 
apparent contradiction through divisions in the bureaucracy.  When asked if Gromyko had 
been briefed on Soviet involvement in African conflicts, Bessmertnykh joked about the 
foreign minister’s ignorance of the topic.  One time, he noted, Gromyko and the deputy 
foreign minister for Africa were reading a cable that mentioned Lusaka, the capital of 
Zambia.  Neither Gromyko nor his own deputy knew where Lusaka was located, although the 
deputy suggested it might be in Africa.  Bessmertnykh laughed that this anecdote 
demonstrated Gromyko’s general lack of interest in African affairs.25  
In other words, whereas some branches of the foreign policy bureaucracy, such as the 
International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, focused their 
efforts on supporting revolutionary movements in the Third World, officials in the Foreign 
Ministry mostly concerned themselves with great power diplomacy, specifically with the US, 
Western Europe, China, India, and Japan.  Foreign Ministry officials never assigned as much 
significance to these African gambits as their colleagues in the International Department, and 
                                                
24 “SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust.”  Conference at Musgrove Plantation, Simons Island, GA, May 6-9, 
1994.  Transcripts available at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.   
25 “The Collapse of Détente: From the March 1977 Moscow Meetings to the December 1979 Invasion of 
Afghanistan.”  Conference in Pocantico Hills, NY, October 22-24, 1992.  Transcript available at the National 
Security Archive, Washington, D.C. 
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they never believed that supporting revolutionaries in Africa took precedence over relations 
with the US.  At the time, they did not comprehend the weight that Brzezinski and other 
American officials assigned to Soviet maneuvers in Africa, leading to surprise at the backlash 
they received from American officials.  As Dobrynin argued at the conference, there was an 
assumed harmony between the Foreign Ministry and the International Department only 
because the two institutions did not communicate with one another.  Since the Soviet 
bureaucracy lacked lateral clearances, meaning that Foreign Ministry and International 
Department officials at the same level did not read each other’s reports or forge a common 
policy, representatives in each bureaucracy frequently did not have a grasp on what decisions 
were being made in the other.  This meant that they could not anticipate or discuss how the 
initiatives of one bureaucracy would impact the other.26  Thus, officials in various Soviet 
bureaucracies had different understandings of their responsibilities, and this allowed different 
and sometimes contradictory conceptions of what détente entailed.  Similar divides existed 
between the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Culture, and other bureaucracies that 
had a role in negotiating détente with the US.  Stronger leadership at the top may have 
softened these differences, but the collective leadership model under Brezhnev gave latitude 
to key bureaucrats to shape their own policies, a standard that only increased as Brezhnev’s 
health steadily declined. 
The third rift in the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy came from within the various 
ministries themselves.  Former Soviet diplomat Victor Israelyan has examined this issue in 
the context of the Foreign Ministry.  First, he identifies a generational difference between the 
“Stalinists” and the “pragmatists.”  The Stalinists were the diplomats who came into the 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
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Foreign Ministry under Molotov during the 1930s and early 1940s.  Typically Party 
functionaries, they did not speak foreign languages and had not traveled abroad.  Israelyan 
describes this generation as  “diligent, obedient, persistent,” “fanatically devoted” to 
communist ideology, and firmly convinced that the Western capitalist regimes would soon 
fall to revolution.27  In contrast, Dobrynin represented a new generation of “pragmatists” who 
began to take many of the critical positions in the Foreign Ministry in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Generally well-educated with extensive experience working overseas, they retained their 
predecessors’ belief in communism, but doubted the Soviet Union’s ability to bring 
communism to advanced capitalist countries and gave priority to national security concerns 
over ideological struggles.  They also sought to create mutually beneficial relationships with 
capitalist countries, playing down the concept of revolutionary struggle with the US and 
Western Europe.28  By the Gorbachev period, the pragmatists themselves were displaced by a 
new generation, practitioners of the “new thinking.”29  The largely generational differences 
regarding the role of ideology in setting foreign policy and the proper approach to dealing 
with the capitalist world often set diplomats at odds when formulating foreign policy. 
                                                
27 Victor Israelyan, On the Battlefields of the Cold War: A Soviet Ambassador's Confession (University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 13. 
28 Ibid., 239-41. 
29 The fault lines between the pragmatists and the new thinkers remained after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
In his memoirs, Dobrynin wrote of Gorbachev’s foreign policy: “Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had no coherent, 
balanced, and firm foreign policy to end it in a fitting and dignified way on the basis of equality.  As the Cold 
War had begun to wind down in the second part of the 1980s, this balance of power with the West was widely 
recognized and could have created a base upon which to transform international relations into a new and 
nonconfrontational era.  With an inexplicable rush, they actually gave away vital geopolitical and military 
positions which we had, instead of using them to achieve a new era of stability and equal cooperation.”  
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 636.  Anatolii Cherniaev, a new thinker and one of Gorbachev’s top foreign policy 
advisors, defended Gorbachev’s policies at the Musgrove Conference in May 1998: “Now you have heard both 
the positions of the new thinking and the old thinking here.  It is precisely the position of old thinking to present 
national interests as contrary to universal human values.  If we had taken the position presented by Dobrynin, it 
would have meant prolonging the final stage of the Cold War for many more years.”  Svetlana Savranskaya, 
Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in 
Europe, 1989 (New York: Central European University Press,2010), 199-200. 
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Moreover, Israelyan notes several divisions within the pragmatist generation at the 
Foreign Ministry, indicating the diversity of opinions about foreign policy priorities in 
Moscow.  Embassy diplomats and their partners at the Foreign Ministry’s American 
Department, many of whom cut their teeth under Dobrynin in Washington, fit in the category 
of the “Americanists.”  These officials felt that, given its shared superpower status with the 
US, the Soviet government should always prioritize American relations when setting policy 
with other countries.  They often complained when operations in the developing world took 
place without sufficient consideration of how they would affect Soviet-American relations.  
A second category of pragmatists, the “disarmamentists” shared the Americanists’ 
prioritization of arms limitations in Soviet foreign policy, though Israelyan contends that they 
often had a “broader outlook on the world” than their Americanist colleagues. Still another 
group, the “Europeanists,” argued that the Foreign Ministry should focus its energies on 
wooing West European states.  They believed that the US would always remain the primary 
antagonist of the Soviet Union, so stronger ties with its Western European allies could 
weaken the NATO alliance.  An offshoot of the Europeanists, the “Germanists,” asserted that 
relations with the US and Western Europe, as well as arms limitations efforts, entirely 
depended on the Soviet Union’s ability to maintain its superpower status while settling the 
issue of a divided Germany.  Lastly, Israelyan recognizes the Foreign Ministry diplomats 
who emphasized maintaining relations with the socialist world and who lamented the fact 
that the Central Committee of the Communist Party handled foreign relations with socialist 
states rather than the Foreign Ministry.  While other blocs existed in the Foreign Ministry, 
Israelyan stresses these as the most important, each with its own proposal for winning the 
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Cold War.30  The real divides in the Foreign Ministry highlight the danger inherent in only 
studying the top Kremlin leadership and not the complex Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy.  
Divergent understandings of Soviet global priorities led diplomats to differing and sometimes 
contradictory suggestions for foreign policy initiatives. 
The fourth rift in the Soviet foreign policy apparatus took shape between the Moscow 
leadership and local Party leaders.  After Brezhnev explained the goals of the Moscow 
Summit at the May 1972 Party Plenum, and again following Nixon’s visit in May, city and 
oblast Party committees submitted reports on local reactions from Party officials.  Most 
reports contained overwhelming support for détente and the new steps to limit the arms race.  
One concluded that establishing a closer relationship with the US would be “the greatest 
victory of Soviet diplomacy,” and another praised “the titanic work” of Brezhnev.31  Many, 
however, demonstrated critical attitudes about negotiating with Nixon, particularly as the US 
pursued the Vietnam War.  One official emphasized that Nixon must be reminded that “the 
Soviet people will never give up their principles or their ideology.  They always will 
strengthen international friendship and brotherly cooperation with the people, and they will 
defend their interests to the end.”32  Another official stated that, while he whole-heartedly 
supported the policy of détente, “I don’t trust Nixon.  Having analyzed his long political 
journey, his political deviousness and demagoguery, I think that this is nothing more than 
cozying up to voters in an attempt to gain political support.  We need negotiations with 
Nixon and for peace, but we should be careful with him.”33  Granted, the divide between the 
                                                
30 Israelyan, On the Battlefields of the Cold War, 241-43. 
31 RGANI, f. 5, op. 64, d. 64, ll. 5-9; f. 5, op 64, d. 64, ll. 14-19. 
32 RGANI, f. 5, op. 64, d. 64, ll. 5-9. 
33 RGANI, f. 5, op. 64, d. 64, ll. 25-27.   
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Kremlin and local Party officials had the least impact of the rifts in the Soviet bureaucratic 
apparatus, as these leaders had no direct influence over foreign policy.  Yet Moscow 
remained conscious of the concerns of local leaders, and the Soviet press, led by Pravda, 
began a campaign to depict Nixon as a peacemaker and an ideal negotiating partner.34  
The divide between the Moscow leadership and embassy officials opened up the fifth 
major rift in the Soviet foreign policy apparatus.  Dobrynin led the Soviet Embassy in 
Washington, D.C., from 1962 to 1986.  Particularly during détente, Dobrynin served as the 
face of Soviet diplomacy, conducting the primary negotiations for superpower agreements 
and managing crises through talks with top American officials.  Dobrynin used his affable 
personality and close connections with Kremlin elites to develop an extensive network of 
American contacts.  In addition, he utilized his ties with prominent Americans in public 
affairs, culture, business, and the press to build closer Soviet-American relations, and he 
encouraged other diplomats at the embassy to do the same.  
Dobrynin’s primary tool for diplomatic negotiations was known as the backchannel.35 
Dobrynin himself defines the term as “the methods used by the White House and the Kremlin 
for the direct exchange of information and views, in strict confidence and outside the normal 
diplomatic channels that existed in the State Department and our Foreign Ministry.”  He 
insists that, while most Americans associate the confidential channel with the Dobrynin-
Kissinger discussions of the Nixon administration, the channel itself has a longer history in 
Soviet-American relations, existing in some form for most of his tenure as ambassador.36  
                                                
34 Michael V. Paulauskas, "A Personal Affair: Diplomatic Negotiations and the Portrayal of Detente in Pravda, 
1972-1975" (Master's Thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006). 
35 The term “backchannel” remains contested.  Other variants include “the Channel,” preferred by Kissinger, or 
“the confidential channel.” 
 
36 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 53. 
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Prior to Dobrynin’s time in Washington, the White House and the Kremlin occasionally 
utilized confidential channels, generally to solve specific problems prior to American 
recognition of the Soviet Union, when no official channels existed, or during World War II, 
when Roosevelt preferred to work around the State Department.37  During Dobrynin’s tenure 
at the embassy, however, backchannel diplomacy became a normalized process, as the Soviet 
ambassador met with top American officials on a regular basis to seek solutions to the 
problems that faced the superpowers, making it a unique institution that requires specific 
attention from historians.  Arguing in favor of the backchannel, Dobrynin states: “It provided 
the freedom of personal chemistry,” which he views as an essential component of diplomacy, 
“and made it possible to explore uncharted diplomatic territory, which was often precisely 
what was needed to break the stalemates that characterized the Cold War.”38   
Backchannel talks under Dobrynin took on a standard form agreed upon and nurtured 
by both him and his American negotiators.  In practice, the US president appointed one of his 
deputies, usually Robert Kennedy in the John F. Kennedy administration and Dean Rusk in 
the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, to take charge of negotiations over a particular issue.  
Dobrynin then met with the designated official periodically to share any statements from the 
Kremlin or the White House.  They gave preliminary responses to these memos and “thought 
out loud,” identifying points of conflict as well as possible avenues of compromise.  The 
secrecy of this step of the process was essential, as any leaks of proposed solutions could turn 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
37 Richard A. Moss, "Behind the Back Channel: Achieving Detente in US-Soviet Relations, 1969-1972" 
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Kimball, The Juggler, 31-37; Frank Costigliola, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start 
the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 121-27. 
 
38 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 53. 
  18 
the American public against the negotiating process, while decreasing the willingness of the 
injured party to offer compromises.  The meetings typically took place informally over lunch 
or drinks without an interpreter in order to encourage friendly relations and to facilitate the 
process of thinking out loud.  Following each meeting, the American negotiator forwarded a 
memo of the conversation to the president, while Dobrynin sent the Politburo his notes, 
composed by memory after the end of the conversation.39  The diplomats waited for further 
instructions from their home governments before meeting again to repeat the process.  Once 
the framework for a potential solution fell into place, the negotiations shifted to normal 
diplomatic channels to settle the final details.    
Despite Dobrynin’s diplomatic skills and connections in both Moscow and 
Washington, the Kremlin’s repeated unwillingness to fully disclose information to him 
hindered his effectiveness and his ability to negotiate détente.  This problem first came to 
light during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Kremlin chose not to inform Dobrynin of its 
plans in Cuba, leading Dobrynin to falsely assure American leaders of the defensive nature of 
                                                
39 Dobrynin’s decision not to take notes during meetings, writing his telegrams from memory after the end of 
the meeting, was quite controversial in Washington.  When interviewed for the Foreign Affairs Oral History 
Collection of the Association for Diplomat Studies and Training, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
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Dobrynin himself didn’t understand.”  Toon suggested that due to Dobrynin’s habit of not taking notes, 
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Relations: The Detente Years, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2007), 
xi. 
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Soviet weapons on the island.  For this error, he received criticism from American officials, 
who questioned how they could trust him to report accurately on the attitudes of Soviet 
leaders if Moscow did not inform him of events that could lead to such a dangerous turn in 
superpower relations.40  This lack of information on the Soviet Union’s activities, particularly 
in the developing world, continued to haunt Dobrynin, as he was not informed of Soviet 
actions in Angola or Ethiopia, and he received no advance warning of the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  As a result, the person who best understood the current 
moods and trends in American politics at times had no opportunity to advise the Kremlin 
leadership on how Soviet actions in the developing world would be received in Washington, 
and he could not soften the blow of these decisions by speaking in an earnest and informed 
matter about these topics to American leaders as they happened.  
This faultline between the Kremlin and the embassy affected other diplomatic efforts, 
including the SALT agreements, which Dobrynin negotiated as the Soviet representative in 
the backchannel.  Dobrynin and the Foreign Ministry received limited and often inaccurate 
data on the Soviet Union’s military weaponry and nuclear capabilities, as full intelligence 
was generally limited to the general secretary, the KGB, and a few top military and defense 
officials.  Therefore, Foreign Ministry officials relied mostly on American publications for 
statistics, while Dobrynin attempted to learn more about Soviet arms from American 
scientists and the diplomats with whom he negotiated.  During talks, Dobrynin never made 
the first proposal, since he had few reliable estimates of the actual numbers of Soviet 
                                                
40 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble:" Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-
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weapons.  Rather, he allowed American officials to present the initial proposals and then 
either agreed to their numbers or suggested revisions after further research.  Soviet diplomats 
even used American names and abbreviations for Soviet weaponry in their memos back to 
the Kremlin, since they did not know the Soviet designations.41  This information gap placed 
Soviet negotiators at a disadvantage, as they struggled to build agreements that effectively 
limited nuclear arms without crippling the Soviet Union’s ability to defend itself.  
The final rift in the Soviet foreign policy apparatus occurred within the embassy 
itself.  This reflects the broader divide between the various Soviet bureaucracies in Moscow, 
since embassy diplomats frequently represented several ministries and departments centered 
in the Kremlin.  Despite Dobrynin’s effective work to coordinate the approach and activities 
of embassy personnel, fissures remained that created a disparity between different diplomats’ 
conceptions of détente.  For example, in 1975, the Citizen Exchange Corps, a nonprofit NGO 
dedicated to building cultural exchanges between the US and the USSR, opened negotiations 
with the embassy’s cultural affairs division for an exchange program with bilingual 
educators.  The American delegation’s proposed visit to Moscow did not go as planned, 
however, after the Soviet government denied one American participant a visa in the so-called 
“Fishman Affair,” discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.  In this incident, poor 
communication between the cultural and consular divisions, as well as a disagreement over 
what sort of delegates were acceptable in an exchange program, stifled the program and 
generated bad press for the Soviet Union, the CEC, and the prospects for effective cultural 
exchange between the superpowers.   
                                                
41 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 193-94. Dobrynin regularly wrote the Kremlin for instructions on how to proceed 
with American proposals.  However, backchannel meetings frequently featured what Dobrynin and his 
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In sum, these rifts had a profound effect on international affairs, allowing multiple 
leaders and bureaucracies to influence the conduct of foreign policy both in Moscow and on 
the ground level.  Thus, while it is important to study the debates and initiatives of the 
Politburo, this dissertation argues for an expanded focus that encompasses the rest of the 
foreign policy apparatus to gain a more complete understanding of international affairs 
during the Brezhnev years.  Moreover, while the post-Cold War historiographical debate over 
whether Brezhnev and the Politburo acted primarily out of ideological or imperial concerns 
remains relevant, my research suggests the need to move toward a broader discussion of how 
this divide influenced different aspects of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus.  Indeed, given 
the different visions of détente held by the Foreign Ministry and the International 
Department, it seems that the divide between revolutionary and imperial tendencies 
transcends individuals and must be discussed along bureaucratic lines as well.   
This depiction of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus has direct bearing on other 
historiographical discussions in the field, including the recently reignited debate about the 
meaning of détente.  Previously, memoirists and scholars described the rise of détente as a 
consequence of new developments in the international arena, such as the increasing strategic 
parity among the superpowers and the Sino-Soviet split.42  Jeremi Suri counters that it was 
not merely a response to new conditions on the international stage, but also a conservative 
reaction to the international protest movement that emerged in the late 1960s.  In Suri’s 
estimation, “the promise of détente became a stick with which to beat domestic critics.”43  
Others, such as Zubok, have argued that, on the Soviet side, détente boiled down to 
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Brezhnev’s personal ambitions to become a peacemaker.44  This dissertation highlights the 
complex process by which the Soviet government negotiated détente, as various groups in the 
Soviet bureaucracy with influence over foreign affairs had different and sometimes 
contradictory ideas about how to approach superpower talks.  While the Soviet Embassy may 
have been staffed largely by diplomats who believed in the importance of improving Soviet-
American relations, it did not exist in a vacuum, contending with groups in Moscow that 
opposed détente or had other ideas about the Soviet Union’s priorities in global affairs.  
These differences ultimately undermined détente at the end of the 1970s.   
In examining the Soviet Embassy, I limit my research to one institution in the Soviet 
bureaucracy that directly faced the consequences of these rifts.  This choice in part reflects a 
practical consideration, given the largely classified nature of files from the International 
Department and the Foreign Ministry.  More importantly, the embassy provides an ideal case 
for studying this phenomenon because, while Foreign Ministry diplomats dominated its 
personnel, it received instructions from various bureaucracies, reflecting the diverse 
organizations that the embassy had to accommodate to fulfill its obligations.  
Notwithstanding Dobrynin’s central role in negotiations, the embassy’s distance from the 
Kremlin demonstrates the extent to which these rifts and the resultant difficulty in identifying 
a single grand strategy could wreak havoc on Soviet foreign policy initiatives.   
 
Sources  
This dissertation makes use of a diverse array of sources from Russian and American 
archives to chart the embassy’s activities during détente.  The State Archive of the Russian 
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Federation, fond (collection) R-9576, houses the records of the Union of Societies of 
Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (SSOD), the institution responsible for 
negotiating cultural exchanges with US authorities during détente.  These documents include 
communication between Moscow officials and embassy representatives and talks with 
American cultural agencies.  The files make it possible to ascertain the role that Soviet 
diplomats envisioned for increased cultural relations in the broader framework of détente 
while providing a lens onto how lower-level officials participated in negotiations.  Fond R-
9518, the records of the Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, liquidated in 
1967, provides additional background on the Soviet conduct of cultural relations before 
détente. 
Central Committee materials from 1970 through 1979 (fond 5, opisi (lists) 62-64, 66-
69, and 73-76), available at the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, show how 
Moscow elites envisioned détente, how they discussed it with lower-level officials at the 
embassy, and how these officials reported back on talks with American diplomats.  In 
particular, these files include closed discussions regarding preparations for Soviet-American 
summits, evaluations of the results of negotiations, and plans for improving the image of the 
USSR in the US through a massive propaganda and public relations campaign.  The 
collections pertaining to Party congresses and plenums (fondy 1 and 2) provide drafts of 
speeches by Soviet leaders concerning superpower relations, such as Brezhnev’s address at 
the May 1972 Party Plenum, where he first told Party members about the secretly negotiated 
SALT accords.  
State Planning Committee files (fond 4372) at the Russian State Archive of the 
Economy shed light on how diplomats conducted negotiations while establishing how 
economic relations fit into the broader conceptualizations of détente held by embassy 
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representatives and Moscow officials.  Records concerning trade deals negotiated through 
embassy officials and the collection of the Ministry of Trade (fond 465) offer memoranda of 
conversations between embassy representatives and American business officials as well as 
orders to the embassy regarding the expansion of trade with the US.  
Perhaps the most valuable potential collection of documents is held in the Archive 
of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, but Russian national security concerns have 
created strict access policies that limit the availability of such sources.  While most files on 
détente remain classified, I received limited access to fond 192, the records for the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington, including discussions between embassy diplomats and various 
Soviet officials about the advisability of working with various American private and state 
organizations, as well as plans for approaching potential new negotiating partners.  The fond 
also includes documents describing embassy negotiations with American cultural and 
economic organizations, reports of crimes committed against embassy personnel, travel plans 
for embassy officials, and other files detailing embassy activities and organization.  
This dissertation also draws upon American archival materials to fill in the blank 
spots of history created by Russian archives. In particular, the Henry A. Kissinger Telephone 
Conversation Transcripts and the Kissinger Papers at the National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland, and the National Security Archive include declassified discussions between 
Kissinger and Dobrynin.  These materials illuminate Dobrynin’s role in fostering détente and 
shed light on how the positions that officials on both sides took at the negotiating table 
affected the practice of détente.  At the National Security Archive, transcripts from the 
Brezhnev-Carter Project conferences, in which Dobrynin and other high-ranking embassy 
personnel participated, provide a valuable source for determining how key officials, in 
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hindsight, assessed their roles in negotiations.  The diaries of Anatoly Cherniaev, a member 
of the International Department during détente, help to decode the attitudes prevalent among 
Moscow elites who dictated the broad visions of détente.  In addition, the Dmitry 
Volkogonov Collection at the Library of Congress offers critical documents on the Brezhnev 
era, such as portions of the general secretary’s personal diaries and material pertaining to his 
foreign policy initiatives.  Further, the W. Averell Harriman Papers provide a unique 
perspective on negotiations as Harriman, an elder statesman in the Democratic Party, had 
close ties with Dobrynin.  The Library of Congress also contains the files of journalists like 
Henry Brandon, who conducted extensive interviews with American policymakers in the 
1970s, asking pertinent questions about the Soviet ambassador. 
Lastly, published document collections,45 works by Soviet authors on détente, and 
memoirs by Soviet and American diplomats offer valuable insights into the role of the 
embassy in negotiations.46  These sources are especially crucial in studying high diplomacy 
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and life at the embassy, as Russian materials on these topics remain mostly classified. 
American newspapers, Soviet newspapers Pravda and Literaturnaia gazeta, Soviet Embassy 
publications such as Soviet Life, and Dobrynin’s writings and speeches enhanced these 
sources. 
One of the consequences of the secrecy of the backchannel during the Nixon and Ford 
administrations is that only Dobrynin and Kissinger know all that happened in their 
discussions.  While many of their reports of these conversations have been declassified in 
recent years, both men had reasons for fashioning their version of events in a way that put 
them in the best possible light.  This means that reports often differ on who proposed a 
particular initiative, who raised a sensitive topic, or who won an argument.  In addition, both 
men wrote memoirs that address the backchannel negotiations.  Kissinger published three 
massive volumes of memoirs starting in 1979, which historians have criticized for their 
biased accounts.  One historian has described them as “perhaps the most determined effort 
ever” on the part of a state leader “to fix the image of their period.”47  Kissinger fashioned 
himself as the ultimate diplomat, rarely outwitted by his opponents, firmly in control of the 
backchannel, and ahead of the curve in most of his initiatives.  He composed the first two 
volumes of his memoirs in the years immediately following his time in office, and since he 
remained a prominent figure in the foreign policy elite, he consciously fought off criticism 
                                                                                                                                                  
2nd ed. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2008); Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, trans. Harold Shukman 
(New York: Doubleday, 1990); Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage 
against the West (New York: Basic Books, 2009); and G. M. Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina: svidetel'stvo ee 
uchastnika (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001). 
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Security Archive. 
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from the left that he was a warmonger and from the right that he was soft on communism. 
Writing after the collapse of the USSR and his departure from foreign policy circles, 
Dobrynin did not have to defend himself against these sorts of domestic critics, perhaps 
giving him less reason to distort his record than Kissinger.  Dobrynin’s memoirs, published 
in 1995 in Russia and the United States, represent a particularly valuable source because, in 
contrast to Kissinger, information on Dobrynin’s life remains limited.  Dobrynin frames his 
narrative of the second half of the Cold War partly as an eyewitness account of the inner 
workings of both Washington and Moscow.  Without ignoring the importance of strategic 
interests and conflicting ideologies, Dobrynin asserts that personalities played the pivotal role 
in shaping Soviet-American relations.  He makes ample use of anecdotes to explain how the 
strengths and weaknesses of leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain determined the 
direction of the superpower conflict.   
Yet Dobrynin’s memoirs remain a subjective source that must be handled with 
caution.  Like other former policymakers, Dobrynin aims to defend his role in superpower 
negotiations.  Consistent with his position as an “Americanist” in the Foreign Ministry, 
Dobrynin presents himself as a stalwart advocate for closer Soviet-American ties, unlike 
other actors on either side whom he blames for thwarting his efforts.  He downplays or 
ignores incidents in the documentary record that demonstrate his willingness to use force or 
the threat of force to strengthen the Soviet position on the world stage or press the American 
side for concessions in negotiations.  Moreover, the memoir reflects Dobrynin’s acute 
sensitivity regarding his position as the primary mouthpiece of the Soviet leadership in 
Soviet-American talks.  Like Kissinger, Dobrynin assigns himself a starring role in 
superpower diplomacy, while portraying other representatives of particular Soviet 
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constituencies as interlopers who have exaggerated their influence.  
 
Methodology 
 My methodology is informed by the “new diplomatic history,” an approach taken by 
recent scholars to revitalize the discipline of international relations.  Writing in the context of 
American history, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman explains that this methodology refers to studies 
with “global themes,” meaning multinational, multi-archival research that discusses how 
events in one country affect policy decisions in another.  This could suggest transnational 
history, or studying nongovernmental organizations whose membership transcends national 
boundaries.  Hoffman also writes that some new diplomatic historians expand the scope of 
research beyond security concerns to examine “domestic themes” in political, economic, and 
cultural institutions.  This often entails using the methods of social and cultural history to 
explain how elite understandings of race, gender, and national identity affect the construction 
of foreign policy.48   
 My research builds on the recent work by new diplomatic historians to revive 
personal diplomacy as a field of interest among scholars.  The most notable example of this 
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trend is Frank Costigliola’s work on the personal relationships of Joseph Stalin, President 
Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  Costigliola argues for the 
importance of “tracing the political consequences of the relationships, personalities, 
emotional lives, emotional dispositions, sensibilities, and cultural assumptions” of these 
leaders, emphasizing “emotional belief,” or the leap in logic from what one knows to what 
one wants to believe.  This, he contends, represents a challenge to Western conceptions of 
realism in foreign affairs, since “realistic” policies are always filtered through flawed human 
beings with cultural ideas formed in a specific context that shape their assumptions and 
policies.49   
 I acknowledge these lessons in examining personal diplomacy during détente, 
especially with regard to the figure of Dobrynin, whose personality and life experiences 
played a key role in determining the embassy’s approach to détente.  I show how Dobrynin 
and other Soviet diplomats at the embassy brought cultural assumptions about the US and 
their American partners to the negotiating table, and how they used these conceptions to 
formulate policy and explain their viewpoints in a language that they felt would resonate with 
their American counterparts.  Thus I analyze the tropes employed by Dobrynin and other 
diplomats to explore how this culturally constructed understanding affected talks and 
changed over time as they became more familiar with American politics and society.  
Similarly, I scrutinize the language used in internal memos about negotiations to see how 
embassy diplomats attempted to gain approval for their policy recommendations by framing 
reports in a way that would appeal to the Kremlin.  Finally, I pay attention to the language 
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employed by diplomats to see how they communicated visions of détente to the Soviet and 
American publics.   
 I follow Library of Congress standards for transliteration.  In instances that a different 
spelling is common practice in English, however, I follow the established standards.  For 
instance, I use “Moscow” instead of “Moskva,” and “Anatoly Dobrynin” instead of “Anatolii 
Dobrynin.” 
  
Overview of Chapters 
 Moscow on the Potomac comprises seven chapters and covers the period from 1969 
to 1979.  An analytical biography of Dobrynin, chapter 1 explores his education, the 
development of his understanding of American politics and culture, and his diplomatic career 
from the end of World War II through his first seven years as ambassador, ending in 1969.  It 
also describes the “Dobrynin school” of diplomacy, or the unique environment that he 
created in Washington for Soviet diplomats, explaining why both the ambassador and the 
institution proved effective in conducting diplomacy with the US. 
 The next four chapters focus on the activities of Dobrynin in negotiations with top 
American officials.  Chapter 2 introduces the backchannel between Dobrynin and American 
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, depicting its origins, the 
surprising optimism that characterized President Richard Nixon’s first few months in office, 
and the cycle of stagnation and attempts to reboot the backchannel that occurred in 1970 and 
the first part of 1971.  Chapter 3 tackles the increasing success of the backchannel from 
spring 1971 to spring 1972, and, like the previous chapter, charts the challenges posed by the 
Soviet and American bureaucracies and by conflicts in the developing world.  Chapter 4 
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shifts gears to discuss personal diplomacy, with specific emphasis on the ways that Kissinger 
and Dobrynin crafted a friendship that then worked as leverage in backchannel talks.  
Chapter 5 covers the decline of détente, arguing that the various crises in American and 
Soviet domestic politics, bilateral relations, and the developing world all placed the embassy 
on the sidelines, preventing it from pursuing potential breakthroughs in superpower talks or 
ameliorating crises. 
 The final two chapters represent a case study in how lower-level diplomats at the 
embassy implemented détente and promoted improved Soviet-American relations, with 
special focus on the embassy’s Cultural Department.  Chapter 6 investigates embassy 
diplomats’ work with the American Department of SSOD to expand relations with 
mainstream cultural organizations.  Chapter 7 describes the embassy’s uncomfortable 
relationship with Soviet-American friendship organizations.  Both of these chapters highlight 
the embassy’s attempt to construct an image of the USSR as a dependable great power with 
whom the US should develop friendlier ties.
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
“THE BEAR THAT WALKS LIKE AN AMERICAN”: 
SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN  
AND THE DOBRYNIN SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY 
 
On April 6, 2010, Dobrynin died at the age of ninety.  Eulogists from around the 
world praised the man who had played a critical role in Cold War superpower relations as 
Soviet ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986.  Robert D. McFadden of The New 
York Times wrote, “To a generation of Washington officials in a perilous nuclear age, Mr. 
Dobrynin was the pre-eminent channel for Soviet-American relations: a tough, nuanced, 
charming ambassador who was, as admirers and detractors put it, no more duplicitous than he 
had to be.”50  Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev telegrammed Dobrynin’s family that the 
ambassador was “a talented and intelligent person, a top professional and a legend of Russian 
diplomacy.”51  Describing Dobrynin as “a great statesman and a brilliant diplomat,” Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin proclaimed that Dobrynin’s tenure at the embassy came 
during “one of the most difficult and dramatic periods in relations with the US” and that 
“Dobrynin’s diplomatic prowess and political vision often helped to find a way out of crisis 
situations, to solve enormous global challenges at the negotiating table.”52 
In their own tributes, the diplomats and politicians who worked with Dobrynin 
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offered even more adulatory assessments.  Former First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii 
Adamishin told the newspaper Kommersant” that Dobrynin was a “giant of Soviet 
diplomacy” who “literally oozed kindness” when sharing lessons with the younger 
generation of diplomats.53  American diplomat Henry Kissinger highlighted the former 
Soviet ambassador’s commitment “to the pursuit of peace, to the reduction of tensions, and to 
the advancement toward a more peaceful world.”  Kissinger acknowledged that “at first he 
was my professional partner,” but then “gradually he became my personal friend.”54  Iurii 
Subbotin, who served at the embassy during Dobrynin’s tenure, provided the most effusive 
praise, dubbing Dobrynin “a diplomat from God, an intellectual, a genuine Russian genius, 
and a good person.”  Subbotin concluded that, while the title of the 1967 Soviet film 
Ambassador of the Soviet Union refers to Alexandra Kollontai, the phrase, in his mind, 
should be associated only with Dobrynin.55 
Acclaim for Dobrynin’s diplomatic skills and personal attributes extend beyond the 
memoriam published after his death.  In his memoirs, Kissinger writes, “Subtle and 
disciplined, warm in his demeanor while wary in his conduct, Dobrynin moved through the 
upper echelons of Washington with consummate skill.”56  Zbigniew Brzezinski, national 
security advisor during the Carter administration, who frequently played chess with Dobrynin 
during breaks in talks, describes the Soviet ambassador as “an amiable bear,” yet one “who 
could all of a sudden turn quite nasty,” if provoked.  Brzezinski refers to Dobrynin as a 
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“skilled and sophisticated debater,” pointing out his ability to use charm or aggression to 
further the Soviet position in negotiations.57  Following his retirement, First Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev mentioned the Soviet ambassador twice during an interrogation by the Party 
Control Commission about the publication of his memoirs abroad, characterizing Dobrynin 
as the Soviet Union’s “most intelligent ambassador abroad.”58   
Despite the near-universal praise heaped on him by Russian and American reporters, 
diplomats, and political leaders, Dobrynin has received relatively little treatment in the 
historical literature on Soviet-American relations in the second half of the Cold War.  Most 
authors have focused on the American side of détente, privileging Kissinger’s role in so-
called backchannel negotiations between Kissinger and Dobrynin.  Such authors frequently 
cite Dobrynin’s memoirs to discuss the Soviet perspective, but give insufficient attention to 
his critical position in determining the outcome of talks.59  Those works that do concentrate 
on the Soviet side of the story downplay the role of the embassy by focusing on the 
formulation of policy in the Kremlin rather than on policy implementation on the ground 
level, where Dobrynin added nuances to policy and raised important issues with American 
leaders while “talking out loud” to seek solutions to the challenges facing the backchannel.60   
This chapter aims to restore Dobrynin’s place as a central figure in the conduct of 
superpower relations.  It looks into his past to assess how he gained his unique perspectives 
on the United States and superpower relations, and explores the qualities that allowed him to 
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  35 
become a successful diplomat, Soviet bureaucrat, and arbiter for détente, themes that 
persisted through his negotiations with Kissinger.  Moreover, it suggests that Dobrynin 
helped foster a specific atmosphere in the embassy that shaped the ideas and approaches of 
hundreds of Soviet diplomats in this period, persuading them of the value in seeking closer 
ties with the US.  As files on Dobrynin remain largely classified in Russian archives, this 
chapter relies on published document collections, memoirs, American archival records, and 
Russian materials when available. 
 
Anatoly Fedorovich Changes Professions 
Information on Dobrynin’s youth remains limited, making his memoirs a critically 
important source.  Dobrynin constructs his early career as a typical example of the 
remarkable social mobility characteristic of the Stalin era, while distancing himself from the 
most negative aspects of that period.  For example, despite the fact that his coming of age 
coincided with both the Great Purges and the height of the gulag, Dobrynin has little to say 
about the repressive aspects of Stalinism.  As such, Dobrynin is careful to situate himself as 
more than just the product of his historical context.  While it is reasonable to assume that no 
man, even one as maneuverable as Dobrynin, could have managed to stay above ideology in 
the Stalin era, Dobrynin presents himself as the ultimate pragmatist in foreign policy, 
downplaying ideology in favor of practice concerns.61  Thus Dobrynin’s ultimate goal is to 
portray himself as both the model new Soviet diplomat and the prototypical new Soviet man.  
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Dobrynin’s narrative of his childhood and early career suggests that, while he took a 
path to the diplomatic service that may seem unconventional to Western eyes, he gained 
experience that proved vital to his work as an ambassador.  He was born on November 16, 
1919, to a family of modest means in the village of Krasnaia Gorka during the Russian Civil 
War.  His father worked as a plumber, and his mother split her time between the home and 
her part-time job as an usher at the Malyi Theater in Moscow, allowing Dobrynin cheap 
access to theatrical productions in the Soviet capital.  Dobrynin excelled in academics, 
winning second prize at the Moscow Olympiad for mathematics.  Although admitted to 
prestigious Moscow State University in 1937, he followed his father’s advice to complete his 
undergraduate studies at the Moscow Aviation Institute before taking work as a designer at 
Experimental Aircraft Plant No. 115, headed by famous aircraft designer Aleksandr Iakovlev.  
Dobrynin’s position as a manager in a critical military industry during World War II reflects 
his rapid professional ascent in his chosen field.  In the summer of 1944, the Communist 
Party Central Committee summoned him to its headquarters, where an official in the 
personnel department informed him that he would be sent to study at the Higher Diplomatic 
School.62  Dobrynin, reluctant to give up his promising career as an aircraft designer, initially 
refused, only to be told by the official that he should regard the assignment as a wartime 
order that had to be fulfilled unconditionally, as “it is wartime and the party knows better 
where and how to use its people.” 63 
Dobrynin and his 150 fellow graduates, the largest class in the Higher Diplomatic 
School’s history, thus became part of the so-called “Stalin Enrollment.”  Having eliminated 
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much of the previous generation of diplomats in the prewar purges, Stalin hoped to avoid a 
return to older, bourgeois approaches to diplomacy by appointing engineers who had no 
previous diplomatic experience.  These new Soviet diplomats also would have complete 
allegiance to Stalin, as they received their new positions thanks to his regime.64  Dobrynin 
recounts a telling anecdote from after his appointment as Soviet ambassador to the US, when 
he questioned Viacheslav Molotov, foreign minister from 1939 to 1949 and 1953 to 1956, 
about his recruitment.  Molotov recalled that, during a 1944 Politburo meeting, Stalin 
instructed him to oversee the expansion of the diplomatic corps, as the approaching end of 
the war would result in the establishment of new diplomatic relationships and the expansion 
of older diplomatic ties.  Molotov asked where he would find potential students who had 
already acquired the requisite training in liberal arts and foreign languages.  Stalin instructed 
Molotov not to worry about these skills, which could be taught later, but instead to look for 
engineers at defense plants who got along well with the workers.  Dobrynin states, “Stalin 
reasoned that if a young engineer managed to handle the difficult day-to-day problems and 
conflicts that were inevitable in those hard times, and the workers still respected him, he was 
a real diplomat, or at least had the necessary abilities to become one.”65 
While it may not have been the primary reason for his promotion, Dobrynin’s 
background as an engineer did ultimately gave him an advantage in strategic arms limitations 
negotiations during détente.  Dobrynin protégé and former Foreign Minister Aleksandr 
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Bessmertnykh notes the rarity of having a diplomat who knew the definitions of such 
terminology as “multiple reentry vehicles” and “phased array radars.”  He concludes: “I do 
not think that anyone but Dobrynin could have been able to conduct those talks so 
effectively.  His aviation engineering background was a great asset” in decoding the precise 
meaning of these new technologies to the arms race.66  Indeed, Dobrynin later joked that, 
while they had to explain to Gromyko how missiles could fly without a propeller, Dobrynin 
could rely on his technical education and remaining connections at the Iakovlev firm to better 
understand weapons technology.67  Such training had real value given the dearth of 
information on military technology that Dobrynin received from military circles.  
After graduating from the Higher Diplomatic School in 1947 with a dissertation on 
American policy in the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War, Dobrynin held a series of 
jobs in Moscow while he waited for an opportunity to serve abroad, the ultimate goal of any 
ambitious young, Soviet diplomat.68  As an assistant professor at the Institute of International 
Relations and then as the assistant chief of the Educational Department of the Foreign 
Ministry, he gave lectures on US foreign policy.  His professional hopes seemed in danger 
when, in 1947, he refused an offer from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei 
Vyshinsky to become the head of the Educational Department.  Dobrynin recalls his fear this 
would lead him into a dead-end job doing work that he loathed, pushing papers, writing 
instruction manuals, and laboring outside the realm of practical diplomacy.  Vyshinsky, 
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circumstances of the publication of Dobrynin’s dissertation, see Dobrynin, In Confidence, 19. 
  39 
likely indignant that Dobrynin had turned down a position equal in rank to a general, sent 
him back to his job as a rank-and-file clerk with little hope for future promotion to an 
assignment outside the country.  
As luck would have it, only a few months later, a way out of this predicament 
presented itself when Valerian Zorin returned from his post as ambassador to Czechoslovakia 
to take a job as deputy foreign minister.  Zorin needed diplomats to serve in his secretariat, 
and Dobrynin’s department head, an old friend of Zorin, used his influence to get Dobrynin 
an appointment as one of Zorin’s assistants.  From this modest start, Dobrynin rose through 
the ranks over five years, moving from second secretary to first assistant.  As Dobrynin 
remembers this period in his career, it provided him with an opportunity to study the business 
of policy formation in the Kremlin, to learn to examine materials carefully, to provide 
analysis to superiors, and to implement his superior’s suggestions made by superiors when 
their recommendations were returned.  After years of working together, Zorin grew to trust 
Dobrynin, and when Dobrynin requested transfer to an embassy in 1952, Zorin helped him 
acquire a post in Washington.69 
Dobrynin arrived at the embassy in 1952 as its fourth most senior diplomat, and he 
left in 1954 as minister-counselor, the top post after the ambassador, when he was only 
thirty-four years old.  Although Ambassador Georgii Zarubin initially assigned him to cover 
American domestic politics and economics, Dobrynin quickly demonstrated proficiency in 
dealing with matters of grand strategy and high diplomacy.  In accounting for his meteoric 
rise, Dobrynin credits his ability to anticipate instructions from Moscow.  Whereas the other 
members of the senior diplomatic staff at the embassy often submitted recommendations that 
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met with negative responses, Dobrynin contends that his experience working under Zorin had 
given him the instincts necessary to anticipate Moscow’s desires and to supply it with the 
requisite information or recommendations.   
Dobrynin’s subsequent few years were spent in various positions of responsibility 
under Foreign Minister Molotov.  During Molotov’s visit to the United States in 1955, 
Dobrynin served as his primary advisor and translator.  Shortly thereafter, he returned with 
Molotov to Moscow to serve as his assistant.  There, Dobrynin witnessed Molotov’s fall from 
power, as well as the rise and fall of Molotov’s replacement, Dmitrii Shepilov, before Andrei 
Gromyko eventually assumed the position of foreign minister in 1957.  Perhaps eager to 
distance himself from the revolving leadership at the Foreign Ministry, Dobrynin 
successfully petitioned for a return to a diplomatic job in the field.  With Gromyko’s 
recommendation to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, Dobrynin assumed the 
position of undersecretary general for special political affairs at the UN.70   
The two years that Dobrynin occupied this position proved essential for his future 
career, as he adopted what I call the “chameleon” approach to diplomacy, immersing himself 
in American society and taking up American cultural practices to better understand popular 
opinion and the motivations of political leaders.  First, Dobrynin improved his fluency in 
English to the point where he edited all of his UN documents in English.  Second, living on 
Manhattan’s Upper West Side, outside of the Soviet UN Mission, gave him greater freedom 
to develop close friendships with influential Americans in a variety of fields, who later 
formed the basis of the complex social network that he relied upon as ambassador.  By the 
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end of his tenure at the UN, Dobrynin felt comfortable enough in American society to spend 
his remaining dollars taking his wife Irina on a two-week vacation road trip from San 
Francisco to Los Angeles to San Diego.  Weather interfered with their return flight, and they 
concluded the trip with a three-day bus ride from Phoenix to New York.71  Few Soviet 
citizens in the late 1950s had a chance to immerse themselves in American culture unfettered 
by official oversight, and Dobrynin made the most of this rare opportunity. 
When he returned to Moscow in 1960 to serve as chief of the American Department 
at the Foreign Ministry, Dobrynin cultivated ties with top Soviet officials that ultimately led 
to his appointment as ambassador.  In regard to his key role in negotiations at the 1960 Paris 
Summit and the 1961 Vienna Summit, Dobrynin again credits his ability to predict leaders’ 
reactions, only now he demonstrated this skill in regard to American responses to Soviet 
proposals.  This talent enhanced his reputation at the highest levels of the Soviet bureaucracy 
as an expert on the United States.  Dobrynin recalls that, at Politburo meetings on foreign 
policy issues, Khrushchev often pontificated about new approaches to Soviet-American 
relations, presenting ideas that “ranged from the genuinely interesting to the impractical and 
bizarre.”  When Khrushchev asked Dobrynin how he felt about a given proposal as chief of 
the American Department, Dobrynin frequently had to do his best to talk Khrushchev out of 
hare-brained schemes in the most diplomatic manner possible.  Dobrynin implies that this 
careful dynamic with Khrushchev paid dividends: in January 1962, the Politburo approved 
Dobrynin’s candidacy to replace Mikhail Men’shikov as Soviet ambassador to the United 
States.  At the age of forty-two, without any previous experience as an ambassador, Dobrynin 
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accepted the top position in the Soviet diplomatic corps.72   
 
Mr. Dobrynin Goes to Washington 
The announcement of Dobrynin’s appointment met with glowing reviews from both 
American officials and the American press.  Newsweek quoted a veteran Washington official 
saying, “No Soviet official has ever been held in higher regard by his Western colleagues.”73 
Referencing Dobrynin’s days at the UN, Joseph Wershba of the New York Post claimed, “He 
is nobody’s bootlicker—but he has a respect for the proprieties.”74  President John F. 
Kennedy apparently agreed with these reviews, as he wrote in a June 1962 letter to General 
Secretary Khrushchev that Dobrynin had “already made a place for himself here in 
Washington as an intelligent and friendly representative” of the USSR.75  Even 
commentators skeptical of Dobrynin’s potential effect on policy found positive things to say 
about the new ambassador.  One official, cited in a Newsweek article suggestively entitled, 
“The Bear that Walks Like an American,” expressed skepticism that Dobrynin’s appointment 
would herald a new era of superpower diplomacy before remarking, “Yet it must be admitted 
that if the Russians really wanted a modest thaw, they would probably find Dobrynin a more 
effective agent than anyone else.”76  
These reports tended to accentuate the positive impact that Dobrynin’s 
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“Americanness” would have on superpower relations.  Referring to Dobrynin’s nickname in 
Soviet circles as “the Amerikanets”—or “the American”—Newsweek quoted an American 
diplomat who argued that, thanks to Dobrynin’s earlier years in the United States, “he could 
pass for any American in any crowd on Fifth Avenue at lunchtime.”77  Another official in the 
New York Post similarly emphasized, “If he didn’t break out into Russian, you’d think you’d 
been talking to an American.”  Paraphrasing a famous quote by Stalin, the author of the 
article characterized Dobrynin as “a throbbing example of Russian revolutionary content—
but also of American efficiency in style.”78  The Associated Press described Dobrynin in 
larger-than-life terms, writing that the ambassador “is a big, hearty, energetic, outgoing man 
well over 6 feet tall, with a booming voice, a bone-crushing handshake and a quick sense of 
humor.  He speaks good French and good English and his accent has been described as 
American.”79  
Several observers compared Dobrynin with his predecessors, emphasizing the 
generational shift that Dobrynin’s appointment represented and its potential to alter future 
superpower relations.  In his cable to Kennedy on Dobrynin’s appointment, American 
Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson declared that Dobrynin embodied a new 
generation of Soviet leaders and that “you can get on the same wavelength as him.”80 One 
American official quoted by Newsweek hinted at this: “He has a keen sense of humor and 
intellectual honesty.  He even engages in small talk, and I have never known another Russian 
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who does.”81  The New York Post’s Joseph Wershba predicted that Dobrynin would show 
Americans whether the “long-awaited ‘new’ generation” of Soviet officials would be 
different from the old.  He elaborated: “All sources agree that he is an altogether engaging 
character.  He is 6-foot-1, speaks English fluently, has a lively, witty style and is an authentic 
personality in his own right in a way that Menshikov could never bring off, despite his 
attempts to be ‘Smiling Mike.’”  Wershba further speculated that Dobrynin’s appointment 
signaled Khrushchev’s desire for somebody at the embassy who was “thoroughly 
knowledgeable about U.S. affairs, who will tell him the truth about American attitudes 
towards the Soviet Union, and who will be capable of carrying through meaningful 
diplomatic conferences with Secretary of State Rusk and President Kennedy.”  He concludes, 
“Most Americans—and many Russians, too—feel that Menshikov never really fulfilled these 
requirements.”82  In his memoirs, Secretary of State Dean Rusk seems to endorse this 
assumption, writing, “When John Kennedy took office, the Soviets guessed that an 
ambassador with Dobrynin’s temperament and personal style would be more effective than 
his predecessor, Mikhail “Smiling Mike” Menshikov, a cold warrior of the old school.”83  
Prominent American diplomat Chip Bohlen summarized Americans’ assessment of 
Dobrynin with three words: “Dobrynin is different.”84  Those who commented on Dobrynin’s 
appointment saw the potential for these differences to play a decisive role in redefining the 
relationship between the superpowers.  The suggestion that Dobrynin was “one of us” no 
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doubt also reflected wishful thinking on the part of those who desired an improvement in 
superpower relations.  By branding Dobrynin as more “American” than other Soviet 
diplomats, these authors maintained that Dobrynin understood American intentions and thus 
could accurately interpret and convey American attitudes and policy approaches to Moscow.  
Moreover, commentators saw great potential in Dobrynin’s relative youth to bring about a 
sea change in Soviet policy that would lead to a less volatile Cold War.   
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis 
As it turned out, Dobrynin barely had time to settle into the position before he faced a 
major test of whether all this Soviet and American confidence in him was justified.  The 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the thirteen-day period in October 1962 when the superpowers stood at 
the brink of nuclear warfare, occurred only seven months into Dobrynin’s tenure.  On the one 
hand, the standoff laid bare the inherent weaknesses in Dobrynin’s position and impeded his 
attempts to negotiate with American authorities.  On the other hand, it gave Dobrynin an 
opportunity to practice the secret backchannel diplomacy that eventually defined his tenure at 
the embassy and propelled him to success.  Since “the Caribbean Crisis,” as it was known in 
the Soviet Union, has been covered in depth by many historians, this section will focus solely 
on Dobrynin’s role in the crisis as a case study of his early diplomatic work as ambassador.85 
The decision by Khrushchev and other top-ranking officials not to keep Dobrynin in 
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the loop on the dramatic policy changes that led to the crisis left Dobrynin in the awkward 
position of having to respond to events without complete information.  Although Dobrynin 
had close connections with Politburo members, including Khrushchev, he had no advance 
knowledge of the plan to send missiles to Cuba.  Unaware of this development, Dobrynin 
unknowingly misled American leaders during private meetings about Soviet actions in Cuba.  
As he wrote in his memoirs, “In seeking to keep the secret, Moscow . . . virtually made its 
ambassador an involuntary tool for deceit, for I kept stubbornly telling the Americans that we 
had nothing but defensive weapons in Cuba,” in line with with instructions from the Foreign 
Ministry.86  For example, on September 4, Dobrynin assured Robert Kennedy that the Soviet 
Union intended to send only defensive weaponry to Cuba, citing the Soviet leadership’s 
commitment to the nontransfer and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.87  Furthermore, on 
October 18, prior to meeting with President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met with Dobrynin to review information on American 
attitudes regarding Cuba.  Unaware that Gromyko wanted to gauge how American leaders 
might react to Soviet missiles in Cuba, Dobrynin assured Gromyko that President Kennedy 
had abandoned designs on invading Cuba, fearing Soviet reprisal elsewhere in the world.  
Gromyko, convinced that Kennedy would not commit any aggressive acts in Cuba, conveyed 
these reassuring messages back to Moscow.88   
In fact, Dobrynin learned of the Soviet missile installations in Cuba from American 
sources.  Prior to the evening of October 22, he received an advance copy of President 
Kennedy’s speech on national television demanding that the Soviet government halt 
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construction of the missile sites and announcing his determination to quarantine Cuba to 
prevent the delivery of offensive weapons.  With no instructions from his government on 
how to proceed, Dobrynin was left “severely confused,” and after forwarding the address to 
the Kremlin, he began security preparations at the embassy.89  KGB Station Chief Aleksandr 
Feklisov checked his office’s emergency electrical generator in case the American 
government cut off the power to the embassy, and secured the KGB’s private oxygen supply.  
Dobrynin met with Feklisov to coordinate security for the embassy, its staff, and Soviet 
citizens traveling in the United States, including tours from the Leningrad Symphony 
Orchestra and the Bolshoi Ballet.  He instructed embassy diplomats to stay home and to 
avoid social activities such as shopping or going to the movies.90   
While still struggling to make sense of the developing situation, Dobrynin worked to 
maintain communication with American leaders, who proceeded to unload their frustrations 
on Dobrynin as the chief representative of Soviet power in Washington.  Late at night on 
October 23, Robert Kennedy arrived at the Soviet Embassy, unleashing an emotional tirade 
that, as Dobrynin described it, “abounded in repetition and digression.”  Kennedy 
complained that both Dobrynin and Khrushchev had falsely assured the president that only 
defensive weapons would be stationed in Cuba.  The attorney general disparaged the still 
fledgling private channel with Dobrynin: “Why on earth should we turn to a confidential 
channel, if . . . even the ambassador, who we believe enjoys the full confidence of his own 
government, does not know that there are already long-range missiles on Cuba that could 
strike the United States?”  Dobrynin found himself navigating between Scylla and Charybdis, 
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forced to either endorse accusations that he had lied to the Americans or admit that his own 
leader had kept him in the dark about major policy initiatives.  Ultimately, Dobrynin chose 
the latter course, telling Kennedy that he received all of the information that the Kremlin 
wished to provide him.  While this did not fully satisfy Kennedy, historians Timothy Naftali 
and Aleksandr Fursenko conclude that this did convince him that Dobrynin had no advance 
knowledge of the missile bases, and, therefore, did not intentionally mislead them.91  
Dobrynin confirms this in his memoirs: “He was right, and I had not much to say to him in 
reply except to confirm that I had no real information from my government.  The 
conversation was tense and rather embarrassing to me.”92 The Cuban Missile Crisis had 
exposed Dobrynin’s weak spot to his American negotiating partners, a position that persisted 
throughout his tenure at the embassy despite his close ties to Politburo members.  This barrier 
between Moscow and Washington haunted Dobrynin, particularly in regard to Soviet policy 
in the Third World later in the détente era, when wars erupted in Angola and Afghanistan. 
Perhaps remarkably given this fact, Dobrynin nonetheless managed to play a key role 
in the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Robert Kennedy may have grumbled about the 
backchannel, but he still chose to rely heavily on it in order to communicate with the 
Kremlin.  Kennedy and Dobrynin spoke with one another on an almost daily basis in the 
early morning hours to assure secrecy. 93  Their most important meeting came on October 27 
after the downing of a U-2 spy plane and reports of Cuban antiaircraft fire on American 
reconnaissance planes seemed to escalate the situation.  In response, President Kennedy sent 
Robert Kennedy to meet with Dobrynin to solve the crisis.  When the attorney general 
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suggested that the Soviet government withdraw its missiles from Cuba in exchange for an 
American commitment not to invade Cuba, Dobrynin inquired about previous indications 
that the US might withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of a deal.  As instructed by 
the president, Robert Kennedy conceded the missiles on the condition that it remain a secret 
in order to placate America’s NATO allies.  The two composed a proposal for settlement 
through a backchannel, and eventually, both parties accepted the compromise, ending the 
crisis.94   
The Cuban Missile Crisis had a second positive outcome for Dobrynin in that it 
secured his victory in a power struggle for the exclusive role of Soviet envoy to the various 
backchannels that would develop in the coming years.  Prior to the events of October 1962, 
multiple Soviet officials stationed in the United States had jockeyed for this position.  In 
particular, in the time between Men’shikov’s return to the USSR in January 1962 and 
Dobrynin’s arrival in Washington in March, Soviet military intelligence officer Georgii 
Bol’shakov had maintained a confidential channel with Robert Kennedy.95  Once Dobrynin 
established himself at the embassy, his channels competed with those of Bol’shakov, with 
both he and Bol’shakov reporting separately on their meetings with top Kennedy 
administration officials.  Before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev already wrote to 
President Kennedy emphasizing his “complete trust” in Dobrynin in an attempt to undermine 
the unorthodox Bol’shakov backchannel of the attorney general and the intelligence officer in 
favor of regular diplomatic channels.96  The personal rapport between Kennedy and 
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Bol’shakov, however, made it difficult to shut down this channel, leaving Dobrynin in a 
precarious situation as ambassador, since Bol’shakov, a “gregarious man,” served as a 
“competitor for Robert Kennedy’s attention.”97  Only as a result of the crisis did Dobrynin—
who provided a direct and official line to the Politburo—became the sole contact.  Pushed 
aside, Bol’shakov became expendable.  President Kennedy allowed his name to be published 
in connection with the duplicitous information fed to the US through backchannels, leading 
to the Kremlin’s decision to recall Bol’shakov in 1962.  Thus, while Dobrynin weathered the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Bol’shakov became a victim of bureaucratic exile.98  
For Dobrynin himself, the critical role played by his backchannel with Robert 
Kennedy in resolving the crisis confirmed for him the usefulness of a confidential channel 
between the White House and the Kremlin.  He writes in his memoirs that he “can not tell 
how the Cuban crisis would have ended if these contacts had not been there,” implying the 
potential for nuclear war, the worst of possible outcomes.  Further, the crisis “provided 
guidelines for my future diplomatic activity which I followed for the remainder of my 
quarter-century as an ambassador.”  He continues: “I tried to be an active participant in the 
constantly functioning confidential channel at the highest level, in order to ensure 
possibilities for a candid if not always pleasant dialogue between the leaders of both 
countries.  I venture to think that at times this appeared to be the only way of preventing the 
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Cold War from turning into a hot one.”99  In other words, he made the constant maintenance 
of a confidential channel between the American and Soviet leaderships his top priority as 
ambassador, seeing this communication as necessary to prevent a disagreement from 
escalating into a nuclear war. 
Overall, the Cuban Missile Crisis made clear both the strengths and weaknesses of 
Dobrynin’s position as ambassador.  On the one hand, his lack of information led him to 
inadvertently lie to President Kennedy and his advisors, raising doubts as to whether they 
should trust the veracity of his promises.  The incident also profoundly affected his approach 
to dealing with his own government; he would no longer parrot official lines from Moscow 
without investigating them more carefully.  “This deliberate use of an ambassador by his own 
government to mislead an American administration,” he later wrote, “remained a moral 
shock to me for years to come and left me more cautious and critical of the information I 
received from Moscow.”100  On the other hand, Dobrynin found himself in a unique position 
to negotiate the resolution of the crisis.  He had the ear of many of Kennedy’s top aides and, 
through direct contact with Moscow, he helped produce a settlement that avoided undue 
embarrassment for either side.  In the long run, Dobrynin’s ability to function effectively as 
ambassador without receiving complete information from Moscow would continue to play a 
role in his negotiations for arms limitations during the administrations of Lyndon B. Johnson 
and Richard M. Nixon.   
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The Backchannel after the Cuban Missile Crisis 
 The years between 1962 and 1969 proved to be essential in the development of closer 
superpower relations.  Dobrynin describes in his memoirs how, after the conclusion of the 
crisis, “relations with the Kennedy administration began settling into a more realistic mode in 
which the emphasis had to be on communication, discussion, negotiation, and continuous 
adjustment if not solution of the differences” between Moscow and Washington.101  In this 
new atmosphere of cooperation, the superpowers touted major accomplishments in 
negotiations, including the installation of the so-called “hotline” that allowed for 
instantaneous communication between the White House and the Kremlin during 
emergencies, and the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear testing in the 
atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space.  Still, significant challenges remained in regard 
to arms limitations and a final settlement on Germany, which would not be effectively 
addressed until the Nixon administration.   
During this period, the backchannel became the primary vessel for negotiations 
between Dobrynin and leading American officials.  In this context, many of the traits that 
characterized Dobrynin’s approach to diplomacy came to the fore.  First, almost all of 
Dobrynin’s negotiating partners highlight his pragmatic, not overtly ideological approach to 
talks.  Journalist Henry Brandon’s interviews with several American policymakers in the 
early 1970s highlight this feature.  Robert McNamara, who served as defense secretary under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, noted, “Dobrynin is not polemical, he’s serious,” and 
Joseph Sisco, who served in the State Department from 1951 to 1976, reported, “He’s a 
thorough professional technician possessing an understanding for the American way of life.  
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He has a quick intellect, an attractive personality, and avoids personal acrimony. . . . He’s 
more pragmatic than ideological and less dogmatic than most Russians I have met.”102  
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, told 
Brandon, “I never had to repeat anything twice to him, and he is also very skilled in 
presenting his own case in a reasonable way.”103  Former Ambassador to the USSR and 
Democratic Party elder statesman W. Averill Harriman put it best: “Dobrynin doesn’t give 
anything away, but he has the facility of understanding Americans and presenting the 
Russian point of view in a manner that Americans can understand.  He probably does equally 
well in explaining the American point of view to the Russians.  He’s frank about the 
problems he has and presents them in a legitimate manner.”  In sum, Dobrynin “has plausible 
explanations for the Russian positions” and “he’s ready to discuss difficult situations.”104   
 American diplomats all suggest that this approach to negotiations played a major role 
in helping to ease Cold War tensions during the Kennedy administration.  Understanding that 
presenting proposals with any tinge of ideological content or language could turn off his 
American partners to further discussions, Dobrynin framed Soviet proposals in a way that his 
American interlocutors would find sympathetic, identifying the stumbling blocks that 
prevented progress in negotiations and attempting to find common ground.  Presented in 
these terms, Soviet concerns with particular issues made more sense to American diplomats, 
which then made them feel more comfortable going forward in the negotiating process 
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knowing that their positions would be clearly explained to the Kremlin.  
 Second, Dobrynin’s use of humor to defuse awkward or tense moments and 
anecdotes to clarify difficult situations made an impression on all of his negotiating partners.  
Two examples shed light on this aspect of Dobrynin’s persona.  In July 1969, Henry Brandon 
had dinner with several prominent American officials at the home of then CIA director 
Richard M. Helms.  Brandon recalls that the American officials began swapping anecdotes 
told to them by Dobrynin.  Helms started, telling a story about a major Soviet airplane 
factory, where the first test model lost a wing on its initial test.  The engineers tried to fix the 
flaw, but on the second test flight, the plane once again lost a wing.  The next day, the 
manager, who had been fretting the potential consequences of a third failed test, received an 
anonymous note, suggesting that they put a row of holes at regular intervals on the wings.  
This worked, and the plane flew flawlessly.  The manager later discovered that one of the 
cleaning women left the note, and when he called her in for an explanation, she simply said 
that toilet paper always tore at the wrong place until they put holes in it.105  Robert 
McNamara went second, telling a story Dobrynin had conveyed about a boy working in a 
bakery during the war.  To prevent theft, the bakery placed guards at the exit doors to search 
everyone before leaving.  Stealing declined, but when one of his co-workers had a birthday, 
the boy decided to surprise him with a party and a gift of bread.  The boy thought he could 
sneak the bread out by rolling the dough into a long noodle and wrapping it around his chest. 
To the boy’s relief, the guards didn’t search him, but rather escorted him to a mandatory 
parade where he had to stand at attention.  As he stood there for hours, the dough began to 
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rise and his clothes began to bulge.  The police noticed this and arrested him.106    
 Although Brandon’s notes do not explain the context for these stories, both are 
revealing for several reasons.  First, they show the strong impression made by Dobrynin’s 
anecdotes, as his negotiating partners clearly remembered them beyond the talks.  More 
importantly, they demonstrate a more realistic depiction of Soviet society than these men 
received from previous Soviet diplomats.  Whereas many Russians might have found 
anecdotes about workplace theft, forced participation in marches, and engineering failures at 
factories familiar and amusing, Americans were not used to hearing such stories from cold 
warriors such as Dobrynin’s predecessors.  To his American partners, Dobrynin’s anecdotes 
suggested that he did not take ideology too seriously, a fact that seemed to earn him their 
respect.   
 A further example of Dobrynin’s use of anecdote comes from Joseph Sisco, who 
recalled that, during tense negotiations over the Middle East, Dobrynin referenced a scene 
from Gogol’s Dead Souls, in which a landowner attempts to borrow money using “dead 
souls”—that is, serfs who were dead, but not yet registered as dead in the census—as 
collateral.  The moneylender consents to the loan, but requests a receipt for the serfs before 
handing over the money.  The landowner persists that he will not hand over the receipt until 
he receives the cash.  The two finally agree to place the money and the receipt for the serfs in 
the middle of the table so that each could snatch the others’ contribution to the deal.  Sisco 
notes that “with a twinkle in his eyes,” Dobrynin concluded that superpower diplomats faced 
a similar situation in Middle East negotiations: “the only trouble is that neither party is 
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willing to move its contribution to the middle of the table.”107  In this way, Dobrynin defused 
a tense situation with a joke, while suggesting that both sides ought to take the first step to 
offer their end of the compromise. 
 Although the backchannel helped facilitate superpower diplomats to discuss their 
problems, they could not solve them without consensus between Moscow and Washington.  
On the twin issues of recognition of the postwar division of Germany and reduction of the 
superpowers’ respective military forces in Europe, negotiators hit brick wall after brick wall.  
Khrushchev directed Dobrynin to continue pressing Soviet demands, despite providing no 
room for concessions that would make a breakthrough possible.  With no new directions, 
Dobrynin simply repeated that the Soviet side sought a demilitarization of Germany and/or a 
neutral Berlin, recognition of the status quo in Germany, and a nonaggression treaty between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  For his part, Rusk, his partner in these discussions, restated 
that no solution was possible that did not ensure the security of West Berlin.  Dobrynin and 
Rusk met every few weekends to discuss these issues informally.  Eventually, Rusk joked 
that these talks had become so repetitive and monotonous that they could save time by 
assigning a number to each question and answer for both sides.  Rusk explained: “After I say, 
for instance, ‘I have asked question number five,’ you would reply, ‘Answer number six,’ 
and so on.  Then you can send home a detailed report, and I can inform the president about 
the meeting.”108  Ultimately, Khrushchev could not accept that the American commitment to 
West Berlin represented a broader commitment to West European security, and this was one 
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concession that American officials simply could not make.109  
 If Khrushchev’s inability to compromise over certain matters prevented the 
backchannel from achieving better relations in this period, skepticism over the importance of 
improving Soviet-American relations permeated the Soviet bureaucracy.  On July 30, 1962, 
Dobrynin sent a note to Moscow describing a conversation he had with Jacqueline Kennedy.  
The first lady suggested that the Soviet government send equestrian Sergei Filatov, gold 
medalist in the 1960 Olympics, to serve as a goodwill ambassador at an American equestrian 
competition.  He could take photos with the first lady, start the race, and give interviews to 
the press.  Dobrynin recognized that showing off a legitimate Soviet star to an American 
audience at a popular sporting event would have a decidedly positive effect on the Soviet 
Union’s image in the US, and he strongly recommended that Moscow agree to the proposal.  
However, both the Soviet Sports Committee and the cultural affairs office responded 
negatively to Dobrynin’s request.110  This episode highlights Dobrynin’s work to expand 
relations beyond top-level talks, something that was not yet a priority for the Kremlin 
bureaucracy, but later became crucial to détente. 
 Following President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963 and Khrushchev’s ouster in 
1964, international events undermined Dobrynin’s work more seriously than the Kremlin’s 
lack of interest in cultural exchanges.  First, American escalation of the Vietnam War cooled 
Soviet enthusiasm for Soviet-American diplomatic initiatives beginning in 1965.  During the 
1967 Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Politburo sent Council of 
Ministers Chairman Aleksei Kosygin to the US for urgent talks with Johnson to kick-start 
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superpower negotiations. However, Kosygin, irritated over American support for Israel, 
proved unprepared to begin negotiations with Johnson over antiballistic missile systems.111 In 
an attempt to improve his international prestige before his term ended, Johnson tried to 
initiate arms limitations negotiations by brokering a final summit through the backchannel.  
Moscow did not even bother to respond until Dobrynin stressed that the Kremlin’s silence 
“was becoming embarrassing.”  Pushed to act, the Kremlin sent an invitation for Johnson to 
visit Moscow on August 17, 1968.  Three days later, Warsaw Pact forces invaded 
Czechoslovakia, effectively ending backchannel negotiations for arms control as well as any 
hope for the summit meeting.112  Oleg Kalugin, then deputy chief of the Washington station 
for the KGB, claims that he witnessed Dobrynin read the telegram announcing the invasion.  
According to Kalugin, Dobrynin called the operation a “monstrous folly” and “idiotic,” 
predicting that it would become “a crippling blow to all our good beginnings with America.” 
He advised his staff to “brace ourselves for a lot of unpleasantness.”113 
In sum, Dobrynin’s work with his backchannel partners prepared the ground for 
détente and garnered some early successes, including the installation of the hotline and the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty.  At the same time, most leaders in Moscow and Washington were 
not yet ready to pursue greater progress at this time.  Germany remained a thorn in the side of 
negotiations, and conflicts in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia drew leaders on both sides away 
from the table.  Major breakthroughs in talks had to wait until conditions changed a few 
years later.  
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“My Favorite Bolshevik” 
During his early years as ambassador, Dobrynin built on the extensive network of 
American contacts that he first established during his previous tours of duty in the US.  
Bessmertnykh emphasizes his “rare gift for building and maintaining reliable contacts in the 
upper strata of the US elite,” boasting that “there were no influential figures in America he 
was not acquainted with.”  Dobrynin’s network of contacts seems especially impressive 
given that he not only courted government officials and Congressmen, but also central 
figures in public affairs, culture, business, and the press.  Moreover, Dobrynin “never leaned 
toward any particular political party,” as he understood that policy initiatives required some 
level of bipartisan support to succeed and that the party that held power at any given point in 
time could quickly lose it.114   
The clearest demonstration of Dobrynin’s efforts to build connections with the 
American elite comes through his relationship with W. Averell Harriman, the Democratic 
Party mainstay who held tremendous sway in Washington from the Roosevelt administration 
through the Reagan administration.  Harriman, who alternately described Dobrynin as “my 
favorite Bolshevik” and “the nicest Bolshevik I know,”115 served as the US ambassador to 
the USSR during World War II and Secretary of Commerce under President Harry S. 
Truman. He played various roles in the State Department under Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson, including chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks on Vietnam, and he continued as 
an elder statesman of the Democratic Party during the Nixon years, advising leaders and 
grooming young talent.  He served as a liaison between Party figures and international 
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leaders, particularly in the Soviet Union, where his work as wartime ambassador had earned 
him lasting respect.116  Harriman kept a detailed record of his relationship with Dobrynin.  
His files include memoranda of conversation, gift cards sent on Harriman’s birthdays and 
wedding anniversaries, and invitations to parties, films, and lectures.  They provide an 
important source in determining how Dobrynin established and maintained his network of 
contacts, calling on them to help him solve diplomatic challenges as they arose. 
Dobrynin made an indelible impression on Harriman during their first meeting on 
April 2, 1962, shortly after Dobrynin assumed the ambassadorship.  Harriman’s report of the 
conversation emphasizes that, after exchanging pleasantries, Dobrynin conveyed greetings 
from Khrushchev, with whom Dobrynin implied that he had “a close and cordial 
relationship.”  Then the conversation turned to Laos, where American-sponsored right-wing 
General Phoumi Nosavan continued his war against state forces despite urging from 
President John F. Kennedy and the CIA to lay down his arms and join a coalition 
government.  Harriman asked Dobrynin for advice on “how to ‘twist General Phoumi’s arm,’ 
since he understood the Soviets were expert in that field.”  Dobrynin demurred, suggesting 
that it was actually the Americans who were specialists when it came to the “twist.”  He 
“confessed that he had not learned the dance but understood how it was done.  He then 
demonstrated with gestures that ‘you simultaneously wipe your back with an imaginary towel 
while grinding out an imaginary cigarette on the floor in front of you, first with one foot and 
then the other.’”  Following the meeting, Dobrynin talked with the media, and Harriman 
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notes that he “handled them pleasantly without saying anything of substance.”  Apparently 
satisfied with Dobrynin’s ability to discuss important issues, talk to the media, influence the 
Moscow leadership, grasp American cultural references, and employ humor in official talks, 
Harriman concludes, “In the whole conversation he showed himself a great improvement 
over his predecessor in personality and temperament.”117 
After meeting Harriman, Dobrynin maintained ties in a number of ways.  He sent 
Harriman gifts each year on his birthday, wedding anniversary, and Christmas, usually 
consisting of Harriman’s “favorite Russian products”: vodka and caviar.  The gift tags and 
thank you notes saved by Harriman indicate that, occasionally, Dobrynin would include other 
items in his gift packages, such as a “charmingly decorated” lacquer box, a book on the 
Bolshoi Theater, and Russian chocolates, sent from Dobrynin’s wife Irina to Harriman’s wife 
Marie.  Harriman reciprocated, in kind, and in 1968, sent a paperweight model of the 
Caroline, the family plane that John F. Kennedy used while campaigning.118  While this 
exchange of gifts may seem superficial, it served to sustain lines of communication with 
Harriman, even during Republican administrations, and it helped keep the relationship 
between Dobrynin and Harriman friendly.  The fact that Harriman saved these mementos 
provides an indication of the value he placed on this relationship.  
Even when Republicans held the reins of power under Presidents Nixon and Reagan, 
leaving Harriman with less influence on policy decisions, the two figures continued to meet 
in both official and social capacities.  They frequently dined together, sometimes including 
their wives in the festivities, and they used these opportunities to discuss the approaches of 
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their respective nations to the major questions of international affairs.119  These talks were 
candid, informal, and did not contain the kind of ideological overtones that colored meetings 
between other prominent state officials.  Additional meetings allowed Dobrynin to gain 
access to Harriman’s circle of powerful allies in the Democratic Party.  In April 1975, for 
example, Dobrynin suggested that Harriman invite some of his Democratic friends in 
Congress to his house one afternoon for drinks, where Dobrynin could meet with them and 
answer questions about Soviet policy. 120  Discussions over dinner or drinks often provided 
Dobrynin and Harriman with information they could not receive from other sources, private 
insight into the other country’s affairs, and critical contacts, as they sought to improve 
superpower relations and put their personal stamps on détente’s successes.  During the Nixon 
administration, conversation repeatedly turned to Kissinger, and Dobrynin gave frank 
evaluations of the national security advisor’s approach when meeting with Harriman.  When 
the backchannel produced positive results, Dobrynin had nothing but praise for Kissinger.  In 
June 1973, Harriman recorded that Dobrynin “was still very high on Kissinger and said that 
Kissinger was a relief from the State Department, that the State Department niggled and 
quibbled over every unimportant detail whereas Kissinger was prepared to give in on 
unimportant small points for other larger, far-seeing policies.”121  When things did not go as 
well, Dobrynin could be far more critical of his negotiating partner.  For instance, in April 
1974, Dobrynin confided to Harriman that Kissinger had not informed the embassy of 
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American intentions to raise the alert status of the American nuclear arsenal during the 
October War between Arab and Israeli forces in 1973.  Dobrynin bluntly stated that “if 
[Kissinger] had checked with him there never would have been a so-called crisis.”  This 
prompted Harriman to note in his record of the conversation that “the whole thing seems to 
be a fairly shabby affair,” taking Dobrynin’s side and blaming Nixon and Kissinger for 
undermining the basis of détente.122   
Just as Dobrynin provided Harriman with informal assessments of the progress of 
negotiations, Harriman served as a source for Dobrynin to better understand American 
political life.  When Dobrynin asked about Harriman’s predictions for the Republican 
presidential primaries, he responded that the Republican establishment would probably select 
Richard Nixon unless polls suggested that Nixon could not defeat a Democratic opponent.  In 
that case, Harriman argued, they would likely turn to Nelson Rockefeller.  When Harriman 
said that Rockefeller was “playing an intelligent game,” acting coy about his intentions until 
the public mood became clearer, Dobrynin interrupted: “Do you think Rockefeller is really 
intelligent?”  Harriman replied, “Well meaning, and better than Nixon, but still a 
Republican.”  He advised Dobrynin to focus on negotiating with Johnson on Vietnam and 
arms limitations immediately, as the Republicans would undoubtedly take a more hawkish 
position on these questions.123  A few months later, Harriman broached this topic again to 
repeat his position on Nixon and Rockefeller and add that he felt Robert Kennedy would 
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most likely win the Democratic nomination.124  In this sense, Dobrynin’s American contacts, 
particularly seasoned experts like Harriman, gave him insider knowledge on political shifts in 
power in Washington, as well as on the prospects for Soviet-American relations should a 
particular candidate get elected. 
In addition, Harriman and Dobrynin reviewed Soviet and American history, 
sometimes for their own edification, sometimes to shed light on current affairs.  In the same 
January 1968 conversation where they appraised the probable results of the Republican 
primary, Harriman and Dobrynin discussed Khrushchev’s legacy.  Harriman brought up the 
so-called corn campaign, when Khrushchev attempted to dramatically increase corn 
production in the Soviet Union.  Dobrynin agreed with Harriman’s critique that it was unwise 
to plant corn in an environment not suited for it.  He followed by criticizing the virgin lands 
campaign, Khrushchev’s attempt to open up the Soviet steppe to agriculture.  On this matter, 
both Harriman and Dobrynin concurred that Khrushchev should have expanded in small 
steps rather than trying to force change on a massive scale.  Harriman concluded: “The 
purport of Dobrynin’s remarks was that Khrushchev was turned out because he went off on 
his own sometimes unwisely without full consultation.”  This discussion of Soviet history 
merits attention because, far from mere small talk, it provided a vehicle for both men to 
indirectly indicate to the other their personal leadership style.  Indeed, Dobrynin used this 
conversation about Khrushchev’s campaigns to emphasize the “very serious” and “sincere” 
nature of the present Party leadership, in contrast to “impulsive” gamblers like 
                                                
124 “Memorandum of Conversation with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, April 1, 1968,” Box 455, Folder 2, W. Averell 
Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  Harriman added that Dobrynin 
never disputed his assertion that “Khrushchev’s aversion to Nixon was shared by all good Russians.” 
  65 
Khrushchev.125   
Moreover, in April, Dobrynin asked Harriman a lengthy set of questions about his 
experiences negotiating with Stalin and Molotov during World War II.  At the end of the 
conversation, Dobrynin affirmed Harriman’s depiction of Molotov as “an extraordinarily 
rigid individual who was difficult to negotiate with.”  Unlike the Khrushchev discussion, 
which Dobrynin transparently used to distance the current leadership from the impulsive 
former first secretary, Harriman wondered why Dobrynin insisted on discussing Molotov, but 
speculated that it was to gain insight into Harriman’s perspective on the history of Soviet-
American relations. 126  Regardless, Dobrynin’s comments to Harriman match Dobrynin’s 
later comments in his memoirs, suggesting that he spoke with candor when discussing 
philosophical and historical topics with Harriman.127  These conversations illustrated that 
Dobrynin understood diplomatic problems within a longer historical perspective, and used 
history as a tool to explain changes in Soviet foreign policy to his American partners. 
Dobrynin’s contacts were not limited to the world of politics, as demonstrated by his 
relationship with PepsiCo CEO Donald M. Kendall.  For years, Kendall endeavored to open 
the Soviet market to Pepsi products, and in 1959, as a young executive in charge of 
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international sales, he successfully obtained permission to serve Pepsi at the 1959 American 
Exhibition in Moscow.  This resulted in the iconic photographs of Kendall and his close 
friend, then Vice President Richard Nixon, sipping Pepsi with Khrushchev.  According to 
Kendall’s account, Khrushchev enjoyed Pepsi, drinking at least a half-dozen cups of the 
American beverage and passing some out to other people in his entourage.128  The beverage 
was also a hit with less prominent Soviet visitors to the exhibition.  One pensioner wrote in 
the exhibition’s visitor’s book that he was “very happy to have survived to the day when I, 
with my own eyes, was able to see the American National Exhibition,” concluding, “Thank 
you for the wonderful drink Pepsi Cola!”129   
While Pepsi made quite an impression on both the top Soviet leadership and the 
ordinary visitors to the American Exhibition, a trade deal came into place only fifteen years 
later, thanks to the intervention of Dobrynin.  In order to expand his business into the Soviet 
Union, Kendall made full use of his political connections.  When Nixon rose to the 
presidency in 1969, Kendall received access to Kissinger and Dobrynin, who put him in 
touch with the Soviet officials who helped him conclude the trade deal.130  From that point, 
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Kendall became one of the few American businessmen with ties to the top Soviet leadership.  
Through his connections at the embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Kendall even met 
with Brezhnev, later telling Alistair Horne that “if [Brezhnev] had been born in the US, he 
would have been head of the Barnum and Bailey Circus!”131   
In exchange for getting him the appropriate connections in Moscow, Kendall became 
a regular Dobrynin confidant, informing the Soviet ambassador of the internal dynamics of 
future Republican presidential administrations.  In 1976, Kendall told Dobrynin that he 
consulted with President Gerald Ford about his presidential campaign, criticizing the 
incumbent president’s anti-Soviet public statements.132  During the Reagan administration, 
Kendall informed Dobrynin of conflicts within the top leadership, reporting on conversations 
with officials such as Al Haig and George Schultz and advocating closer ties with the Soviet 
Union.133  Kendall also put Dobrynin in touch with key businessmen in the US.  In 1977, for 
example, Kendall flew with the Dobrynins in a private jet to Alaska, where they planned to 
visit some early settlements in the former Russian colony and visit several oil processing 
facilities as guests of the Atlantic Richfield Company.134 
Dobrynin’s promotion of personal contacts with American figures such as Harriman 
and Kendall demonstrates his foresight as a diplomat.  While busy negotiating détente with 
Nixon and Kissinger, he nevertheless invested energy into maintaining his relationship with 
Harriman, even though he understood that it could not bear immediate fruit.  Rather, he 
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grasped that the cyclical nature of American politics and the fact that someday in the future, 
Harriman might be relevant again.  He also understood the value that Kendall would have as 
a contact, providing him with insider knowledge of Republican administrations and top 
business circles. 
 
Diplomatic Chameleon 
As the Harriman relationship suggests, during his time as ambassador, Dobrynin 
perfected his skills as a “chameleon,” immersing himself in American culture and blending in 
with American society at all levels.  Dobrynin’s ability to mingle with members of high 
society proved essential to his success.  Harriman told Brandon, who was writing an article 
on Dobrynin in 1970, that he recently invited the Soviet ambassador for a two-day trip to 
Harriman’s vacation home at Hobe Sound.  Harriman observed that Dobrynin spent his time 
swimming in the pool, walking along the beach with his wife, and driving around the 
countryside, and that he “fitted in easily” with high society “and didn’t need to be 
entertained.”135   
Moreover, Dobrynin flourished in the party scene in Washington, making quick 
friends with members of the Washington elite and pursuing contacts with the movers and 
shakers of the city’s capital.  Newsweek noted Dobrynin’s affinity for the party scene upon 
his arrival in Washington: “Dobrynin’s partiality for things Western extends to Scotch-and-
soda and Washington cocktail parties, which other incredulous diplomats say the Russian 
attends because he actually enjoys them.”136  In her diary, Lady Byrd Johnson describes how 
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at one party for the diplomatic corps in the first months of the Johnson administration, she 
“had a whirl with everybody from the French Ambassador to Anatoly Dobrynin of Russia, 
which I am sure caused all the lady reporters to get out their pads and pencils (But he was 
covering the territory, because he got around to [the Johnsons’ daughter] Lynda Bird 
too!).”137  Dobrynin hoped to use the party to make an impression on the new president and 
his family, and, at least in Lady Bird’s case, it seems to have been successful.  At other points 
in her diary, she refers to Dobrynin as “affable,” “talkative,” and “beaming,” stating that 
“there is always a little rustle of excitement when [Dobrynin] rises” to give a speech at these 
events, as he speaks “in very clear English and very clear words and with dramatic effect.”138   
When attending these parties, Dobrynin always brought his wife Irina, who also had 
been an aircraft engineer during World War II and developed a fluency in English and a love 
of American culture while stationed in the US with her husband, and their strong relationship 
improved his image among key segments of the Washington elite.  Lady Bird recalls how, 
during a state dinner, the two women discussed the challenges of interacting with old friends 
at home after embarking on their new lives in Washington.  Irina chimed in that “when they 
were at home in Russia, their old-time neighbors kept on giving Dobrynin advice as 
Ambassador, just as though he were still the boy next door.”  This personal interaction 
reflected well on the Dobrynins, and Lady Bird gushed that Irina was “vivacious” with 
perfect English and that they made an “attractive couple.” 139  Years later, writing in his diary 
about a 1982 dinner for the diplomatic corps, President Ronald Reagan expressed similar 
sentiments about the Dobrynin family: “Everything we’ve heard is true—[the Dobrynins] are 
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a most likeable couple.  In fact so much so you wonder how they can stick with the 
phoniness of the Soviet system.”  Four days later, Reagan felt compelled to revisit this topic: 
“Truth is he and his wife are most likeable and very much in love with each other after 40 
years of marriage.”140  In this sense, Dobrynin’s cultivated public image of himself as a 
family man at Washington parties helped humanize him to American guests, even appealing 
to hardliners like Reagan, who did not expect or desire to find him likeable. 
In 1976, Parade magazine painted a picture of the Dobrynins as the life of the party.  
One hostess recalled that “the Dobrynins made a big splash on the Washington social scene 
when they first took over the embassy,” and, when compared to previous ambassador 
Men’shikov, “they seemed especially relaxed and sophisticated.”  Dobrynin made use of his 
legendary storytelling and joke-telling abilities to captivate guests.  The wife of famous 
Washington lawyer Sylvan Marshall, who frequently entertained the Dobrynins, told Parade 
that “if you ever go to a dinner party and sit next to him, you’ll have the time of your life.”  
Irina, a skilled concert pianist, sat at the piano and encouraged guests to sing along with her.  
As Robert McNamara’s wife said, “They knew all the music and lyrics to American and 
international, as well as Russian songs.”141  When the embassy hosted a party for members of 
the Washington elite, they did not turn down the invitation, and fourteen years into their stay 
in Washington, the Dobrynins were still much sought-after guests by elites looking to throw 
showy cocktail parties. 
Dobrynin used the festive environment of the parties to maintain his contacts with 
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American officials, sometimes taking them aside to discuss the important business of the day.  
Lady Bird explained that at one black-tie diplomatic reception: “Dobrynin of Russia and 
Dean Rusk sat on the sofa in the Red Room for over an hour talking quietly, while people 
passed, casting glances over their shoulders, wishing, I suppose, that they could 
eavesdrop.”142  The Soviet Embassy also threw several dozen parties a year, where Dobrynin 
pulled aside influential Americans to conduct important business.  The Evening Star 
describes an embassy party for Red Army Day with about 600 guests, where “party talk 
focused on trade ties and cultural exchanges rather than saber-rattling.”  The article notes: “In 
a corner of the dining room, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin was seen in long 
conversation with a foursome which one guest assumed was a delegation of East European 
diplomats getting the latest word from Moscow.”  The author discovered that, to her surprise: 
“the foursome was from the US Department of Commerce.  They declined to be identified, 
‘because we’re here unofficially,’ one of them explained.”143  
Beyond attending the high-society events to nurture his network, Dobrynin pursued 
other methods of blending into American culture that would help him better understand 
American society.  The Dobrynins continued their habit of taking road trip vacations, and by 
1976, they had driven across the country in a rented car several times, developing friendships 
and shooting endless reels of home movies.  By this time, they had reportedly visited every 
state except Alaska, and had seen every major city except New Orleans.  Unlike most 
ambassadors’ wives, Irina did most of the family’s shopping.144  She drove her own car, and 
when the Dobrynins arrived in Washington in 1962, she endured an ordeal experienced by 
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every American, standing in line for three hours to take a driving test, rather than requesting 
diplomatic privilege and receiving a license without the wait.145  The Dobrynins were avid 
cyclists, and the ambassador sometimes rode to McDonald’s with his granddaughter for 
dinner.146  Dobrynin took part in American cultural events when he traveled as well.  
Sometimes he did this as an official representative of the Soviet government, including at 
boxing matches between American and Soviet competitors and performances by the Soviet 
dance, theater, and music troupes visiting Washington.147  Frequently, though, Dobrynin 
attended events on his own initiative.  During his interview session with Dobrynin, Brandon 
noted that, when on business trips to his favorite American city, New York, Dobrynin did his 
best to take in a musical, which he viewed as the quintessential American art form.148   
In this regard, Dobrynin was not merely a keen observer of American society, but 
also a participant in it.  His engagement with Americana allowed him to better understand his 
negotiating partners and the nature of his position as representative to the US, as well as to 
report more accurately to Moscow on the public mood.  As part of their interview, Harriman 
told Brandon: “It is difficult to explain why certain Russians are more at ease than others.  
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Why for instance, was Mikoyan much easier to talk to than Molotov?  Why is Dobrynin 
more a man of the world than Malik or Menshikov or Zorin?  Perhaps because he knows that 
it is important for him in order to succeed in his job.”149  Indeed, without his commitment to 
blending into the American scene, Dobrynin would not have been able to accomplish his 
main tasks as ambassador as effectively.  He would not have had such an extensive network, 
which proved critical to accomplishing diplomatic tasks, and he would not have had such a 
firm grasp on American popular opinion or the attitudes of American policymakers, a 
necessary tool for him to frame his diplomatic initiatives to his American partners.  
Any account of Dobrynin’s tenure at the embassy would be incomplete without a 
discussion of his interactions with Moscow, which demonstrate his unique ability to explain 
American affairs in a way that made sense to Politburo members, who generally had a weak 
grasp of American politics.  Dobrynin served as ambassador under five general secretaries 
and survived cataclysmic moments in superpower affairs, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  If there is a plethora of evidence suggesting why, 
under these trying circumstances, most American officials wanted Dobrynin to remain in 
Washington, there is much less to explain why the Soviet government left him in the US for 
twenty-four years.   
Several sources argue that Dobrynin stayed in Washington because his return to 
Moscow would have posed a threat to Gromyko.  According to this argument, Dobrynin built 
enough prestige abroad that the only other suitable post would be foreign minister, where his 
direct superior, Gromyko, was comfortably ensconced.  American journalist Connecticut 
Walker, for example, gave credence to this theory during the Cold War by writing that 
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Dobrynin’s “skillful behind-the-scenes stage-setting and presence at top-level negotiating 
sessions fuel rumors that he may one day replace Andrei Gromyko as Russia’s foreign 
minister.”150  After the end of the Cold War, KGB General Kalugin and former Dobrynin 
aide Iulii Vorontsov both supported this assertion.151 
That said, Dobrynin states just the opposite in his memoirs, explaining his longevity 
as a result of the fact that Brezhnev valued stability and expertise in establishing his foreign 
policy team. He supports this position with two anecdotes.  First, he describes how, during 
each trip to Moscow, he gave a full debriefing on American affairs to Brezhnev.  When he 
asked for instructions, Brezhnev simply replied, “What instructions do you need?—you 
know better than I how to deal with the Americans.  Let there be peace; that’s the main 
thing.”  Second, Dobrynin addresses Brezhnev’s attitudes toward Gromyko, writing: 
“Contrary to Khrushchev, who at times imposed his will on Gromyko (as well as on other 
colleagues), Brezhnev gave his foreign minister full rein because he was sure that Gromyko 
was a better specialist in international affairs than he was.  Besides, Brezhnev and Gromyko 
were friends.”152  In Dobrynin’s view, desire to maintain stability in the hierarchy, as well as 
concern for continued professionalism drove the Kremlin to keep Dobrynin in Washington.  
Moreover, by the time détente began, Dobrynin had an extensive network of sponsors in the 
Soviet Union who could intervene on his behalf against opponents in the Moscow 
bureaucracy who wished to remove Dobrynin, perhaps because he had become too 
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“Americanized.”153   
There were other practical reasons for the Soviet government to allow Dobrynin to 
stay in Washington.  His job performance generally met their expectations.  Dobrynin told 
Brandon that the primary responsibilities of a good ambassador are “to report to his superiors 
as true and fair a picture as possible; secondly, to provide them with honest proposals of how 
to act under certain circumstances; and thirdly, to have the courage to tell the facts as they are 
and to advise his government what reactions it can expect from certain decisions.”154  
Dobrynin adhered to these criteria, producing long, detailed memos that honestly reported the 
progress with negotiations.  He also provided generally accurate recommendations for 
proceeding, and advised the Soviet government on how the Americans might react to specific 
proposals.  Moreover, Dobrynin’s memoirs make clear that he did not want to leave.155  
Perhaps most importantly, no other Soviet diplomat could replicate Dobrynin’s extensive 
network of American friends in high places.  Dobrynin spent his entire career establishing 
contacts with prominent Americans, and the loss of such a network would undoubtedly play 
a major role in damaging future relations.   
Thus, by making himself indispensible to both his Soviet bosses and his American 
negotiating partners, Dobrynin assured that he would hold onto the post of ambassador 
longer than any other Soviet diplomat.  An American diplomat interviewed by The New York 
Times expressed it best: “He simply has to have some sensitivity to the flow of things and 
events in Moscow and Washington and a shrewd sense of how to position himself in both 
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capitals so he’s with the flow and it doesn’t run over him.”  The anonymous official also 
credits “that special feel he has for ‘translating’ from the Russian into American and from the 
American into Russian, and doing it in such a way that the objective is achieved without the 
undesired effects of anger and resentment.”156  Bessmertnykh, who helped Dobrynin 
compose the reports of conversations that he submitted to the Kremlin, repeated this praise, 
explaining that Dobrynin provided arguments in favor of closer Soviet-American relations to 
leaders in both Moscow and Washington.  In times of great tension, he showed sensitivity in 
phrasing his comments to both parties in such a way that the policy of Soviet-American 
rapprochement would be understood as the best way to proceed.157  Dobrynin’s ability to 
sense the political mood of the time and place and incorporate it into his negotiations served 
him well as the superpowers entered détente, the most important period in his ambassadorial 
career.  In sum, Dobrynin’s efforts to become a diplomatic “chameleon” were central to his 
accomplishments as a Soviet diplomat, as he successfully retained his message, but changed 
his method of presentation to promote closer Soviet-American relations both in Washington 
and in Moscow. 
 
The Public Face of Anatoly Dobrynin 
Outside of Washington’s social circles, Dobrynin seemed more than happy to avoid 
the public spotlight.  He rarely granted newspaper interviews and he almost never appeared 
on national television.  As he told Connecticut Walker of Parade, “Well, I have been a 
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faceless diplomat for the last 18 years and managed to do all right.”158  In his interview with 
Brandon, Dobrynin noted that he gave ten speeches the previous year and sixteen speeches 
the year before that.  The embassy press office did not make copies of these speeches 
available to the public, so the public reach of these speeches did not extend far beyond the 
limited number of people who actually heard him speak.159  
A rare copy of one 1964 speech that Dobrynin gave at the Economic Club of Detroit 
helps explain his approach to handling the American public.160  It came in the early years of 
Dobrynin’s ambassadorship, before he reached the pinnacle of his influence.  This speech, 
“The Soviet Union Today,” covers a variety of topics, though Dobrynin focuses on economic 
issues, due to his intended audience of businessmen at the Economic Club. There are 
moments when Dobrynin’s charm comes to the fore.  In starting the speech, Dobrynin 
explains that he was initially hesitant to accept the invitation, since it was an election year 
and he was told that presidential candidate Nelson Rockefeller would be giving a speech on 
the same day in an adjacent building.  Dobrynin quipped: “I was afraid I might be involved in 
the election campaign, which is something a foreign diplomat should never do.  But then I 
glanced at the prices per plate at the bottom of page one of the announcement sheet ($2.75 
per plate) which seemed far too low for a campaign luncheon and concluded that I am on the 
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safe side.  I suppose I was given a diplomatic discount!”161  Other one-liners pepper the 
speech.  For example, when discussing the “hot line” between the White House and the 
Kremlin, he declared, “It is said that this line is so hot that no one wants to touch it and when 
it is ringing at one end—for testing, you know—everyone hopes very much that it is a 
‘wrong number.’”162  Dobrynin’s jokes reflect his deep familiarity with American culture, 
down to the minutia of the cliché banquet speech.   
 Much of the twenty-seven page speech focuses on economic issues in an attempt to 
cater to the interests of the businessmen in the crowd.  In these areas, he parrots Khrushchev-
era Soviet tropes, quoting a string of statistics reflecting tremendous economic growth and 
concluding that the Soviet Union “produces in 8 days the same amount of products as all pre-
Revolution Russia during the year of 1913.”163  Dobrynin emphasizes that he did not cite 
these figures to boast of Soviet successes or to suggest that life is perfect in the Soviet Union.  
Indeed, Dobrynin has no quarrel with American visitors to the USSR who “like to report 
back home that there are still few motels in the Soviet Union, that our roads are not as good 
as highways here, or that we still lack shiny American bathrooms.”  Rather, he suggests that, 
due to the promise of continued economic growth and the strength of the planned economy, 
“We will have more and more of these things in the future.  There is no doubt about it.”164  
Citing figure after figure, Dobrynin echoes Khrushchev’s promises that the Soviet Union 
would “catch up and overtake America”: “We still have many difficulties to overcome and 
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many goals to attain and mistakes on that road are inevitable.  But we see our future very 
clearly and we are determined to build in a short period of time a new society in which 
everyone is happy.”165  
 When addressing recent developments in Soviet-American negotiations, Dobrynin 
seems much more comfortable, although he still does not deviate from the Party line.  In 
these passages, he quotes American and Soviet leaders who favor better relations.  Dobrynin 
expresses optimism about progress in superpower relations, noting that the past year 
witnessed the installation of the hotline and the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.  
These agreements are important, he suggests, because they demonstrate that the Soviet Union 
and US can find mutually acceptable solutions to the problems of the day if there is a mutual 
desire to pursue them.  Still, Dobrynin expresses concerns about hotbeds of tension that 
remain unaddressed, including the German question.166  He proposes other areas in which the 
superpowers could make progress, including a treaty for nuclear nonproliferation and a 
general renunciation of the use of force to settle territorial disputes.167  Dobrynin effusively 
declares that “the Soviet people are deeply convinced that differences in the way of living, in 
our political and social systems, must not be an obstacle not only to maintaining normal 
relations between our countries, but also to fruitful cooperation between us in the interests of 
the people of the world.”168  He wraps up his speech by addressing the issue of trade between 
the USSR and the US.  He argues that while Soviet-American trade remains minimal, other 
West European countries have taken advantage of trade deals with the USSR, suggesting that 
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it would be wise for the US to do the same.  He asks the members of the Economic Club to 
get involved in increasing business ties between the superpowers, and he encourages 
everyone present to visit the USSR, as “world affairs are now everybody’s business and 
anyone is most welcome to contribute to the cause of peace.”169   
The question-and-answer period demonstrates Dobrynin’s ability to deal with groups 
of people in informal conversation.  It featured queries about Soviet-American trade 
opportunities, the relative lack of Soviet tourists in the US, the condition of Sino-Soviet 
relations, Soviet taxes, and the method that would eventually be used to select Khrushchev’s 
successor.  On the last question, Dobrynin turns on the charm one last time, assuring the 
audience that, while Khrushchev was nearly seventy years old, he was “in very good health 
and full of energy.”  “Maybe you do not feel it,” Dobrynin cracks, “but I feel it on an every-
day basis.”170  Here, the Soviet ambassador reveals his aptitude for dodging tough questions 
and evading uncomfortable conversations, using humor to defuse the situation.  Given the 
advanced age of subsequent Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin 
Chernenko, this use of humor would become a familiar part of Dobrynin’s repertoire.171   
 Thus, while Dobrynin seemed much more at ease in private discussions with 
individuals like Rusk or Harriman, he functioned reasonably well as a public speaker.  At 
times, he relied on Party tropes, particularly when discussing issues like economics, where he 
had no expertise.  When the discussion shifted to topics within his field, however, he spoke 
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much more authoritatively.  He did not deviate from the Party line, but at the same time, he 
had sufficient understanding of the topic that he did not need to rely on the boilerplate 
language that filled his earlier comments on economics.  Mostly, Dobrynin displayed a desire 
to communicate with his audience, cracking jokes, taking audience questions seriously, and 
giving concrete ways to improve superpower relations a year and a half after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.  This alone separated him from his predecessors at the embassy, who 
generally did not speak English well and did not place much stock in understanding the 
American public.  
 
The Dobrynin School of Diplomacy 
Prominent officials and veteran diplomats from the Soviet period often describe the 
Soviet Embassy as “the Dobrynin School” of diplomacy, referring to the way that working in 
Washington under Dobrynin served as a formative experience in the careers of young 
diplomats.172  Indeed, an impressive array of Soviet diplomats cut their teeth at the embassy, 
including future Ambassador to the US and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh; future 
ambassadors to the US Viktor Komplektov, Yulii Vorontsov, and Sergei Kisliak; and other 
prominent diplomats, including Georgii Mamedov, Vitalii Churkin, and Viktor Isakov.  
Further, Dobrynin’s influence stretched over the entire American Department at the Foreign 
Ministry, which was led during détente by Georgii Kornienko, who previously served under 
Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy.  These officials confronted unique circumstances in 
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Washington, facilitated by Dobrynin’s position in the Soviet government, and as a result, 
built successful diplomatic careers.  Moreover, they frequently retained much of the 
pragmatism advocated by Dobrynin in conducting foreign policy.  Years after the Cold War, 
Dobrynin’s aide on arms control issues, Aleksandr Ereskovskii, explained his personal 
philosophy on diplomacy to a friend, American diplomat Brandon Grove.  Ereskovskii stated 
that “a diplomat must be a creative negotiator,” and he expressed his belief in “the power of 
negotiations,” presenting initial positions and working to find a mutually acceptable 
compromise.  Thus, Ereskovskii endorsed the attitude that “a modified treaty is better than no 
treaty.”  He also stressed the importance of conveying “the truth” to the center, even if it was 
unpopular with the Moscow leadership.173  Dobrynin epitomized all of the qualities listed by 
Ereskovskii, suggesting the profound impact that the junior diplomat’s apprenticeship at the 
embassy had on his future attitudes in negotiations. 
The significance of the “Dobrynin school,” however, extends beyond the lessons 
passed down by the Soviet ambassador to top embassy diplomats, as he helped shape an 
environment at the embassy that impacted all Soviet diplomats stationed there.  Examples of 
Soviet embassies in other countries or time periods help explain why the Washington 
embassy in this era was so exceptional.  Viktor Kravchenko, who worked for the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission at the embassy before defecting in April 1944, described it as a 
“chunk of pure totalitarianism torn loose from the banks of the Moscow River and deposited 
intact on the shores of the Potomac.”  Few Soviet diplomats knew English, making it hard for 
them to become acquainted with Americans, even the host family with whom Kravchenko 
lived.  The officials were forbidden to pursue friendships with Americans, except for 
                                                
173 Brandon Grove, Behind Embassy Walls: The Life and Times of an American Diplomat (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2005), 284. 
  83 
business purposes, when they could tap a special stipend to wine and dine them, fishing for 
information, all of which had to be reported to the appropriate authorities.  The Party strictly 
regulated their reading materials, with close attention paid to what kinds of books they 
requested at the library, and it implicitly discouraged them from reading mainstream 
American newspapers such as The New York Times.  Rather, to play it safe, Kravchenko 
states that they read the American Communist Party paper the Daily Worker, the pro-Soviet 
Russian language paper Russkii golos, and weeklies that were friendly to the Soviet Union, 
such as The Nation and The New Republic.  Any private comments critical of Soviet 
authority were reported to one’s superiors, who made decisions about appropriate 
punishment.  The embassy closely monitored correspondence, requiring that all holiday cards 
be printed and mailed through embassy offices.  Kravchenko notes that many embassy 
representatives still became friendly with one another, discussing their innermost secrets, 
fears, and complaints, but did so carefully to avoid spies.  Praising the abundance of 
consumer goods and American civil liberties, he concludes that his bosses and his American 
interlocutors had no clue how many embassy representatives were in “a state of complete 
disillusionment,” having been “infected by the democratic contagion in America.”174   
Aleksandr Kaznacheev faced similar troubles during his stint at the Soviet Embassy 
in Burma in the late 1950s.  Before departing for his new assignment, Kaznacheev was told 
by his boss that the embassy in Burma was “one of the best we have in Southeast Asia,” with 
a tight, friendly group of colleagues and no complaints of difficult working conditions.175  He 
arrived to find things worse than he anticipated.  Kaznacheev was the only Soviet diplomat in 
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the embassy who spoke Burmese; in fact, according to his memoirs, he was the only Soviet 
official to speak Burmese in the entire Soviet foreign policy apparatus.176  All of the senior 
diplomats were Party functionaries with little understanding of foreign affairs and no 
knowledge of foreign languages.177  Owing to his poor connections in Moscow, the 
ambassador was a weak, secondary figure, and true authority at the embassy rested in the 
hands of the elite intelligence officers, who poached the ambassador’s best personnel for 
intelligence services and openly flouted his authority.178  Surveillance in Burma mirrored the 
experience of Kravchenko in the US.  In particular, the Burmese embassy’s Komsomol unit, 
the official youth organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had a constant 
schedule of obligatory meetings and events, effectively taking up any time that otherwise 
might be used for mischief and providing a forum for official censure of unauthorized 
behavior.179  Diplomats had to live on the embassy compound in cramped quarters designed 
to allow neighbors to monitor their colleagues’ behavior, and one of Kaznacheev’s 
coworkers even lived in a retrofitted bathroom.  They coped with this situation by drinking a 
considerable amount of alcohol.180 
By 1959, Kaznacheev had been recruited to serve as an intelligence officer, and he 
soon developed “an uneasy double life,” having grown disillusioned with Soviet life.  During 
the day, he officially served as a junior diplomat at the embassy, while simultaneously 
working as a full-time agent-interpreter for Soviet intelligence.  By night, he became “Mr. 
                                                
176 Ibid., 26. 
177 Ibid., 42. 
178 Ibid., 46-48; and 199-202. 
179 Ibid., 55-57. 
180 Ibid., 57-60. 
  85 
Alex,” a European who spoke Burmese and had a wide array of friends through Rangoon 
University and other cultural institutions.  The rift between “Mr. Alex” and “Comrade 
Kaznacheev” grew increasingly wide, and while Soviet intelligence expected him to report 
on his friends, he found himself increasingly sympathetic to the Burmese, spending all of his 
free time with his Burmese friends in the countryside.  This led to his eventual decision to 
defect.181   
In contrast to Kravchenko and Kaznacheev, Alexandra Costa had a more positive 
opinion of her time in service at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from 1975 to 
1978.182  Certainly some aspects of her experience bear a strong resemble to Kravchenko’s 
recollections.  For example, Costa, who did most of the domestic chores, found herself 
enamored with Western consumer goods, including air conditioned cars, coffee makers, 
dishwashers, plastic wraps, disposable mops, no-iron sheets, Teflon pans, Western fashions, 
and Barbie dolls.  Most impressive to Costa were the goods for babies, including disposable 
diapers, baby food, baby formula, and instant baby cereals, all of which meant that she would 
not be stuck in the kitchen doing chores for half of the day.  At the grocery store, Costa 
marveled at the colors of the labels and the variety of food products, and she was amazed at 
how easily she could purchase a car, which could take several years in the Soviet Union.183   
Like Kravchenko, Costa also griped about her work, especially the slowness of 
receiving a response from Moscow.  Costa’s husband served as the representative of the 
Soviet All-Union Copyright Agency, newly created after Soviet leaders signed the Universal 
Copyright Convention in 1973 as part of a renewed effort to demonstrate their commitment 
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to international standards during détente.  She worked as his assistant, and her fluency in 
English, developed during her training as a linguist and a sociologist, allowed her to manage 
the agency’s correspondence.  They had little authority to make decisions on the spot, and the 
Soviet bureaucracy could be very slow to respond, frustrating their American partners, who 
could provide answers to their questions almost instantaneously.184  Costa also cited incidents 
of diplomats with insufficient English language skills, although that seemed much less 
common during her time at the embassy.185  Just as in Kaznacheev’s time, official meetings 
at night were part of life at the embassy, but for Costa, they consisted of seemingly 
unobtrusive women’s meetings once per week on Wednesday nights.186 
Unlike Kravchenko, Costa does not portray the Soviet Embassy as a totalitarian 
extension of the USSR on American soil.  She describes Soviet diplomats in the US as 
consummate professionals who were knowledgeable of world affairs and overwhelmingly 
friendly.  In fact, at parties where they personally knew everyone at the affair, they would 
openly debate topics such as American electoral politics and Soviet-American relations 
without fear of surveillance by American or Soviet intelligence forces.  While the state 
encouraged Soviet officials to live in apartment buildings with other Soviet citizens for both 
security and surveillance reasons, it did not insist upon it, and by the end of their stay in 
Washington, Costa and her family lived in a building with no other Soviet families.187  
Embassy officials, at times, seemed to have an unfriendly relationship with their superiors in 
Moscow.  Costa and her husband had to call on a high-ranking colleague at the embassy for 
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help when the copyright office in Moscow attempted to veto their choice of apartments due 
to it exceeding the maximum size for a foreign representative of the bureaucracy, despite the 
fact that it fit within the allocated budget.  Promising to fix the problem, their friend 
responded: “Oh, no, not again.  When will those idiots in Moscow get in touch with reality?”  
He forwarded a letter to the Moscow office telling them to “lay off and let the embassy 
decide what was appropriate for its members.”  The problem soon went away, demonstrating 
the ways that the embassy was not merely an extension of the center, often coming into 
conflict with Moscow over living conditions and policies.188 
Costa explains how Soviet diplomats in the US in this period had a much more 
intimate relationship with life in their host country.  Unlike Kravchenko, Costa did not shy 
away from making American friends, even if she remained careful about keeping some of 
them private from other Soviet representatives.189  Costa and her acquaintances at the Soviet 
Embassy all read The Washington Post and watched Walter Cronkite’s evening news 
program, stopping after it aired to discuss the issues with fellow Soviet diplomats.  Costa 
even embraced American popular culture, becoming a devoted fan of The Six Million Dollar 
Man and Star Trek.190  Costa’s family enjoyed weekend trips in the summer to Pioneer Point, 
a vacation home on Maryland’s Eastern Shore acquired by the embassy in 1972.  It featured a 
summer home for the ambassador, cottages for embassy diplomats, tennis courts, and a 
banya, or traditional Russian sauna. This gave Soviet diplomats additional opportunities to 
meet American citizens with no ties to the American government, as they visited local stores 
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and antique shops during their time on the Chesapeake.191  While Kravchenko explained that 
accessing mainstream American culture or meeting with private American citizens was out of 
bounds at the embassy in the mid-1940s, Costa developed a close bond with American 
citizens and culture that gave her a better understanding and appreciation of her host country. 
Costa concludes that the close ties forged by the embassy with Americans and their 
institutions changed the way that she and her colleagues understood the US.  She writes that, 
during her first vacation to Russia during her stay at the embassy, she began to realize that 
she thought of Washington as “home,” missing her car, the TV shows, and the open 
discussions with embassy friends about US politics.  She found that after living in 
Washington, she had trouble connecting with her old friends in Russia.192  Later, at their 
welcome-home party, Costa’s husband brought this up with their high-ranking friend at the 
embassy, saying, “It’s as if we were talking a different language.  We couldn’t understand 
each other.”  Their friend explained that this was a normal reaction for embassy diplomats.  
Suggesting that they were now members of a fraternity of “Soviet Americans,” he noted that 
working at the embassy made people think in global terms, rather than the internal politics of 
Moscow.  Stating that the change was permanent, he declared, “When you return to Moscow, 
you will continue to socialize with people you met here at the embassy, rather than with your 
old friends, because we know the same things, we think the same way.  You will feel like a 
foreigner in Moscow for many years to come, and the only people you will be comfortable 
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with are those with the same experience.”193   
Costa explains that this change was so dramatic that when Soviet diplomats returned 
home after their tour in Washington, which usually lasted three years, they engaged in 
“taking a piece of America home with us.”  To varying degrees, they all attempted to make 
money by smuggling in goods to sell on the Soviet black market.  More importantly, though, 
they sought to import the creature comforts that they enjoyed in Washington back to the 
USSR.  As she writes, “It is almost impossible to go back to the drab Soviet environment 
after living in the US for a period of time, so the solution was to re-create the American 
environment in your own little world in Moscow—your home.”  To this end, Costa 
purchased shag carpets, wallpaper, a washer, a dryer, boxes of books and records, and other 
major appliances, bought in sufficient numbers to maintain this standard of living for a long 
time.  She even attempted to have her car shipped home, though this ultimately proved 
impractical.194  In this sense, becoming a “Soviet American” had an intellectual and cultural 
component, represented by the difficulty Costa and her colleagues found in talking with their 
old friends in the Soviet Union, and a material component, as they sought to maintain their 
American standard of living when their tours ended. 
Other embassy diplomats reported a similar response to living in Washington, as their 
worldviews changed in such a way that left them isolated, even among other members of the 
Foreign Ministry.  Sergei Tarasenko, a junior diplomat at the embassy who eventually served 
as an aide to Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, told political scientist Robert English 
that the American Department became “a separate ministry” within the Foreign Ministry, as a 
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rift developed between those with experience in the US and those who worked on other 
regions.  He continued that serving in the US required “a higher level of professionalism and 
culture, and such experience changes your outlook.”195  Kalugin, the KGB agent stationed at 
the embassy, expressed similar feelings, stating that living in America gave him his first 
“twinge of doubt” about the Soviet system, as he learned to speak his mind and lost his 
unquestioning respect for authority after he “tasted the freedom of American life.”196  Even 
Dobrynin harbored these sentiments, telling English of the “deep respect, even love” for the 
US that developed among specialists on American affairs.  He concluded, “Often we felt 
more at home in Washington than in Moscow.  After all, who could we talk to back there?  
Nobody really, except Arbatov and Primakov,” two academics who had traveled throughout 
the West.197   
Although this new atmosphere can be explained by a number of generational factors, 
with an embassy staffed by well-educated diplomats who were more open to Western culture 
than any previous group of Soviet officials, it also owed a great deal to the Dobrynins.198  A 
1976 article about the couple noted that there were about 700 people connected with the 
Soviet Embassy, including spouses and 200 children, who frequently had less exposure to 
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English and the difficulties of living abroad.  Dobrynin’s wife Irina told the reporter that she 
often served as “den mother,” giving young embassy diplomats and their families advice on 
living on the US and listening to their problems.  She claimed to take part in every activity 
with the staff, and she was an frequent participant in the embassy’s social scene.199  Dobrynin 
played an active role in managing his staff.  In his eulogy for the Soviet ambassador, 
Subbotin recalls a New Year’s party at the embassy at which Dobrynin greeted people from 
every department, knowing virtually all of them by name.200  The embassy regularly threw 
parties on the major Soviet holidays for its diplomats, at which they drank “rivers of 
champagne and vodka” alongside American journalists and politicians.201  Moreover, 
Dobrynin sometimes pushed his staff to get involved in Washington society and meet 
Americans at parties outside of the embassy’s walls.  During a telephone call in 1973, 
Dobrynin told Kissinger that he sent an embassy diplomat to a reception because he was new 
in Washington and not yet familiar with the social scene.202  Thus, despite the fact that 
Dobrynin spent tremendous energy on top-level diplomacy, he remained interested in life at 
the embassy, helping Soviet diplomats become more open to American society than they had 
been in the past. 
Undoubtedly, working at the embassy had its drawbacks.  Security concerns meant 
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that the two large windows in Dobrynin’s office had been bricked up, and a second room was 
built inside of the original room with magnetic radiation field between the outer and inner 
walls, leading to what Dobrynin described as a form of “continuous solitary confinement” 
that carried potential health risks.203  Other security hazards existed, including groups like the 
Jewish Defense League, which effectively declared war on Soviet civilians in the US, 
committing several acts of terror against Soviet property.204  The embassy sent lists of recent 
petty crimes committed against Soviet diplomatic personnel to the State Department on a 
regular basis, usually amounting to stolen car parts and broken car windows.205  
Occasionally, they indicated violent attacks, including when five unidentified individuals 
reportedly attacked First Secretary Zhil’tsov outside of the Woodner Hotel.  He attempted to 
fend off the attackers, but they stole his jacket from the car, as well as $250.206  Another case 
involved the publication of Zhil’tsov’s personal phone number in The Washington Post, 
resulting in multiple prank calls in the middle of the night.207   
Other complaints were more mundane.  Low salaries remained an issue, as most 
foreign ambassadors in Washington made two to three times as much as Dobrynin, while the 
American ambassador in Moscow earned four to five times as much as his Soviet 
counterpart.  The Romanian ambassador’s driver was even taking home pay equivalent to the 
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counselor at the Soviet Embassy.208  The embassy had such limited funds that it lacked 
sufficient cash to provide air conditioners to staff residences as late as the 1960s.  Embassy 
diplomats also maintained a demanding schedule.  Ereskovskii once joked that he worked 
“eight-hour days—from 8:00 AM to 8:00 PM—and then from 8:00 PM until midnight.”209  
In fact, one unmistakable way to determine which embassy officials doubled as KGB agents 
would be to examine their expenditures.  Soviet officials affiliated with the KGB had more 
expensive apartments, personal automobiles, and unlimited budgets for wining and dining 
American officials, while those who worked exclusively for the Foreign Ministry lived a 
more plebian lifestyle.  When taking an American to a restaurant, for instance, the embassy 
would contribute twenty to twenty-five dollars toward the whole meal, leaving the diplomats 
to cover any additional costs.  For this reason, embassy diplomats without KGB ties often 
entertained their American counterparts in a more economical fashion than their KGB 
counterparts.210      
Despite these issues, the embassy remained an extremely desirable appointment in the 
Soviet Foreign Service, in no small part because of the new generation of Soviet diplomats, 
trained in academies run by the Foreign Ministry and schooled in the pragmatist approach to 
foreign affairs, and the influence of the “Dobrynin school.”  In an attempt to explain what 
made this institution unique, Bessmertnykh stated that it was like “a miniature foreign 
ministry dealing with all the most important areas of foreign policy.”  Unlike other 
embassies, it had departments covering a variety of geographical regions, as well as the 
normal departments on politics, economics, science and technology, cultural relations, 
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information, and, of course, consular work.  In other words, as the largest Soviet diplomatic 
mission in the world, it functioned much like an independent foreign ministry, only on 
foreign soil.211  In his memoirs, Dobrynin explains that he had more freedom to maneuver 
than other Soviet ambassadors, allowing him to “improvise within certain limits” in informal 
conversations with American diplomats, introducing “new ideas and some flexibility within 
the rigid constraints of the Politburo.”212  This spirit of relative independence shaped 
embassy culture, at large, as lower-level diplomats experienced more freedom to meet with 
Americans and interact with American culture than previous diplomats in the US.  The 
community that formed around these principles separated those who served in Washington 
from their other Soviet counterparts, even in the Foreign Ministry. 
 
Conclusion 
In his first interview as ambassador, Dobrynin stated: “‘In the sixteenth century . . . 
when an ambassador had to travel 2,000 miles to his post by troika, he could and did shape 
policy.  But now he is at the end of a telephone wire, and he has to do what he is told.  Of 
course,” Dobrynin smiled, “there are different ways of telling the same thing.”213  The first 
half of this quote reflects one theme of Dobrynin’s early years in Washington: the limitations 
placed on backchannel activities by Washington and Moscow.  The Soviet and American 
governments were not yet prepared to compromise on key problems that blocked the further 
development of relations.  Khrushchev’s stubbornness, American escalation of the Vietnam 
War, and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia further delayed progress in superpower 
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negotiations. 
 The quote, however, also highlights the fact that, despite tremendous roadblocks, 
Dobrynin influenced policy implementation on the ground level.  His negotiating strategies 
employed pragmatism and humor to frame Soviet policies in a way that Americans could 
comprehend, while helping to identify mutually acceptable compromises that guided 
negotiations forward.  American diplomats, for the first time in the Cold War era, felt they 
had a reliable Soviet partner in Washington with whom they could work and socialize.  
Dobrynin’s willingness to throw lavish parties at the embassy and attend social events in 
Washington, D.C., allowed him to establish an impressive list of American contacts and 
friends that proved useful in building closer relations between the USSR and the US.  His 
public presence, particularly in the early years of détente, was minimal, yet in time Dobrynin 
showed the public a more humane side of the Soviet Union that, for too long, had been 
dominated by his hawkish predecessors.   
Most importantly during the period before 1969, the backchannel became firmly 
established as a means of coordinating relations between the superpowers.  The Cuban 
Missile Crisis convinced Dobrynin to maintain a backchannel with American officials at all 
cost.  The initial contacts with Robert Kennedy and Rusk gave Soviet and American 
diplomats practical experience in secret diplomacy that Dobrynin drew upon when he and 
Kissinger managed détente in the 1970s.  In this sense, diplomats of the 1960s laid the 
foundation for détente, a development finally achieved during the Nixon administration.  
Dobrynin’s ability to function in both the Washington and the Moscow bureaucracies proved 
essential to this approach, as he could serve as “translator,” helping the two sides better 
understand one another.  Finally, Dobrynin established his “school of diplomacy,” training 
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junior Soviet diplomats in his pragmatist worldview and his methods for pursuing relations 
with other states, leaving a legacy that continues to impact Russian diplomacy today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
CONFRONTATION AND APPREHENSION: 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BACKCHANNEL, 1969-1971 
 
Ambassador Dobrynin greeted the news of Richard M. Nixon’s 1968 election to the 
presidency with wariness.  Dobrynin’s thoughts drifted to a day nine years earlier, when then 
Vice President Nixon visited Moscow engaged Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the 
infamous “kitchen debate” over the virtues of each man’s respective society.  In his memoirs, 
Dobrynin remembers how Khrushchev, “infuriated by an anti-Soviet [American 
congressional] resolution referring to the ‘captive peoples’” of Eastern Europe, “took Nixon 
for a ride on a motor launch down the picturesque Moscow River” following the debate. The 
ambassador recalled: 
It was a weekend, and the boat stopped at sandy beaches, where Khrushchev 
introduced Nixon to ordinary citizens enjoying themselves in the sun. He then would 
ask them loudly and in a joking manner if they felt enslaved. The answer was always 
a burst of laughter. Throughout the trip he persisted in lecturing and teasing Nixon, 
who was made quite uncomfortable by his hectoring host.214   
 
The Soviet leadership feared that these initial contacts as well as Nixon’s personal history of 
“anti-Sovietism, anti-communism, and militarism” could lead to only “hard times for Soviet- 
American relations.”215 
In 1968, Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
displayed similar reservations about the new president.  In an article published the week prior 
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to the election, “President or Sheriff?,” Pravda correspondent B. Strel’nikov characterized 
each of the presidential candidates as essentially identical, writing: “It is necessary to note 
that in a society of universal fear the slogan ‘law and order’ hypnotized many voters.  But not 
all.  Here today there is a very popular caricature: two Americans stand in front of portraits of 
the candidates.  One American asks another: ‘Whose nightstick would you rather be beaten 
with? Vote.’”216  Two days later, correspondent V. Nekrasov mirrored these feelings about 
the elections: “Many realize that, in the final analysis, nothing is decided, nothing is 
determined.”217  Such critiques did not point to an optimistic future for Soviet-American 
relations.   
The next four chapters explore how, despite the initial pessimism of Dobrynin and 
others, Soviet and American leaders ushered in a new era of superpower affairs that featured 
high-level talks to normalize the Cold War and several critical summits to formalize 
important new agreements, with pageantry designed to cement the image of a new 
superpower relationship in the public eye.  These chapters examine the Soviet Embassy’s 
role in carrying out backchannel negotiations with Dr. Henry Kissinger, who served as 
national security advisor from 1969 to 1975 and as secretary of state from 1973 to 1977, and 
his successors in the Carter administration.  These private talks led to a number of 
agreements to limit the arms race, including the first SALT treaty, signed by Nixon and 
Brezhnev in Moscow in 1972, and a second agreement, SALT II, with the preliminary 
framework approved in Vladivostok in 1974 before Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter 
signed the final draft in 1979.  The backchannel also aided in a dramatic expansion of 
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economic and cultural ties, serving as the primary forum to discuss superpower conflicts 
around the globe.  From January 1969 to May 1972, alone, Kissinger and Dobrynin met a 
total of 40 times and spoke on the phone 450 times, meaning that they talked on average 
about four times a week, and records have been released for 653 telephone conversations 
over the entire eight years that Kissinger spent in office.218   
This chapter focuses on the period from January to December 1969, when Kissinger 
and Dobrynin established the backchannel, dealt with superpower conflicts in Vietnam and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and attempted to overcome the inertia that emerged 
when a consensus on how to solve certain problems was not immediately reached.  It 
investigates the major problems facing Dobrynin and Kissinger in order to draw broader 
conclusions about the role of the backchannel and the nature of Soviet-American relations in 
the early détente period.  Many historians have treated the backchannel as a shortcut that 
allowed Kissinger to work around the normal American bureaucracy to engineer dramatic 
accomplishments.219  Even Kissinger’s critics concede that it was successful in this respect, 
reserving their complaints for the lack of transparency in the process, Kissinger’s lack of 
faith in a democratic approach, or Kissinger’s personal insecurities or failings.220  I argue 
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that, while the backchannel provided a forum for two influential diplomats to discuss their 
national leaderships’ respective concerns and to defuse tensions, negotiations remained a 
slow, arduous process that made substantial progress only after two-and-a-half years of 
wrangling, when conditions changed markedly.  A fragile structure in these years, 
backchannel talks ground to a halt for months at a time in response to various crises, 
threatening to derail the détente initiative entirely.  
Second, I break new ground by considering Dobrynin as a strategic thinker.  Most 
histories of détente are written by American historians, who focus their attention on Nixon 
and Kissinger’s innovations in international diplomacy, relegating Soviet diplomats to the 
role of reacting to American policy.  The few historians of the USSR who have written on 
détente concentrate on what motivated Brezhnev and other members of the Politburo to 
pursue certain policies, downplaying the critical process of policy implementation.221  The 
process of diplomatic negotiations between Kissinger and Dobrynin demonstrates that, from 
the start of the Nixon administration, Dobrynin understood Kissinger’s policies of linkage 
and triangular diplomacy, sought to defuse his opponent’s use of these strategies, and, in 
many cases, devised strategies to appropriate these policies and employ them against the US.  
Dobrynin’s recommendations to the Foreign Ministry and the Politburo reveal a diplomat 
who sought, above all, to defend Soviet strategic interests.  While he attempted to improve 
relations with the US, he was prepared to deal with a world in which that was not possible, 
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and he did not shy away from recommending assertive and even aggressive tactics in the 
Third World to allow the Soviet Union to negotiate with the US from a position of strength.  
In other words, Dobrynin did not simply react to Kissinger’s actions, but conceived of 
strategies for dealing with Kissinger that dealt with the increasingly complex international 
scene.  Even if the US came out on top in triangular diplomacy, it was not due to a lack of 
effort on the Soviet side.   
While most Russian archival collections on détente remain closed, there is a wealth of 
recently declassified American archival and Russian published materials that serve as the 
basis for the next four chapters.  In particular, in this chapter, I rely on the published 
document collection Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, initiated by 
a joint agreement between the State Department and the Russian Foreign Ministry.  It 
contains the reports on backchannel discussions prepared by Kissinger for Nixon and by 
Dobrynin for the Kremlin.222  Dobrynin’s messages to Moscow come in two forms.  First, 
after each meeting, Dobrynin filed a memorandum of conversation with the Politburo 
outlining the major developments.  He sometimes made recommendations or observations in 
these reports, but he mainly sought to convey what was said about the major topics covered.  
Second, after important discussions or events, Dobrynin typically wrote telegrams to the 
Foreign Ministry with policy recommendations.  More direct in these telegrams, at times 
Dobrynin made recommendations for Third World policies that had a positive influence on 
the superpower relationship.  These reports help explain Dobrynin’s attitudes toward the 
backchannel.  Since disparities exist between Kissinger and Dobrynin’s accounts of 
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backchannel conversations, even on mundane issues, I tap declassified telephone 
conversation transcripts, memoirs, and other sources to clarify certain events.  
 
The Big Issues 
The period between Nixon’s assumption of the presidency in 1969 and the summer of 
1971 shepherded in a cautious beginning to détente. Leaders on both sides used this time to 
get acquainted with each other, negotiate some preliminary agreements, and gauge how 
seriously the opposing side took the matter of nuclear limitations.  According to Dobrynin, in 
his first year of office Nixon “confirmed [Soviet] apprehensions” that arose after his election 
“because there were no attempts on his part to improve relations on the diplomatic level. He 
avoided making any statements about armaments control.”  In Dobrynin’s opinion, Nixon 
represented the first US president to accept that “the nuclear power of the Soviet Union was 
as strong” as that of the US, and “he thought that there had to be some means of control: that 
there should be no political confrontation that would have brought about nuclear 
confrontation.”  Dobrynin concluded, “When Nixon came in, there was a combination of 
confrontation and apprehension on both sides, but at the same time a mutual desire to 
somehow control things.”223  Détente developed slowly, with both sides taking time to size 
up their opponents and consider their positions. 
 Nixon’s inauguration coincided with a number of critical issues facing superpower 
negotiators.  Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, or SALT, had been delayed since the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.  There existed a general understanding that these 
negotiations should include both offensive weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic 
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missiles (ICBMs), and defensive weapons, most notably antiballistic missile systems 
(ABMs), which theoretically could fire missiles at incoming ICBMs with the intention of 
destroying them before they reached their intended targets.  The technology for such systems 
was, at the time, primitive and extremely unreliable, but both sides feared that the 
development of ABM systems would lead to a new and perhaps more dangerous arms race.  
European issues also served as a critical realm for negotiations.  The Soviet government 
hoped to attain an agreement for a conference on European security to gain formal 
recognition of the postwar borders on the continent and of its role in European affairs.  
Moreover, the issue of West Berlin’s relationship with West Germany remained unsettled.  
After the war, West Berlin remained under the control of the Western powers, despite the 
fact that it sat in the middle of East Germany, a Soviet satellite.  The Western powers took a 
vague stance on whether West Berlin belonged to the Federal Republic of Germany, and saw 
East Germany as potential threat to the security of the supply routes that brought goods into 
the city by land.   
 The developing world also created a set of conflicts that demanded negotiations 
between Kissinger and Dobrynin.  In the Middle East, Israel’s defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and 
Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War allowed it to take control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai 
Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan 
Heights from Syria.  Despite the 1967 UN Resolution 242, which called for Israel to return 
territory in exchange for peace and diplomatic recognition from the Arab world, the armies 
remained entrenched, and hostilities between the sides periodically erupted, with both the 
Soviet and American governments offering support to their allies and attempting to enforce 
the ceasefire.  The Vietnam War continued in full force as Nixon came to office with the 
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promise of implementing a “secret plan” to achieve “peace with honor.”224  His strategy 
called for Vietnamization, or stepping up American bombing raids while decreasing the 
American troop presence and training the South Vietnamese army to fight on its own.  
Soviet-American diplomats met with the hopes of finding common ground for peace talks 
between the US and North Vietnam.  Finally, by 1969 it was increasingly clear that China 
would play a central role in Soviet-American relations in the 1970s.  The Sino-Soviet split, 
which had roots in ideological and personal differences between Chinese leader Mao Zedong 
and Khrushchev, escalated when Chinese leaders publicly denounced Soviet authority in the 
early 1960s.  In 1969, armed hostilities broke out on the Sino-Soviet border, setting the stage 
for a diplomatic competition between the three powers during the Nixon administration.    
 
Meeting of the Minds  
Like many events in this period, Kissinger and Dobrynin explained the establishment 
of the backchannel in substantially different ways.  On the evening of February 14, 1969, less 
than three weeks after Nixon took office, Kissinger attended a reception at the Soviet 
Embassy for American expert Georgii Arbatov, whom Kissinger had met during an earlier 
trip to Moscow.  Kissinger reported to Nixon that Dobrynin had gone to bed with the flu, but 
had his aide call Kissinger to his apartment for a brief discussion.  Dobrynin informed 
Kissinger that he had a message from Moscow for Nixon, which he would like to deliver 
personally to the president.  On the topic of relations with the new administration, Kissinger 
wrote that Dobrynin requested a backchannel with someone who was not part of the official 
diplomatic establishment.  He also relayed that Dobrynin expressed a willingness to proceed 
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with discussions on the Middle East, but outside of the UN framework, with talks confined to 
two trusted officials in Moscow or Washington.  Kissinger’s description suggests that 
Dobrynin proposed the backchannel to Kissinger, looking for a venue to discuss a broad 
array of issues, from the Middle East to Vietnam to “any other political problem on our 
mind.”225 
 Dobrynin’s memo to the Politburo provides a significantly different characterization 
of this conversation.  According to Dobrynin, Kissinger informed him that Nixon wanted to 
meet with him on February 17.  Then Kissinger reportedly declared that the president 
requested a confidential channel with the Soviet government, mainly due to his belief that 
normal State Department channels were “not particularly reliable” and prone to leaking 
material to the press.  In Dobrynin’s version, Kissinger asked for direct negotiations between 
the national security advisor and the Soviet ambassador.  Kissinger ended this portion of the 
conversation by giving Dobrynin his personal telephone number and saying that he was 
willing to meet “any time, any place,” and Dobrynin assured Kissinger of his willingness to 
take on this obligation.226   
The discrepancies between these two depictions of the initial meeting between 
Kissinger and Dobrynin are striking.  Kissinger’s memo suggests that the two men did not 
discuss the dimensions of the backchannel, leaving open the option of a channel in Moscow 
or in Washington with an unspecified person that Nixon trusted.  Dobrynin’s memo, 
however, indicates that they outlined more specific details about the backchannel’s functions.  
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In this account, Kissinger stated outright Nixon’s intentions to establish a backchannel 
between the national security advisor and the Soviet ambassador.  Moreover, Kissinger 
reportedly directly told Dobrynin of Nixon’s distrust of the State Department, implying that 
the critical negotiations should take place outside of official diplomatic channels. Dobrynin’s 
report on the initial meeting also describes two moments when Dobrynin took a hard line 
toward his new negotiating partner that only were hinted at in the Kissinger memo. First, in 
his memo, Kissinger notes that Dobrynin had stayed in the same sanatorium with Brezhnev, 
Podgorny, and Kosygin, as if to highlight Dobrynin’s ties with these top Soviet officials.227  
In Dobrynin’s memo, however, the ambassador states that Kissinger asked about the health 
of these officials, citing “various rumors” in Washington.  Dobrynin responded by vouching 
that these leaders were “healthy and vigorous.”  Furthermore, Dobrynin informed Kissinger 
“in a personal, friendly way” to ignore the gossip about Soviet affairs that was “so abundant” 
in American circles.228   
Second, in his memo, the ambassador mentions a conversation with Kissinger about 
the concept of linkage, or linking progress in one area of discussion with progress in another.  
Kissinger asked Dobrynin if he had heard about the “pleasant conversations” that the national 
security advisor had had with two Soviet officials in Washington about his thoughts on the 
future of Soviet-American relations.  Dobrynin responded that he had, but that he “personally 
did not like one aspect of what [Kissinger] said to his Soviet interlocutors.”  Kissinger, 
“pricking up his ears,” asked which aspect Dobrynin did not approve of, and Dobrynin 
responded that the comments could be interpreted to mean the US Government hoped to link 
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progress on disarmament—one of the Soviet government’s primary goals—to issues such as 
the Vietnam War and the Middle East peace settlement.  Dobrynin warned that trying to 
force concessions through these sorts of political games would not serve as an effective basis 
for constructive negotiations.  According to Dobrynin, Kissinger became defensive, claiming 
that the officials misunderstood him and that he had merely been discussing “the impact of 
the overall political climate in the world on progress” in talks.  He assured Dobrynin that 
Nixon “does not intend to put forward any preconditions with respect to the issue of 
beginning negotiations,” and that the president would be willing to open discussions “on 
several different problems in parallel and simultaneously,” emphasizing these words.  
Kissinger stressed their awareness “that the Soviet Union is a great power and that it cannot 
be forced to do something that it believes is contrary to its interests.”229  Kissinger glossed 
over this exchange in his memo, simply noting that Soviet leaders “were reluctant to accept 
conditions on the ground that they had to show their good faith,” but were “ready to proceed 
on the basis of equality” if American leaders “wanted simultaneous progress on several 
fronts at once.”  He did not mention the issue of linkage, the misunderstanding between 
himself and the Soviet officials, or the early attempt by the two negotiators to set the terms 
for how they would discuss the multiple problems facing the superpowers.230   
This meeting represents the birth of the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel, yet also 
demonstrates the challenges inherent in dealing with these sources.  The document 
collection’s placement of Kissinger’s memos to Nixon on backchannel activities next to 
Dobrynin’s memos to the Politburo can be deceptive.  After all, these respective sets of 
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memos served different purposes.  Kissinger frequently met with Nixon in person to discuss 
Soviet-American relations, so it was less critical for him to be precise and comprehensive in 
his descriptions.  Dobrynin, however, needed to convey the full extent of discussions, since 
he could meet with Soviet leaders only during consultations in Moscow every few months.   
Additionally, at this point in their careers, both Kissinger and Dobrynin were in 
tenuous positions.  Kissinger had not yet established himself as Nixon’s foreign policy guru 
and remained in competition for influence with Secretary of State William Rodgers for much 
of Nixon’s first term.  By 1969, Dobrynin had served as ambassador for seven years, which 
already represented the longest tenure for any Soviet ambassador in the United States since 
official recognition in 1933.  Dobrynin held the top overseas post in the Foreign Ministry and 
Gromyko was ensconced in his position as foreign minister, so any appointment back in 
Moscow would represent a demotion.  Further, Dobrynin enjoyed living in the United States 
and performing his duties as ambassador, making it imperative for him to retain his post.  
After the removal of Khrushchev in 1964, Dobrynin understood how quickly the winds could 
change for an official, and he had little to no immediate feedback from the Politburo on his 
analysis, making it difficult to assess its reception in Moscow.  Thus both Kissinger and 
Dobrynin framed their memoranda with an awareness of the fragility of their respective 
situations. 
In his memoirs, Dobrynin addresses the issue of differing reports.  He notes that, 
because of the secrecy of the backchannel, they held their meetings without secretaries, 
leaving no official record of the meetings except what they reported back to their superiors.  
He states: “Although at times it could have led to differing versions of what was actually said 
and meant (for the participants might also yield to the temptation of presenting themselves in 
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the best possible way, especially later, in their recollections and memoirs), no problems or 
arguments arose during the actual talks and negotiations over what had actually been said in 
previous conversations.”  Dobrynin further argues that the two diplomats shared a clear 
understanding of what they had officially agreed upon and what they had discussed in 
moments when they were “talking out loud,” when they would “explore new ideas or 
approaches on a personal basis.”  He concludes: “This enabled us to keep our frank 
exchanges in strictest confidence and preserve secrecy in negotiations.  That was why our 
channel was of great value to both governments.  Its importance should not be 
underestimated.”231  In other words, Dobrynin recognized that the American and Soviet 
records of these conversations might contradict one another, especially in situations when a 
refashioning of the truth might help one party look better in the historical record or in the 
eyes of their bosses, although he suggested that it such discrepancies were limited to minor 
issues and that, privately, they acknowledged exactly what each had said.  The existence of 
this “private understanding” remains unclear, as no sources corroborate this argument, but 
future conversations demonstrate that disparities in the transcripts are sometimes more 
dramatic than Dobrynin would suggest.   
  
Getting to Know You  
On February 17, 1969, Nixon met with Dobrynin directly to set the tone for future 
talks.  The initial part of the conversation took place in private and, as Dobrynin reported, the 
president went out of his way to create a friendly atmosphere.  Nixon showed off the newly-
decorated Oval Office, pointing to a presidential emblem that his daughter had embroidered, 
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new curtains and carpets, and the new furnishings, including a “trusty old desk” that Nixon 
used since his first election to public office.  Nixon and Dobrynin sat near a lit fireplace, 
talking informally about the differences between Camp David and the Soviet leadership’s 
dachas.  Nixon even joked about the kitchen debate, the same memory that gave Dobrynin 
such ominous feelings after Nixon’s elections, concluding, “We both, perhaps, talked too 
much then and without particular need.”232  Nixon clearly did not want to repeat the intense 
theatrics of the kitchen debate, instead looking forward to a calmer, more businesslike 
approach to superpower relations. 
At the end of their private discussion, Nixon returned to the issue of the backchannel, 
and from his first discussion with Dobrynin, he hinted that secret talks directly between the 
White House and the embassy would be closer and more secretive than ever.  According to 
Dobrynin’s report, Nixon pointed to the past successes of confidential ties between Dobrynin 
and members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.  Dobrynin noted that Nixon 
expressed his wish to “further develop and use such confidential channels with Moscow,” 
creating a forum for sensitive discussions known to “only a very small circle of people on the 
US side.”  Nixon emphasized that this elite group included Secretary of State William 
Rogers, a close personal friend and a trusted advisor, and that he did not intend to keep 
secrets from him in Soviet-American relations.  Still, Nixon stated, “it will be harder for 
[Rogers] than for Kissinger, because he is more visible, always surrounded by State 
Department officials,” making Kissinger a more logical partner for confidential talks with 
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Dobrynin.  Dobrynin agreed, in principle, to meet with whomever Nixon designated.233  
Nixon thus took the first steps toward marginalizing his secretary of state and the other 
members of his foreign policy bureaucracy in his first meeting with the Soviet ambassador. 
When Kissinger and State Department official Malcolm Toon joined Nixon and 
Dobrynin, the conversation shifted to a general overview of the major topics at issue in 
Soviet-American relations during Nixon’s presidency.  Nixon expressed a desire for a 
summit meeting with the top Soviet leadership after extensive preparations.  They discussed 
curbing the arms race, putting an end to the war in Vietnam, settling the conflict in the 
Middle East, and easing tensions in Germany.  While both sides articulated a willingness to 
move forward on multiple issues in parallel, they spoke only in general terms about these 
situations, and Dobrynin did not see a clear path to a quick solution to any of these issues.  
He reported that, on the one hand, “Nixon conspicuously tried to remain friendly, clearly 
avoided ‘thorny issues,’ and in his whole demeanor demonstrated his desire for improved 
relations with the USSR.”  On the other hand, Dobrynin concluded that Nixon’s “position is 
still not defined and has not been worked out in any detail.”  His stance on Vietnam did not 
seem to differ significantly from that of President Johnson, he had unclear views on the 
Middle East, and he showed an early commitment to linkage in strategic arms talks that could 
forestall progress in this matter.234   
Kissinger similarly expressed caution in a memo to Nixon, in which he responded to 
a note Dobrynin delivered from the Soviet leadership.  With some surprise, he described the 
Soviet approach as “totally non-ideological—even anti-ideological,” observing that “the 
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arguments are posed strictly in terms of national interests and mutually perceived threats, 
without even the usual ritual obeisance to Marxist-Leninist jargon.”  Kissinger optimistically 
stated that the Soviet leadership’s apparent willingness to move forward on a wide array of 
topics—including the Middle East, Central Europe, Vietnam, arms talks, and cultural 
exchange—provided the Americans with the linkage they desired, giving them the 
opportunity to make headway in areas of value to the Soviet side contingent upon progress in 
areas singled out by the American side.  Kissinger urged discretion, however, identifying two 
possible reasons that Soviet leaders expressed hope for progress.  The first possibility, as 
officials from the Johnson administration had also believed, was that Soviet leaders sought to 
work on areas in which American and Soviet interests overlapped, like strategic arms, 
compartmentalizing disagreements and using progress on some issues to prevent 
disagreements in others from contaminating the entire superpower relationship.  The second 
possibility was that Soviet leaders wanted to “use the bait of progress in one area in order to 
neutralize our resistance to pressures elsewhere,” pursuing a more “adventurous” foreign 
policy.  Kissinger leaned toward the second interpretation, emphasizing that a real 
improvement in Soviet-American relations could not come from arms limitations alone and 
that the US should hold off on concluding an arms limitations agreement until it achieved 
solid gains in areas such as the Middle East and Vietnam.235  Thus, while both Dobrynin and 
Kissinger saw reasons for optimism after the first meeting between the president and the 
ambassador, both expected a difficult period of negotiations ahead. 
Indeed, much of the remainder of the first year of backchannel talks largely followed 
the pattern of this initial discussion, as Dobrynin and Kissinger familiarized themselves with 
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one another, defined the purpose of the backchannel, and set out an agenda that would shape 
the next three years of talks.  In their next meeting, on February 21, Dobrynin reported that 
Kissinger, on instructions from Nixon, set up the basic parameters for how their backchannel 
would function.  The national security advisor requested that the backchannel facilitate the 
first exchanges between the Soviet and American governments on basic problems, as well as 
the most important issues confronting the superpowers.  After these issues were settled in 
principle, Kissinger stated that they would be forwarded to the State Department and the 
Foreign Ministry for official talks.  If difficulties arose in official channels, the topics could 
return to the backchannel for additional conversation.  Kissinger suggested that this two-
tiered approach to negotiations—to lay out the groundwork and work out the most 
contentious problems in the backchannel—would “best suit the US President, allowing him 
to personally exercise more direct leadership and observe the exchange of opinions on the 
aforementioned problems.”236  In this sense, more than any previous administration, Nixon 
and Kissinger sought to conduct the most sensitive business in Soviet-American through the 
White House, leaving the State Department to settle the details. 
In many ways, Moscow quickly recognized and welcomed Kissinger’s dominance 
over foreign affairs.  After a June conversation, Dobrynin detailed Kissinger’s activities in a 
memo to the Kremlin: “It can be stated with a good deal of confidence that at the moment 
Kissinger is the main—in fact, the dominating—influence on the President in the area of 
foreign policy.”  He noted that Kissinger gathered all foreign policy materials, including 
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intelligence, and reported directly to Nixon, and he prepared the agenda for meetings of the 
National Security Council, which met more regularly than under previous presidents.  
Dobrynin stated that State Department officials “bluntly” complained to him that if “Henry” 
is against one of their proposals, Nixon “will almost certainly reject it.”  Furthermore, 
Dobrynin observed that Kissinger—whom he described as “an intelligent and erudite person” 
but “at the same time quite vain”—“conducts himself more freely in the presence of the 
President” than previous national security advisors, and “one feels the definite confidence of 
someone who has already gained for himself a firm position in the White House.”  During a 
backchannel meeting over lunch, Kissinger even boasted to Dobrynin that “only two people 
can, at any given moment, provide a precise answer concerning the US position on a 
particular issue”: Nixon and Kissinger.237 
Further, Dobrynin acknowledged that Kissinger had a personal stake in backchannel.  
He commended Kissinger for arranging meetings as soon as they were requested, and he 
frequently initiated backchannel meetings on his own, contributing to the “fairly good 
personal rapport” that they had developed.  In fact, Dobrynin suggested that Kissinger 
“exercises personal control over all contacts” between the embassy and his twenty-five-
person staff, and he made sure that all conversations between embassy officials and his staff 
were reported directly to him.  Kissinger gradually restricted those conversations to push 
these issues into the backchannel.  Dobrynin commented, “Evidently, [Kissinger] is using all 
this to reinforce his own authority with Nixon as the confidential channel of communication 
with the Soviet side.”  The Soviet ambassador concluded that even though Rogers seemed to 
be gaining power over some aspects of foreign policy, using the State Department’s 
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“extensive apparatus,” Kissinger’s influence over foreign affairs was still “predominant.”  
Dobrynin wrote, “It would be best “to develop and utilize the Kissinger channel even more 
actively in order to exert influence and communicate our views on various issues through 
him to President Nixon personally.”238  In other words, Dobrynin recognized Nixon and 
Kissinger’s attempts to take foreign policy out of the realm of the traditional authorities, to 
seize the reigns of the process and to place as much authority in the hands of the White 
House as possible.  Dobrynin advised taking advantage of this state of affairs to handle 
sensitive issues outside the gaze of the public and the media, and he recognized Kissinger’s 
vanity, recommending that Soviet officials stroke Kissinger’s ego to manipulate the 
backchannel.   
Thanks in large part to Kissinger’s influence in the administration, Dobrynin’s initial 
assessment of the Nixon administration was positive, if guarded.  Dobrynin’s telegram to the 
Foreign Ministry on March 13 included his observations of Nixon’s behavior.  Dobrynin 
stated that Nixon seemed to have acknowledged that brinksmanship was not an effective 
foreign policy, since both the US and the USSR had sufficiently large nuclear stockpiles to 
destroy the world several times over.  While Nixon recognized the irreconcilable differences 
between the US and the USSR, he also promised to follow a “pragmatic course,” initiating 
talks when it would be beneficial for US interests or when compromise could be reached.  
Dobrynin expressed optimism regarding European affairs, as Nixon had implied he would 
respect the status quo and would not intervene in Soviet affairs in Eastern Europe.  Dobrynin 
added that Nixon’s unwillingness to get involved in a conflict over West Berlin indicated that 
the time was ripe to reach a formal agreement normalizing West Berlin’s status.  Dobrynin 
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did not foresee a quick end to the Middle East crisis, but argued that Nixon wanted to 
establish “a concrete, businesslike exchange of views” with the Soviet leadership on this 
matter, moving toward a possible resolution.  Regarding SALT, Dobrynin sensed that 
American policymakers had given up on linking the start of talks with the resolution of 
Vietnam, making progress possible.  Dobrynin suggested waiting until the US side “finds 
itself compelled to approach us” with a proposal for the initial stages of discussion, to 
counteract the impression that the Soviet side wanted an agreement more than the American 
side.  Moreover, Dobrynin contended that “Nixon’s personal interest in meeting with Soviet 
leaders” to resolve issues such as SALT “could be important as a retraining factor that could 
have a positive effect on US Government positions on issues of interest to us.”239  Thus, just 
as Kissinger aspired to link progress on SALT to concessions from Soviet diplomats, 
Dobrynin hoped to use SALT and the promise of a summit to push the US to accept Soviet 
positions on other issues.    
Dobrynin correctly identified Vietnam as the most pressing issue for the Nixon 
administration, and his recommendations reflect astute observations on the changing nature 
of international politics in the late 1960s.  He wrote that Nixon’s policies did not differ much 
from those of President Johnson and that the Nixon administration did not believe it could 
reach an agreement with North Vietnam to end the conflict in the near future on terms 
“acceptable” to the US.  Still, Dobrynin found reason for optimism, emphasizing the 
importance that Nixon attached to Soviet assistance in the initial round of the Paris Peace 
Talks.  Dobrynin recommended using Nixon’s conviction that the Soviet leadership could, if 
it so desired, play a constructive role in ending the Vietnam War by nudging American 
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leaders “in the most realistic direction possible,” cautioning against the American inclination 
to escalate violence in order to seek a “solution through a crisis” and pushing the president 
toward concessions and compromise with North Vietnam.  Demonstrating an awareness of 
the emergence of “triangular diplomacy” between the US, USSR, and China, Dobrynin 
wrote: “While maintaining our policy of support for our Vietnamese friends—we could have 
a more realistic idea of where the Vietnam issue belongs within the framework of world 
politics, particularly in light of the deterioration of our relations with China and in view of 
the fact that Vietnam continues to restrict US freedom to maneuver, including vis-à-vis 
[Beijing], as well as [Beijing]’s freedom to maneuver vis-à-vis the US.”240  In other words, 
Dobrynin counseled that, as long as the Vietnam War continued, the US and China would 
have a harder time reconciling their differences.  Soviet diplomats, he implied, should use 
that space to develop relations between the US and the USSR, ensuring that the Soviet Union 
would not find itself isolated, facing a US-Chinese alliance, at some point in the near future.  
Thus Dobrynin anticipated the way that China later altered the international scene, 
prescribing solutions for how the USSR could best position itself.    
Dobrynin seems to have felt encouraged by the potential for US-Soviet relations three 
months into the Nixon administration.  Regretting that talks were currently in a “suspended 
state,” Dobrynin nonetheless praised the approach behind the “businesslike” and 
“constructive” initial Soviet proposal, as “it helped allay the serious apprehension and doubts 
the new President had (in view of his past) regarding what Moscow’s attitude toward him 
was, whether there would be an opportunity for a private confidential dialogue with Soviet 
leaders, etc.”  This, Dobrynin asserted, set the groundwork for productive talks on issues 
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such as the Middle East, and could be furthered by sending Nixon personal messages from 
the Soviet leadership.  He maintained that, while they should continue to cultivate ties 
through official channels with the State Department, the backchannel with Kissinger 
represented “one of the most effective practical channels for us to influence the President and 
his policy at this time,” specifically in dealing with the most critical issues.  In particular, 
Dobrynin pointed to “Kissinger’s obvious personal interest in being the President’s principal 
foreign policy advisor,” proposing that Soviet leaders play on the national security advisor’s 
ambition and vanity to achieve their goals.  In this way, Dobrynin expressed hope for the 
future of superpower relations, even if Nixon’s ideological views and political past did not 
immediately bolster this view.   
Despite Kissinger’s brash displays of confidence and Dobrynin’s plan to focus talks 
on the backchannel, lingering doubts remained about each side’s motivations and the 
soundness of Nixon’s new approach to conducting superpower relations.  If Kissinger 
assumed an air of confidence around Dobrynin, other observers recognized the national 
security advisor’s insecurity.  In his diaries, White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman 
recorded dozens of moments when Kissinger blew his top over Rogers’s involvement in 
Soviet-American affairs.  For example, prior to Nixon’s first conversation with Dobrynin, 
Haldeman informed Rogers, under orders from Nixon, that the president would meet with 
Dobrynin privately, without a State Department representative.  Rogers objected, arguing that 
the president should never meet with a foreign ambassador alone.  Kissinger, protective of 
the backchannel, was “disturbed,” knowing that Dobrynin had a note for Nixon from the 
Soviet leadership and that, with a State Department official in attendance, “word will get out 
  119 
and [Nixon] will lose control” of the backchannel.241   
Haldeman described the general contours of this conflict as a difference in philosophy 
between Nixon and Kissinger.  He writes that while Kissinger emphasized the need to 
“maintain tight discipline on the little things or you can’t control the big ones,” Nixon felt 
that “you should lose the ones that don’t matter and save your strength and equity for the big 
battles that really count.”  In other words, Kissinger believed that in order to maintain 
absolute control over foreign policy, the State Department should be cut out of all sensitive 
negotiations.  This, of course, left every important decision in the hands of the White House 
and Kissinger’s office.  Nixon had a more flexible view of the situation, only panicking when 
the State Department got involved in the most critical moments.  The result is that, by 
October 1969, Haldeman “sense[d] a growing intolerance of K[issinger]’s attitudes and 
habits,” as he “overreact[ed] to each little aberration of Rogers” and bothered the president 
about it every time.  Haldeman suggests that this led Nixon to keep Kissinger out of 
important discussions, frustrating Kissinger and leading to more and more complaining.242   
Tensions built, leading to a dramatic moment when announcing the start of official 
SALT talks.  Nixon assigned the task of briefing the press to Rogers.  This sent Kissinger—
who told Haldeman that he should brief the press and Nixon should receive all of the credit—
into a fury.  On October 27, Haldeman noted that Kissinger complained to Nixon about State 
Department contacts with Dobrynin, as well as policy issues in the Middle East.  Nixon 
finally said, “‘Well that’s all for today, have to get to work,’ and got up and walked out into 
his little office.”  Kissinger pleaded with Haldeman for a noon meeting to discuss Rogers, but 
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Haldeman convinced him to back off.  That day, Nixon vented about Kissinger to Haldeman 
and others, claiming that Kissinger “is impairing his usefulness, and is obsessed beyond 
reason” with Rogers.243  Kissinger’s emotional response to the potential of Rogers to 
undermine his authority continued until Rogers left the administration in 1973.  As historian 
Stephen E. Ambrose notes: “Haldeman was also the chief hand-holder.  Almost every day, 
certainly at least every week, he had to reassure Henry Kissinger that the President really did 
love him and appreciate him and couldn’t get along without him and would someday fire Bill 
Rogers.”244  Kissinger may have put on an air of confidence when dealing with foreign 
diplomats, but those within the administration grew increasingly annoyed at his anxiety over 
his position in the administration.  This angst would continue through the remainder of 
Nixon’s first term, even as Kissinger gained fame as an influential and effective diplomat. 
 
Talking in Circles on Vietnam 
According to Dobrynin, in his initial conversation with the president, Nixon “did not 
particularly try to hide” that “in the long term,” the Vietnam War would be the issue that 
“will trouble him the most.”245  While Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed SALT, Europe, and 
the Middle East in the first few months of backchannel discussions, the topic of Vietnam 
dominated their conversations.  Talks on ending the Vietnam War did not make significant 
progress, despite the focus it received in the backchannel, where numerous scenarios for the 
resolution were discussed.  As early as March 3, the participants picked up on a refrain that 
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would be repeated time and again for the next four years.  Dobrynin believed that Nixon’s 
policy in Vietnam increasingly looked the same as the previous administration’s approach, 
with an even greater willingness to use military actions to force North Vietnam to the 
negotiating table.  He emphasized that such an approach “is most certainly doomed to 
failure,” and encouraged Kissinger to “realistically assess” the situation.  Kissinger alleged 
that he tried to arrange a confidential meeting with the North Vietnamese even before Nixon 
assumed the presidency, but the North Vietnamese responded with an “abusive letter” and 
“crude attacks against him personally.”  Instead of establishing a “businesslike discussion,” 
Kissinger stated, the North Vietnamese spread anti-American propaganda about the war and 
continued “endlessly repeating demands that are clearly unacceptable in terms of US 
prestige.”  He warned that, unless it reached a settlement in the near future, the US would 
resort to military means to force a solution.  Dobrynin again stressed that military attacks 
would not work, underscoring “the adventurist nature and the danger of such ‘ideas.’”246  
This circular conversation occurred multiple times from 1969 to 1973, and it highlights the 
extent to which Soviet-American efforts to settle the Vietnam War were slow, repetitive, and 
based on a real clash of ideas. 
Nevertheless, the groundwork for discussions of a Vietnam settlement was laid in the 
early months of the Nixon administration.  On March 11, 1969, Kissinger said that the 
American side could not permit a situation in which radical political change occurred in 
South Vietnam after a settlement, as some might accuse Nixon of having “‘cut a deal’ with 
the enemy, of having ‘betrayed an ally.’”  However, the national security advisor conceded 
that, if gradual changes took place after some time, the US would accept that, regardless of 
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the role played by the Viet Cong.247 In other words, Dobrynin reported that the US did not 
care if South Vietnam eventually removed its government or became communist.  The US 
leadership simply wanted to make sure that it was free from blame from the press or political 
opposition for whatever happened.  The American account does not contain a detailed 
description of this proposal.  In its version, Kissinger merely implied the possible escalation 
of force if North Vietnam did not meet certain conditions.248  
The two men met again on April 15 for dinner at Kissinger’s home to discuss 
Vietnam, at which Kissinger presented a paper to Dobrynin that outlined many of the 
proposals previously mentioned in Dobrynin’s memos.  It repeated the American proposal, 
now with additional details, that both the US and North Vietnam withdraw forces from South 
Vietnam, installing a coalition government for five years, at which point elections would take 
place.  American leaders expressed a willingness to see the Viet Cong participate in these 
elections and maintain an official political party.  The US would not interfere if this party 
ultimately took power through nonmilitary means, as “the result of further appropriate 
internal ‘Vietnamese processes’ with the country itself.”  They could not accept “a forcible 
change in the present leadership in Saigon,” though, as “all the US allies would then become 
suspicious of the current US administration.”249  In Kissinger’s account, Dobrynin asked him 
to understand “the limitations of Soviet influence in Hanoi.”  He complained, “Communist 
China was constantly accusing the Soviet Union of betraying Hanoi.  The Soviet Union could 
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not afford to appear at a Communist meeting and find itself accused of having undermined a 
fellow Socialist country.”  Dobrynin commented that, although the USSR did not have 
strategic interests in Southeast Asia, it needed to support North Vietnam because of solidarity 
with socialist states and the Soviet need to retain a leading role in the socialist world.  He 
even claimed that “often Soviet messages were never answered by Hanoi so he could not 
guarantee what the reply would be or indeed if there would be a reply.”250  Dobrynin’s 
account does not contain evidence of this aspect of the discussion.  In addition, while 
Kissinger reported that Dobrynin characterized the discussion as a critical meeting, Dobrynin 
himself wrote that it was more pedestrian and a repeat of earlier remarks by Kissinger.251  
On May 14, Kissinger invited the ambassador to meet again to discuss Vietnam, with 
the hidden intention of having Nixon call during the meeting to propose that Dobrynin meet 
with him personally.  Nixon showed Dobrynin around the White House living quarters and 
his private office in the Lincoln Room, which Nixon thought would be impressive “since no 
one usually gets to go in there.”252  Before bringing up Vietnam, he discussed in general 
terms the backchannel, SALT, trade relations, the Middle East, and his desire to arrange a 
Soviet-American summit.  Nixon repeated that he was prepared to accept any kind of 
government that emerged in South Vietnam, stating that his speech was not “propaganda,” “a 
clever trick,” or “a political or military trap,” but rather a “sincere attempt” to break the 
impasse in negotiations.  He assured Dobrynin that he sought a political situation to the 
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crisis, though if the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong continued to delay progress, he 
could not “wait forever” to “begin real negotiations” and would have to start considering 
“alternatives,” such as military action.  When Dobrynin protested that “there can be no 
alternatives to a political settlement,” Nixon, “clearly not wanting the conversation to 
become contentious,” restated his dedication to a political solution before ending the 
conversation, sending his personal greetings to the Soviet leadership and inviting Dobrynin 
and his wife to a reception commemorating the tenth anniversary of Nixon’s first trip to the 
Soviet Union.  The Soviet record of the conversation observes that, before the meeting with 
Nixon, Kissinger repeated the assurance that “provided there is a fairly reasonable interval 
between conclusion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system,” the American 
side was prepared to accept “whatever the South Vietnamese themselves agree upon.”253 
Both diplomats seemed to think that they could link progress in Vietnam to future 
advances in other fields of negotiations.  In talking points for an April 12 meeting, Kissinger 
suggested that, while Nixon “will ask nothing of the Soviet Union inconsistent with its 
position as a senior communist power,” an end to the Vietnam War would lead him to 
anticipate progress in bilateral relations.254  Although Kissinger stopped short of declaring 
that talks on other topics were contingent upon progress in Vietnam, he made it clear that a 
Vietnam settlement could accelerate breakthroughs in other fields.  For his part, Dobrynin 
wrote after his initial meeting with Nixon that there was not “any doubt that the Vietnam 
question and our role in the talks remain an important tool in our hands for influencing the 
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new administration in the United States.”255  By dangling the promise of Soviet aid in 
bringing the North Vietnamese to the table, Dobrynin believed that concessions could be 
received in other areas of interest to the Soviet leadership, such as SALT or the official 
recognition of the postwar boundaries.  Thus, Dobrynin hoped to use Kissinger’s own 
linkage against him, tempting him with the concessions he implicitly requested to advance 
superpower relations. 
While each side thought it could play the Vietnam card to gain ground in other areas 
of negotiations, both Kissinger and Dobrynin wrote that they would not allow this to happen.  
In his suggestions for how Nixon should conduct himself in a meeting with Dobrynin on 
May 14, Kissinger wrote: “I would not thank him for anything the Soviet Union did in 
Vietnam.  Their contribution is too nebulous.”256  Kissinger realized that heaping praise upon 
his Soviet counterparts would give them an upper hand in future discussions.  For his part, 
Dobrynin consistently reminded Kissinger that linkage was unacceptable.  As early as March 
13, Dobrynin reported optimistically that American leaders had given up the concept of 
linkage.”257  He later summarized his comments to Kissinger in an October 9 discussion, 
simultaneously emphasizing the failure of linkage and the Soviet government’s preparedness 
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to move forward in solving any number of issues.258  In other words, while each diplomat 
recognized and encouraged linkages in memos to their leaders, they both denied them in 
private talks with the other side, hoping that they could hold out and use their position to gain 
leverage in future negotiations in other fields.  
Conscious of the delicate nature of his attempt to link the Soviet ability to bring 
Hanoi to the table with progress in détente talks, Dobrynin did everything he could to shore 
up this position when it was threatened.  He stated that, in an October 9 discussion, Kissinger 
opened a conversation by stating that American policymakers did not intend to “pester” the 
Soviet side any longer on Vietnam, due to their impression that the Soviet side lost all 
motivation to help end the conflict once the US side ceased bombing in North Vietnam.  
Dobrynin reassured Kissinger that the Soviet Union remained interested in settling the war as 
quickly as possible, and he blamed the US for delaying peace, pointing to the American 
unwillingness to establish a coalition government in South Vietnam, the attempts to link the 
potential for resolving other issues to a Vietnam settlement, and Kissinger’s threats of using 
military force to bring about peace talks.  Dobrynin reported that, after fuming that two US 
proposals to Moscow on settling the Vietnam conflict had not received a response, Kissinger 
eventually calmed down and asked Dobrynin not to forward these grievances to the Kremlin, 
since he had not been authorized to mention them.259 
Sufficiently concerned about Kissinger’s belief that the Kremlin wanted the Vietnam 
War to continue in perpetuity, Dobrynin penned an urgent telegram to the Foreign Ministry.  
Dobrynin wrote that this turn of events was not advantageous for Soviet authorities.  Given 
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their work to link Vietnam with other issues, Soviet interests in bilateral agreements, 
international problems, and ending war itself would be damaged.  Having established the 
danger of a persisting conflict in Vietnam, he gave Nixon and Kissinger the impression that 
the Soviet Union, under certain circumstances, would provide help in settling the war, which 
could “promote a certain ‘unfreezing’ of the situation and a more flexible US policy in other 
areas.”  Dobrynin proposed that the Soviet leadership satisfy Kissinger’s complaints by 
sending a response to the two American messages on Vietnam and made suggestions on how 
to proceed.260  Dobrynin recognized that the carrot he dangled—the hint that the Soviet 
government could influence Hanoi toward resolution of the Vietnam War—was in danger, 
and in order to encourage progress on other matters of interest to the Soviet state, action was 
required from the center to restate its interest in Vietnam.   
Kissinger understood Dobrynin’s clever strategy and even praised him for it in his 
memoirs.  In June, the American side expressed its preparedness to begin strategic arms 
talks, and “characteristically, even though the Soviets had professed their eagerness for talks 
for months, once we were committed they evaded a reply.”  On October 20, after it became 
clear that Dobrynin needed to re-bait the hook, the Soviet leadership delivered notice that the 
Soviet government was prepared to start SALT negotiations by mid-November.  As 
Kissinger wrote, “it was a shrewd move,” as the Kremlin understood that given the 
enthusiasm of many American officials for SALT, Nixon “could not possibly refuse” the 
Soviet offer.  Moreover, “in the resulting climate of hope, any escalation in Vietnam would 
appear as hazarding prospects for a major relaxation of tensions.”  In short, the Soviet 
leadership “applied reverse linkage to us,” and as Kissinger concluded, “Their calculation 
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proved to be correct.”261  In this instance, the Soviet leadership and the embassy successfully 
appropriated Kissinger’s concepts of linkage for their own gain. 
Although it is difficult to evaluate the actual content of backchannel discussions on 
Vietnam, given the disparities between Kissinger and Dobrynin’s accounts of discussions, 
important observations can be made about these documents.  Despite the depth of their 
disagreement, neither Kissinger nor Dobrynin described it in ideological terms, instead using 
realpolitik language when discussing it with superiors in the White House or the Kremlin.  It 
would appear that both Kissinger and Dobrynin demonstrated a distinct awareness of how 
actions on the Vietnam issue would affect superpower relations with their allies.  On the one 
hand, Kissinger emphasized that the US could not simply overthrow its ally, Thieu, before 
leaving Vietnam, as it would give the impression that the US was not a reliable partner for its 
allies and client states.  On the other hand, Dobrynin apparently told Kissinger that the Soviet 
government continued its support for North Vietnam primarily to maintain its position as the 
leader of the world communist movement over China.  In this sense, both Dobrynin and 
Kissinger demonstrated concern as to how Vietnam might impact their respective nations’ 
image in the international community, especially among allies.  Both employed linkage, 
using the Vietnam crisis to try to extract concessions, yet they also both emphasized in their 
memos that they would not be duped by the other side’s attempts at linkage.   
 
The Advent of Triangular Diplomacy 
 Authors on Soviet-American relations during détente have focused on Nixon and 
Kissinger’s work to open relations with China not merely for the sake of relaxing tensions 
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around the globe, but to conceive a new order to international affairs.  William Burr 
describes this vision in The Kissinger Transcripts: “Putting Cold War containment policy on 
a new basis, the Nixon administration sought an equilibrium based on Sino-Soviet 
estrangement, cooperation with Moscow, and a covert tilt toward Beijing, while trying to 
ensure that neither power became too close to US allies in Asia and Europe.”262  Burr 
continues, “As long as Moscow and Beijing were antagonistic, Kissinger saw limitless 
possibilities for subtly influencing both and balancing one against the other so that 
Washington could keep its options open while preserving its influence.”263  Thus the goal of 
American policymakers was to ensure that the US had better relations with both Moscow and 
Beijing than the two communist powers had with one another, all while maintaining the 
integrity of the various American alliances.  In any dispute, the US would always have one of 
the other two powers on its side, ensuring that it was never isolated.  Using this system, the 
US could preserve its position as the world’s top power, even following the debacle in 
Vietnam, which demonstrated America’s weakening position in the international arena.  As 
Burr concludes: “Nixon’s rhetoric about a ‘lasting peace’ rested on a foundation of Cold War 
mistrust: ultimately, it was suspicion of Moscow that had drawn Nixon and Kissinger closer 
to Beijing.  The goal was a détente that would contain the Soviets and sustain American 
power.”264 
 Other authors on this topic have agreed with this focus on the American move to 
initiate triangular diplomacy, maintaining that Soviet diplomats merely reacted to American 
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advances in China, hoping to prevent a Sino-American condominium.  Robert Dallek writes, 
“There is almost universal agreement that the opening to China was a wise act of 
statesmanship” on the part of Nixon and Kissinger, and “the policy itself deserves acclaim as 
not only a step away from more than two decades of tensions that risked world peace but also 
a device for pressuring the Soviet Union into more accommodating relations with the 
West.”265  Vladislav Zubok echoes this sentiment, explaining that Nixon and Kissinger used 
triangular diplomacy successfully to push forward Soviet-American détente.266  In his 
encyclopedic work on détente, Raymond Garthoff asserts that, by alienating China, Soviet 
officials facilitated the emergence of triangular diplomacy, and the Soviet Union was 
“perforce coopted into it as the weakest side in the triangle.”  Garthoff states, “The Soviet 
role in the formation of triangular diplomacy . . . was essentially reactive.”267  In an attempt 
to curb Chinese influence and check Sino-American rapprochement, Soviet diplomats 
complained about China to American diplomats, warning them that the Chinese wanted to 
start a nuclear war between the superpowers. 
 Kissinger’s biographers have taken a similar approach to this issue.  Alistair Horne 
contends that, if Nixon formulated an opening to China from a “visionary,” “romantic,” and 
“messianic” standpoint, focusing on the importance of reintroducing China to “the family of 
nations,” Kissinger, “true to the Metternichian principles and realpolitik,” believed that “the 
overriding importance of the ‘China card’ lay in how it could affect relations with Moscow—
not in China per se.” 268  Jeremi Suri furthers this point, writing, that in Kissinger’s strategic 
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endgame, the US would “stand above” the USSR and China as: “the central diplomatic 
player, the worldwide mediator.  Leaders in Washington would become the only figures with 
effective networks of influence throughout the major regions and among the major powers.  
They would be the transcendent statesmen for the indispensable nation.”269  Reflecting these 
statements, Jussi Hanhimäki explains that Nixon and Kissinger relished “play[ing] the 
triangular game” with Dobrynin in 1969, vaguely hinting at the possibility of improved Sino-
American relations while keeping the Soviet ambassador guessing and reacting to American 
moves.  He emphasizes the leverage that the US obtained by noting a potential opening to 
China in discussions with Dobrynin.270  In sum, the major authors on triangular diplomacy 
have focused on Nixon’s vision of a breakthrough with China, Kissinger’s role in 
engineering the Sino-American rapprochement, and the way in which triangular diplomacy 
was designed to isolate the USSR and accentuate American power.  They characterize the 
Soviet response as an attempt to weaken the Chinese position by convincing American 
leaders that the China was a dangerous partner that hoped to provoke a nuclear war between 
the superpowers.   
 While the American side may have eventually won the triangular diplomacy contest 
between the superpowers, Dobrynin was far from “reactive” in his approach, recognizing at 
an early stage that Sino-American rapprochement represented a real danger and providing 
recommendations to counter or slow this process.  In the first months of the Nixon 
administration, Dobrynin already tried to persuade American leaders of the dangers of 
negotiating with the Chinese.  As early as March 3—the day after the first border clash 
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between the USSR and China at Damansky Island—the issue of the triangular relationship 
came up, with Kissinger assuring Dobrynin that the “main concern” of the US was 
developing its relationship with the Soviet Union, not China, since “the two of us are the only 
real nuclear powers.”271  Eight days later, they explored the Sino-Soviet split at greater 
length, and Kissinger reported that Dobrynin broached the topic, asking for the national 
security advisor’s opinion and assurances that the US would not take advantage of the 
USSR’s troubles.  Kissinger confirmed that the American side did not intend to get involved, 
but Dobrynin delivered a “gory account” of Chinese atrocities and a breakdown of the 
military situation.272  According to Dobrynin, however, Kissinger brought up the issue of the 
Sino-Soviet split.  Dobrynin also wrote that during backchannel talks, “we have been 
seeking, in an appropriately low-key manner, gradually to reinforce the current mood of 
caution and wariness that already exists among the Americans themselves with respect to the 
actions of the Chinese.”  Dobrynin hinted that the Chinese attacks near Damansky Island 
were “but one part of [Beijing]’s foreign policy plan,” a symptom of their “Great Power 
chauvinism,” an attempt “to instill in their people hatred for their neighbors—and not just 
their neighbors—and to create at home an atmosphere in which new, more dangerous foreign 
policy adventures—particularly against countries of Asia—can be justified.”273  Having 
heard Nixon’s discussion of opening to China during the campaign, Dobrynin hoped to 
discourage American overtures to the Chinese by implying the potential for Chinese 
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aggression against Taiwan or Japan and dropping hints that Chinese foreign policy did not 
match up with American interests. 
 In the first two years of backchannel negotiations, Dobrynin did his best to convince 
Kissinger that China was a rogue state, while Kissinger assured Dobrynin that American 
leaders prioritized the Soviet relationship above all else.  On April 2, Dobrynin reported on a 
long conversation in which Kissinger confirmed that he was heading a committee on 
reevaluating US relations with the PRC.  Kissinger stated the administration’s belief that, 
while there were then only two superpowers in the world, China could emerge as a third 
within twenty to twenty-five years.  He also expressed doubts that relations would improve 
much before Mao’s death, instead hoping to lay the foundation for a future rapprochement.  
He emphasized that some liberals in the Democratic Party believed the US could play off 
Sino-Soviet differences to improve Sino-American relations and strengthen the American 
position in international politics.274  Kissinger assured Dobrynin that this was not Nixon’s 
intention, since improving Soviet-American relations was the administration’s “No. 1 
priority” and “an attempt to play on the disagreements could embroil the United States itself 
and even further alienate both the USSR and the PRC.”  In other words, Kissinger attempted 
to convince Dobrynin that there was no reason for the Soviet government to be concerned 
about American overtures to China.275  Here, Kissinger played electoral politics, trying to 
convince Dobrynin that the Democrats pushing for triangular diplomacy, even as he secretly 
negotiated with the PRC. 
 When discussing the China situation, Kissinger worked hard to engender trust in 
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American motives by complimenting Soviet policy and flattering Dobrynin and the Soviet 
leadership.  According to Dobrynin’s notes, Kissinger reiterated that while he could not say 
that American leaders were “greatly distressed by [the Soviet Union’s] growing differences 
with the Chinese,” they did not want to take sides since relations with the Soviet Union had a 
greater impact on American global interests than Sino-American relations.  Dobrynin 
continued: “Moreover, Kissinger added, Mao [Zedong]’s actions cannot be assessed using 
rational logic. . . . The Soviet Union is a different matter; it is led by political figures who 
think realistically and who are interested in the welfare of their people and their country.  
With them specific agreements are possible, in the interests of both countries and others as 
well.”276  Kissinger followed this praise by emphasizing that this relationship rested on 
progress in Vietnam.  Later, when discussing Soviet attempts to restart relations with the 
Chinese in September and October 1969, Kissinger speculated that the deciding factor was 
the Chinese leadership’s belief that the USSR might launch a preemptive strike against 
Chinese nuclear centers.  When Dobrynin asked for Kissinger’s opinion on this situation, he 
complimented the Soviet Union’s violent response to the Prague Spring the previous year. 
After this “unexpected” action, Kissinger commented, “Washington no longer questions the 
determination of the Soviet Government [to act] if it believes there is a genuine threat to the 
supreme national interests of the USSR.”277  In this sense, Kissinger commended the 
pragmatic and even brutal nature of Soviet foreign policy in discussions on China to suggest 
that American policymakers were more interested in a deal with the USSR, a country that 
shared its values and had sufficient power to influence American behavior around the world. 
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 The Soviet ambassador’s reports on China demonstrated a shrewd understanding of 
what Nixon and Kissinger hoped to accomplish in triangular diplomacy.  In discussing the 
April 2 backchannel discussion, Dobrynin argued that Nixon and Kissinger were “looking 
very carefully at how to find ways to improve relations with [Beijing], without at this time 
causing undue difficulties in the relations with us, the most powerful socialist country, and 
without losing sight of future opportunities to somehow use the Soviet-Chinese friction to 
their own advantage.”  Dobrynin did not believe Kissinger’s assurances that the US would 
not use Sino-Soviet differences to its advantage.  He understood that, if an opening presented 
itself in Sino-American relations, the US would not hesitate to utilize the Sino-Soviet split to 
strengthen its own position in global affairs.  For the moment, though, Dobrynin underscored 
that American leaders were uncertain of the potential for Sino-American rapprochement, and 
since the Soviet Union remained the more powerful country from a military standpoint, 
improving relations with Moscow remained Nixon’s top priority.  Indeed, Dobrynin noted 
Kissinger’s emphasis on American “reasonable behavior” in triangular diplomacy, “clearly 
hoping that this will be duly appreciated in Moscow and taken into account in specific Soviet 
foreign policy measures.”  For the time being, Dobrynin suggested, the US would use the 
potential for an opening to China to gain concessions from Soviet diplomats.  With regard to 
Kissinger’s comment about liberal Democrats, Dobrynin interpreted it as a sign that electoral 
politics already played a role in the conduct of Nixon’s foreign policy, as Kissinger promoted 
the belief that the Nixon administration would be more favorable in negotiations than a 
liberal Democratic presidency, making the Soviet Union predisposed to take a more 
conciliatory position in backchannel talks.278  Thus Dobrynin accurately assessed the 
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motivations behind Kissinger’s statements about China in 1969. 
 In addition to understanding American motivations, Dobrynin recommended that 
Soviet leaders develop a triangular strategy of their own to use the China issue to their 
advantage.  In an urgent telegram to the Foreign Ministry on October 10, Dobrynin proposed 
that the Soviet leadership not view the reopening of Soviet talks with the Chinese as 
sufficient reason to freeze relations with the US.  He was confident that a Sino-Soviet bloc 
would reemerge, defeating Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy and putting the US at a 
disadvantage.  He contended that, if the Soviet leadership put a stop to Soviet-American 
progress in order to normalize relations with the Chinese side, and the Chinese leadership 
eventually backtracked in negotiations, Soviet officials would find themselves at a 
disadvantage, trying to reestablish contacts with the US in an unfriendly diplomatic climate.  
This would be especially dangerous, since some American advisors already were 
“whispering” to Nixon that the Soviet leadership pursued détente only because of “short-term 
factors” like the Sino-Soviet split.  To keep the American side interested, the Soviet 
ambassador recommended the Soviet leaders respond to American pleas for a start time and 
venue for strategic arms talks, even if they later had to wait for Soviet-Chinese border talks 
to begin.  Dobrynin expressed the belief that the Soviet Union was in a favorable position in 
the triangular game, with the American leadership, impressed by Soviet action in 
Czechoslovakia and China, scrambling to open a “whole series of channels” with China.279   
In sum, while Dobrynin’s telegrams to the Kremlin confirm some arguments in the 
historiography, they also suggest that Dobrynin understood triangular diplomacy from the 
                                                
279 “Telegram from Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,” October 10, 1969, in Soviet-
American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, 81-83.  For the October 9 telegram, see footnote 3 on page 
82. 
  137 
start of the Nixon administration, that he tried to play his own “China card” in talks with 
Kissinger, and that he wrote Moscow on several occasions to suggest ways in which the 
Soviet Union could find itself on the winning side of this game of diplomatic chess.  
Dobrynin recognized Kissinger’s maneuvers as attempts to exploit the differences between 
the Soviet Union and the PRC and create a situation that allowed for the US to pair with one 
of the communist powers in debates over any international issue.  In recommending the start 
of official US-Soviet talks for SALT, he constructed a plan that he felt would have maximum 
benefit and minimum risk for the USSR, putting the Soviet Union in the most secure global 
position possible.  The Soviet government followed his advice, extending a proposal to begin 
official strategic arms limitations talks.  While the Soviet Union may have come out on the 
short end of triangular diplomacy in the end, it was not because Soviet diplomats did not 
understand the game or did not participate in a proactive way. 
 
1969 in Review 
 By the end of 1969, the cautious optimism that characterized the initial months of 
negotiations had faded.  The summer of 1969 witnessed a lag in talks, with no backchannel 
meetings from June 11 to September 27, thanks to a trip by Dobrynin to Moscow for 
consultations and a frustration with the lack of progress.  In late September 1969, Foreign 
Minister Gromyko visited the US, giving a speech at the UN and meeting with Rogers three 
times to discuss Soviet-American relations.  Gromyko did not, however, travel to 
Washington to meet with the president, standard procedure for Soviet foreign ministers 
visiting the US.  Kissinger responded to this perceived slight against the president, making 
Dobrynin wait several days after requesting an appointment until they finally had a brief 
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meeting on September 27.  According to the American record of the conversation, Kissinger 
expressed regrets that Gromyko did not visit Washington, while Dobrynin suggested that 
Gromyko never received an invitation.  Kissinger lamented the lack of a formal request from 
the Soviet side, and Dobrynin remarked that “he was not aware that there were such fine 
questions of protocol.”280  In his memoirs, Kissinger wrote that Dobrynin was trying “to fish 
for an invitation” for Gromyko to visit the White House,281 and Kissinger stuck to his guns, 
claiming they were so “swamped” that the president was not meeting with foreign ministers 
in Washington.282  
The substance of the conversation was equally frosty.  On November 1, 1968, 
President Johnson had ceased the bombing campaign in North Vietnam, and Nixon had 
previously stated that, if negotiators had not made progress by the one-year anniversary of 
that date, he would take strong action.283  After a frustrating summer with little evolution in 
talks with Hanoi, the American side decided to play hardball with Dobrynin.  Nixon and 
Kissinger prearranged for the president to make a phone call to Kissinger in the middle of the 
backchannel meeting, allowing the national security advisor to pass along an informal 
message.  Kissinger reported, “The President had told me in his call that the train had just left 
the station and was now headed down the track.  Dobrynin responded that he hoped it was an 
airplane and not a train and would leave some maneuvering room.  I said the President 
chooses his words very carefully and that I was sure he meant train.”  When Dobrynin 
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expressed disappointment and repeated previous promises that the Soviet Union hoped to 
help with a settlement, Kissinger snapped that the American side “had no illusions about 
Soviet help in the past.” Dobrynin attempted to shift to other areas of Soviet-American 
relations, such as trade liberalization, but the national security advisor responded that those 
issues were secondary and could be addressed once Vietnam was solved, “especially if the 
Russians took an understanding attitude.”  Dobrynin smiled, according to Kissinger, and 
made a snarky remark about Kissinger’s pursuit of linkage.  Earlier in the conversation, 
Dobrynin tried to bring up other issues, but Kissinger rebuffed him, stating that the lack of a 
Soviet reply to American formal notes on Vietnam and SALT made it difficult to discuss 
issues like the Middle East outside of the normal diplomatic channels.284  In short, Kissinger 
emphasized that progress in other areas was unlikely without a resolution on Vietnam and a 
formal response to several American proposals.  As Kissinger wrote to Nixon, “I believe the 
Soviets are concerned and now more clearly understand that we mean business on the 
Vietnam issue.”285 
The second meeting between Nixon and Dobrynin, which took place on October 20, 
is emblematic of the problems facing the backchannel in late 1969.  Kissinger informed 
Nixon of Dobrynin’s attempt at “reverse linking” SALT and Vietnam: “It is particularly 
important not to encourage the Soviets to believe that they can pacify us with the carrot of 
SALT while continuing to beat us with the stick of abetting Hanoi’s intransigence.”286  In 
both records of the conversation, Dobrynin began by suggesting that SALT talks begin on 
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November 17 in Helsinki, and while Nixon and Kissinger said that they preferred Vienna, 
Dobrynin agreed that the Soviet leadership would be flexible.287  Dobrynin then read an Aide 
Mémoire, which expressed Soviet concerns that, while the US claimed to desire talks on a 
broad array of issues, it evaded concrete issues.  In fact, in some cases, the American side 
took steps that ran counter to developing better relations.  The Aide Mémoire then addressed 
unanswered Soviet proposals for eliminating military blocs and setting the postwar European 
map, as well as announcing a readiness to negotiate on the issue of West Berlin.  It also 
highlighted American unwillingness to cooperate on the Middle East, the dismissal of 
proposals made by the North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to end the Vietnam War, and 
Nixon’s implied threats to escalate military actions to force the North Vietnamese to accept 
American terms.  Following a warning that any attempt to exploit the differences of the 
USSR and the PRC would lead to “very grave consequences,” the Aide Mémoire concludes 
that Soviet leaders still “attach great significance” to US-Soviet relations.288  
Although there are frequently minor disparities between the memorandums of 
conversation written by Kissinger and Dobrynin, the transcripts of this meeting bear little 
resemblance to one another.  In the American transcript, after Dobrynin read the Aide 
Mémoire, Nixon “pulled out a yellow pad, handed it to Dobrynin and said, ‘you’d better take 
some notes,’ and began to speak almost uninterruptedly for half an hour.”  Nixon declared 
that he had been in office for exactly nine months, and “the baby” of better Soviet-American 
relations “should have been born; instead, there have been several miscarriages.”  He 
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explained why relations had not changed for the better, beginning with Middle East, where 
he contended that the Soviet leadership had not done enough to bring the Arab states to the 
table.  When Dobrynin tried to challenge Nixon’s portrayal of events, Nixon interrupted, 
claiming that Dobrynin’s complaints were “technical issues” that should be discussed with 
professional diplomats.  Touching on European matters, Nixon argued that they could be 
discussed “at a very high level, if we can make a breakthrough somewhere.”  When 
Dobrynin asked for clarification on how to proceed, “the President ignored him and turned to 
China,” repeating that an improvement in Sino-American relations was not targeted against 
the USSR.   
Moving on to Vietnam, Nixon complained that one year after the cessation of 
bombing, when the Soviet leadership promised to become active in talks, nothing had 
changed.  Nixon suggested that “maybe the Soviet Union did not want to end the war in 
Vietnam,” and that Soviet leaders continued parroting “the same tired old slogans” presented 
by the North Vietnamese side since the start of the Nixon administration.  Nixon repeated the 
well-worn linkage from previous months, stating: “If the Soviet Union found it possible to do 
something in Vietnam, and the Vietnam War ended, the US might do something dramatic to 
improve Soviet-US relations, indeed something more dramatic than they could now imagine.  
But until then, real progress would be difficult.”  Nixon concluded that, while he wanted to 
be remembered for bringing about “a watershed in US-Soviet relations,” he refused to “hold 
still for being ‘diddled’ to death in Vietnam.”  Talking on the phone the next day, the 
Americans seemed pleased with Nixon’s performance. They planned the next move, which 
was to have Kissinger play up Nixon as an “out of control” force who has “made up his 
mind” that “unless there’s some movement” on Vietnam he would just shake his head and 
  142 
walk out.289  In sum, the American account features an assertive Nixon dominating the 
conversation and repeatedly cutting off Dobrynin.   
While Dobrynin faithfully recorded the substance of Nixon’s comments, his 
characterization of the rest of the conversation differs.  Dobrynin noted that, while he was 
reading the Aide Mémoire, “Nixon became visibly nervous,” particularly during the 
statement on Vietnam, and after handing Dobrynin the pad, “he rambled,” at first, “repeating 
himself and losing his train of thought.”  Later in the conversation, “he seemed to pull 
himself together and began speaking more calmly and clearly.”  After Nixon’s statement on 
the Middle East, when he complained that Israel had made significantly more compromises 
than the Arab states, Dobrynin reported that he interjected forcefully, arguing that the 
president’s argument contradicted US support for the UN Security Council Resolution 242, 
which opposed Israel retaining territories captures in the 1967 Six-Day War.  The two 
engaged in a back and forth: Dobrynin repeated the Soviet position, while Nixon stressed that 
Israel would not accept UN troops.  Dobrynin criticized the American unwillingness to 
discuss Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, while Nixon condemned Soviet 
inflexibility.  Dobrynin declared that he “could not agree with such an arbitrary assessment 
of the Soviet position,” pointing to the “one-sided pro-Israel position” taken by the US 
during recent consultations.  After a general discussion about the potential for a settlement, 
Dobrynin wrote that, for Nixon, “success in a Middle East settlement depends on the 
intensity of our efforts to resolve the Vietnam conflict,” as the American side was “in no 
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hurry” to settle in the Middle East.290  This heated exchange, in which Dobrynin provided 
strong responses to Nixon’s claims about Soviet policy in the Middle East, contradicts the 
American report’s suggestion that Nixon “cut off” Dobrynin when the Soviet ambassador 
initially began to protest. 
Dobrynin also offered a differing account of the two men’s discussion of Vietnam. 
According to Dobrynin, Nixon was “displeased and agitated” with the characterization of 
Vietnam in the Aide Mémoire, acting “very nervously” and going into “a long-winded 
monologue” which he “delivered emotionally and without stopping.”  Dobrynin strongly 
criticized Nixon’s implied argument that the Soviet government was the “main problem” in 
negotiating a settlement, reiterating that it was American troops who were “thousands of 
miles away from their own country in foreign territory, sowing death, destruction, famine, 
and illness.”  He reemphasized the Soviet Union’s interest in peace, and assured Nixon that 
the USSR would continue to play a constructive role in ending the conflict.  Dobrynin 
warned Nixon of the dangers of using additional military action to bring the war to an end.291     
After this tense debate, Dobrynin observed that Nixon “cooled off a bit,” and the two 
discussed the progress in Soviet-American relations, including the limiting of “personal 
polemics” in public remarks, before returning to the issue of Vietnam.  Nixon again 
expressed frustration that the Soviet Union had taken a “wait-and-see position,” delaying 
strong intervention until it was most advantageous for Soviet leaders.  Denying this 
allegation, Dobrynin cited the president’s own words that the continuation of Vietnam 
impaired breakthroughs in Soviet-American relations, asking Nixon if “no genuine progress” 
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on bilateral talks could be made on other issues before the conclusion of the war.  Nixon 
responded that this would have to occur in normal diplomatic channels, not the backchannel, 
until the war’s close, at which point he could take an active role in promoting “dramatic 
leaps” in US-Soviet relations.   
Dobrynin’s description is more dynamic than the American report.  In Dobrynin’s 
retelling, Nixon declared that the Soviet leadership would remember him as “the most 
conciliatory US president of the entire postwar period,” and as a man who personally 
“engage[d] in many matters bearing on relations with the USSR instead of delegating them to 
the diplomatic service.”  Dobrynin understood this as a threat to the backchannel by pushing 
Kissinger and Dobrynin’s conversations to the side. He responded, “If the US Government is 
not interested in this at present, we can just as well wait.  We have never kowtowed to 
anyone, and we never will.”  Dobrynin described Nixon as conciliatory after this comment, 
replying that he was “personally” interested in improving US-Soviet relations, even if 
Vietnam served as a “serious obstacle.”  Dobrynin criticized Nixon’s growing obsession with 
Vietnam.  In his words, the conflict had assumed “such an emotional coloration that Nixon is 
unable to control himself even in a conversation with a foreign ambassador.”  For his part, 
the Soviet ambassador reported, he “conversed with Nixon in a calm, business-like tone,” 
taking a “firm stance when our interests were involved” and emphasizing Soviet influence 
over Hanoi.292  
The opposing interpretations of this meeting can largely be interpreted as a result of 
their intended audiences. Dobrynin could not give the Kremlin the impression that the 
president had walked all over him.  He needed to demonstrate that he stood his ground, 
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delivered the Soviet interpretation of events, and calmly defended Soviet interests in 
opposition to the more erratic, emotional president.  Similarly, Kissinger composed the 
memo for Nixon’s file understanding the president’s own insecurities about these sorts of 
meetings.  Kissinger describes the president as “nervous” about personal diplomacy, finding 
it “painful” to insist directly on his position and requiring reassurances afterward that he had 
performed well.  For instance, after his first meeting with Dobrynin, Nixon called Kissinger 
into his office four times to confirm that he did a good job.293  It is not surprising, then, that 
the memo portrays Nixon as the domineering force in the conversation.  In all likelihood, 
Nixon may have come off as forceful, but Dobrynin, a diplomat with seven years of 
experience in direct negotiations with presidents, almost certainly did not simply fold in the 
face of aggressive tactics.  Regardless of the real tone of the meeting, these memos 
demonstrate how each side tailored its reports to appeal to their respective readers. 
The follow-up memos highlight the mutual frustration both parties felt with one 
another in the aftermath of the meeting.  Kissinger speculated to Nixon that Dobrynin’s goal 
was to assess if America seriously intended to go through with its threats to escalate the 
violence in Vietnam, using SALT, Berlin, and the backchannel as carrots to make it more 
difficult for Nixon to “play it rough” in Vietnam.  He found “nothing new” in Dobrynin’s 
Vietnam proposals, but that Soviet acknowledgement of American hints about potential 
military action might lead them to press for some concessions from Hanoi.  He recognized 
the implicit danger that Dobrynin presented on China, but suggested to Nixon that this should 
not alter American policy.  Kissinger also expressed pessimism about the Middle East, 
acknowledging that the Soviet side may have genuinely believed that the US had not exerted 
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enough pressure on Israel.  Highlighting Dobrynin’s statement that both sides should 
continue talking as “a signal that for all their complaints and accusations, they remain 
interested in normal relations,” Kissinger was positive that American policymakers could 
press the Soviet Union on Vietnam, but leave the door open for future breakthroughs in 
normalizing relations.294 
In contrast, Dobrynin seemed more pessimistic than ever in his follow-up telegram to 
the Foreign Ministry, even proposing that the Soviet side consider moving primary talks 
outside of the backchannel.  He complained that Nixon displayed an obsessive preoccupation 
with the Vietnam War and did not introduce anything new on other issues.  In evaluating 
Nixon’s “more emotional and excitable” attitudes toward Vietnam, Dobrynin pointed to 
Nixon’s extant anticommunism and the growing influence of anticommunists in the 
American government, including Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who led negotiations with North 
Vietnam in Paris.  Dobrynin also revealed his frustration with Kissinger’s rigidity on the 
Vietnam issue, recommending that the Soviet Union turn to Rogers, who was viewed as 
“more flexible” on Vietnam.  He advised that they “gradually increase Rogers’ involvement 
in the confidential exchange of views with us, while continuing our contacts via Kissinger. 
To enhance Rogers’ role in this exchange,” he suggested Gromkyo send him letters directly 
to raise his standing in the administration.  Dobrynin believed it advisable to continue 
reminding Nixon that the Soviet Union valued improving relations with the US, arguing that 
this, along with additional pressure on Vietnam and other issues, would help steer Nixon and 
Kissinger to “more realistic positions.”  Dobrynin reemphasized his previous suggestion for 
reverse-linkage: “We ought to keep in mind that the Vietnam crisis itself and our role in it 
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remain one of the most powerful tools that we have for influencing US policy and President 
Nixon personally.”295 
Later sources fail to shed much light on the real mood of the conversation.  At their 
next meeting, Dobrynin reported that Kissinger used a more conciliatory tone.  To him, this 
suggested the American side regretted the emotionality of Nixon’s statements and hoped to 
“soften this impression somewhat.”296  Both men also downplayed the passionate nature of 
this meeting in their memoirs.  Instead, Dobrynin focused on the agreement to begin SALT 
talks and Nixon’s assurances that Sino-American talks were not directed against the Soviet 
Union, while Kissinger praised Soviet reverse-linkage in agreeing to SALT discussions and 
recorded Nixon’s promise to “do something dramatic” in Soviet-American relations if the 
USSR helped bring about the end of the Vietnam War.  Kissinger also mentioned that Nixon 
asked him to inform Dobrynin that the president was “out of control” and willing to embark 
on a brutal offensive to bring Vietnam to the table, though Kissinger suggests that he did not 
pass this note to Dobrynin, endeavoring to avoid threats that he considered idle.297   
Several conclusions can be drawn about the backchannel in the first year of the Nixon 
administration.  While Nixon and Kissinger contended that the president’s tirade on Vietnam 
came off as forceful and determined, Dobrynin described Nixon as weak, emotional, and 
vulnerable.  Although Kissinger believed that Dobrynin’s comments on the Middle East 
indicated real Soviet doubts about the level of pressure the US exerted on Israel, Dobrynin 
left the meeting convinced that American policymakers were linking progress in the Middle 
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East to Soviet efforts to end the Vietnam War.  If Kissinger remarked that the Soviet 
leadership remained eager for confidential contact with Nixon through the backchannel, 
Dobrynin was frustrated enough to recommend a turn toward Rogers and away from the 
White House.  By December 1969, the backchannel rarely met, did not produce immediate 
gains, frequently resulted in repetitive arguments that exasperated its participants, and 
generated conflicting reports that denote confusion over the other side’s positions and 
motivations.  If the first step in attaining an agreement on substance is to reach a consensus 
on what was actually said at the negotiating table, the backchannel failed in its first year to 
advance the cause of Soviet-American relations.     
 
Conclusion 
As 1969 came to a close, Kissinger and Dobrynin met again for an overview of 
developments in superpower relations since Nixon entered office.  Neither diplomat wanted 
to leave the impression with his respective superiors that their side was eager for this 
meeting, and their reports conflict as to who requested the meeting.  Kissinger claimed that 
Dobrynin invited him to dinner at the embassy, while Dobrynin reported that Kissinger 
suggested meeting for an unofficial “tour d’horizon of the international situation.”298  
According to Kissinger, Dobrynin started “on a frank and open basis” by declaring that “he 
had missed the opportunity to talk to me for a long time, and he hoped that our meetings 
would be more frequent.”  In his account, Kissinger responded that “it was always a pleasure 
to talk to him.”299  Dobrynin began his telegram, however, by noting that two or three weeks 
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ago Kissinger had “expressed interest in such an informal meeting, citing the usefulness of a 
periodic ‘frank’ exchange of views between us.”300   
Although they both noted the friendlier mood of the meeting in comparison to the 
October conversation, reports do not suggest much progress.  Despite the previous year of 
negotiations, the role of linkage and the Vietnam War remained unclear.  In Kissinger’s 
account, Dobrynin persisted in asking for clarification as to whether the link between 
Vietnam and progress in Soviet-American relations precluded progress in bilateral 
negotiations until the war ended, despite the fact that this was a central question in the 
October meeting with Nixon.  Dobrynin also lectured Kissinger on not using the complexities 
of American bureaucracy as an excuse to delay progress in negotiations. “Such reports,” he 
remarked, “Were not believed in Moscow.”301  Dobrynin’s notes suggest that he spent a 
portion of the conversation listing instances in which US actions contradicted American 
statements in favor of improving superpower relations, including its opposition to a European 
security conference, its lack of response to a Soviet proposal to meet in bilateral channels in 
advance of a European security conference, its opposition to the liberalization of trade policy 
with the USSR, its stepping up of “hostile activities” through Voice of America, and its 
actions in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe.302  Overall, by the end of the year, 
neither side had managed to resolve the tensions from the October conversation between 
Nixon and Dobrynin. 
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Yet there was some reason for optimism.  Kissinger wrote in his preparatory notes 
that the “major purpose” of the meeting was to open a dialogue about a summit to address 
cooperation in SALT, Europe, China, and the Middle East.  He proposed disconnecting 
Vietnam from Soviet-American relations, emphasizing that the American side would not ask 
for Soviet aid, but “will always be interested in their view.”  “If matters get worse,” 
Kissinger added, “it will not be directed at them.”303  Kissinger told Dobrynin that the US 
“remained interested in good relations with the Soviet Union,” and that “we were the two 
great powers, and we had to avoid conflict.”  If they could not come to agreements on major 
issues while the Vietnam War continued, they could discuss the major issues, “at least on a 
hypothetical basis,” in the interests of “exploring what such solutions might look like.”  
Thus, Kissinger stated that, at the end of the conversation, Dobrynin proposed getting 
together “at regular intervals,” focusing on one issue at each meeting to determine what sort 
of solutions might be plausible.304   
In contrast, Dobrynin’s memos infer that Nixon recommended that regular 
backchannel meetings take place so that Kissinger and Dobrynin could explore “only 
fundamental issues.”  Once the two sides agreed to a consensus, orders could be drafted to 
the normal diplomatic channels to complete the agreement.  Dobrynin emphasized that these 
talks were not designed to replace normal diplomatic channels. Rather, their primary function 
was to produce agreements “on a fundamental mutual approach at a high level, especially 
when normal channels are clearly at an impasse or when the situation requires quick, 
purposeful action.”  He speculated, “On the whole, one gets the impression that President 
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Nixon is currently trying to reestablish some direct contact with the Soviet leadership, which 
was, for all intents and purposes, broken off following his remarks during a conversation 
with the Soviet Ambassador in October, when, on instructions from the Soviet Government, 
he was presented with our critical analysis of his administration’s actions on the main foreign 
policy issues.”305  While Dobrynin seems somewhat less optimistic than Kissinger, both 
diplomats reemphasized that the backchannel could produce tangible results in improving 
Soviet-American relations.   
Thus the backchannel survived its first major test in 1969.  Its conceptualization, 
rooted in Nixon and Kissinger’s desire to keep critical issues out of State Department 
channels, as well as Dobrynin’s long history of confidential backchannel talks with previous 
administrations, was followed by a period of regular meetings and optimism that a 
breakthrough could be achieved, with SALT negotiations announced in the fall.  The circular 
arguments on Vietnam left Kissinger and Dobrynin in a trap, however, and the American side 
turned up the heat in an attempt to force a settlement in Southeast Asia.  By the end of the 
year, despite some intense arguments, the participants agreed to meet more regularly, and this 
created the first step toward breaking the impasse and putting Soviet-American relations on 
more solid footing.   
Recent archival releases paint a much more complex picture of Dobrynin than the one 
offered by previous historians.  While he was bound to follow orders from Moscow, he also 
made policy recommendations that colored his approach to backchannel diplomacy.  He 
astutely recognized Kissinger’s policies of linkage and triangular diplomacy from the start of 
the Nixon administration, and he made recommendations about global policy to counter these 
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strategies.  His approach of “reverse-linkage” put the Soviet leadership in a position to 
exploit the connections between American behavior in Vietnam and a summit, and he made 
suggestions for how to cope with the emerging issue of Sino-American rapprochement, 
arguing that greater efforts toward Soviet-American relations could help defuse this process.  
To conclude, Dobrynin was not just as a mouthpiece for the Soviet government, but a shrewd 
observer of international affairs with insight into how to deal with the new international order 
imagined by Kissinger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE BACKCHANNEL BECOMES OPERATIONAL, 1970-71 
 
Once Kissinger and Dobrynin recommitted themselves to preserving their 
backchannel, they faced a series of challenges that defined how the backchannel would 
influence Soviet-American relations during the Nixon presidency.  First, Kissinger and 
Dobrynin initiated a series of attempts to “reboot” the backchannel in order to identify 
ground suitable for the long-term development of better relations, with each diplomat hoping 
to satisfy his own nation’s strategic interests. Attempts to reboot the backchannel from the 
end of 1969 to spring 1971 followed a basic pattern.  First, Kissinger and Dobrynin would 
hold a dramatic “tour d’horizon” meeting.  Then, they would follow it up with sessions 
geared toward engineering a breakthrough on all of the issues confronting the superpowers.  
Next, both diplomats would promise to let bygone be bygones and to focus on areas of 
agreement that could yield progress.  Eventually due to a lack of progress in talks or outside 
developments, the backchannel would shut down again until the impetus arose for another 
attempt.  Although an improvement in the relationship did not occur until the summer of 
1971, critical steps in this period shaped superpower relations for the remainder of détente. 
Second, they confronted the fact that individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
hoped to usurp the backchannel’s monopoly on negotiating the most sensitive issues in 
superpower relations.  This situation produced an emotional response from both diplomats 
that has two meanings.  On the one hand, these reactions were genuine, reflecting Dobrynin 
and Kissinger’s frustrations with the lack of progress in the backchannel and mutual fears 
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that their respective personal positions in the superpower relationship could be circumvented 
by the actions of the other party.  On the other hand, these emotional outbursts represent a 
negotiating tactic used by both diplomats to warn their partners against skirting the 
backchannel and to show their bosses the value of the backchannel.  Moreover, these 
situations demonstrate that complex bureaucratic structures on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
created organizational confusion, and Kissinger and Dobrynin had to identify ways to deal 
with crises that emerged as a result of this two-tiered bureaucratic construction. 
 Third, they dealt with the consequences of America’s rapprochement with China, 
which threatened to derail Soviet-American détente.  While previous historians have focused 
on the ways that Sino-American rapprochement sped Soviet moves toward a summit, this 
chapter suggests that, initially, the announcement of Kissinger’s trip to China cooled 
Dobrynin’s enthusiasm for détente.  Dobrynin’s endorsement of a summit returned only after 
progress was made in other areas, confirming that the American side remained willing to 
pursue improved Soviet-American relations. 
In general, this chapter explores how, in the aftermath of a rocky first year, Kissinger 
and Dobrynin activated the backchannel to pursue negotiations on issues that had been 
stalled for years, ultimately putting the superpower relationship on more solid footing by the 
summer of 1971.  Without this period of gradual improvement in Soviet-American relations, 
the genuine breakthroughs that took place in 1972 would have been impossible.  Dobrynin 
and Kissinger began to meet regularly in this period, and they came to grips with the 
backchannel mechanism, formalizing procedures to achieve agreements and identifying paths 
to improved superpower relations.  
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Repeatedly Rebooting the Backchannel 
The “tour d’horizon” meeting at the end of 1969 represented the first attempt to 
reboot the backchannel relationship, as Kissinger and Dobrynin worked to smooth over the 
bilateral relationship after the confrontational discussion between Nixon and Dobrynin in 
October.  Following this meeting, the diplomats communicated their feelings on the nature of 
the relationship and codified the backchannel operations.  On February 18, in discussing the 
prospects for an ABM treaty, Dobrynin wrote that Kissinger took great pains to explain the 
difference between “propaganda intended for Congress” and White House policies.  
Kissinger emphasized that, while statements made by certain politicians and editorials in the 
US press might say one thing about détente, the “actual state of affairs” could be found only 
in the backchannel.306  In his report on this conversation, Kissinger told the Soviet 
ambassador that, in dealing with SALT, “we should have a full discussion,” setting up “two 
channels—one for the formal negotiations, and one between him and me to deal with general 
principles.”307  Dobrynin again emphasized the importance of the backchannel in telegrams 
to the Foreign Ministry.  For example, on March 7, Dobrynin stated that he would carry out 
his instructions to contact the State Department with regard to bilateral talks on a Middle 
East settlement, but underscored that meeting with Kissinger on this topic was critical.  He 
suggested three advantages to initiating talks through the backchannel.  First, it would “tie 
[Nixon] more closely to these talks than in the past,” effectively giving the White House 
greater leverage and incentive to pursue a settlement.  Second, it would provide additional 
motivation for the White House to keep on top of the State Department in seeking an 
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agreement.  Third, it “would then provide the opportunity to once more approach the White 
House should the talks be deadlocked through the fault of the American side.”308  The Soviet 
ambassador explained to the Kremlin the advantages of dealing with the backchannel, rather 
than normal channels, and Dobrynin and Kissinger emerged from the arguments of late 1969 
with an increasing commitment to making the backchannel work. 
Both sides also demonstrated an active interest in holding a US-Soviet summit during 
Nixon’s first term, although each pegged the other as the more eager party.  Kissinger 
described Dobrynin as “visibly attentive” when he brought up the possibility of a summit. 
Dobrynin apparently believed the administration was uninterested, leaving Soviet leaders 
“put off” by Nixon’s apparent reluctance.309  Dobrynin emphasized Kissinger’s own 
enthusiasm, writing that the US side proposed having a summit as early as the end of the 
year.310  As in previous reports, both Kissinger and Dobrynin wanted to convince their bosses 
that they occupied the position of strength in the relationship and that their respective proxy’s 
negotiating strategies were yielding the desirable results.  Regardless of who was most 
excited about the prospects for a summit, the two sides began outlining the process for 
coming to an agreement through both official negotiations via State Department and Foreign 
Ministry representatives negotiating in Vienna and the backchannel in Washington.  This set 
up the framework for SALT negotiations that then accelerated the following year. 
 Dobrynin and Kissinger laid the foundations for future SALT negotiations in this 
period.  For example, Dobrynin filled the gaps in his knowledge of ABM systems and 
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strategic arms.  Dobrynin never received any information on the nature of Soviet or 
American weapons and defense systems from the Kremlin, which closely guarded this data.  
Therefore, he relied on what he could glean from American publications, contacts with 
American scientists, information from his negotiating partners in the backchannel, and his 
own background as an engineer.  Although he received instructions from the Politburo and 
the Foreign Ministry, much of the work in the backchannel occurred through sessions of 
“thinking out loud.”  Dobrynin’s independent research made it possible to take part in this 
sort of conversation, crucial to the success of the backchannel.311   
The Soviet ambassador displayed his mastery of the technical aspects of strategic 
arms talks when Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed American plans to build ABM systems to 
protect ICBMs.  On February 18, for example, Kissinger reported that Dobrynin asked for an 
explanation of the nebulous difference between point defense (an ABM system to protect a 
missile field or city) and area defense (an ABM system to protect a region or country).  In 
particular, Dobrynin asked how the Safeguard system, designed to protect Minuteman 
missile bases, could also be used for area defense.  Kissinger provided only a “very crude 
explanation,” as he “did not want to go into missile characteristics” and promised to let one 
of the White House’s technical experts explain the details in a future meeting.312  On March 
10, Kissinger and Dobrynin met with this expert, who explained the utility of the Safeguard 
system, emphasizing that it could not be used to defend against a massive Soviet strike, but 
could protect against smaller attacks from third countries or accidental launches.  Kissinger 
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recorded that Dobrynin did not seem interested in the discussion, only asking “a few 
perfunctory questions which, incidentally, showed that he had studied the subject very 
carefully.”313  In spite of these meetings, Dobrynin informed the Politburo that “in 
accordance with instructions,” he did not “get drawn into a discussion of specific technical 
issues pertaining to strategic arms.”314  Yet Kissinger’s report demonstrates that Dobrynin 
took a great deal of interest in mastering technical details, which proved important when 
SALT negotiations accelerated in 1971. 
The initial meetings after the New Year did not reveal progress over SALT, Europe, 
or China.  Dobrynin revealed his lack of faith in the backchannel’s ability to solve these 
fundamental problems in a February 10 memo on the Middle East: “One can say with almost 
complete certainty that another discussion with Kissinger of the main issues pertaining to a 
settlement is unlikely to produce any kind of result.”  He complained that the American 
positions seemed to remain the same, and warned of the potential that the American side 
might attempt to undermine multilateral talks in the Middle East using information from the 
backchannel.  In this sense, the backchannel was not only ineffective; it was a potential 
liability in Middle East talks. Dobrynin concluded, “At the present time Nixon is interested in 
basically only one thing: neutralizing, through confidential negotiations, the possibility of 
more direct involvement by the USSR in events in the Middle East while at the same time 
publicly maintaining his current ‘hard-line’ position.”315  In other words, Dobrynin argued 
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that bilateral talks with the US on the Middle East were counterproductive and risky since it 
appeared that the US primarily hoped to prevent the USSR from playing any role in an 
international settlement. 
To strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East, Dobrynin proposed that the 
Soviet government take a position of strength and inform the US about the possibility of 
Soviet pilots “appearing” in the UAR, for example, to aid in the defense of Egyptian borders.  
This would force Nixon to “look seriously” at the Middle East and to reevaluate the 
American position, allowing the Soviet government a greater role in negotiating a settlement.  
Moreover, while the American leaders could respond by sending US pilots to Israel, this 
would signal that the US openly supported Israel against the Arab states, and “the Arab 
world, even the so-called ‘moderate countries,’ would never forgive the current President, 
and US prestige there would be completely undermined for a long time.”  
Dobrynin also argued that this policy could undercut Nixon at home by activating the 
“silent majority” against his policies and alienating large segments of the American 
population.”  Nixon, he hoped, would recognize the “danger of a “‘new Vietnam’ for the US 
in the Middle East.”  Dobrynin concluded, “We are not proposing, of course, a policy of 
direct confrontation with the US.  We are talking about playing a new political card with a 
greater degree of pressure: the possibility of sending our personnel to the UAR for defensive 
purposes only if, taking all circumstances into account, we are capable of doing this now or 
exploiting this tactic in talks with Americans.”316  Dobrynin repeated his support for sending 
additional military aid to the Middle East a month later, noting in a telegram to the Foreign 
Ministry that Nixon and Kissinger seemed unnerved about the potential for Soviet personnel 
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to be involved in staffing SA-3 missile bases or flying MiG-23 aircraft.  “Even if we 
currently have no plans to deploy our crews with Egypt’s air-defense system,” he wrote, “we 
should—in the Embassy’s view—make use of this issue for political and diplomatic ends, to 
put pressure on the Nixon administration now.”317  Dobrynin later emphasized that these 
tactics had paid off, stating that “Kissinger’s persistent questioning about our military 
personnel in the UAR was noteworthy,” as “it was evident that this issue is now forcing the 
White House—perhaps for the first time—to take stock of events in the Middle East 
seriously and with increasing wariness.”318   
This series of telegrams to the Foreign Ministry provides insights into Dobrynin’s 
strategic thinking.  By negotiating from a position of strength, Dobrynin hoped to push Nixon 
to the table, allowing the Soviet government a more prominent role in seeking a solution to 
the Middle East crisis.  Dobrynin demonstrated that he was a realist who thought in terms of 
preserving and expanding Soviet power.  He saw the introduction of Soviet military 
personnel into the Middle East as a chip to use to persuade the American leadership to allow 
the USSR a greater role in the region, knowing that Kissinger aimed, above all, to prevent 
this from happening.  Moreover, Dobrynin and other Soviet leaders who favored détente 
faced pressure from Soviet hawks in the Defense Ministry and the army, who felt détente 
would weaken Soviet power.  Thus Dobrynin’s proposal protected his flank from criticism 
that he, as an “Americanist” who lived and worked in the US for over a decade, had grown 
soft in his dealings with Kissinger. 
Following the uproar that greeted the Nixon administration’s announcement of the 
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incursion of American and South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia, no private meetings of 
the backchannel took place until June 10 after Dobrynin returned from a trip to Moscow.319  
At this point, Nixon invited him for a brief meeting at the White House, before Kissinger and 
Dobrynin left for an evening cruise on the president’s yacht, the Sequoia.  Nixon referenced 
the October meeting, expressing disappointment in the lack of progress since then.  This 
time, however, instead of offering a sharp critique of Soviet policy, Nixon said that “he was 
prepared to let bygones be bygones and start afresh,” asking that the Soviet ambassador and 
American national security advisor speak in that spirit.  According to the American report, 
Dobrynin “felt the same way,” emphasizing that his desire to “concentrate on the future.”320  
Dobrynin’s record of this part of the conversation suggests a less relaxed exchange, as he 
expressed criticism of American actions in Cambodia and responded to Nixon’s calls for an 
“unemotional, businesslike look” at Soviet-American relations by claiming that the US did 
not negotiate in good faith, instead seeking the unilateral advantage in all fields.  Still, 
Dobrynin’s memo confirms that the June 10 meeting remained, at the very least, cordial, and 
he writes that Nixon understood the Soviet reaction to Cambodia, but still hoped that the 
Soviet government would “seriously discuss” his comments and introduce a “constructive 
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element” to backchannel talks.321 
As earlier, Nixon and Dobrynin confirmed the importance of the backchannel in the 
future of Soviet-American relations.  Kissinger recorded the president’s comment that “if 
serious business was to be done, it was to be done in our channel.”322  According to 
Dobrynin’s notes, Nixon twice endorsed Kissinger, emphasizing that Dobrynin “should 
regard everything Kissinger says as coming personally from me” and that information should 
not be shared with any American officials except Nixon and Kissinger.  Nixon mentioned 
that American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jacob Beam and any other top State 
Department officials should be kept out of the loop.  Dobrynin highlighted the unusual nature 
of this request, “It must be said that in my experience, neither President Kennedy nor 
President Johnson had given such sweeping powers or instructions to their assistants as 
Nixon had, bypassing even the Secretary of State.  Kissinger, who was present during all of 
this, positively glowed with pleasure and from the acknowledgment of his importance.”323  
Here, again, Dobrynin describes Kissinger’s ego as one of the national security advisor’s 
central personality traits, implying that it could be used to the Soviet advantage in 
negotiations. 
The backchannel thus moved beyond the limitations of the previous administrations 
with which Dobrynin had negotiated, as the American authorities asked him to conspire with 
them to hold information from the rest of the American government.  From the Soviet 
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perspective, this represented a streamlining of the American bureaucracy, reminiscent of 
when President Roosevelt took charge of Soviet-American affairs during World War II, and 
it indicated the potential for real breakthroughs.  Furthermore, as Dobrynin implied, it 
provided an additional opportunity for him to use flattery and compliments to feed 
Kissinger’s ego, buttering him up to make concessions during talks.  Finally, it represented a 
new codification of the channel, ensuring that Kissinger and Dobrynin remained the key 
diplomats in negotiating the parameters of détente.   
After the meeting with the president, Kissinger and Dobrynin drove to the Sequoia, 
where they cruised the Potomac River until 1:00 AM.  In his preparatory notes, Kissinger 
wrote to Nixon, “The main purpose of the session will be to convey to the Soviets that they 
face a fundamental decision about our bilateral dealings.  Both sides can engage in constant 
tactical maneuvering for minor advantages—this process inevitably leads to confrontations, 
however unintentional.  The other choice is to seek sweeping solutions based on a broad-
gauged relationship.”324  In the meeting, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed their respective 
understandings of “broad” and “limited” agreements, as well as Soviet complaints about the 
SALT package that was then under discussion by the official channel that met in Vienna.  
They concluded that they would allow the diplomats in Vienna to continue their work, while 
they discussed “general principles” in the backchannel and sought for ways to settle Soviet 
grievances.   They then moved on to the main issues preventing an agreement on the Middle 
East, specifically troop withdrawals, demilitarized zones, and the fate of Sharm-el-Sheik, a 
port town on the Sinai peninsula where the Israelis hoped to retain a military presence—as 
well as the future role of the Soviet military in the region and Dobrynin’s frustrations with 
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American negotiators.  They also covered Berlin, the potential for a European security 
conference, and the ongoing war in Vietnam, with no new proposals.325 
 Perhaps most surprisingly, the meeting ended with Dobrynin complaining about the 
state of the backchannel.  According to Kissinger, the Soviet ambassador explained that the 
“period of relative hopefulness” at the start of the Nixon presidency eventually gave way to 
“a period of stagnation,” and as the situation began to improve in spring 1970, the US 
invaded Cambodia, spoiling their constructive dialogue.326  Dobrynin’s record insinuates that 
he took an even stronger stance.  Speaking “from a purely personal perspective,” Dobrynin 
reportedly told Kissinger “we had failed to reach a single concrete agreement or 
understanding—even a little one—through this channel of ours.”  In Dobrynin’s notes, he 
conveyed to Kissinger that confidential channels had been utilized “more effectively” under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.  Dobrynin commented that he left open the hope that the 
backchannel would play a “useful role” if it focused on concrete issues, but he emphasized 
his contention that the Soviet government had “no intention of settling for the external 
trappings of a ‘confidential communication channel’ when in strict confidence we hear pretty 
good things, but they don’t show up in US policy.”  Dobrynin observed that these comments 
“made [Kissinger] somewhat uneasy,” due to the prestige that his role in the backchannel 
afforded him in the Nixon administration.327  He remarked that, without progress, the 
backchannel meant little to Soviet authorities, threatening Kissinger’s position in an attempt 
                                                
325 “Memorandum of Conversation (US),” June 10, 1970, in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 
1969-1972, 154-59, and “Memorandum of Conversation (USSR),” June 10, 1970, in Soviet-American 
Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, 159-65. 
326 “Memorandum of Conversation (US),” June 10, 1970, in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 
1969-1972, 154-59. 
327 “Memorandum of Conversation (USSR),” June 10, 1970, in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 
1969-1972, 159-65. 
  165 
to persuade him to move forward in backchannel talks.  Despite the harsh nature of this 
critique, the overall conversation in both accounts seems to have been constructive and even 
friendly, with the hope that, in spite of the American incursion in Cambodia, progress could 
be made in bilateral negotiations.   
 Although Kissinger and Dobrynin met more frequently after the cruise on the 
Sequoia, the relationship did not improve in summer and fall due to American involvement 
in Cambodia, Soviet naval activity and the apparent attempt to build a Soviet naval base in 
Cuban waters, and the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970.  While they made 
progress in SALT negotiations, discussing the potential for linking talks on offensive and 
defensive weapons and setting an agenda for a possible summit, on July 9, Kissinger 
expressed his frustration with what he perceived as Soviet foot-dragging.328  According to his 
notes, he lamented to Dobrynin that “it is early enough in our Administration to have a 
fundamental departure in our relationships with the Soviet Union,” but as time passed by, any 
agreements would be made under conditions in which they could not be “effectively 
implemented.”  When Dobrynin complained that the upcoming Congress of the CPSU and 
the situation in Cambodia “make this a difficult manner for us,” Kissinger shot back that he 
was “looking at problems from our point of view, and it was up to him to take care of his 
problems.”329  In reference to the same conversation, Dobrynin reported back to the Kremlin 
that “not only has it proven impossible to establish any businesslike dialogue between him 
and the Soviet leadership during the year and a half he has been in office, but the 
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corresponding relations at the highest level are even worse now than they were before, not to 
mention the fact that we have not achieved any degree of trust.”330  For his part, Kissinger 
felt that Dobrynin “appeared to bluster,” claiming in frustration that the Soviet system was 
“more permanent” than the American system, that they would wait until the end of the Nixon 
administration, if necessary, to seek progress in superpower relations, and that “it was the 
consensus of all their senior officials that relations with the United States had never been 
worse since the Cuban missile crisis.”331  Shortly thereafter, Gromyko wrote to the Kremlin, 
following a rare meeting with Rogers, to say that “the US does not anticipate any serious 
agreement on strategic weapons, at least any time soon.”332 
 At the same time, Dobrynin reiterated the strategies that he proposed the previous 
year.  He noted Nixon’s increasing interest in a summit, as the president no longer seemed to 
view a meeting as contingent upon a prearranged set of agreements, a shift which Dobrynin 
attributed to electoral concerns, the upcoming Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, the lack 
of progress in the backchannel, the conflict in the Middle East, and a perceived cooling of 
Soviet interest in a summit.  Dobrynin argued that the Soviet side should use Nixon’s desire 
for a summit to pressure the president to accept the need for agreements on issues of interest 
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to the Soviet state.  Moreover, Dobrynin stressed that this approach would “make it possible 
to test the seriousness of Nixon’s own intensions.”333  In other words, Dobrynin believed that 
they could determine Nixon’s willingness to grant concessions to Soviet demands in order to 
receive a Soviet agreement to a summit.  Gromyko later seconded this assessment during his 
visit to Washington in October 1970, when the foreign minister observed that publicly 
announcing a summit would help the process of negotiating a treaty with West Germany, 
organize a European security conference, reduce tensions in the Middle East, increase 
pressure on Israel, demonstrate the futility of the Chinese strategy of playing the US and 
USSR off one another, and exert a restraining influence on the Nixon administration’s 
foreign policy. All of these factors would make it more difficult for the president to pursue 
policies that could endanger the summit once it became a public issue.334  Thus, as it had 
previously, the Soviet Union used the prospect of a summit to press forward its goals in other 
areas of foreign policy. 
 Dobrynin also emphasized the importance of proactive triangular diplomacy in his 
messages to the Kremlin.  Although he noted Kissinger’s recent cooling toward negotiations 
for a bilateral agreement against the use of nuclear weapons by third countries, Dobrynin 
argued that the Soviet side should press for it in the backchannel for two reasons.  First, it 
would “contribute to the overall vulnerability of the Chinese in their relations with us,” 
particularly in the Sino-Soviet border conflict, as they “would essentially be faced with a 
united front (or at least the potential for such a front) of the two main nuclear powers.”  
Second, such an agreement would remove the basis for American triangular diplomacy, as 
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the US could no longer play “on the friction between the USSR and China, making a 
pretense of wanting ‘equal relations’ both with us and with China, but in essence 
encouraging China toward conflict with us, giving China to understand that as far as the US 
is concerned, it will not have to ‘watch its back’ in the event of such a conflict.”  While 
Dobrynin stressed that Kissinger understood the consequences for his “grand, global 
strategy” that such an agreement would bring, the American diplomat remained open to 
discussing this issue, even if Kissinger preferred to “await further developments” or at least 
to “try to get something in return.”335  Dobrynin did not back away from the tactics of the 
previous year, using the summit to receive concessions from the US, while trying to ensure 
that the USSR did not end up on the wrong end of triangular diplomacy. 
  On December 22, after a two-month interval of relative stagnation, Kissinger and 
Dobrynin again attempted to reboot the backchannel.  In his memo, Kissinger reported that 
he “made a little speech” on the worsening state of bilateral relations, pointing to various 
misunderstandings and suggesting that “distrust has begun to set in on both sides and a 
dangerous momentum and interaction seems to be occurring.”  Kissinger warned that these 
“pinpricks” could build on each other, causing relations to “slide into a serious 
deterioration,” and “suspicion between us could grow to the point that a minor incident could 
develop into a major one because of a failure in communication.”  Kissinger complained that 
a stalemate in their confidential talks could have catastrophic consequences.  Hoping to push 
Dobrynin toward concessions with such alarmist prediction, Kissinger declared that they 
were at a “crossroads” in Soviet-American relations, in which they could adopt a new course 
toward détente or settle back into the superpower rivalry.  He emphasized the need to accept 
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each other’s moves as legitimate, if misunderstood, and to move forward in a constructive 
manner.  Kissinger recorded that Dobrynin “concluded with an eloquent speech on the need 
to make some progress in our bilateral channel,” inviting Kissinger to dinner and stating his 
preparedness to meet as often as necessary and to review their positions on all issues.336   
In contrast, Dobrynin’s record suggests that he, not Kissinger, gave a critical account 
of Soviet-American relations that blamed the Nixon administration for the lack of progress.  
Dobrynin states that he did not invite Kissinger to a future meeting, but rather that he 
reluctantly accepted Kissinger’s invitation for the next backchannel discussion.  While he 
agreed to come, he “did not see much point in having such a meeting so soon if he, 
Kissinger, was going to continue to limit himself to general observations without going into 
the specific substance of the issues.”  He concluded sardonically, “The two of us talk a lot, 
Mr. Kissinger, but to be honest, we’re not getting anywhere.”337  Although the two versions 
of events differed as both parties continued to manipulate their memos to present themselves 
in a favorable light, they both suggest a mutual dissatisfaction with bilateral relations and the 
backchannel and a desire to improve the state of affairs.  
Following this conversation and a subsequent trip by Dobrynin to Moscow for 
consultations, another round of enthusiastic follow-up negotiations took place.  Dobrynin 
contacted Kissinger to meet immediately after his return to Moscow.  Kissinger described the 
discussion as “perhaps the most significant I have had with Dobrynin since our conversations 
began.”  Kissinger’s record states that Dobrynin proposed setting a specific date for the 
summit, reaffirmed Soviet readiness to discuss Berlin and the Middle East in the 
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backchannel, and confirmed Soviet approval of Kissinger’s basic approach to a SALT 
agreement.  In Kissinger’s account, Dobrynin remarked that “this could be the most 
important year in US-Soviet relations.” Demonstrating his firm grasp of American politics, 
Dobrynin noted that since little gets done in election years, “whatever progress was to be 
made had to be made this year.”  According to Kissinger, Dobrynin then “smiled and said 
that he hoped that Indochina would not be an obstacle” to agreement on other issues, and he 
“implied strongly that in its present framework it would not be.”  As Dobrynin left the room, 
he said, “So the future of Soviet-American relations is in our hands, and I want you to know 
we are going to make a big effort to improve them.”338  Dobrynin’s memo does not reveal the 
same level of euphoria, but suggests that Dobrynin focused on new progress in bilateral 
relations.  He anticipated a rapid development in talks and an expansion of backchannel 
activities, noting, “Kissinger and I agreed that our meetings must now be held on a more 
planned and regular basis.”339 
As progress on SALT seemed imminent, Dobrynin, speaking off the record, 
addressed the issue of how Kissinger should handle the Soviet bureaucracy.  Dobrynin 
explained that “no lateral clearances” existed in the Soviet bureaucracy.  In other words, 
bureaucracies did not share information with their various counterparts at equal levels of 
seniority, meaning that, while the Foreign Ministry was responsible for conducting SALT 
negotiations, it did not have authority over the Soviet nuclear arsenal.  Also, while the 
Defense Ministry and the army understood the Soviet nuclear program, these groups had no  
involvement in Soviet foreign policy or the management of the Vienna delegation.  To deal 
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with this situation, Dobrynin advised Kissinger to formulate his most recent SALT proposal 
as an unsigned Note Verbale, which Dobrynin could forward to Moscow for a response.340  
This set the parameters for how SALT proposals would be presented through the 
backchannel, and the first exchange of notes took place in late February and early March, 
with proposals to begin negotiations on limiting ABMs and strategic arms.341  With this new 
approach to negotiations, Kissinger and Dobrynin began to work toward strategic arms 
limitations. 
 The slow nature of progress still led to tensions.  In February, Dobrynin summarized 
the status of the three main topics addressed in the backchannel—SALT, Berlin, and the 
Middle East—stating that “progress on these issues varies, but, on the whole, we believe it is 
clearly insufficient, and in some instances progress thus far is virtually nonexistent.”  Still, 
Dobrynin remained optimistic that the summit could encourage additional developments in 
bilateral relations, as it had already “compelled Nixon to agree to discuss issues, which, 
under other circumstances, he would hardly elevate to the level of this channel, much less 
take up personally, leaving them instead to ordinary diplomatic negotiations.”  Dobrynin 
recommended “taking advantage of the President’s interest in a summit meeting” to “enable 
us to exert additional pressure on the White House and bring about certain progress.”342   
Kissinger showed his own frustration when the Soviet government delayed its 
response to the proposal for formal ABM and strategic arms negotiations.  On March 22, 
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Dobrynin tried to calm Kissinger’s nerves, emphasizing that the upcoming Party Congress 
had consumed much of the Politburo’s time and that SALT “represented a very complex 
decision-making issue for the Soviet Union,” as “it involved both the Defense and the 
Foreign Ministry, and the Soviet government was not used to inter-departmental 
clearances.”343  By March 25, though, an impatient Kissinger told Dobrynin that “we were at 
a key point in our relationship” and that the Soviet government continued to drag its feet.  He 
warned ominously that “fundamental decisions” would be made in a few weeks, that “we 
would not tread water,” and that he “would hate to think that the channel between Dobrynin 
and me was a channel of lost opportunities.”344  Again, Kissinger hoped that threatening to 
pull the plug on the channel might push the Soviet side toward an agreement. 
Throughout these discussions, the Middle East remained a thorn in the side of the 
backchannel negotiators.  Dobrynin pushed for using the prospect of a summit to gain 
concessions: “We should clearly try to exploit the advantages of the direct channel: secure 
and direct access to the President as well as—and this is now of no small importance—his 
interest in the summit.”345  In his recommendations to Moscow in February 1971, Dobrynin 
observed that the “central objective of American policy in the Middle East remains the same: 
to weaken the influence of the Soviet Union in this region of the world and, above all else, to 
‘eliminate’ Soviet military presence there.”  He offered a series of diplomatic 
countermeasures, as well as a more aggressive approach: “We are far from proposing now 
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any radical measures on our side in the Middle East—and this is not required—but the 
skillful and deliberate use of threatening various actions on our side in the military-political 
realm should be added to our arsenal of active means in the diplomatic fight for a peace 
settlement in the Middle East.”  Dobrynin concluded, “This is a very effective means for 
influencing the White House.  All our experience in relations with this administration 
testifies to this.”346  Dobrynin understood the benefits that a summit would convey to the 
Soviet Union, but he also hoped to use it to strengthen the Soviet position. 
The role of linkage in Soviet-American relations also continued to cause problems in 
the backchannel.  On April 23, Kissinger asked Dobrynin about the summit prospects, and 
while Dobrynin repeated the Soviet government’s invitation for a visit by Nixon, the Soviet 
diplomat also stated that he did not think a visit was likely until after the settlement of the 
Berlin question.  Kissinger wrote that he “reacted very sharply,” considering this a form of 
linkage.  Dobrynin claimed that Kissinger misunderstood him and that “it was a reality that 
there should be some progress on Berlin, not a condition,” repeating language Kissinger 
frequently used in negotiations when discussing issues that he felt were linked.  Kissinger 
snapped that he was familiar with this approach and called it “unacceptable” to use it toward 
the president.347  Dobrynin characterized Kissinger’s demeanor as “very nervous” and 
“worked up,” describing how “with great excitement” he “began to rummage through his 
briefcase” for a message from the US ambassador to West Germany, demonstrating Nixon’s 
clandestine work to encourage a Berlin agreement.348  Kissinger protested Dobrynin’s 
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attempts at reverse-linkage, essentially using his own tactics against him, demonstrating the 
ways in which unresolved conflicts involving third countries continued to plague bilateral 
negotiations. 
 
The Semenov Affair 
 Owing to the two-tiered nature of SALT negotiations, diplomats in normal channels 
purposefully or inadvertently attempted to seize the reigns of détente from Kissinger and 
Dobrynin, testing the backchannel.  When this system functioned properly, Kissinger and 
Dobrynin secretly worked out the contours of a deal in the backchannel.  Then the leadership 
in Washington and Moscow used these agreements to draft orders to the diplomats in normal 
channels, namely Gerald Smith and V. S. Semenov, who served as the chiefs of the 
American and Soviet delegations on the reduction of strategic weapons in Vienna.  Their 
initial orders usually did not reflect the agreements reached by Kissinger and Dobrynin—
after all, neither side wanted to appear weak in the eyes of their allies and the American press 
by accepting the first offer from their superpower rivals—but were designed so that official 
talks eventually would yield the agreement already reached clandestinely by Kissinger and 
Dobrynin.  Smith and Semenov’s task was to produce the formal documents necessary to 
conclude the agreement. 
 One difficulty in this arrangement was that, as a deputy foreign minister, Semenov 
frequently had access to information on top-level talks and thus understood that the 
Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel had negotiated the general contours of détente, while Nixon 
and Kissinger kept Smith in the dark.  Unfortunately for the American side, Semenov 
sometimes dropped hints to Smith about the existence of a backchannel, and this left Smith 
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confused, Nixon and Kissinger in a fury, and Dobrynin scrambling to keep the backchannel 
together.  For example, on December 22, 1970, Kissinger mentioned that Semenov allegedly 
told Smith that it would be a “hot, political summer” and that the SALT delegation in Vienna 
would have to “mark time while the principals were negotiating.”  Fuming that Smith now 
believed that negotiations were happening over his head, Kissinger told Dobrynin that he 
“really had to be sure Soviet diplomats would not speak to other Americans about the content 
of our conversations,” as “special care should be taken that our channel would not be played 
back into any American net.”349   
Moreover, Semenov occasionally attempted to circumvent the backchannel, 
presenting proposals on the kinds of major political issues that Nixon and Kissinger preferred 
to handle secretly.  In July 1970, for example, Semenov casually handed Smith a note at a 
concert suggesting an alliance between the US and the USSR against any country that had 
engaged in provocative acts with nuclear weapons.  Kissinger emphasized to Dobrynin that, 
while they could discuss this proposal, “such a politically important matter should not be 
handled within the context of SALT, but should be handled at a higher level.”350  This 
situation was made even more difficult for Dobrynin, because as he told Kissinger on April 
7, 1970, “Semenov was a Deputy Foreign Minister and it was hard for a mere Ambassador to 
interject himself.”351  The interjection of a high-ranking Soviet official who either did not 
understand or purposefully flouted the backchannel system exposed just how messy, 
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confusing, and vulnerable the backchannel system was for both sides. 
This situation came to a head in May 1971.  First, on May 4, Semenov presented a 
proposal to Smith that, after achieving an agreement to limit ABM systems to defending the 
capitals, the superpowers should freeze new ICBM construction with the aim of achieving an 
agreement on offensive arms limitations.  This closely mirrored a proposal that Nixon and 
Kissinger had rejected in the backchannel a few weeks earlier.  Since Dobrynin had not yet 
provided them with a response to their counterproposal, they became convinced Semenov’s 
proposal was an attempt by the Soviet government to work around the backchannel, playing 
the White House and the State Department off one another to secure a better deal.  Kissinger 
was on vacation, so his assistant, General Alexander Haig, delivered a stern warning to 
Dobrynin, suggesting that “both Dr. Kissinger and the President were beginning to seriously 
question the value of continuing with this special channel and wondered whether or not it 
might not be more advantageous to terminate this channel now and return the discussions on 
the range of issues which had been covered in this channel to their regularly established 
forums.”  Dobrynin “reacted somewhat sharply,” arguing that Smith’s memo indicated that 
Semenov “merely hinted at the direction in which Soviet thinking was progressing” and that 
the US side “should be encouraged by this turn of events” because it signaled an acceptance 
of the US position.  Haig reminded Dobrynin of the importance of restricting critical 
conversations to the backchannel and that the Soviet side should coordinate with Kissinger 
before bringing new initiatives into official channels.  Dobrynin promised to communicate 
these points to Moscow.352   
Although Dobrynin promised tighter control of information and a backchannel 
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response to Kissinger’s proposal in the near future, the situation in Vienna continued to 
devolve.  On May 6, two of Semenov’s aides took aside American diplomat Raymond 
Garthoff at a Soviet reception to emphasize the importance of reaching a SALT agreement in 
1971 and the need to “consider seriously and respond affirmatively” to the “very significant” 
statement that Semenov presented to Smith two days earlier.  Then, on May 9, Semenov and 
Smith took a cruise on the Wörthersee in Carinthia, Austria, where they had an informal five-
hour discussion on the potential for a SALT agreement.  During the cruise, Semenov 
expounded on the ideas that he initially presented earlier, leading Smith to report to the 
president and the secretaries of state and defense that he believed an ABM agreement could 
be reached along with a freeze on offensive weapons and limitations on radar and the testing 
of surface-to-air missiles.  Much of this proposal—the freeze on offensive weapons and the 
ABM agreement—was similar to the agreement that was currently under consideration in the 
backchannel, but the issues of radar and surface-to-air missiles had not been discussed.  
Semenov reported to the Foreign Ministry that he did not exceed his orders, only mentioning 
these ideas informally, but Smith believed that the talks were serious enough to warrant 
contacting the Washington and requesting a formal reply.353 
Upon receiving the memo from Smith on the morning of May 11, Kissinger called 
Dobrynin in a fury, declaring that “apparently our channel is not working properly” and 
asserting that there were only two ways to interpret this situation: either there was confusion 
in Moscow, which he did not believe, or there was a “deliberate attempt” to bypass the 
president.  Dobrynin retorted: “We are not children.  We know who is boss.”  Kissinger 
continued that, regardless of their intentions, Soviet actions had imperiled the backchannel.  
                                                
353 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, May 11, 1971, 9:10 AM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger Telephone 
Conversation Transcripts.  Also available in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, 342-49. 
  178 
He groused that it was “a hell of a strange feeling” to see people so low on the bureaucratic 
chain with apparent knowledge of backchannel activities.  “It’s not in the good of our 
relationship that while you and I are discussing something, subordinates are discussing the 
same thing,” he said. “It embarrasses the President.”  While Dobrynin attempted to calm 
Kissinger, the American diplomat remained alarmed, emphasizing that violating the rules of 
the two-tiered system posed a danger to the backchannel and to progress in superpower 
relations.  He argued that, because these talks had entered into normal channels, they would 
have to conclude an agreement in the backchannel before normal channels took over and 
sidestepped the work that Dobrynin and Kissinger already completed.354   
Kissinger’s emotional response to this situation reflects the tenuousness of 
Kissinger’s position, as well as his strategy of using emotional manipulation in the 
backchannel to bolster his position.  On the one hand, his anger represents a real emotional 
response to the perception that the Soviet side could be circumventing his authority over 
foreign policy.  This triggered the insecurity that he expressed in private meetings with 
Haldeman and Nixon, fearful that he could be displaced in favor of normal channels.  On the 
other hand, it demonstrates the way that Kissinger used emotion to punctuate his messages to 
Dobrynin.  He wanted to ensure that the Soviet government understood the dire 
consequences of breaking the backchannel, and he broke the friendly tone of their 
conversations to make sure that Dobrynin understood the seriousness of the situation, from 
the perspective of the White House. 
Dobrynin’s report on this meeting reveals the tenuous nature of the backchannel 
relationship.  In explaining Kissinger’s frustration, Dobrynin pointed to “personal elements,” 
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explaining that Kissinger hoped that successful backchannel negotiations “would elevate him 
in the President’s eyes” and that Kissinger had become “nervous, fearful both of a failure 
through the confidential channel and the possible exposure of his behind-the-scenes role” in 
subverting the State Department’s authority.  Moreover, Dobrynin reminded Soviet 
authorities that Nixon was “a very petty and distrustful man with a huge ego, who carries 
grudges.”  His general paranoia combined with his long history of anticommunism meant 
that he viewed every Soviet move through “a magnifying glass” to determine if it represented 
“some sneaky trick here or a wish to ‘deceive or demean’ the President personally,” meaning 
that “Nixon measures everything by his own yardstick.”  Dobrynin warned that this 
suspiciousness had reached “pathological proportions,” leading him to listen increasingly to 
members of his inner circle who parroted his fears that Soviet leaders did not intend to 
improve relations.  The ambassador ominously concluded that Nixon’s “hostile frame of 
mind” was growing, while Soviet-American relations were “deteriorating.”355   
Dobrynin’s personal analysis of Nixon and Kissinger’s reactions to the Semenov 
affair points to the fragility of the backchannel as a method for conducting Soviet-American 
relations, and it underscores the weakness of Kissinger’s approach of using emotional 
outbursts to manipulate the backchannel.  In some ways, it reflects a genuine emotional 
reaction to Kissinger’s refusal to believe that Semenov’s actions did not reflect a ruse on the 
part of the Soviet government to extract concessions.  Dobrynin invested significant time and 
energy into building a friendly personal relationship with Kissinger, and when the American 
diplomat burst into an angry outburst over a minor blip in secret talks, Dobrynin felt as if it 
demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in personal diplomacy with an emotionally unstable 
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person.  In other ways, though, this alarmist message may have been intended to gain the 
attention of the Soviet leadership, encouraging them to keep a closer eye on Semenov and 
ensure that it presented all sensitive proposals to Dobrynin, the only Soviet official who 
could handle Kissinger’s ego and Nixon’s paranoia in Washington. 
 Kissinger and Dobrynin worked to finalize the agreement and avoid the bureaucratic 
chaos feared by the American side. When Kissinger and Dobrynin met again the following 
day, the Soviet ambassador finally produced a response from Moscow on the American 
proposal.  The Soviet leadership conceded to the American demand that formal letters 
exchanged between Nixon and the Soviet leadership would not include a provision on 
limiting ABM construction to defense of their respective capitals, and it accepted 
simultaneous negotiations for ABM and offensive arms limitations.  Kissinger and Dobrynin 
hammered out the language of the letters and the public statement.356  On May 20, the public 
text was released;357 a major step had been taken in SALT negotiations.  The conversation in 
the backchannel reflected the hope that this breakthrough could lead to general progress, and 
Dobrynin reported that Kissinger mentioned the “prospect for a real upturn in relations 
between the two governments,” with a promise for renewed efforts to achieve a Berlin 
                                                
356 “Memorandum of Conversation (USSR),” May 13, 1971, in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 
1969-1972, 356-59.  Also see Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversations, May 13, 1971, 1:28, 3:55, and 
4:30 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
357 In particular, the Soviet news agency, TASS, was supposed to publish the English-language version of the 
public statement as delivered by the White House.  Instead, it published its own translation of the Russian text, 
which suggested that the superpowers were “preparing a treaty,” which alarmed Kissinger, who feared that it 
would prompt Senate involvement. Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, May 20, 1971, 1:48 PM, 
NSArch, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts.  Dobrynin released a statement from the 
embassy correcting the error, and he called back at 4:04 PM with news that TASS had released the correct text 
in English.  Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, May 20, 1971, 4:04 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts.  Working out the details on the private letters took a little longer. 
Dobrynin received a final copy signed by Kosygin on May 25.  Dobrynin proposed that the letters be dated May 
20 to match the public announcement, and Kissinger agreed.  Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, 
May 25, 1971, 12:50 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
  181 
agreement and unilateral efforts on the part of the US to improve trade relations.358 
 Despite this optimism, the private messages from Kissinger and Dobrynin to their 
respective leaders reveal the shakier foundations of the agreement that came in the wake of 
the Semenov affair.  Kissinger bragged to Nixon, “We got practically everything we asked 
for.”  Nixon asked, “Conciliatory?”  Kissinger responded, “Oh yes.  I really shook him 
yesterday.”  Nixon replied, “Good.”359  If Kissinger reveled in the way in which he used a 
crisis to extract concessions from Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador submitted a different 
report to the Politburo.  Dobrynin wrote that Kissinger “commented in a markedly 
conciliatory tone that yesterday they had apparently ‘gotten somewhat worked up.’”  
Complaining about the response time from Moscow, Kissinger reportedly remarked that 
“President Nixon has to work under great stress all the time, he has a host of all kinds of 
complicated issues to deal with, and now comes the ‘Smith memorandum’ as well, which 
exacerbated the President’s general irritation even more.”  Dobrynin continued:  
I told Kissinger that the Soviet leaders had no fewer governmental concerns and 
responsibilities than the President.  They exercise necessary self-control, however, 
and do not deviate from a businesslike tone, which is the only kind permissible in 
relations between great powers, although they themselves could present their own list 
of completely legitimate grievances to the US President, considering the wide gaps 
between the words and deeds of the White House that continue to exist in a number of 
instances.  I added that the hot temper and lack of self-control, combined with tinges 
of semi-hysteria, that were present yesterday in Kissinger’s description of the 
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President’s feelings had made the most negative impression on me personally.  I am 
sure the impression all this produced in Moscow was no better. 
 
When Kissinger suggested that “these things happen” and that they “forget the whole 
episode,” Dobrynin responded that “such things are not easily forgotten” and that “one must 
control one’s emotions and not allow them to influence serious intergovernmental relations.”  
“Kissinger,” Dobrynin concluded, “felt awkward after yesterday’s loss of self-control in our 
conversation.  The point, of course, is not what he feels today, but the fact that yesterday’s 
comments are quite revealing in terms of the general psychological state of the President 
himself.”360  For their part, Nixon and Kissinger were convinced that only a potential crisis 
could accelerate Soviet attention to the backchannel and produce real results, and they 
remained suspicious of what Semenov’s actions meant about Soviet intentions in bilateral 
relations.  In Dobrynin’s view, the episode demonstrated the growing hostility of the White 
House to an agreement, despite what an apparent moment of progress.  Although they 
achieved a workable agreement on negotiating SALT, neither Kissinger nor Dobrynin 
seemed satisfied with the other side’s actions during the Semenov affair and, using 
emotionally-charged language, both expressed skepticism that the backchannel could 
survive.    
 The primary backchannel negotiators continued to disagree on the causes of the 
Semenov affair years later when penning their memoirs.  Kissinger suggested that Gromyko 
intentionally sought to exploit the two-tiered system of negotiations.  Alternately, he argued 
that perhaps Gromyko wanted give Semenov a role in talks, or that Semenov wanted to show 
that he could do better than Dobrynin.  Either way, Kissinger concluded, “One should not 
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assume that the Soviet system is more immune to bureaucratic infighting than ours; in all 
likelihood, it is more virulently prone to it.”361  Dobrynin wrote in his memoirs that Semenov 
learned about the backchannel’s activities from friends in Moscow and decided to act on his 
own.  He contends that Semenov “hoped to give Moscow a pleasant surprise with his 
improvisation and obtain permission to continue negotiations along those lines.”  Instead, 
Gromyko launched an investigation into the matter and while Semenov remained in charge 
of the SALT delegation, he did not receive any further information on backchannel 
activities.362  These accounts support the conclusion that the bureaucratic disarray on both 
sides—the American two-tiered channel system and the fractured foreign policy apparatus of 
the Soviet Union—allowed a figure like Semenov to wreak havoc. 
 
Camp David 
 Following the agreement on the negotiations for SALT, Kissinger invited Dobrynin 
for a private dinner at Camp David for another “tour d’horizon” meeting that lasted roughly 
six hours.  In preparation for this meeting, Kissinger proposed to Nixon that they give the 
Soviet government an “ultimatum” for announcing a summit date.  Kissinger expressed 
concerns that the Soviet leaders were playing a “cute game,” trying to gain additional 
concessions on Berlin, SALT, and trade relations by being coy about their interest in a 
summit.  If Nixon did not press the Soviet leadership for a firm commitment, Kissinger 
feared that the Soviet side would “harvest everything and we will end up losing,” with no 
help on Vietnam and no summit.  According to their plan, if the Soviet government did not 
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respond to the ultimatum, Kissinger was to tell Dobrynin that “we have been horsing around 
for a year, that we would be glad to come to Moscow but will delay” until spring 1972.  
When Nixon worried that he did not want it to appear as if “we are begging for the goddamn 
Summit,” Kissinger assured Nixon that “we have all the cards in our hands,” and that in the 
event of additional delays, the Americans could turn their attention to a Chinese summit.  
Then, Kissinger claimed, the Soviet leaders “won’t scream so much,” making them more 
willing to wrap up an agreement with the US.363 
 As he had promised to Nixon in advance, Kissinger presented Dobrynin an ultimatum 
at this meeting, stating that, for the summit to take place in September, they would need the 
Soviet decision by the end of June.  Otherwise, they would have to defer the decision with 
the goal of planning a summit for 1972.  According to Kissinger’s report, Dobrynin 
recommended stalling the summit several times, proposing that they wait for the conclusion 
of the Berlin negotiations and Brezhnev’s trip to Paris in October.  When Kissinger refused 
to give ground, Dobrynin promised a response in two to three weeks.364 
Perhaps influenced by the Semenov affair, Dobrynin and Kissinger also used the 
meeting to discuss the impediments of bureaucratic structures.  According to Kissinger, 
Dobrynin expressed regret that SALT had become the “test case” of the superpower 
relationship.  Although the Foreign Ministry and Dobrynin personally supported improved 
relations with the US, SALT was “essentially out of their control because the military played 
a very important role.”  When representatives from the Foreign Ministry and the Defense 
Ministry met with Brezhnev to discuss SALT, “the Foreign Ministry was precluded from 
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making any comments on military issues.  They could only defend their proposals on the 
grounds that it would help relations with the United States.”  Furthermore, “the military were 
precluded from making any political judgments, but on the other hand, their military 
judgments were pretty definitive.”  The military’s opposition to any restrictions on the arms 
race, therefore, complicated matters tremendously.  Dobrynin concluded that “this separation 
[between bureaucratic institutions] was being strictly maintained,” limiting the Foreign 
Ministry’s influence.  Kissinger reported Dobrynin’s claim that he had to request clearance 
for military briefings when visiting Moscow, and that he was only reluctantly granted limited 
access based on his recent nomination to the Central Committee.  Although Dobrynin 
declared that both he and Gromyko ardently desired advances in Soviet-American relations, 
he lamented that Soviet bureaucratic structures meant that progress was not entirely in his 
hands, making SALT a problematic “test case” for détente.  Still, Dobrynin expressed 
optimism for a spring 1972 summit, and according to Kissinger, the Soviet ambassador 
indicated his general support for the Nixon administration, criticizing the spring protests 
against the president and suggesting that the Soviet leadership favored Nixon’s reelection in 
1972.365  This sort of flattery was designed to soothe Nixon’s ego, especially after the 
outburst that came at the start of the Semenov affair. 
Kissinger’s report covered additional matters, including notes on their discussion of 
developing world. He informed Dobrynin that the US has made a “final offer” to North 
Vietnam and assured the Soviet ambassador that “it was not our policy to push the Soviet 
Union out of the Middle East.”  The two men apparently gave particular attention to China 
and the possible improvement of Sino-American relations. Dobrynin suggested that such a 
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development would provoke a “very strong” Soviet reaction if done “in a manner that was 
designed to embarrass the Soviet Union or if it were publicly justified on the grounds of 
encircling the Soviet Union.”  Kissinger noted, however, that if a breakthrough in Sino-
American relations occurred “on the basis of normal diplomacy” and stayed “within some 
bounds,” Dobrynin stated, the Soviet reaction would be “different.”  The two men even joked 
about the situation.  When Kissinger quipped that Siberia could fall into the Chinese sphere 
of influence in the future, Dobrynin “laughed grimly” and said that “we are building it up at a 
very rapid pace and we even told the Chinese we would let them do some investing there.”  
When Kissinger asked, “What about Chinese immigration?” Dobrynin shot back, “We are 
not crazy.”366 
 Dobrynin’s report focused on different matters, even if the general optimism was 
similar.  Dobrynin hardly mentioned their conversation on China, preferring to emphasize the 
role of Berlin in the discussion, in which Kissinger stated that it would convey Moscow’s 
perspective in consultations with American and West German diplomats during their visit to 
Washington.  He wrote that “one got the feeling that the White House would like for 
Moscow, in particular, to know about the ‘good will’ gesture it had now made.”  Dobrynin 
also reiterated the improvements in trade relations in recent months.  Unlike the American 
report, which suggested that Dobrynin gave an unsolicited positive appraisal of the 
president’s chances for reelection, the Soviet report notes that Kissinger “analyzed in detail” 
the electoral situation.  Stressing that Nixon’s position improved each day, Kissinger 
speculated that Nixon would most likely face Senator Edward Kennedy or former Vice-
President Hubert Humphrey as his Democratic opponent.  In Dobrynin’s view, Humphrey 
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would be “much easier to defeat, although Edward Kennedy,” a “lightweight,” according to 
Kissinger, “lags far behind his two assassinated brothers . . . in terms of intelligence and 
overall intellectual development.”  Dobrynin concluded, “Although Kissinger was noticeably 
trying to exaggerate the poor chances the Democrats have for retaking the White House and 
thereby enhance the status and prospects of Nixon himself in our eyes, one must admit that 
judging by the Embassy’s observations, at the present time Nixon’s chances really are no 
worse than those of the Democrats.”   
Dobrynin’s description of the summit ultimatum closely resembled Kissinger’s 
portrayal, although he emphasized that Nixon greatly desired a one-on-one meeting with 
Brezhnev and that he got the feeling that “the entire ‘tour d’horizon’ of Soviet-American 
relations that he had conducted up to that point . . . was in preparation for this main point of 
the discussion—a summit meeting.”  In other words, according to Dobrynin, Kissinger (and, 
by extension, Nixon) came off as rather eager for a summit, and Kissinger complained about 
bureaucracy, noting that Nixon did not trust anyone from “the State Department bureaucracy, 
not even their interpreters.”367   
Dobrynin telegrammed the Foreign Ministry, taking a strong stance in favor of setting 
a summit date for the first time.  He argued that, while a summit might help Nixon 
politically, this was not the worst thing in the world, as “there are no great friends of ours” 
among the Democrats.  Dobrynin noted that Nixon could campaign on a pro-détente agenda, 
an improvement over the anti-Soviet tone of previous campaigns.  Also, he emphasized that a 
summit with substantial agreements could “clear up” several sticking points in Soviet 
European policy, including a Berlin agreement, the ratification of a treaty with West 
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Germany, and the beginning of a European security conference.  As Dobrynin writes, “It is 
no secret to Washington that the thrust of this policy (like the specific interests noted above) 
does not coincide with US interests and that basically Nixon is agreeing to this quite 
reluctantly, as an unavoidable compromise in exchange for the summit meeting he wants.”  
The Soviet ambassador also pointed to the further expansion of trade and the conclusion of 
an ABM agreement and a SALT treaty as potential benefits to agreeing to a summit.  Even in 
situations in which no resolution was in sight, such as the Middle East, Dobrynin argued that 
“at the meeting we can reach agreement on a mechanism for future discussion of the most 
important issues.”  
 As always, Dobrynin remained conscious of the “Chinese angle,” and he maintained 
that a summit would not hurt the Soviet position in triangular diplomacy.  He stated that the 
Chinese would find it difficult to “launch a propaganda assault” on a Soviet-American 
summit after “their celebrated ‘ping-pong’ flirtation with the US,” meaning that Soviet 
prestige in the socialist-leaning states of the developing world would not be in danger if a 
summit took place.  Moreover, if the Chinese did mount this kind of propaganda offensive, it 
would “inevitably affect the flirtation between [Beijing] and Washington and slow down the 
normalization of Sino-US relations.”368   
In all areas of Soviet-American relations, Dobrynin highlighted the positive aspects of 
finalizing a summit with Nixon, demonstrating the advances in Soviet-American relations in 
1971 and the real potential for breakthrough perceived by both sides in summer 1971.  
Having downplayed his interest in scheduling the summit in previous telegrams, hoping to 
prolong the decision and pressure Nixon and Kissinger into concessions in Berlin talks, 
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Dobrynin now saw an opportunity to present the summit to the Politburo in such a way that 
even the more hawkish elements in the Defense Ministry and the military would recognize its 
advantages.  In this sense, Dobrynin recommended finalizing the summit, not merely because 
he felt that the maximum concessions had been extracted from the Nixon administration, but 
also because he perceived that the Soviet leadership was prepared to receive this 
development. 
On June 15, this optimism was further buttressed by a meeting between Nixon, 
Kissinger, and Dobrynin, in which Dobrynin presented a Soviet proposal for a five-power 
conference on nuclear disarmament.  Nixon seemed cool to the idea: “The way our two 
governments can make the most progress is through the talks that you and Kissinger have 
been having. . . . Apart from the cosmetics of a Five-Power discussion, the real issue is the 
Two-Power relationship.”369  Still, the overall tone of the meeting remained positive and 
constructive.  Nixon promised to examine the Soviet proposal in a serious fashion.  
Emphasizing progress on a Berlin settlement and SALT and the “extremely useful role” of 
the backchannel “in finding compromises,” Nixon claimed that Soviet-American relations 
were “now entering an important period, a period of tests and opportunities where it is 
possible, with goodwill on both sides, to move forward in key areas.”  Dobrynin concluded: 
“In contrast to our previous meetings, this time Nixon was less tense and spoke more calmly.  
One could sense from all his remarks and from their tone that he is still preoccupied with the 
idea of a possible summit meeting as an important element in our relations and is awaiting 
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our response.”370  While Nixon did not directly address the summit, it loomed large over the 
proceedings, and there was a discernable air of optimism surrounding the backchannel and 
the future of bilateral relations.   
 
“A Neuralgic Point” 
Between the first round of backchannel discussions and the June 1971 meeting at 
Camp David, China appeared in reports on backchannel meetings only on a few occasions.  
One such moment took place on November 6, 1969, when, venting about the state of the 
superpower relationship, Dobrynin stated that he lectured Kissinger about triangular 
diplomacy.  He pointed out that some American officials made public their desire to improve 
relations with China during the Sino-Soviet border clashes, which seemed to Soviet 
observers as “unambiguous encouragement of the Chinese.”  When Kissinger attempted to 
excuse this as the unfortunate, if unintentional result of the large American bureaucracy, 
Dobrynin snapped that “they need to put their own house in order to prevent such 
‘absurdities’ and ‘mistakes.’”371  China came up in discussions again nearly two months later 
on January 20, 1970, when American and Chinese diplomats met in Warsaw for the first time 
in two years.  Kissinger reported that Dobrynin fished for information, emphasizing that 
China was a “neuralgic point” with Soviet leaders.  When Kissinger tried to pacify Dobrynin 
by telling him that China did not pose a military threat to the USSR, that there was no 
possibility of the US using China to challenge Soviet power, and that Sino-American 
relations were “so far from normalcy” that discussion of these conditions was pointless, 
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Dobrynin noted that, while he “personally agreed,” he wanted to make sure that Kissinger 
understood “the intensity of feeling in Moscow” on the subject.372  It took nearly six months 
before the two men returned to the issue of China on June 10, 1970, when Dobrynin wrote 
that Kissinger tried to exploit Sino-Soviet differences during a conversation about American 
actions in Cambodia.373  In turn, Kissinger claimed that Dobrynin brought up the Sino-Soviet 
divide to complain that “China was clearly in the ascendance in Hanoi,” and was using the 
Cambodia issue to pressure the Soviet Union into abandoning talks with the US.  Dobrynin 
concluded that a settlement would be much more difficult for the American side to achieve if 
China controlled Vietnam, and he pressured Kissinger for more information on Sino-
American talks later in the conversation.374  While these discussions reflect continuing Soviet 
concerns about how triangular diplomacy could reflect bilateral issues, the more remarkable 
fact is how little attention China received in backchannel talks. 
By spring 1971, however, as the press began to catch wind of improvements in Sino-
American relations, China once again arose as a topic of discussion.  On March 16, Dobrynin 
asked why the State Department had lifted restrictions on Americans traveling to China.  
When Kissinger described the action as “routine,” Dobrynin questioned why restrictions 
were lifted toward China but not Cuba.  Kissinger responded by poking fun at Dobrynin’s 
suspicions of triangular diplomacy, saying that the American side hoped to “drive a wedge 
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between Cuba and China.”  In response, Kissinger reported, “Dobrynin smiled sourly.”375  
Two weeks later, Dobrynin brought up China once more, stating that “he hoped we were not 
trying to blackmail the Soviet Union by the moves we were making on China,” because “the 
reaction in the Soviet Union would be very violent.”  Kissinger assured the Soviet 
ambassador otherwise, stressing that China could not pose a threat to Soviet interests and that 
improving relations with the Soviet Union was important to President Nixon.376   
Dobrynin did not address Sino-American relations in his memos until May 10, when 
he stated that Kissinger raised the issue, arguing that American press reports that the 
administration hoped to use improved relations with China in a manner hostile to the USSR 
did not reflect President Nixon’s actual position.  Kissinger pointed out the importance of the 
future development of a “tripolar system,” but contended that American interest in better 
relations with China had roots in contemporary issues in Asia, particularly mentioning the 
Vietnam War and Japan.  He emphasized the administration’s understanding that Soviet-
American relations took priority over Sino-American relations and that they would proceed 
with bilateral talks with this fact in mind.377 
 Finally, on July 15, 1971, the other shoe dropped in triangular diplomacy.  Kissinger 
called Dobrynin at 9:45 PM to inform him that he had met with Chinese leader Zhou Enlai in 
Beijing from July 9 to 11 and that Nixon had accepted an invitation to visit China before 
May 1972.  The formal note delivered to Dobrynin stated that the announcement was not 
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directed at any other nation, including the Soviet Union, and that Nixon hoped the Soviet 
leadership would join in “furthering and accelerating the positive developments” in bilateral 
relations that had taken place in recent months.  Kissinger suggested that the US government 
went forward with the China trip only after the Soviet leadership delayed the summit, and 
that the superpower leaders faced two potential routes: continuing on the course toward 
improved relations, or an “agonizing reappraisal” of relations.  Kissinger emphasized that the 
American government preferred the former option, declaring it “essential” that the Soviet 
government “not misread the meaning of this event and that our two countries continue to 
work cooperatively” in talks. Both Nixon and Kissinger hoped to avoid a panic in the 
Kremlin, even as they recognized the potential damage this could do to Soviet-American 
relations.  
 Roughly a day and a half after reporting the phone call to Moscow, Dobrynin sent a 
seven-page urgent telegram to the Foreign Ministry, outlining his proposals for responding to 
the situation with China.  The telegram contained harsh words for both the Chinese and 
American governments, calling the Chinese leadership even “more unprincipled” than Nixon, 
and describing Chinese policy as a sign of its “aspiration to play a global role, and its 
obstinate pursuit of its nationalistic objectives above all else—objectives it places much 
higher than ideological considerations."  Here, Dobrynin outlined how ideological bonds 
were no longer sufficient to maintain Sino-Soviet solidarity against the US.  Also, without 
irony, he criticized the Chinese government for pursuing the kinds of policies rooted in 
realism that Dobrynin personally recommended to the Kremlin on a consistent basis.  In 
other words, Dobrynin expressed frustration that the PRC had taken its final steps away from 
solidarity with the socialist bloc toward a more independent foreign policy.  Dobrynin also 
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complained that Nixon, in an attempt to secure reelection, settle the Vietnam War, and 
exploit the Sino-Soviet split, had secretly conducted parallel talks with the Chinese 
leadership for a personal visit while trying to reach an agreement for a summit in Moscow.378     
 Yet Dobrynin did not despair at the news and, while he acknowledged that Nixon’s 
trip to China was “unquestionably of major international significance,” he highlighted ways 
to defuse its effects.  He emphasized that, as soon as the Chinese leadership agreed to a 
meeting and, most importantly, a public announcement of the details of the meeting, “the 
President straightaway seized this opportunity.”  Dobrynin concluded, “There is no doubt he 
would act the same way if there were a similar turn of events with respect to his Moscow 
trip.”  Thus, Dobrynin believed that a summit agreement could be reached quickly with 
Nixon, minimizing any Chinese gains that came with the announcement of Nixon’s trip to 
Beijing.  Furthermore, Dobrynin warned against reading too much into this step.  As in 1961, 
when Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna with great “ballyhoo” to solve the Berlin 
problem, among others, the two sides might very well clash during top-level talks, leading to 
ideological conflict and retrenchment instead of a breakthrough.  Dramatic summitry could 
be useful, but it could also easily backfire.379  
Moreover, Dobrynin still saw the potential for the Soviet Union to come out on top in 
triangular diplomacy.  He contended that Soviet leaders should continue their work to ensure 
that the Sino-American rapprochement would not have an anti-Soviet basis.  To accomplish 
this goal, Dobrynin conceded the inability of the Soviet government to influence Chinese 
behavior, instead suggesting that it should utilize all of its means to prevent the US from 
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resorting to anti-Soviet behavior in establishing its relationship with China.  Therefore, 
Dobrynin argued that, if the Chinese side of the triangle remained closed to Soviet influence, 
Soviet authorities should turn their attention to codifying détente and convincing their 
American partners that the Soviet Union would be a more reliable long-term diplomatic 
partner than the PRC.  Because Soviet and American interests lined up more closely than 
Chinese and American interests, Dobrynin believed that the Soviet Union could still emerge 
in a strong position in international politics.  This required fast and assertive action on the 
part of Soviet diplomats to forge a closer Soviet-American partnership.380 
 To accomplish this feat, Dobrynin made five suggestions.  First, he recommended 
that Soviet diplomats maintain their line that the normalization of relations between the US 
and the PRC did not concern them, so long as it did not develop an anti-Soviet foundation.  
He emphasized that the Soviet government should be careful to “give Washington no reason 
to believe that we fear the possibility of his colluding with [Beijing] and that we might make 
concessions to the US under the influence of the ‘Chinese factor.’”  Rather, Dobrynin stated 
that they should persuade Nixon that their reaction represented a “calm determination” not to 
sacrifice Soviet interests in any way.  Second, Dobrynin urged the Soviet leadership to 
continue with its previous approach to talks with the US, with a particular focus on European 
issues.  Third, Dobrynin proposed that the Soviet government make use of Nixon’s interest in 
a summit to secure his chances in the 1972 election, pushing for greater economic ties and 
scientific-technical exchanges.  Fourth, Dobrynin took a step back from the wholehearted 
endorsement of a summit that he gave a month earlier, suggesting that they “leave this entire 
matter up in the air, while not directly ruling out such a possibility.”  Instead, he proposed 
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returning to the position of using the potential summit to extract concessions in Europe and 
to prevent the Sino-American rapprochement from becoming anti-Soviet in nature.  Fifth, 
Dobrynin recommended that Soviet leaders work to “maintain US-Chinese differences and 
the mutual suspicion and distrust that undoubtedly exist even now in both Washington and 
[Beijing].”  Dobrynin concluded, “In the final analysis presidents—with all their 
manipulation and swings from one extreme to the other—come and go.  But our relations 
with the US, the leading country of the Western world, will remain of major importance to 
us.”381  Gromyko subsequently instructed Dobrynin to “conduct yourself calmly” in 
backchannel discussions, tackling the China issue only if Kissinger raised it and avoiding 
talks about the prospects for a summit until further instructions came through.382 
 Dobrynin and Gromyko’s dampened enthusiasm for the summit provides an 
important caveat to work done by previous historical analysts, who declared that the 
American opening to China forced the Soviet government’s hand in accepting American 
conditions for détente talks.  Kissinger, for example, wrote that, in addition to working to 
embarrass China in the developing world, the Soviet Union “sought rapidly to improve its 
relations with Washington: It was suddenly anxious to create the impression that more 
serious business could be accomplished in Moscow than in [Beijing].”383  Historian Vladislav 
Zubok argues that, after the breakthrough with China, “Gromyko’s procrastination tactics no 
longer looked prudent,” propelling the Soviet Union to accept Nixon’s conditions for 
détente.384  Basing his conclusions on Kissinger’s reports, Robert Dallek concludes that the 
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improvement in Sino-American relations vindicated the administration’s hopes and forced 
the Soviet Union to be more cooperative partners in seeking détente.385  Yet Soviet records 
point to the ways that Dobrynin and Kremlin leaders initially became increasingly wary of 
American intentions.  Recognizing the consequences of American secret diplomacy, and 
fearful of the ways that the international scene could change under a so-called “Sino-
American condominium,” Dobrynin returned to his earlier position of advocating that Soviet 
leaders wait to see if additional concessions could be achieved before finally committing to a 
summit meeting. 
 
“Bureaucrats have been foiled” 
 In the weeks after Kissinger’s visit to China, Dobrynin’s analyses of the situation 
grew more serene.  On July 22, he sent another urgent memo to the Foreign Ministry, noting 
that “as the dust settles over the sensation caused here by Nixon’s announcement,” major 
aspects of the Sino-American rapprochement remained unresolved, pointing to the lack of a 
precise date for the visit, the dearth of specific agreements on the table, and the fact that, 
given the 1972 presidential elections, Nixon would need to ensure that his visit would occur 
before May 1972, as promised.  This, Dobrynin argued, would persuade American 
policymakers to stay on “good behavior” for at least a year.  Dobrynin acknowledged that the 
agreement represented “indisputable evidence” of major changes on the international stage, 
but he encouraged the Moscow leadership to continue working quietly to undermine the 
rapprochement.386  Dobrynin expressed disappointment that Kissinger did not wait a little 
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longer to receive the Soviet reply on a summit in Moscow, hinting that the Soviet-American 
summit could have happened first if Kissinger had been more patient.387 
 A burst of progress toward a summit, fueled both by Soviet interest in détente and 
triangular diplomacy, followed the initial shock of Sino-American rapprochement.  Nixon 
wrote his first of many letters to Brezhnev on August 5, 1971, emphasizing that his work to 
improve relations with China and the forthcoming trip to Beijing had “no hidden motives.”  
Nixon hoped that, as a result of détente, “we of this generation will be able to pass on to our 
children a better and safer world.”388  While the letter did not directly mention the summit, 
Kissinger took up this issue with Dobrynin, stating that the president still desired to meet 
with the Soviet leadership to make key agreements toward improving superpower relations.  
Moreover, Kissinger expounded on Nixon’s “love for doing things on a grand and global 
scale” and “his willingness to personally make major, crucial decisions without involving a 
broad circle of individuals in them.”  Dobrynin commented that these observations should be 
taken seriously: “The occupant of the White House plays a very large, almost dictatorial role 
in the area of US foreign policy, although they do not forget to praise American 
‘democracy.’”  Despite this sardonic remark, Dobrynin stressed the need to deal with Nixon, 
given that he could be in office for another five and a half years and that his desire for 
improved Soviet-American relations presented an opportunity to achieve Soviet foreign 
policy goals in SALT, Europe, and global affairs.389  The Soviet leadership sent a letter on 
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August 10 recommending that a summit be held in May or June 1972 in Moscow.390  
Kissinger responded by proposing the date of May 22 for the summit, with an announcement 
on September 15 or 16.391   
 Meanwhile, the most important Soviet precondition for a summit—an agreement 
settling the Berlin question—was fulfilled on September 3, with the signing of the 
Quadpartite Agreement on Berlin by the four powers that occupied Germany after World 
War II.  The agreement left the exact status of West Berlin—or, as the text of the agreement 
referred to it, “the relevant area”—unclear.  Although West Berlin was not technically 
governed by West Germany, citizens of West Berlin could hold West German passports and 
West Germany would represent West Berlin abroad.  Citizens gained a legal basis for travel 
between West Berlin and West Germany, and the agreement eased communication 
restrictions between East and West Berlin.  Historian M. E. Sarotte concludes that the 
agreement “must be judged a success,” as “it had the desired effect of making Berlin much 
less of a flashpoint than it had previously been.”392 
 The negotiations played a central role in Kissinger’s use of linkage in backchannel 
talks.  Sarotte notes that Kissinger delayed finalizing the Berlin agreement in spring 1971 
because he hoped to use it to prevent a violent Soviet reaction to his surprise visit to China, 
knowing that the Soviet government would not want to risk the resolution of the Berlin issue.  
Kissinger also felt he could use it as leverage in SALT.  Indeed, the Soviet leadership finally 
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agreed to simultaneously negotiate offensive and defensive weaponry in the spring of 1971, 
as the Berlin talks heated up.  With all of the cards on the table when he returned from China, 
Kissinger permitted the American ambassador to West Germany to make an agreement.  As 
Sarotte put it, “Once Kissinger decided to get personally involved, talks finally began to 
make substantial progress.”393 
The completion of this agreement occurred with the backchannel bureaucratic 
confusion that preceded other détente breakthroughs.  The settlement was negotiated through 
a series of backchannels between different groups, with Kissinger, in particular, having secret 
ties to Dobrynin; German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s top aide, Egon Bahr; and US 
Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush, who agreed to keep his boss, Secretary of 
State Rogers, out of the loop.  The West German and Soviet governments had secret 
backchannels of their own, with Bahr communicating privately with Brezhnev and Gromyko.  
As Sarotte wrote, “Information that Bahr received over, say, the Soviet channel, would then 
naturally influence how he perceived information from the American channel.  Occasionally 
allies would find out from their ‘enemies,’ via a secret channel, information they did not 
know about each other.”394   
This proved to be problematic, and helps explain both the faults and the utility of the 
backchannel.  On August 18, Kissinger informed Dobrynin of an “internal incident” in the 
“bureaucratic procedures.”  Namely, Rush reported in official channels that the four sides 
were close to an agreement.  Rogers called Rush back to the US for consultations, since the 
secretary of state was, according to Dobrynin, “decidedly unprepared for the results attained 
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at these meetings (since he is not aware of the exchange of views through the confidential 
channel).”  Kissinger told Dobrynin that this incident resulted from the “purely internal and 
complicated dual chain of command,” referring to the White House and the State 
Department, and he assured Dobrynin that “there is no deliberate tactic to drag out the 
negotiations.”  He said that Rush would attempt to convince Rogers that the break in talks 
was unnecessary, but if he was nonetheless forced to return home, the delay in talks would 
last no more than one to two weeks.  Kissinger promised that everything they had already 
agreed upon would remain in place.395  By August 19, Kissinger notified Dobrynin that Rush 
had finished the agreement on his own, lamenting that “State is going crazy because they 
don’t know why it’s working so fast,” so Rush would probably have to return to the US for a 
few weeks for consultations.  Still, Kissinger reiterated that, in the event of dispute between 
Rush and Rogers, the White House would side with Rush.  As he concluded, “Bureaucrats 
have been foiled.”396   
In the case of the Quadpartite Agreement, the multiple secret channels brought 
problematic complications to the negotiating process, adding several overlapping voices to 
the conversation.  The need to manage the official bureaucracy in Washington, in particular, 
proved tricky.  At the same time, both sides managed to overcome these difficulties to 
produce an agreement amenable to all parties.  The trust built through friendly personal 
relations in the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel played a role in making sure these 
bureaucratic complications did not derail the agreement in its final stages. 
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By the time of Gromyko’s visit to Washington in late September 1971, détente 
seemed to have real momentum, and leaders from both superpowers expressed satisfaction 
with the backchannel’s capacity for resolving the issues they faced.397  In bureaucratic 
matters, Dobrynin assured Kissinger that, while Gromyko had to meet with Rogers, “the 
Soviets had pretty much given up on that channel,” recognizing that they did not expect 
much to come of talks with the State Department.398  Gromyko and Kissinger did not make 
much progress in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, but both sides made preliminary 
proposals.  Most importantly, Kissinger and Gromyko agreed to put a concrete discussion of 
this issue into the backchannel for the first time.  With regard to Vietnam, both parties 
seemed optimistic about the potential for resolution, and Kissinger even tossed around the 
idea that communists could serve in a transitional government in South Vietnam.  Assuring 
Gromyko that the breakthrough with China was not directed against the Soviet Union, 
Kissinger emphasized that “the peace of the world depended on our relationship with the 
Soviet Union.”399 
 Following the settlement on Berlin and Gromyko’s visit, Dobrynin’s mood and the 
tone of the backchannel seemed more positive than ever.  At their next meeting, Dobrynin 
told Kissinger that Gromyko was “the most open he had ever seen him be” in meeting with 
the national security advisor.  Dobrynin emphasized that Gromyko reported to Moscow that 
                                                
397 Gromyko visited Washington to sign the “Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of 
Nuclear War,” an agreement between the superpowers to improve safeguards against the accidental or 
unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, to notify one another in the event of such an occasion, and to notify 
the other party of missile launches directed at them. 
398 “Memorandum of Conversation (US),” September 20, 1971, 5:30 PM, in Soviet-American Relations: The 
Détente Years, 1969-1972, 444-45. 
399 “Memorandum of Conversation (US),” September 30, 1971, 6-8 PM, in Soviet-American Relations: The 
Détente Years, 1969-1972, 476-81; and “Memorandum of Conversation (USSR),” September 30, 1971, in 
Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, 481-85. 
  203 
Kissinger “was a man well worth doing business with,” and he flattered Kissinger by 
delivering Gromyko’s positive assessment of the national security advisor as someone who 
had a “global approach” and a “tendency to see things in the large,” as opposed to Rogers, 
who “would always talk about specific tactical issues, never about global problems.”  In 
Dobrynin’s assessment, this was “the sort of thing that Kennedy always wanted to do but 
never quite brought off.”  Dobrynin concluded that, while the USSR conducted its foreign 
affairs “on an objective basis, these sorts of personal impressions carried an enormous 
amount of weight” in the Kremlin.400    
 Dobrynin also seemed much calmer about the prospects of Sino-American 
rapprochement after Gromyko’s visit.  Kissinger secretly shared information about his 
upcoming trip to China and repeated assurances that he “would keep his word and make 
good” on his promise to Gromyko that the Sino-American breakthrough was not directed 
toward the Soviet Union.401  Kissinger wrote, “Dobrynin played it very cool and said this was 
the proper way to proceed.”402  When the backchannel met for the first time after Kissinger 
returned from his trip in late October, the national security advisor reported that Dobrynin 
was “again unusually affable.”  When Kissinger wondered if the Chinese gave opposite 
messages to the US and the Soviet governments, the Soviet ambassador joked, “They are not 
talking to us in Moscow or in [Beijing].”403  In his memo of the conversation, Dobrynin gave 
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a detailed rundown of what Kissinger told him about his plans to negotiate with Zhou Enlai.  
He wrote that the president intended to keep the USSR informed about Sino-American talks, 
and Dobrynin approvingly argued that this would oblige the president to take a more cautious 
approach in talks with the Chinese leadership.  Thus Dobrynin expressed optimism that the 
restraining influence of the potential summit was having a “positive effect” on US policy in 
China.404  By the time that Kissinger informed Dobrynin that the president’s trip to China 
would take place in February, they were already discussing whether the First Lady and 
members of Congress should be permitted to attend the summit in Moscow.405  
 In Kissinger’s memos, at least, Dobrynin’s attempts to divide the US and China come 
off as transparent and ill-conceived.  During a November 18 dinner conversation, for 
example, Dobrynin asked what would happen if China began making moves to outstrip the 
limits that the US and the USSR set in SALT.  Kissinger emphasized that, by reaching an 
agreement on SALT, they would set into motion a joint approach to nuclear arms that would 
take into account changes in the global balance of power.  Later, Dobrynin questioned the 
motives behind the rapprochement, suggesting that Nixon’s trip to Beijing would provide the 
Chinese a “status that they could not have achieved through years of effort on their own” in 
exchange for “a little publicity and the uncertainty of our allies.”  Kissinger responded that, 
given the potential of China easing the American exit from Vietnam and “the rather 
ungenerous reactions of the Soviet Union to our repeated efforts to bring about a fundamental 
change in our relationship,” the opening to China gave the US space to maneuver.  He added 
that rapprochement was inevitable, and even if Nixon and Kissinger advanced it by a few 
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years, the potential benefits outweighed the liabilities.  Dobrynin highlighted the concern 
these developments produced in Moscow, particularly with the “major long-term danger” 
that China posed to the global balance of power.406  Despite these ongoing concerns about 
China, détente moved forward in the aftermath of the Berlin settlement, and it seemed as if 
Kissinger and Dobrynin’s work to build a personal and professional relationship in the 
backchannel would bear fruit with a spring summit and a SALT agreement without too many 
complications. 
 
Conclusion 
 By June 1971, Kissinger and Dobrynin had overcome many of the lingering 
suspicions clouding Soviet-American relations, and they had weathered several of the 
problems caused by a bureaucratic apparatus designed to facilitate simpler relations.  The 
superpowers had agreed on a basic procedure for negotiating SALT, with discussions to limit 
ABM systems and a temporary freeze on building offensive weapons until an agreement 
could be hammered out to limit them as well.  Vietnam no longer received much attention in 
backchannel talks or blocked progress on vital points of interest, and while triangular 
diplomacy riled the nerves of Soviet diplomats, stability seemed increasingly likely as the 
superpowers came closer to a summit agreement.  The backchannel, Kissinger recorded in 
his memoirs, finally became “operational” in this period, and even if members of the normal 
bureaucracy found it “demoralizing,” Kissinger concluded that “it worked,” as it successfully 
attained “that elusive blend of laborious planning and crisp articulation on which successful 
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policy depends.”407  Dobrynin wrote of the May 20 agreement that, while the bureaucrats in 
normal channels were justifiably aggravated to learn of the work in the backchannel, it was 
“a more convenient means for both governments to compromise a deadlock and reach a final 
decision at the crucial moments of negotiation.”408  Both diplomats continued to defend the 
efficacy of their backchannel, even after their careers were long over, and by June 1971, they 
felt that they had reason to believe that their work would finally bear fruit. 
 This chapter has employed the reports written by both Kissinger and Dobrynin on the 
activities of the backchannel from January 1970 through November 1971, focusing on 
Dobrynin and Kissinger’s efforts to reboot the backchannel, the progress in the spring of 
1971, and the handling of Kissinger’s trip to China and Sino-American rapprochement.  It 
also explained the bureaucratic difficulties posed by the backchannel.  Nixon and Kissinger 
created a two-tiered system of negotiations, with the secret backchannel settling all of the 
major issues while the normal channels were left in the dark until decisions had been made at 
the top.  Kissinger became the main arbiter of information, enforcing a strict regimen of 
secrecy, even if State Department diplomats eventually had to draft the final agreements.  
This compounded existing problems in the Soviet bureaucracy, where the lack of lateral 
clearances meant that Dobrynin entered SALT negotiations with little information from his 
own government about the nature of Soviet or American weapons and nuclear stockpiles.  
Moreover, Dobrynin and his colleagues at the Foreign Ministry took charge of negotiations 
over which they had little authority, as the Defense Ministry and the military controlled 
nuclear policy.   
                                                
407 Kissinger, White House Years, 806. 
408 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 214. 
  207 
All of this complicated the already difficult negotiations, since there was little 
agreement in either government over what kinds of limitations would be equitable or 
acceptable.  The somewhat dysfunctional nature of the backchannel and the superpower 
relationship in this period, accentuated by the fact that this approach was still new and 
evolving by the end of 1971, is further highlighted by the fact that Kissinger and Dobrynin 
frequently submitted contradictory reports to their respective leaders and colleagues, who 
were expected to assess the state of Soviet-American relations and construct future policies 
around the information provided by their backchannel representatives.  As Kissinger and 
Dobrynin’s positions became stronger in the summer of 1971, with the backchannel 
increasingly serving as a more permanent and regularized institution for settling diplomatic 
questions, they faced real challenges in dealing with crises in the developing world, while 
serving as the primary negotiators of critical agreements.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE PINNACLE OF DÉTENTE, 1971-72  
 If the tangled bureaucracies, conflicts in the developing world, and mutual suspicions 
challenged détente, the personal diplomacy between Kissinger and Dobrynin provided its 
greatest engine.  Perhaps no other pair of Cold War diplomats could boast of this kind of 
relationship, built on friendly banter, common interests, and mutual ambitions.  This chapter 
analyzes Kissinger and Dobrynin’s relationship, outlining the ways in which the two 
diplomats bonded over a sense of what I call conspiratorial togetherness, a shared identity as 
male diplomats representing the world’s only superpowers, and an ability to joke about both 
professional and personal matters.  It picks up the narrative in November 1971 and carries it 
through the 1972 Soviet-American summit in Moscow, explaining how Kissinger and 
Dobrynin’s personal diplomacy fared in promoting closer superpower relations in specific 
scenarios.  Finally, it explains how Nixon and Brezhnev used this personal diplomacy in a 
similar way in their own top-level talks. 
Until recently, historians have not dealt with this relationship in-depth, limiting their 
analysis to the friendly rapport that helped to grease the gears of negotiations.  For example, 
Robert Dallek describes the development of personal diplomacy as the “greatest benefit” to 
Kissinger in the 1970 SALT negotiations, writing that he and Dobrynin quickly became 
“friendly rivals.”409  Zubok suggests that Kissinger used Dobrynin as a “confidant” to 
grumble about “the ‘Byzantine bureaucracy’ of Washington and Nixon’s ‘idiosyncratic 
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style,’” inviting the Soviet ambassador to the top-secret Situation Room in the White House 
on several occasions, as he built a personal relationship to break through superpower 
deadlock.410  Jeremi Suri emphasizes Kissinger’s belief that personal diplomacy could 
overcome the stagnation of previous negotiations.”411  In other words, several historians have 
explored Kissinger’s view of personal diplomacy as critical to bilateral relations from the 
start of his diplomatic career.  All of these scholars have examined this relationship from 
Kissinger’s perspective in his negotiations with the Soviet Union or have focused on its 
impact on Kissinger as a policymaker. 
From retirement, both Kissinger and Dobrynin wrote about their relationship in the 
context of how their informal style improved the day-to-day workings of the backchannel, 
allowing them to “think out loud” and discuss ways in which they could find common 
ground to move talks forward.  As Dobrynin detailed in his memoirs, “Good personal 
relations with Kissinger were founded on our mutual desire to listen to and understand each 
other, and to seek some agreeable solution or compromise to our differences, all of which 
helped overcome or minimize our difficulties during our official contacts or negotiations.”412  
For his part, Kissinger said, “I respected [Dobrynin’s] human qualities.  We both tried to 
temper our abiding sense of the potentially disastrous consequences of failure by conducting 
our dialogue in a polite and at times even jocular manner.”413  He further sang Dobrynin’s 
praises: “He was one of the few Soviet diplomats of my acquaintance who could understand 
the psychology of others.  He was suave not just by Soviet standards—which leave ample 
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room for clumsiness—but by any criteria.  He knew how to talk to Americans in a way 
brilliantly attuned to their preconceptions.”414  In other words, both men understood that a 
personal connection facilitated the backchannel, providing flexibility in times of conflict and 
tools for seeking compromise.  However, neither man elaborated how this relationship 
formed and evolved. 
Barbara Keys, the only historian to critically examine the Kissinger-Dobrynin 
relationship, depicts Henry Kissinger as an “emotional statesman.”  Keys argues that 
Kissinger’s feelings and emotional state and, in particular, his relationship with Dobrynin had 
a profound influence on American foreign policy.  She writes, “Kissinger formed a bond of 
affection, trust, and mutual interest with Dobrynin that profoundly shaped his views and 
actions in ways that have hitherto been unrecognized.”  She states that this friendship 
reinforced Kissinger’s tendency to view an increasingly multipolar world in a bipolar 
manner, and she suggests that “the ease and habit of this relationship, and the practical and 
emotional benefits it brought, reinforced Kissinger’s inclinations to see the US-Soviet 
relationship as his primary focus in foreign affairs.”  Keys draws on the “logic of habit” 
theory, positing that habit instead of deliberate calculation dictated policy decisions. She 
notes, for example, that Kissinger repeatedly contacted Dobrynin first to handle pressing 
issues when more direct routes could have been taken.  For example, after the outbreak of the 
1973 October War between Israel and the Arab states, she observes that Kissinger called 
Dobrynin first, not representatives of the warring parties.  In sum, Keys contends that 
Kissinger’s policies cannot be understood without an examination of his emotional states, 
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and his relationship with Dobrynin was central in defining his approach to foreign policy.415  
I analyze how Kissinger and Dobrynin developed their relationship as a mechanism 
for diplomatic negotiations.  While Kissinger and Dobrynin enjoyed and valued their 
friendship with one another, they also saw it as a diplomatic tool to advance their respective 
countries’ interests.  The two men also consciously used their emotions to reflect both 
genuine frustrations and to manipulate the backchannel relationship.  Finally, while Keys and 
other historians focus on Kissinger, I shed light on Dobrynin’s role in the partnership. I 
demonstrate the need to contextualize Dobrynin’s approach to Kissinger within the longer 
continuum of his work with previous American diplomats such as Averell Harriman, Robert 
Kennedy, and Dean Rusk.  In other words, while Kissinger may have entered office 
intending to build these kinds of relationships with Soviet officials, Dobrynin had been 
practicing this art since he first worked at the UN in 1957. 
Dobrynin’s approach to Kissinger was evident already during their first meeting in 
February 1969, when he ensured that their discussions carried the same friendly, informal 
tone that he had built with previous foreign policy representatives.  When Kissinger came to 
the embassy for the reception in honor of Arbatov, Dobrynin, sick with the flu, did not attend 
the party, but invited Kissinger upstairs to his private apartment.  There, he greeted Kissinger 
in his dressing robe and insisted that they call each other by their first names.  Kissinger’s 
memoirs conveys the informal nature of the meeting and his immediate understanding of 
Dobrynin as a shrewd and capable diplomat: “Dobrynin greeted me with smiling, watchful 
eyes and the bluff confident manner of one who had taken the measure of his share of senior 
American officials in his day.”  Dobrynin reminisced about previous lost opportunities to 
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improve Soviet-American relations, especially in the Kennedy years. When Kissinger 
pointed out incidents of Soviet aggression in that era, “Dobrynin smiled and conceded that 
not all the mistakes had been on the American side.”416  In all, Dobrynin ensured that his 
relationship with Kissinger began in the same friendly manner that characterized his previous 
diplomatic relationships.  
The intimate locations of Kissinger and Dobrynin’s meetings reflect their mutual 
interest in developing a friendly relationship.  They frequently met over lunch or dinner, with 
drinks to help grease the conversation.  Just as Dobrynin invited Kissinger to his private 
apartment for their first conversation, Kissinger had Dobrynin to his Rock Creek apartment 
for dinner, where he dismissed his maid early to allow for greater privacy.417  Kissinger and 
Dobrynin’s conversations at these meetings expose the depth of this relationship.  Kissinger 
biographer Alistair Horne perhaps best described their back-and-forth as “sometimes . . . 
more like the gossipy chat of two old college roommates than representatives of potentially 
hostile states.”418  When Kissinger hoped to highlight the potential significance of a 
backchannel meeting, he would pick a showier, more striking venue, such as a late night 
cruise on Nixon’s personal yacht or a weekend excursion to Camp David.  Although 
Kissinger designed these trips to stroke Dobrynin’s ego and obtain concessions, they 
highlight the remarkably personal relationship between the negotiators.  Never before had a 
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Soviet ambassador received this sort of treatment from an administration, and Dobrynin was 
certainly more effusive in dealing with Kissinger than he had been with representatives from 
previous administrations. 
 
“You’re a Dirty Old Man” 
In many ways, Kissinger and Dobrynin were outsiders in their respective systems.  
Historian Robert D. Dean has explained how the worldview of American foreign 
policymakers in the post-World War II era was shaped by their participation in all-male elite 
institutions: boarding schools, Ivy League fraternities and secret societies, military service, 
and metropolitan men’s clubs.  These institutions, along with the “lavender scare” of the 
1950s that sought to purge the State Department of homosexuals, bequeathed a certain brand 
of masculinity that affected their approach to international relations.  In particular, Dean 
suggests that this “ideology of masculinity” acquired in their formative years shaped their 
view that victory in Vietnam required escalation and violence.  Dean emphasizes that the 
boarding school experience created a sort of fraternity of foreign policy makers, as they 
shared a common background and a common worldview.419 
Kissinger’s identity as a German-born Jew, whose family emigrated from Nazi 
Germany to New York in 1938, set him apart from the white Protestant men who constituted 
the core postwar American foreign policy elite at that point in time.  Kissinger grew up in the 
Washington Heights neighborhood and attended public school, taking accounting classes at 
the City College of New York before being drafted in 1943.  After World War II, when 
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Harvard opened it doors to foreigner-born and Jewish veterans, Kissinger enrolled.420  He 
emerged on the public scene as an academic, not a bureaucrat, and the foreign policy elite 
described by Dean saw him as an outsider. Suri, who has written the most comprehensive 
study of the impact of Kissinger’s identity on his approach to foreign policy, maintains that, 
despite his wartime service and the broadening of “American identity” during and after 
World War II, “His obvious German Jewish qualities made him a perpetual outsider.  He 
could never become fully accepted within the American mainstream in the way that an 
American-born figure like Robert McNamara could.  He could never escape the accusation 
that he really did not understand America.”421   
In Moscow, Dobrynin had key supporters in the Politburo and the Foreign Ministry, 
including Brezhnev and Gromyko, and his status as a Central Committee member after 1971 
conveyed a certain degree of insider status.  He still faced questions, however, from critics 
who viewed him as too “Americanized,” having been stationed in New York for two years 
with the UN and in Washington since 1962 as ambassador.  His critics suspected that his 
extended time in the US corrupted his worldview, making him overly sympathetic to 
American policymakers and leaving the Soviet government at a disadvantage in talks.422  At 
the same time, his status as an avowed communist made him the ultimate outsider in the 
Washington circles that he frequented.  Both Kissinger and Dobrynin received criticism from 
the traditional foreign policy elite in their countries, leading some officials to treat them as 
outsiders, and thus their prestige depended on the backchannel and the success of détente.  
Both men understood this aspect of their careers.  In fact, Kissinger poked fun at the oddity 
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of two Europeans conducting bilateral negotiations in imperfect English: “We spoke in 
English.  I did not make fun of him because he spoke with an accent.”423      
Kissinger attempted to gain insider status by hobnobbing with the Hollywood elite.  
Kissinger, who divorced his first wife in 1964, dated a variety of Hollywood stars and 
prominent young women in the first years of the Nixon presidency.424  During nights out with 
Jill St. John, whom he dated more frequently than any other movie star, Kissinger made sure 
to publicly promote their romance, holding her hand and running his fingers through her hair 
“in a display that other diners sometimes found unseemly.”425  The Nixon administration, the 
press, and even the Soviet government paid attention to Kissinger’s rising star. Arbatov even 
reported giving Brezhnev a copy of an October 1972 Harvard Lampoon centerfold featuring 
the national security advisor’s face on a nude body sprawled out on a panda skin rug with the 
caption, “Forbidden fruit of the executive branch.”426  Overall, Kissinger promoted his image 
as playboy to spread his name and acquire additional power in Washington.  Even today, the 
phrase most widely attributed to him remains, “Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac.”427 
Isaacson writes, “Since social standing is so dependent on power, a backwash effect occurs: 
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social visibility becomes a way to enhance the appearance of power.  This is important, 
because power in Washington . . . is largely a game of perceptions.  Consequently, the 
appearance of power is a large component of the reality of power.”428  Similarly, Robert 
Dallek concludes that Kissinger’s dating exploits made him a “larger-than life celebrity” and 
someone whose fame would not be confined to the years of the Nixon administration.429  In 
this sense, Kissinger, an outsider to the Washington elite, entered its ranks through his public 
romances.430 
If Kissinger’s dating conquests helped to raise his public profile, they also provided 
material for male bonding in the backchannel.  For example, on May 25, 1973, Dobrynin 
called Kissinger regarding Brezhnev’s visit to the US.  Dobrynin, in a humorous mood, 
brought up Kissinger’s infamous love life.  After Kissinger stated that he had “been a little 
tired” the day before, the Soviet ambassador noted that he heard that the national security 
advisor was “sitting with a very nice girl” whose picture he had “on this Playboy Calendar.”  
After Kissinger responded, “Oh-h-h-h-h, you’re a dirty old man,” Dobrynin egged him on, 
“Oh, come on, come on. . . . She’s a real nice girl.” Kissinger interrupted, exclaiming that 
“she’s very attractive” and “I hope she isn’t a nice girl.”  Dobrynin retorted, “You were with 
her, I wasn’t.  So you are an authority, not me.”431  Dobrynin flattered Kissinger, knowing 
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that the national security advisor enjoyed the press he received by going on dates with 
famous women. Another example comes from April 1973.  This time, Kissinger brought up 
the subject, saying that he heard that the Soviet ambassador made an unkind comment about 
him to Donald Kendall, CEO of PepsiCo, accusing him of taking a woman to the opening of 
the Bolshoi ballet.  They laughed until Kissinger interrupted, saying, “It’s true but why 
should you give away my secrets to an outsider?”  Dobrynin described how, when Kendall 
asked him to identify Kissinger’s latest date, he joked, “I really don’t know all the names of 
Henry’s girls so I’m not so sure whether he knows himself.”432  Here again, joking about 
Kissinger’s love life permitted the diplomats to connect on a more personal level, while 
providing Dobrynin with the opportunity to massage the national security advisor’s ego.  
At times Kissinger extended invitations to Dobrynin to attend Hollywood parties and 
meet beautiful women.  For example, on June 29, 1971, when Dobrynin informed Kissinger 
that his wife Irina needed to go to Moscow, Kissinger asked if he wanted to come out to 
Hollywood alone.  Dobrynin replied that he would prefer to come with his wife.  Kissinger 
joked, “If you come alone, we can corrupt you.”  Dobrynin said, “I am trying to be 
uncorruptable,” and Kissinger shot back, “But every man must have a weakness.”433  Later, 
Kissinger called Dobrynin from California, telling Dobrynin that he had “all the actresses 
lined up for you.”434  In March 1973, Kissinger brought up the subject of a Hollywood trip 
again.  When Dobrynin commented on Kissinger’s appearance at The Godfather premiere in 
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California, Kissinger promised that, if the Dobrynins came to California, the movie stars 
would throw them a party.  When Dobrynin promised to check his calendar, Kissinger 
declared, “We will throw you a party beyond socialist realism.”435   
Kissinger’s joking banter with Dobrynin about infidelity formed a common theme in 
their relationship.  In a conversation in November, when Dobrynin mentioned that his wife 
was out of town, Kissinger asked, “You want some of the phone numbers I have?436  During 
a long series of phone calls in January 1973, Kissinger joked that Dobrynin’s wife probably 
thought he was cheating on her, given the amount of time he spent on the phone with 
Kissinger.437  In July 1973, Kissinger opened a call by saying, “I tried to call you last night 
but you were probably out with one of your girlfriends.”  When Dobrynin explained that he 
just had a night out with his wife, Kissinger responded, “I see.  With probably one of your 
Democratic senator clients.”  Dobrynin laughed and said, “No, no, no, no.  It was just two of 
us, nobody else.”438  Here, Kissinger’s lighthearted accusation is coupled with a joke that 
carried more serious connotations: that Dobrynin associated with members of the opposition 
party, even while “dating” Kissinger in the backchannel.  Kissinger, anxious not to share the 
backchannel, needed reassurance of the monogamy of their diplomatic relationship.  
Kissinger’s “accusation” of Dobrynin’s political infidelity also shows how the 
backchannel diplomats occasionally joked that they were a couple.  At times, Kissinger and 
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Dobrynin referred to backchannel meetings as “dates.”439  In the rush of meetings that 
preceded the 1972 Moscow summit, Kissinger began a phone conversation, “Anatol, how 
can you and I be separated?”440  A year later, he opened a call, “Anatol, you just can’t stay 
away from me,” to which Dobrynin responded, “Of course not.”441  In March 1971, Kissinger 
put it most bluntly: “You and I are going steady.  We should exchange telephone 
numbers.”442   
Jokes about sex, women, and fidelity worked to cement their friendship even through 
Dobrynin appears to have remained faithful to his wife and thus did not actually share 
Kissinger’s romantic adventures at all.  In fact, Dobrynin and his wife were inseparable.  
KGB General Oleg Kalugin points out that many other ambassadors caused the KGB 
headaches, behaving in reprehensible and dangerous ways, particularly in sexual 
relationships, because they knew that their connections in Moscow, solidified by foreign 
luxury items shipped from the embassy, shielded them from any allegations.  Kalugin 
describes Dobrynin, however, in glowing terms, as “an intelligent, tough, and able 
professional with owlish looks and a kindly manner.”443  Dobrynin, cognizant of the dangers 
posed by Cold War espionage and potential entrapment, avoided these kinds of liaisons.  In 
fact, this may help account for the longevity of his term as ambassador.  This also highlights 
                                                
439 For example, in one conversation, Dobrynin told Kissinger, “I have a date with you Tuesday morning.”  
Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, April 9, 1973, 11:27 AM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger Telephone 
Conversation Transcripts. 
440 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, May 12, 1972, 11:15 AM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
441 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, April 22, 1973, 9:35 AM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
442 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, March 26, 1971, 8:20 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
443 Kalugin, Spymaster, 114-15; and 254-55. 
  220 
the extent to which Dobrynin, the consummate family man, stepped outside of his own 
boundaries in making these jokes about sexual infidelities.  Dobrynin bought into the 
language that Kissinger spoke, utilizing the national security advisor’s interest in women and 
fame to flatter him and gain his trust.  
Kissinger and Dobrynin also showed tremendous interest in each other’s families, 
giving gifts to one another and to their spouses and children on birthdays, anniversaries, and 
other holidays.444  On one occasion, Dobrynin even sang “Happy Birthday” to Kissinger over 
the phone, when he knew he would not see his American counterpart for a few weeks.445  
Kissinger invited the Dobrynins to meet Kissinger’s parents.446  Dobrynin apparently shared 
details about his own parents with Kissinger, expressing a desire for Kissinger to meet 
them.”447  Kissinger even paid playful compliments to the ambassador’s wife, telling 
Dobrynin that “I got a very pleasant girl answering me” after Irina picked up the phone in the 
ambassador’s office.448  On March 8, 1972, when Dobrynin informed Kissinger of his 
upcoming thirtieth wedding anniversary, Kissinger responded with discernable enthusiasm, 
“Isn’t that terrific; isn’t that terrific!” He joked, “That’s more than I will ever make in a 
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marriage.”449  The following day, Kissinger brought the Dobrynins a bottle of champagne 
and the two drank it together while Dobrynin reminisced about meeting his wife as a student 
at a Moscow institute that was then moved to Alma-Ata, joking, “You see, we were watching 
the Chinese even then.”  Caught up in the moment, Dobrynin added that Americans did not 
fully comprehend that “Russians were a deeply sentimental people, and that if you did things 
with them on the basis of friendship, it was always better than doing it from a position of 
strength.”450  While this statement might be read as calculated to influence Kissinger, coming 
just two months prior to the May 1972 summit in Moscow, it more likely reflects the 
euphoria of a social evening and three years of hard work together.  
In sum, whether the role-playing in their humor involved portraying themselves as 
boyfriends, confidants, or wingmen, their banter put the backchannel on friendlier footing.  It 
is important to note the manufactured nature of this “common ground,” which represented 
less a natural overlap of interests (Dobrynin never dated) and more a conscious decision to 
create a shared, intimate language.  Equally important, understanding the vanity of the 
national security advisor allowed Dobrynin to influence Kissinger to a certain degree. 
Dobrynin teasingly mentioned his sexual exploits in glowing terms.  In this way, two 
outsiders in Washington found a common language in constructing détente.  
 
 “Four More Years!” 
Kissinger and Dobrynin also cemented the backchannel relationship through a very 
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real shared position of conspirators in secret efforts to negotiate agreements between the 
superpowers.  As part of this, Kissinger and Dobrynin celebrated each other’s professional 
victories.  Kissinger went to great lengths to compliment Dobrynin on his career advances.  
When Dobrynin was elected to the Central Committee in 1971, Kissinger tested the Moscow 
number that Dobrynin had given him a few weeks earlier, joking that he wanted to determine 
if “that number you gave me is any good.”  He then congratulated Dobrynin on his election, 
noting that “it gives all of us here a feeling of greater confidence in you.”451  When rumors 
circulated in Washington that Dobrynin might be recalled to take on a major position in the 
Kremlin, Kissinger told him, “Well, I’m torn, because on the one hand I would like you to 
have an even wider field of activity.  On the other, you are almost irreplaceable here in 
Washington.”452   
Dobrynin could be even more effusive in his praise for Kissinger’s professional 
accomplishments.  On the morning after Nixon’s overwhelming victory in the 1972 election, 
Kissinger opened a telephone conversation by joking, “We didn’t carry Siberia.”  Dobrynin 
responded that his impression was to the contrary, as the embassy erupted in chants of “Four 
more years, four more years” when television news announced the results.  Judging by the 
telegrams he received from Soviet leaders, Dobrynin declared that the same sentiments were 
shared in the halls of the Kremlin.  He continued, “From the deep in my heart I really like 
this development because I have a nice relationship.”  Kissinger responded, “I don’t know 
whether one can have a feeling of personal friendship with a Communist diplomat but I have 
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it.”453  Perhaps with some sense of irony, when they discussed the potential for the 
congratulations from Soviet leaders reaching the public, Kissinger said, “There’s nothing to 
hide in our relationship with you, it’s one of the best things we’ve done.”454  Later, when 
Nixon nominated Kissinger to the position of secretary of state in 1973, Kissinger called 
Dobrynin to share the good news two hours before Nixon made the announcement, joking 
that Nixon based the decision on Dobrynin’s recommendation.  Kissinger also promised, “I 
won’t insist on protocol, Anatol, if you just call me Excellency we’ll get along fine.”455  
If Kissinger and Dobrynin celebrated their professional achievements, they also 
collaborated to create unprecedented access to each another.  By 1971, Dobrynin entered the 
White House through the service gate to avoid public scrutiny.  The two men generally met 
in Kissinger’s West Wing office or in the Map Room, a quiet room on the ground floor of the 
mansion.456  Following the success of the 1972 Moscow summit, Nixon had a private 
telephone line installed between the embassy and Kissinger’s office in the White House on 
Dobrynin’s suggestion, creating a “second hot line” that did not require dialing and did not 
depend on the regular telephone network.457  In addition, previous protocol demanded that 
the Soviet ambassador receive explicit permission from the US Government when traveling 
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in the country, providing the plane’s identification number, the reserve plane’s identification 
number, the precise list of the crew and passengers, as well as a specific flight plan with 
approximate times that the plane would fly over certain cities.458  In March 1973, Dobrynin 
rushed back to Washington from Moscow to meet with Kissinger before the start of his 
vacation.  When Dobrynin informed Kissinger that he had to make a stop in London because 
they could not be sure that they would receive permission from the American authorities, 
Kissinger responded, “No, no, but you can always assume you will get authority from us.  
You don’t have to check before.”  Kissinger told Dobrynin to just let him know whenever he 
needed to fly back to the US and it would be approved immediately.459  This sort of goodwill 
gesture, not offered by previous administrations, highlights the men’s unusually close 
relationship, as Kissinger broke protocol in bypassing this rule without consulting the State 
Department.  Kissinger also knew that this kind of maneuver represented a simple way to 
curry favor with Dobrynin, making the Soviet ambassador feel as if this administration 
treated him better than any other. 
Kissinger and Dobrynin’s conversations frequently touched on the unique and 
sometimes bizarre nature of their partnership.  One especially strange situation unfolded in 
February 1973, when Dobrynin called Kissinger after the National Prayer Breakfast, an event 
hosted by the US Congress to celebrate faith.  Dobrynin—representing the officially-atheist 
Soviet Union—attended the event.  In contrast, Kissinger acknowledged that he had not 
attended one after four years in office, leading Dobrynin to make fun of him, “Well, well, 
well, what are you doing? I was praying very strongly as far back as 7:30. . . . You did not 
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pray.  This was my strong impression, and now I have proof.  I’m ashamed of you.”460  Here, 
both officials apparently appreciated the irony of the situation. 
Adding to this odd partnership, the diplomats practiced a sort of pretend nepotism 
with one another.  For example, on March 26, 1971, when Dobrynin joked that Kissinger 
should use his academic connections to get him a doctorate, Kissinger promised to do what 
he could when he returned to academic life.461  In 1973, when Dobrynin informed Kissinger 
that he would have to return to Moscow at some point for a Central Committee meeting, 
Kissinger cracked, “Now, Anatol, you can’t elect me to the Central Committee—I hope you 
realize it.  It would look bad in America.”  Dobrynin laughed and suggested that since, as a 
foreign-born national, he could not be elected president in the United States, he should 
consider candidacy to the Central Committee.  Kissinger agreed on the condition that he 
receive one of the official cars driven by Soviet officials.462 Kissinger joked that he would 
not pose any problems, since, “All I want is the privileges, I don’t want any of the 
responsibility.463 This pretend nepotism played on the reality of the two diplomats working 
on the most important questions in superpower relations in complete secrecy and relative 
obscurity, particularly in the case of the Soviet ambassador.  
To a certain extent, Kissinger and Dobrynin’s work to keep the State Department and 
other federal bureaucracies in the dark about the backchannel fueled their sense of 
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conspiratorial togetherness.  This is evident in their reports on backchannel meetings from 
the first two years of the Nixon administration, and it continued until Kissinger became 
secretary of state.  For example, on February 2, 1972, Secretary of State Rogers suggested to 
Dobrynin that they meet to review the state of Soviet-American relations, as the State 
Department had begun to take a more active role in planning the summit scheduled in 
Moscow that spring.  Kissinger caught wind of this and proposed an advance backchannel 
meeting with Dobrynin on February 3.  According to the Soviet report, Kissinger declared 
that he hoped to bring Dobrynin “up to date, on a strictly confidential basis, about what 
specifically the Secretary of State knows concerning the state of Soviet-US relations, which 
have been discussed with me at the White House level . . . since the Secretary of State does 
not know everything.”  Kissinger wanted to make sure that Dobrynin did not discuss issues 
of which Rogers had no knowledge, in particular the concrete proposals on SALT, the 
summit agenda, and the extent of backchannel talks on Vietnam and the Middle East.  As 
Dobrynin wrote, “It is a unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly 
informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know 
concerning relations between two states at the level of the President of the US and leaders of 
the other state—the Soviet Union.”  He emphasized that this situation showed “the enormous 
influence” of Kissinger over foreign affairs in the US.”464   
If the reports on backchannel talks indicate how Kissinger and Dobrynin schemed to 
keep the State Department out of the loop, their comments in telephone conversations reveal 
the extent to which they reveled in the conspiratorial aspect of their relationship, even if it 
sometimes complicated matters.  Kissinger compared his work to the role of a movie 
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director, ensuring that the statesmen shielded information from the American bureaucracy.  
He declared, “If we can keep all these things straight, we will have achieved a minor triumph 
of US-Soviet cooperation.”465  Venting his frustration with the American bureaucracy over 
how the official channel had leaked private proposals, Kissinger sighed to Dobrynin, “If you 
lend us Siberia for a couple of years, I have some people to send there.”466  After Dobrynin 
met with a junior member of the bureaucracy, Kissinger began a call, “I was afraid you were 
settling on problems” outside of the channel.  Dobrynin cracked, “I left something for us,” 
and Kissinger responded, “I would miss seeing you. . . . I know what he raised.  I have every 
confidence you didn’t give him a meaningful answer.  I saw no way I could interfere and I 
was sure you could take good care of yourself.”  Dobrynin padded Kissinger’s ego as he 
replied, “He doesn’t matter.”467  Having successfully worked together to circumvent the 
official bureaucracy, Kissinger told Dobrynin, “You understand our government better than 
the professors at Harvard.”468  Both men saw themselves as the only legitimate gateway for 
serious negotiations, and they made fun of potential usurpers of that authority.   
In addition, Kissinger and Dobrynin frequently conversed about the problems 
inherent to the structures of the Soviet government, as Dobrynin often used the complexities 
of the Soviet government to explain away a delay in getting a response to one of Kissinger’s 
proposals.  Kissinger reported that, during an extensive conversation in 1971, Dobrynin 
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compared the reign of Stalin with the current situation.  Dobrynin suggested that Stalin never 
consulted with the Politburo, calling on them only to occasionally ratify his policies, and did 
not accept opinions from senior officials that contradicted his own.  In contrast, Dobrynin 
explained, the current Politburo meets every Thursday and requires consensus to pass any 
resolution. Dobrynin emphasized, “No Politburo member, not even Brezhnev, can take any 
unilateral decision.”469  Kissinger noted this all with interest, undoubtedly fishing for details 
on how the Soviet government operated. 
Dobrynin shared with Kissinger the logistical problems posed by the Soviet 
bureaucracy and its lack of lateral clearances.  Kissinger reported, “Dobrynin said that in the 
Soviet Union, of course, decisions were taken in a different manner; that is to say, there was 
no coordination between departments at a lower level.  Each department worked 
independently, and all issues were resolved at the higher level.”470  Making matters worse, 
Dobrynin made clear on several occasions that insufficient coordination at the upper levels of 
government caused embarrassing situations or confrontations.  For example, Soviet naval 
actions around Cuba were a constant headache for Kissinger and Dobrynin, including an 
apparent attempt by the Soviet government to establish an informal naval base at Cienfuegos.  
Kissinger complained in 1971 of a Soviet naval flotilla that arrived a week after the 
announcement of the planned summit. Dobrynin responded, “The Soviet government 
suffered very much from the separation in its top ministries,” assuring Kissinger that the 
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Foreign Ministry did not even know about this decision.471  In this sense, Dobrynin 
demonstrated a remarkable transparency with Kissinger regarding his own government’s 
weaknesses in an attempt to make Kissinger more sympathetic to the challenges of détente 
for the Soviet government.  Additionally, he could use Kissinger’s curiosity about the Soviet 
government to pass the buck, telling Kissinger that his negotiating partners valued détente 
and did not appreciate the activities of those forces in the Soviet government that caused 
Kissinger such headaches.  
Dobrynin underscored the divide between bureaucracies when it came to negotiating 
SALT.  Kissinger reported that speaking “off the record” in January 1971, Dobrynin noted 
that “SALT presented the Soviets with tough bureaucratic problems.”  The Soviet 
ambassador explained, “It was very hard for them to handle it since they have no lateral 
clearances in their bureaucracy.”  He suggested that the US government forward a Note 
Verbale to Moscow whenever it had a new proposal.  Then, the Politburo could address it.472  
By March, when the Politburo kept the Americans waiting more than a week for a response, 
Dobrynin reiterated “that SALT represented a very complex decision-making issue for the 
Soviet Union.”473  In May, Dobrynin expressed outright frustration with the process in 
Moscow.  Kissinger quoted him as saying “that the negotiations on SALT with me had been 
the most difficult in which he had engaged in Washington.  They had produced both hope 
and irritation in Moscow—hope because there was some desire for progress, but irritation 
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because it was the first time in his experience that the whole government was actually 
involved in drafting documents.  This was partly due to the fact that more than one 
department was involved.”474  Thus, when meeting with Kissinger, Dobrynin openly 
acknowledged the bureaucratic problems in Moscow, kvetching about their mutual disdain 
for bureaucracy and justifying the sluggishness of the Soviet government.  
Flattery helped Dobrynin smooth over relations with Kissinger regarding bureaucratic 
issues.  According to Kissinger’s reports, Dobrynin told him “to remember that in the Soviet 
Union, decisions were not made by one man as in the United States, but by eleven.”475  
Almost a year later, Dobrynin used with the same line, but hinted that “he had been very 
much impressed by the existence of an office such as mine [Kissinger’s] in which all the 
major activities were pulled together and he had been urging Moscow to install the same 
thing in the Kremlin.”476  At another meeting a week later, Kissinger reported that Dobrynin 
reiterated this argument over brandy and tea: “There was some desultory conversation about 
the organization of government.  It was Dobrynin’s view that the method of having one 
central focus into which flowed information from the State Department, the Defense 
Department, and intelligence was something that the Kremlin was lacking, and that they 
should implement.”477  Dobrynin later acknowledged that Brezhnev’s personal assistant for 
foreign policy matters, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, was the closest equivalent of a 
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“Kissinger” in the Soviet system, but he did not benefit from the same level of authority as 
the American national security advisor.478  Dobrynin’s proposal for a Kissinger-like position 
does not appear in declassified Foreign Ministry memos, suggesting the possibility that 
Dobrynin made these comments solely to flatter Kissinger or, alternatively, that Kissinger 
created them to bolster the utility of his special role to Nixon.  Regardless, these reports 
provide additional evidence of the frustrations Dobrynin expressed in post-Cold War 
conferences with the complexities of the Soviet bureaucracy, and they suggest that Dobrynin 
used these conversations to connect with Kissinger over their mutual disdain for bureaucracy, 
to flatter the national security advisor, and to explain delays in Soviet responses to American 
proposals, even if those delays were intentionally designed to extract concessions from the 
American side. 
The two men also voiced a mutual willingness to manipulate or circumvent the press 
to serve their designs, a position that affected the public’s access to information on 
negotiations. For example, they discussed timing announcements to serve the political 
interests of each side.  In 1972, when setting a date for the release of a trade agreement, they 
decided to avoid announcing it during the Democratic National Convention due to take place 
the following week.  As Kissinger put it, he did not want it to “look like a stunt,” and 
Dobrynin expressed his understanding.479  They also discussed how to spin different news 
reports to suit their mutual political interests.  On June 3, 1973, The Washington Post 
published an article by Sanford J. Ungar claiming that the Soviet Embassy had a complete 
copy of the Pentagon Papers at the same time that the Justice Department was fighting to 
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prevent the publication of the documents.480  That afternoon, Dobrynin called Kissinger, 
disgusted with the article and seeking advice on how to proceed.  Dobrynin suggested that 
somebody did offer to provide the Soviets with a copy of the Pentagon Papers, but at the UN 
mission in New York, not the embassy in Washington, and they had refused it. Dobrynin 
vented about the media, contending that the newspaper released this story on the brink of 
Brezhnev’s visit to the US “just to make more reliable all their complaints they are 
conducting against White House and now they’re trying to involve us.”  When asked for his 
advice, Kissinger argued that he should just tell the truth, that they were offered the papers, 
but refused to take them, as “it would help us and it would not hurt you.”  Dobrynin promised 
to consult with Moscow and provide a response to the media.481 
Dobrynin likely also railed against the media as a conscious move to share common 
ground with Kissinger and the Nixon administration’s paranoid fears of press leaks and 
negative coverage, especially when Nixon increasingly found himself under siege in the 
press.  On May 24, 1973, after Kissinger mentioned the press in an aside, Dobrynin launched 
into a tirade about the coverage of the Watergate scandal.  He stated that reporters “are losing 
all sense of proportion and national dignity.”  When Kissinger agreed, Dobrynin interrupted 
him to say, “Really, it’s unbelievable that they do not think a little bit about their own 
country.  It’s rather ungrateful.”  After discussing other issues, including a press allegation 
that the American government sought a nuclear nonaggression treaty to draw the public eye 
away from Watergate, Dobrynin ranted about how the British press was “behaving really 
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lousy” on the Watergate issue and were “rather undermining the President.”  The Soviet 
ambassador expressed relief when Kissinger told him that he believed that the tide in the 
press would soon turn.482  
Dobrynin and Kissinger’s scheming did not focus solely on the American press, but 
also extended to Soviet interlopers.  For example, on July 28, 1971, Kissinger informed 
Dobrynin that Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist with ties to the KGB who was employed by a 
Western media outlet, sought a meeting with the national security advisor through an 
acquaintance.  Louis may have been checking in on Dobrynin’s activities in the backchannel, 
but it is more likely that he either acted independently or under orders from the KGB 
leadership to establish a second channel that they could control, circumventing the Foreign 
Ministry.  After claiming that the Foreign Ministry had no knowledge of Louis’s presence in 
the US, Dobrynin declared, “He has no messages and nothing of any importance at all.”  
Kissinger, understanding that Dobrynin might feel threatened by the potential of a secondary 
backchannel, reassured the Soviet ambassador that he simply wanted to inform him of 
Louis’s proposal, and he said, “I am assuming you are the person I deal with.”483  Over three 
months later, Louis unexpectedly showed up for a thirty-minute meeting with Kissinger, a 
fact which Kissinger shared with Dobrynin: “I made very clear to him that my dealings are 
with you.  I think that what he would have liked was for me to tell him something that he 
could bring back.  You can rest assured I told him nothing.”  Kissinger continued, “I made 
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clear to him that I was extremely satisfied with present arrangements” and that a secondary 
backchannel “would confuse matters.”  Dobrynin thanked Kissinger for letting him know.484  
Both Kissinger and Dobrynin thus understood the other party’s fears of being usurped by a 
backchannel managed by outsiders and interlopers, and they both made a show of 
demonstrating support for one another.   
Another way that the two bonded over their conspiratorial partnership came in the 
way they discussed their home country’s relationships with allies and client states.  The 
Vietnam War, one of the major sticking points in Soviet-American relations, often served as 
a space for humor.  For example, on March 16, 1973, Dobrynin made a quick call to 
Kissinger before the American left to Mexico for vacation and told Kissinger that he hoped 
nothing would disturb his vacation.  Kissinger responded, “Maybe you could make a request 
through your allies,” the North Vietnamese, “for about ten days to observe the agreement.”  
Dobrynin playfully suggested, “Your old friend Le Duc Tho,” the North Vietnamese 
diplomat with whom Kissinger negotiated the end of the Vietnam War, “you should invite 
him to come to Acapulco.”  Kissinger snickered, “It would be an experience.”  Dobrynin 
ended the conversation, “I’m sure it would be quite an experience.  And really everything 
will be under control.”485  In this sense, Dobrynin felt comfortable poking fun at the 
frustration caused to Kissinger by a Soviet ally and on a rather serious matter. 
Kissinger and Dobrynin also found room to rail about their supposed friends.  In a 
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1973 discussion of Article I of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, Kissinger 
highlighted the troubles that the American side might have in selling the treaty’s stipulations 
to their allies, who might interpret the document to mean that they could not rely on the 
American nuclear umbrella for protection from the USSR.  When Kissinger remarked, “I 
know what hell is going to break loose in NATO even with this draft,” Dobrynin shot back, 
“I think you can handle it.” Kissinger protested, “No, we cannot handle it easily.  We have no 
support at all.”486  Later, Kissinger again requested latitude in explaining and selling the 
provisions of Article I to their allies.  Dobrynin sympathized, “You see, with the Allies we 
have the same problem that you have. . . . After all, a leading country has a right to say 
something or do something.  It is good for them and for their Allies.”487  Similarly, in 1973, 
Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed the potential for granting most-favored nation status to the 
Soviet Union, despite protests from Jewish-American organizations and key politicians.488  
Kissinger told Dobrynin, “I told the [Israeli] Ambassador that we would take very serious 
measures if they obstructed then MFN.  And between you and me, even going to airplane 
deliveries.”  Kissinger asked that Dobrynin keep this information from the public, and the 
Soviet ambassador agreed.489  Here, Kissinger gave Dobrynin information about the pressure 
he applied in his private negotiations with an ally, impressing upon the Soviet ambassador 
the seriousness of his attempt to pass MFN status for the USSR. 
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Even the 1973 October War, which produced the most heated arguments between 
Dobrynin and Kissinger during the Nixon administration, provided a venue for bonding over 
the troubles caused by allies.  The British government served as a channel to Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat during the crisis.  Kissinger joked, “Maybe the British are trying to 
become a world power as a result of this.”490  Dobrynin and Kissinger also teased each other 
about the problems posed by allies in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict later in the war.  
Dobrynin suggested that limiting the number of participants in consultations to the US, the 
USSR, the Israelis, and the Arab countries involved in the war would better facilitate peace 
than including the entire UN Security Council.  Kissinger responded, “Why are you so hard 
on your allies?”  When Dobrynin asked for Kissinger to clarify which ally he meant, 
Kissinger stated, “The only ally you have as a permanent member of the Security Council,” 
hinting that he was referring to the PRC.  Of course, given the recent exacerbation of the 
Sino-Soviet split and the breakthroughs in Sino-American relations, the Soviet ambassador 
shot back, “For the sake of conversation, why not drop them?”  Kissinger sympathized, 
“Actually we are no more eager to have your allies there than you are.  We are not much 
more eager to have our own allies there.”491   
Both Kissinger and Dobrynin enjoyed their powerful position enough to poke fun at 
less powerful, neutral Third World countries, as well as lower-level officials overstepping 
their authority.  On August 18, 1971, Dobrynin informed Kissinger that the American 
ambassador to Burundi, Thomas Melady, apparently boasted to the country’s Soviet 
ambassador that he had been “personally invited” by Nixon and Kissinger to join the 
                                                
490 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, October 13, 1973, 1:40 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
491 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, October 18, 1973, 8:45 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
  237 
president’s trip to China.  Kissinger responded: “He is a liar.”  Dobrynin retorted, “I was 
impressed, especially after I looked at the map!”  Kissinger continued, “If there’s a 
delegation of 2800 . . . he [Melady] will be 2700.”  Dobrynin joked, “This is the only 
telegram I have ever gotten from Burundi,” to which Kissinger replied, “Burundi!  Jesus!”492   
In sum, despite their antagonist relationship, the US and USSR shared something in 
common: superpower status.  In this sense, they faced some similar problems, including 
negotiating with antagonistic states, coping with disgruntled allies, and managing a complex 
and problematic foreign policy apparatus that stretched around the globe.  Kissinger and 
Dobrynin found common language over these shared difficulties in their conversations.  By 
expressing empathy with the other side’s troubles, both diplomats discovered that personal 
diplomacy could provide opportunities to connect with one another and learn more about the 
opposite party’s system of governance and strategic interests.  It also allowed them to 
manipulate their partners, assuring each other that their motives were pure and that outside 
forces were at fault for stumbling blocks to breakthroughs in negotiations. 
 
“You Were Easier to Deal with When We Bought Alaska” 
Perhaps more remarkably, Kissinger and Dobrynin found common ground over the 
more antagonistic aspects of the superpower relationship.  For example, each joked that the 
other received all of the concessions in diplomatic negotiations due to his superior diplomatic 
skills.  In the wake of the Semenov affair, when they agreed to work on offensive arms 
limitations and an antiballistic missile treaty simultaneously, Kissinger told Dobrynin, “My 
boss is getting mad at me—he thinks you are taking advantage of me.”  Dobrynin shot back, 
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poking fun at Kissinger’s role as a foreign-born diplomat: “You are taking advantage of me.  
It’s your native language.”  Kissinger then flipped sides, pretending to take advantage of 
Dobrynin: “You see, I want to tell you as a friend, what we want to propose is an 
arrangement so that we can keep 20 radars and you can keep one—we have to keep some 
flexibility for that.”  Kissinger concluded the conversation, “You were easier to deal with 
when we bought Alaska.”  Dobrynin responded, “We didn’t have Kissinger then,” to which 
Kissinger replied, “We didn’t have Dobrynin.”493     
Faux accusations of taking advantage of each other permeate the backchannel talks 
throughout the Nixon and Ford years.  In 1971, as Dobrynin prepared to go on vacation, 
Kissinger remarked, “You are tough enough when you are exhausted.  Rested you will be 
impossible.”494  In 1972, when finalizing a grain deal, Kissinger asked humorously, “Did you 
ever not get what you want out of my office?”  Dobrynin responded, “Well, well, you’re 
going to receive almost a billion dollars, I should say.  Does it sound enough?”495  In March 
1973, during planning for the June summit, Dobrynin remarked that “in a year or so,” the 
Soviet side would dismantle its SS-9 ICBM in exchange for “some other things.”  Kissinger 
replied, “No, you dismantle all SS-9s and we will give you good will.”  Dobrynin joked that 
it seemed like a “good idea,” and Kissinger replied, “I know you’re so easy to deal with. . . . 
You’ll agree to that easily.”496  After completing preliminary negotiations on the 1973 
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summit agreements, as he prepared to meet with Brezhnev to finalize the deals, Kissinger 
declared, “Now the only other thing I’m going to tell you, Anatol, is that if I arrive in 
Moscow and I find a stone statue to you in a park I know you’ve taken advantage of me . . . . 
Particularly if it has Article I engraved in the bottom.”497 
These exchanges also reflect a mocking retort to the general tone of censure from 
both American and Soviet critics of détente.  American historian Richard Pipes emerged as a 
leading conservative opponent of détente, maintaining that “as now defined and practiced, 
détente primarily benefits the Soviet Union.”498  Similarly, he declared that the backchannel 
“works greatly to the advantage of the Soviet leadership.”  In his words, “The fact that the 
Soviet ambassador in Washington has virtually free access to the president, and indeed has 
been known to travel to Moscow on the same plane with the American secretary of state, 
assures the Politburo that it is reasonably well informed of major American initiatives before 
the occur.”499  Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a Democrat from the state of Washington 
infamous for tying the Soviet Union’s most-favored nation status to Soviet Jewish emigration 
rights, criticized Kissinger for giving up too much in negotiating SALT I, and accused Nixon 
of making risky concessions to the Soviet side that actually increased the future costs of the 
arms race.500  Kissinger satirized these critiques of his work in the final conversation he 
shared with Dobrynin before leaving for the president’s historic trip to China in February 
1972.  When Dobrynin wished Kissinger a “happy landing,” Kissinger responded, “I 
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understand some of my colleagues want to leave me there.  If you hear something happened 
to me in a plane crash in Mongolia, don’t believe it.”501 
The snarky remarks by Kissinger and Dobrynin notwithstanding, public criticism 
from individuals skeptical of the backchannel or of détente in general represented a serious 
challenge to their special relationship.  Malcolm Toon, who served as US ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia (1969-71), Yugoslavia (1971-75), Israel (1975-76), and the Soviet Union 
(1976-79), voiced serious concerns about the backchannel.  In a 1984 profile of Dobrynin in 
The New York Times Magazine, Toon commented, “Dobrynin is one of the ablest diplomats 
of the 20th century, but you shouldn’t treat him as a friend at court.  He’s a representative of a 
government, a system, a philosophy that is hostile to everything we stand for.”502  Noticing 
the chummy relationship between the two men, Toon believed that Dobrynin used his charm 
to gain an advantage over American diplomats in negotiations.503  
Toon’s critique is typical of American diplomats who served at the American 
Embassy in Moscow and in the State Department, and it is reflective of their frustration with 
the backchannel, which left them with little influence over foreign affairs.  Warren 
Zimmermann, who twice served at the American Embassy in Moscow in the 1970s and 80s, 
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later stated, “In the embassy we did not share the view that Dobrynin was the liberal or in the 
reforming wing of the Soviet communist party, that he was a reliable interlocutor.”  
Zimmermann concluded that Dobrynin “was an opportunist, he would tell his bosses what 
they wanted to hear.”  Zimmermann also acknowledged rather frankly, “We resented the fact 
that Dobrynin had terrific access in Washington whereas our Ambassador had very little 
access in Moscow.”504  Similarly, Mark Palmer, who served in Moscow from 1969 to 1971 
and in the State Department for his entire career, noted, “Those of us who are sort of old 
Soviet hands used to get very pissed off because Dobrynin had this direct channel in to 
[Kissinger].  Literally, he had a phone on his desk that Dobrynin picked up on his desk on 
16th Street and it rang on Henry's desk.”  While Palmer decides in retrospect that Kissinger 
“was working in a constructive fashion with [the Soviets] on a lot of very serious issues,”505 
the anger of former State Department officials, left out of the most important negotiations 
during détente, remained palpable, even after the end of the Cold War. 
Even one of Kissinger’s closest assistants, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, criticized the national 
security advisor’s dominance over policy and the American approach to the USSR.  
Acknowledging his “undoubted personal disappointment” that Kissinger excluded him from 
many sensitive details, Sonnenfeldt warned Kissinger of the dangers of “lone-wolf 
diplomacy,” and he contended that one person could not bear the burden of the historic and 
critically important task of conducting superpower relations.  Sonnenfeldt also critiqued 
Dobrynin’s role in the backchannel, writing, “Over the years Soviet representatives, notably 
the current, much-admired one here, have developed the psychological knack to heighten the 
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sense of expectancy as well as the sense of obligation of their American interlocutors.”  In 
other words, because Dobrynin was such a skilled diplomat, Kissinger should know better 
than to deal with him without a broader support network to help him examine the situation 
logically and without the emotional impact of direct negotiations, especially during an 
election year, when American negotiators were prone to making dangerous concessions.506   
Most importantly, Sonnenfeldt articulated reservations about the foundation of 
Kissinger’s vision.  Sonnenfeldt doubted that the USSR could be brought into a “rational 
system of world order.”  In his view, “For all the stultification of ideology, the Soviet state 
remains a revolutionary one committed to the destruction, or at any rate the prevention of any 
type of order that you and I would consider even remotely harmonious and viable.”  
Furthermore, Sonnenfeldt described the Soviet system as “fundamentally unstable,” due to 
the nationality problem, the role of the Party in global affairs, and the inability of the regime 
to provide for orderly succession.  Sonnenfeldt even attacked linkage, Kissinger’s 
foundational negotiating strategy, as a method that “reinforces the rigidity (i.e., essential 
instability) of the Soviet system because it becomes a substitute for reform.”  In sum, 
Sonnenfeldt declared, “I question that this or the next generation of Russian rulers either 
wants to participate, or is capable of participating, in an ordered structure of international 
relations.”507  Sonnenfeldt cast doubts on Kissinger’s ability to build a stable international 
system around the Soviet-American relationship, suggesting that Kissinger’s vision for the 
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future of international relations had cracks in its foundation.  In this sense, critiques of 
détente and the backchannel emerged even among Kissinger’s closest advisors. 
Dobrynin also faced criticism from his home front.  In his memoirs, Dobrynin 
discussed rumors in the Central Committee, the KGB, and the Foreign Ministry that he had 
become “Americanized” by his long stay in the United States.  Also, while most Soviet 
ambassadors “preferred to stay within the walls of their embassies,” Dobrynin and his wife 
had “a wide circle of friends and acquaintances in the United States” and took regular trips 
around the country.  Dobrynin emphasized that this forced him to remain “cautious” and to 
rely on his Party credentials and good connection in the Politburo, Foreign Ministry, and 
various bureaucracies, including the KGB, to keep in good standing.508   
Former KGB Chief Kalugin pointed to criticism of Dobrynin in the Kremlin from 
those who opposed détente.  He writes, “At times, as he defended the official Soviet line, he 
may have seemed like a hard-liner, but Dobrynin was a comparatively progressive man who 
came under attack from orthodox Communists in Moscow for being too soft on America.”  
Unlike these Moscow elites, Dobrynin “knew the United States well and scoffed at the idea 
of an American cabal—composed of Jews, the military-industrial complex, and evil 
capitalists—determined to bury the Soviet Union.”  Kalugin also identifies an unexpected 
“enemy” of Dobrynin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, “who saw the ambassador as a rival and 
tried to diminish his achievements and stature in Washington.”509  In this regard, Kissinger 
and Dobrynin’s banter about one side taking advantage of the other reflected the real 
critiques that they faced every day from domestic critics.  
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Further, Kissinger and Dobrynin joked about mutual surveillance and espionage, 
frequently hinting that one knew where the other had been the previous night and teasing 
about the secret files kept by the other side on their lives.  In 1971, Dobrynin brought up 
Kissinger’s exploits on the West Coast, saying that he had been “reading with pleasure about 
your adventures.”  Kissinger begged that perhaps “once we get to know each other better,” 
Dobrynin would share the file on him.”510  Later that year, Dobrynin complimented 
Kissinger, saying that he “always was thinking and deeply believed you were a very efficient 
man.”  Kissinger countered, “You also think that I am easily flattered.”  When Dobrynin 
protested, Kissinger replied, “When we are both out of government service, which will be a 
lot later for you than me, I hope you will let me read the reports you send in on me.”511  The 
following year, Kissinger complained, “You’ve read a lot of my cables; I’ve never seen one 
of yours.”  Dobrynin promised to show him some in Moscow the next time they were both in 
town.  Kissinger commented that his analyses of the American scene were probably 
“outstanding.”  Dobrynin retorted that, while the wording might be a little different, 
Kissinger “could guess what I think” based on their discussions.512   
While officially promising that the Soviet Embassy did not spy on Kissinger, 
Dobrynin played along with Kissinger’s jokes about espionage.  A few months later, 
Dobrynin told Kissinger, “I hope you arrived on time at your office last night,” with 
Kissinger responding, “You should know with your intelligence network.”  When Dobrynin 
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told him that some reports said he went back to his office and others claimed he went 
elsewhere, Kissinger instructed him to “keep only the agents who said I went to my office.”  
Dobrynin said that Kissinger’s other potential activities sounded “official,” as well, and 
Kissinger promised, “I’ll let you know when I am doing something unofficial.”513  Dobrynin 
opened one conversation by saying, “Welcome back,” with Kissinger thanking him and 
asking, “Where was I?”  Dobrynin mysteriously said, “I think that you were somewhere 
about 230 miles to the north,” indicating that he had visited New York City.  Kissinger 
stated, “That’s right.  Did you have me wired for sound?”514  In 1973, Dobrynin commented 
enigmatically, “I heard you were quite a hit yesterday.”  When Kissinger noted, “Oh, you had 
your man there,” Dobrynin replied, “Of course I have to watch you.”  Underlining the extent 
to which they poked fun at the Cold War standard of spying on officials, Kissinger told 
Dobrynin that at the event, he delivered a parody of an intelligence report.515 
At times, Kissinger and Dobrynin combined the themes of spying and Kissinger’s 
dating habits.  In May 1973, after Dobrynin sang Kissinger an abbreviated version of “happy 
birthday,” Kissinger asked, “Now Anatol do you mind not letting KGB guys run loose in the 
streets in Washington?”  Kissinger informed a confused Dobrynin that one night near the 
embassy, he had “just brought a girl home” when recognized five body guards from the staff 
of General Sergei Antonov, a KGB officer who had been responsible for Nixon and 
Kissinger’s security detail when he visited Moscow in 1972.  Kissinger said, “They were so 
                                                
513 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, March 23, 1971, 5:30 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
514 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, March 15, 1972, 12:25 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger 
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
515 Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Conversation, April 14, 1973, 1:55 PM, NSArch, Henry Kissinger Telephone 
Conversation Transcripts. 
  246 
nice to me when I was there, so I stopped and said hello.”  The two men laughed about the 
coincidence.     
Jokes about Kissinger spying on Dobrynin occurred less frequently.  When Dobrynin 
did not come to work on his thirtieth wedding anniversary, Kissinger joked, “I was thinking 
of getting the FBI to look for you.”516  Later, a minor scandal erupted when Brezhnev, 
aggravated by some last-minute changes to the SALT agreement, declined an offer to visit 
Nixon’s residence in San Clemente during the 1973 summit.  Brezhnev covered his real 
reasoning by claiming that health concerns led his doctors to advise against too much air 
travel.517  Kissinger requested that Dobrynin ask Brezhnev to reconsider, since Nixon “was a 
little bit offended” and reporters inevitably would discover the cancellation, leading to 
further embarrassment for Nixon in the press.  In trying to identify Brezhnev’s reason for 
cancelling, Kissinger asked, “Do you think you are being wiretapped out there?  You’re not 
on my staff, why should we wiretap you?”  Dobrynin laughed, “Exactly,” and Kissinger 
reiterated, referencing the Watergate scandal, “That’s only for staff members.”518  Dobrynin, 
convinced that the informal atmosphere of Nixon’s residence would be a good place for 
informal talks and developing a closer personal relationship between the leaders, persuaded 
Brezhnev to go ahead with the trip. Brezhnev declared that he would “defy his doctors’ 
advice” to make it happen.519  Here, Kissinger not only joked about the potential that the CIA 
would spy on Soviet officials while in the US, but also about the Watergate scandal and the 
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media accusations of Kissinger’s role in wiretapping White House officials.520 
Additionally, Kissinger and Dobrynin bonded over their shared love of history.  Both 
diplomats published dissertations on diplomatic history, Kissinger on Metternich and the 
Congress of Vienna, and Dobrynin on President Theodore Roosevelt’s work to settle the 
Russo-Japanese War.521  Stalin was a frequent subject of conversation.  On July 20, 1970, 
Dobrynin maintained that Stalin was “the only individual who really counted in World War 
II in the Soviet Union.”  Dobrynin noted the general secretary’s “iron nerves” and 
“unbelievable powers of concentration,” citing one instance in which he sat alone in a train 
car in silence for three straight days preparing for the Tehran Conference, resulting in “an 
absolutely masterly performance” from the Soviet perspective.522  During another 
conversation just before the 1972 summit, Dobrynin expressed stronger criticism of the 
deceased dictator, including his initial handling of World War II and his “absolute brutality 
in pursuing” the war.  Based on his own experience in the Foreign Ministry in the early 
1950s, Dobrynin concluded that “Stalin generally never raised his voice in meetings and, 
indeed, one could never tell whether he was agreeing or disagreeing, but he would take 
violent action on the sly behind people’s backs.”523  Records do not exist as to what 
Kissinger thought about Dobrynin’s assessment of Stalin, but it suggested Dobrynin’s 
willingness to address sensitive matters with a trusted negotiating partner.  These comments 
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also played to Dobrynin’s cultural assumption that Kissinger, an American, would be critical 
of Stalin’s domestic policies and would appreciate the feeling that he was negotiating with a 
different type of Soviet, who understood the problems associated with Stalin’s rule.  Plenty 
of Soviet officials were critical of Stalin’s domestic policies, but raising these complaints in 
conversations at the top level in the 1970s reflects a level of intimacy unusual among 
superpower diplomats. 
When Khrushchev’s memoirs were released in the West, Kissinger asked Dobrynin to 
evaluate their authenticity.  Dobrynin explained that Khrushchev never personally wrote 
anything during his time in the Kremlin, but concluded that that the book was most likely 
“dictated in some form” and “therefore quite authentic.” Kissinger then asked Dobrynin 
about a specific passage in the memoirs, which cited a message from Dobrynin during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis suggesting that Robert F. Kennedy feared a military coup in the US.  
Dobrynin reminded Kissinger that the former first secretary did not have the precise 
telegrams in front of him when writing the memoir, and he confirmed that Kennedy said to 
him, “If things continued much longer, the military dominance would become so great that 
there would be no choice except to invade Cuba.  But he obviously never said anything about 
a coup.”524  Here, Kissinger raised the issue of history not simply out of personal interest, but 
also with the aim better understanding the Soviet state’s previous ruler and Dobrynin’s 
history of reporting to the Soviet leadership.   
Kissinger also took an interest in Dobrynin’s opinions on previous American 
diplomats.  For example, in one 1970 conversation, Dobrynin evaluated several previous 
secretaries of state, calling Dulles “the most impressive” and Rusk “the most reliable.”  
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Regarding Robert F. Kennedy, Kissinger recorded Dobrynin’s assessment that “underneath 
his liberal façade,” Kennedy “was an extremely tough man.”  Dobrynin told Kissinger that if 
elected president, after a year or so, Kennedy “would have been the most intransigent cold 
warrior that had ever been in the Presidency.”525  Dobrynin may have been playing down his 
assessment of Kennedy to appeal to Kissinger’s ego, as Kennedy had been a rival to Nixon 
for the presidency in 1968.  Similarly, Kissinger may have distorted Dobrynin’s views for the 
purpose of priming Nixon’s ego.  Still, Dobrynin was critical of Kennedy’s foreign policy 
skills in his memoirs, suggesting that Kissinger’s report may contain some truth.526 
Kissinger and Dobrynin found common interests outside of government.  On May 7, 
1972, Kissinger mentioned that he had tickets to watch game 4 of the Stanley Cup Final that 
evening, but had to stay in to work on problems in Vietnam.  When Dobrynin revealed that 
he also enjoyed ice hockey, Kissinger claimed that he liked the Soviet national team. 
Dobrynin argued that the Soviet team was beginning to “learn to play rough,” Kissinger 
responded, “I have no doubt . . .  No one will ever doubt the Russia ability to be tough.”527  
The pair also shared a mutual love of film, with Dobrynin inviting Kissinger to watch films 
shown by the embassy and asking Kissinger for his opinion of American movies like Patton 
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and The Godfather.528  In fact, when Dobrynin and his wife visited Hollywood with 
Kissinger in summer 1972, the national security advisor arranged meetings with Alfred 
Hitchcock and Bob Hope.529  To a certain extent, then, Kissinger and Dobrynin appeared to 
simply enjoy each other’s company, relishing the rare evenings that they could spend 
together in purely social situations.   
 
Friendship or Fraud? 
For all of their kind words face-to-face, the relationship between Dobrynin and 
Kissinger cannot be characterized as entirely sincere.  In private conversations and in their 
reports, both Dobrynin and Kissinger could be extremely critical of the other party.  In their 
first meeting after Kissinger’s trip to China, Kissinger wrote, “Dobrynin was at his oily best 
and, for the first time in my experience with him, totally insecure.”530  In phone 
conversations with Nixon, Kissinger readily complained about Dobrynin’s actions.  On 
March 11, 1971, he called Nixon and advised that Dobrynin was trying to put proposals in 
both the backchannel and the official channel to attain concessions, calling him a “son-of-a-
bitch.”531  He later referred to Dobrynin as “slobbering” and “pleading,” attempting to 
highlight his own dominance of the conversation and quell Nixon’s fears that the Soviet 
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diplomat took advantage of him.532   
In his memos to Moscow, Dobrynin also could be harsh when describing his 
counterpart, painting him as a vain person whose ego could be used to the Soviet advantage 
in negotiations.  In July 1970, Dobrynin described Kissinger as “a very ambitious individual” 
who “highly values the fact that some issues are handled only through him.”  He noted that 
Washington circles referred to Kissinger as “the President’s ‘Grey Cardinal,’” suggesting that 
the national security advisor controlled policy behind the scenes.  Dobrynin proposed 
“occasionally us[ing] this in our own interests,” effectively playing on Kissinger’s ego to 
attain concessions.533  As late as March 1972, after Kissinger voiced concerns that the Jewish 
Defense League might physically attack him for his participation n Middle East talks, 
Dobrynin commented, “It can be noted in passing, based on my long observations of his 
behavior, that he himself, it must be said, is not notable for great personal courage."534   
Both of these sets of descriptions underscore that the backchannel participants 
recognized and hoped to exploit the weaknesses of their negotiating partners.  Kissinger 
understood the limitations of Dobrynin’s negotiating position, particularly after the success 
of the Nixon administration’s China initiative, and openly mocked him to Nixon.  Placed in 
such a situation, Kissinger felt that Dobrynin had little choice but to smile and swallow 
American demands, if he hoped to conclude a SALT agreement or plan a summit.  Dobrynin 
recognized that Kissinger’s greatest flaw was his own ego, and he counseled that 
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backchannel flattery could be used to persuade the American diplomat to compromise on 
Soviet demands and secure Soviet strategic interests.  Neither of the backchannel diplomats 
paints a flattering picture of his negotiating partner in these documents, demonstrating the 
extent to which the backchannel friendship was a construction that both diplomats hoped to 
use to their advantage. 
This is not to say that that the relationship was entirely fraudulent.  For one, Dobrynin 
and Kissinger had plenty of reasons to downplay the friendly nature of their backchannel to 
their superiors in the White House and the Kremlin, given the nature of the criticisms they 
faced at home.  Seeming too cozy or too approving of the other party could give way to 
accusations of granting too many concessions.  Also, all evidence in the memoir literature 
and the telephone conversations themselves indicates that Kissinger and Dobrynin genuinely 
enjoyed the back-and-forth of their conversations.  The point, then, is that Kissinger and 
Dobrynin built a language of diplomacy around friendship that permitted the smooth flow of 
negotiations.  Neither diplomat forgot that he represented a competing power, but both 
understood that friendlier personal relations could facilitate talks.  This relationship, and the 
mutual desire to achieve progress in relations and preserve their own positions, gave them a 
strong incentive to compromise and find success in establishing détente.  Perhaps more 
importantly, it provided them with the means to make these compromises happen, as they 
could use their personal relationship as leverage in a critical discussion.  Above all, Kissinger 
and Dobrynin believed in the potential for the backchannel, fueled by their relationship, to 
achieve breakthroughs in superpower relations.  As Kissinger told Dobrynin while working 
out the final wrinkles in an agreement for the 1973 summit, “If we had put it in the regular 
bureaucracy, maybe ten years from now half if it would have been achieved.”  Dobrynin 
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wholeheartedly agreed.535   
 
“A Watershed in Our Relationship” 
 In 1971, conflict between India and Pakistan nearly destroyed the bonds forged over 
three years of personal diplomacy.  Since independence, Pakistan had been split into two 
noncontiguous territories under one government: West Pakistan, or the current state of 
Pakistan, and East Pakistan, or the present-day state of Bangladesh.  Tensions between the 
Punjabis, who dominated the West Pakistani government, and the Bengalis in the east had 
long simmered, finally exploding in November 1970, when a deadly cyclone hit East 
Pakistan, and West Pakistan provided what many perceived to be insufficient relief efforts.  
Moreover, the East Pakistani military government, led by Yahya Khan, refused to 
acknowledge election results that favored Bengalis, prompting calls for independence and 
riots in Dhaka, the eastern capital.  All told, after the cyclone and the failed uprising, 500,000 
people lay dead, with millions of refugees fleeing to India.  Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi responded by calling for East Pakistani independence.   
Recent changes in the international scene complicated this situation.  The US 
brokered its rapprochement with China through Pakistan, a Chinese ally that the US had long 
supplied with arms, and on August 9, the Soviet Union and India announced a friendship 
treaty promising that, if one party was attacked, mutual consultations would be held to 
discuss how to remove the threat.  According to historian William Bundy, Kissinger “gave 
the darkest possible interpretation” to this development, viewing these vague promises as an 
assurance that the USSR would support India in a war against Pakistan.  More generally, 
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Nixon and Kissinger understood the commitments of the Soviet Union and China to their 
respective allies in South Asia to be far tighter than they were in reality.  Bundy explains this 
through both men’s “strong tendency to see great-power ties as the key to regional 
situations.”536   
 The backchannel diplomats barely discussed the subcontinent before the war.  On 
August 17, in the first conversation on South Asia after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, 
Dobrynin noted the “ironic development” that the Soviet government supported the “pillar of 
democracy” while the US backed China.  Kissinger countered that the US was “not lined up 
with anybody,” hoping instead to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.  When Kissinger 
proposed working on the refugee and relief problems first, then focusing on a political 
solution, Dobrynin “basically agreed.”537  The Soviet record of this conversation suggests 
that Kissinger went a step further in promising an American commitment to prevent war, 
informing Dobrynin that the US had practically cut off Pakistani military and economic 
assistance.  Kissinger also stated that the US had not consulted with the Chinese government 
about supporting Pakistan against India.538  Throughout October and November, both men 
emphasized restraint to prevent the outbreak of a war.539  Dobrynin explained this in a 
telegram to the Foreign Ministry, writing that Nixon primarily feared “the political 
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consequences that a direct military conflict between India and Pakistan could have on 
relations inside the Big Triangle—the USSR, the US, and China.”540  Still, while India and 
Pakistan came up in many conversations, the focus remained on other issues. 
 By the time war broke out on December 3, Dobrynin was in Moscow for 
consultations, leaving the backchannel in the hands of Chargé d'Affaires Yuli Vorontsov.  An 
able diplomat, Vorontsov did not have the personal relationship and experience with 
Kissinger that afforded Dobrynin greater success in defusing crises.541  After the USSR 
vetoed a UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire and a UN General Assembly debate 
failed to produce a consensus, Kissinger met with Vorontsov daily to discuss what he 
described as a “watershed” in superpower relations.  When Vorontsov expressed his hope 
that the US and USSR were still at a “good point” in their relationship, Kissinger responded 
that “we were developing severe doubts.”  Without the ceasefire that the US demanded, 
Kissinger felt (or at least wanted Vorontsov to think) that the future of bilateral relations was 
in question.  For instance, in discussing the Soviet invitation for him to visit Moscow before 
the summit, Kissinger told Vorontsov, “There are major bureaucratic obstacles, but now 
there are major substantive ones as well.”  Vorontsov declared, “In a week the whole matter 
will be over,” and Kissinger shot back, “In a week it will not be over, depending on how it 
ended,” implying that this conflict could inflict major damage to détente.542   
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On December 9, Nixon and Kissinger took a harder line.  Nixon met with the Soviet 
agriculture minister, someone with no authority to discuss foreign policy, telling him, “What 
I want to suggest is that you ask whether India’s gains—which are certain—are worth 
jeopardizing your relations with the United States.  I don’t say this in a threatening way.  Let 
the US and the USSR find a way to work together.”543  That day, Nixon also ordered a carrier 
group from Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal, and the following day, Kissinger traveled to New 
York secretly to meet with two Chinese UN representatives, informing them on the substance 
of his conversations with Vorontsov and explaining his conviction that it was critical to 
intimidate the Soviet and Indian leadership in order to prevent India from destroying 
Pakistan’s armed forces and annexing Kashmir, as it would mean the end of Pakistan.   
The height of the crisis came on December 12 when the Chinese side demanded a 
face-to-face meeting in New York.  At this point, Nixon and Kissinger believed that the 
Chinese leadership planned to attack India.  If this was the case, they could not call off the 
Chinese strike, as the Chinese government would view them as weak and not serious about 
their overtures of Sino-American unity.  Such a move would end the Nixon administration’s 
China initiative and its position of strength in triangular diplomacy, as its leverage over the 
Soviet Union would evaporate.  Most dangerously, the Soviet Union might attack China, in 
response.  Nixon asked Kissinger, “So what do we do if the Soviets move against them?  
Start lobbing nuclear weapons in, is that what you mean?”  Kissinger responded, “If the 
Soviets move against them . . . and succeed, that will be the final showdown. . . . We will be 
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finished.  We’ll be through.”  The Americans assured themselves that the Soviet leadership 
would not take that step.544  Still, this chilling conversation reflects the tenuous nature of 
détente in December 1971.  
No sooner did it begin than the most dangerous phase of the conflict ended.  The 
Soviet government forwarded a message through Vorontsov that India did not intend to 
attack West Pakistan and that it had started cease-fire negotiations.  In their subsequent 
phone conversation, Vorontsov told Kissinger that they were now “on the same track” and 
must continue cooperation.545  Haig reported back from New York that the Chinese 
representatives called the face-to-face meeting not to announce military action, but to inform 
the American leadership that the Chinese government now viewed an independent East 
Pakistan as inevitable, announcing their intention to support an American UN proposal for a 
ceasefire with troop withdrawals and the beginning of talks.  India agreed to a ceasefire in the 
West and went on to conquer the rest of East Pakistan, paving the way for the declaration of 
an independent Bangladesh.546  
The drama on the American side took a little longer to subside.  On December 14, 
Kissinger announced at a press backgrounder that, if Soviet conduct continued on its present 
course, failing to deliver a ceasefire, the Americans would reconsider holding the May 
summit, leading to a flurry of press activity designed to reassure the Soviet leadership that 
Kissinger misspoke.547  Two days later, Kissinger and Nixon talked on the phone about what 
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would happen if the work to conclude a ceasefire failed.  Nixon responded with a laundry list 
of steps designed to put the breaks on détente: “Cut off the Middle East talks, pour arms into 
Israel, discontinue our talks on SALT. . . . We have to stop our talks on trade, don’t let Smith 
have any further things on the Middle East and stop seeing Dobrynin under any 
circumstances.”  Kissinger chimed in, “That is right.  Break the White House channel.”548  
Even after the war was essentially settled, Nixon and Kissinger were remarkably prepared to 
end the backchannel and put the brakes on détente at the first sign of trouble. 
Bundy describes the Indo-Pakistani War as a “fundamental error” of Nixon and 
Kissinger’s policies, arguing that the Americans flirted with the idea of abandoning the 
notion of triangular diplomacy for an American-Chinese-Pakistani alliance in South Asia to 
counter an Indo-Soviet alliance, or “balance-of-power diplomacy at its most naked and 
extreme.”  This measure failed, Bundy contends, partially because it did not properly weigh 
the interest of the other parties and did not fulfill American values or strategic interests.  As 
Bundy writes, Nixon and Kissinger’s policies were “replete with error, misjudgment, 
emotionalism, and unnecessary risk taking.”549  Zubok states that Nixon and Kissinger 
viewed the war “almost hysterically,” believing it to be “a Soviet plot to undermine the entire 
edifice of American triangular diplomacy, specifically American attempts to build up China 
(and its ally Pakistan) as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.” 550  This emotional response 
stems from Nixon and Kissinger’s own paranoid world view, as they saw a vague Indo-
Soviet friendship accord as an iron-clad alliance and quickly assumed the worse about the 
situation. 
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In contrast, Soviet policy appeared reserved in its attempt to restrain India while 
preserving the superpower relationship.  Zubok contends that the Soviet leadership viewed 
the friendship treaty with India as a geopolitical maneuver to counterbalance the Sino-
American rapprochement, but Nixon and Kissinger’s aggressive behavior horrified the Soviet 
leadership during the war.  He asserts, “Brezhnev, puzzled at first, was soon enraged,” even 
considering helping India produce nuclear weapons, and years later, when Aleksandrov-
Agentov brought up this message, Brezhnev “still reacted angrily and spoke spitefully of 
American behavior.”551  Even if no formal superpower agreements had been reached by this 
point, the Soviet leadership viewed this episode as a violation of détente.  It seemed to 
confirm their worst fears of the new American relationship with China and reflected the 
challenges that détente faced in the Third World. 
This episode reflects the importance of the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship to the 
backchannel.  Kissinger did not share the same relationship with Vorontsov that he had with 
the Soviet ambassador, and their conversations lacked the personal touch that typified the 
backchannel conversations.  In his memoirs Kissinger remained suspicious of the Soviet 
government’s intentions in keeping Dobrynin in consultations, as he believed that this 
maneuver was designed to buy time for the Indian government to achieve its objectives.  
Kissinger bitterly complained that Dobrynin seemed to be recalled in advance of “most 
crises.”552  Still, Dobrynin informed Kissinger well before the war started of his travel plans, 
making it unlikely that this was a deliberate ploy to speed the Indian advance.553  Moreover, 
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international crises later erupted when Dobrynin remained in Washington, and in those 
situations, the backchannel participants employed their personal relationship to ameliorate 
the situation.  Here, though, Vorontsov, a junior diplomat with little personal history with 
Kissinger, was ill-equipped to smooth the rough seas of the superpower relationship in the 
midst of the Indo-Pakistani War. 
 
Back to Business 
When Dobrynin returned to Washington a month later, it seemed on the surface that 
all transgressions incurred during the Indo-Pakistani War were forgiven.  In their first 
telephone conversation upon his return in mid-January, Kissinger joked, “I have now 
formulated a basic rule.  When you leave town you are up to mischief. . . . If you were here 
during these situations, it would have been better.”  Dobrynin promised details, and they 
went back to their witty banter.  Kissinger teased Dobrynin that he saw him applaud during 
the State of the Union address when Nixon announced higher defense spending.  They agreed 
to meet at Dobrynin’s place for dinner, where, as Kissinger said, they would be “a little more 
comfortable” than in the White House.554  At this meeting, the two men acted as if the war 
had not happened.  Kissinger noted that the meeting “lasted nearly four hours and was 
conducted in an atmosphere of effusive cordiality, buttressed by slugs of vodka and cans of 
caviar.”  Kissinger emphasized that “if the Vietnam issue were removed, all other areas in 
our relations would make quick progress.”  In reference to Vietnam, Kissinger complained 
that “whatever the convoluted maneuvers of inter-Communist politics,” if the Soviet 
leadership had taken a stronger stance for peace, it would have happened resulted in a quick 
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end to the war.  
Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed the Indo-Pakistan War at this meeting, but the 
memos they composed suggest that they did not agree on the direction of the conversation.  
Kissinger reported his comments that the bulk of the blame for the crisis fell on the shoulders 
of the Soviet leadership.  Dobrynin asserted that the USSR “had exerted maximum counsels 
of restraint” and that until Kissinger’s inadvertent comment about potentially canceling the 
summit, the Soviet government did not realize that the gains in Soviet-American relations 
were even at stake.  Rather, he urged Kissinger to understand that the Politburo debate on the 
war did not carry an anti-American character, and if any other country was considered in the 
debate, it was China.  Dobrynin remarked that American actions during the war only 
confirmed suspicions among some elements in the Soviet leadership of American ties to 
China, and stated that “anytime we made a move that looked pro-Chinese, the anti-US people 
in the Politburo got the upper hand again.”  Kissinger retorted, “The danger now was that the 
more intransigent the Soviet Union was, the more we would respond by compensating moves 
towards Communist China.”555  In this sense, Dobrynin and Kissinger both related the Indo-
Pakistani War to triangular diplomacy. Dobrynin suggested that the pro-Chinese leanings in 
US foreign policy empowered anti-détente voices in the Soviet government, while Kissinger 
contended that perceptions of Soviet aggression in the Third World only pushed the US 
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closer to China.  They agreed, however, that improved Soviet-American relations represented 
the best way to prevent future crises.  Thus, the Indo-Pakistani War, as interpreted in the 
backchannel, served as yet another reason for the formalization of détente. 
Additional complications emerged in January, when Nixon announced that Kissinger 
had been secretly conducting talks with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris the 
previous three years, leading the Soviet leadership to fear that the American administration 
hoped to play the USSR and China off one another to achieve its goals in Vietnam.  The day 
after Nixon’s speech, Dobrynin wrote to the Foreign Ministry to express concern that the US 
was “unquestioningly counting on China” to solve the Vietnam crisis, perhaps concluding an 
agreement during Nixon’s visit.  Pointing to American “diplomatic gamesmanship,” 
Dobrynin stated that the US would “play its main trump card,” exchanging a total withdrawal 
of American troops for “unspoken assistance” in achieving a Vietnam settlement “with 
honor” and thus avoiding scandal during the 1972 elections.  Dobrynin recommended a new 
tactical approach: three-way negotiations between the USSR, China, and North Vietnam.  
Overall, Dobrynin stressed that they should prevent Nixon from organizing a settlement with 
the Chinese leaders, and that Soviet representatives should continue to press Nixon and 
Kissinger on the necessity of Soviet involvement in any settlement, aiming to build a deal 
that served the interests of both North Vietnam and the USSR.556 
Two days later, in a backchannel meeting with Kissinger, Dobrynin continued to 
emphasize the divides in the Kremlin, implying that getting too cozy with the Chinese 
leadership would enable hawks in the Politburo to seize the initiative, throwing a wrench into 
détente.  Kissinger argued that the Vietnam War “distorted” the Sino-American relationship, 
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and once it was settled, “everything would fall in its proper perspective.”  He implied that 
Soviet aid in settling Vietnam would resolve their concerns about Sino-American relations.557  
Dobrynin’s more expansive memo of this conversation details Nixon’s itinerary in China and 
the plans for official banquets.  Kissinger apparently also told Dobrynin that the Chinese and 
American negotiators were close to finalizing a joint statement to be signed on Nixon’s final 
day in China.  He informed the Soviet ambassador that it did not currently have language 
about Vietnam, though they would certainly discuss this subject, and it would provide the 
visit with tangible results.558 
Following Nixon’s visit to China, Dobrynin and Kissinger met immediately, and as 
usual, the accounts differ as to who brought up the topic of China.  Kissinger wrote that 
Dobrynin was “extremely jovial” and “clearly under instructions not to ask any questions or 
show any excessive interest.”  Kissinger noted sardonically, “He violated these instructions 
consistently,” pretending that although the Soviet government remained uninterested, “it 
would help him if I volunteered certain information.”559  Dobrynin stated that he 
“deliberately did not broach the subject of their trip to China.”  During the conversation, 
Dobrynin argued, it was “clearly evident” that Kissinger hoped to discuss the trip, and after 
he “could not restrain himself any longer,” he brought it up on his own accord.  Dobrynin’s 
memo provides Kissinger’s account of the meetings in Beijing, in which Kissinger asserted 
that the American relationship with the Soviet Union continued to supersede the Sino-
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American rapprochement for a variety of reasons.  China remained weak militarily relative to 
the Soviet Union, and the volume of American trade with China remained negligible for the 
foreseeable future.  Kissinger further stated that the US could hardly be of assistance in 
China’s ideological dispute with the Soviet Union.  In fact, meeting with Nixon most likely 
would damage China’s accusations that the Soviet leaders were sell-outs and revisionists.  
Kissinger concluded that, even if the US supported China in every way against the USSR 
over the next five years, the “collusion” and its effects would be “extremely limited.”560   
The following day, Dobrynin telegrammed the Foreign Ministry with his proposals 
for dealing with the international situation after Nixon’s visit to China.  Dobrynin observed 
“a serious shift” in relations between the two states, from confrontation to normalization and 
even discussion of “parallel courses” on issues such as the conflict between India and 
Pakistan.  American and Chinese representatives began working on, but could not solve, 
problems involving Taiwan, Vietnam, and trade relations.  Dobrynin noted a “psychological 
shift” in public opinion, with more sympathetic descriptions of China in the press, and 
observed that the most critical result would be a “new strategic alignment of forces” in Asia.  
Several figures in Washington policy circles told Dobrynin, “It’s a whole new ballgame.” 
Nonetheless, Dobrynin expressed doubts in Washington about the longevity of the 
rapprochement, as changes in the American and Chinese leadership circles could 
significantly alter the situation.  He explained that Washington elites still viewed the Soviet-
American relationship as more important than the Sino-American rapprochement. Progress in 
Soviet-American talks would put the Chinese on guard.  Dobrynin advised continuing their 
focus on the summit and shifting the public conversation from the “[Beijing] motif” to a 
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“Moscow motif.”  He concluded that a “well-prepared and productive US-Soviet meeting in 
Moscow” could benefit the Soviet Union’s position in this evolving triangular diplomacy.561  
In sum, even after the debacle of the Indo-Pakistani War and Nixon’s visit to China, 
Dobrynin viewed the problem of triangular diplomacy as manageable, especially if the Soviet 
government committed itself to a productive summit. 
During this period, the Middle East provided an additional area of discord, as 
Kissinger and Dobrynin struggled to find common ground in addressing the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War.  Although their conversations covered 
issues from demilitarized zones to retaining the ceasefire, the primary disagreement occurred 
over whether or not the Soviet Union should have a significant role in the region.  Kissinger 
and Nixon hoped to get Soviet troops out of the Middle East, giving the US the power to 
engineer a settlement directly with Israel and the Arab states and without Soviet interference.  
As Kissinger said to Nixon in a phone conversation, “We have got to get the Soviets out of 
the Middle East.”  Nixon responded later: “That is one area we want to take charge of the 
policy and run it our own way.  State is looking at it in terms of just the Middle East.  We are 
looking at it in terms of the Soviets.”562  Yet Dobrynin sought to ensure a Soviet role in the 
future of Middle Eastern affairs.  In late January, he made recommendations on the Middle 
East to the Kremlin, noting that White House had “a certain calm” in dealing with the Middle 
East crisis based on the confidence that Israel was in a superior position.  He recommended 
pushing matters by stirring things up, perhaps by announcing the construction of a Soviet 
naval base in Egypt: “It appears to us that letting the White House know in some way about 
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our possible intentions along these lines would be a useful additional incentive at the present 
time for it to accelerate the already agreed-upon serious confidential negotiations with us on 
a Middle East settlement.”563  According to American records, during talks in March, 
Dobrynin followed the threat in this proposal, telling Kissinger that the Soviet side already 
had made huge concessions by promising to remove troops and bases from Arab countries, 
and that if no deal was forthcoming, they might answer requests from several Arab states to 
provide air support and weapons.  He concluded ominously: “The Soviet Union would stay 
there until the local people were in a position to defeat the Israelis militarily.”564 
Despite these signs of tension, real progress toward a SALT agreement was made in 
this period.  In his letter to Brezhnev on February 15, Nixon used the term “détente” for the 
first time in a message to the Kremlin, and the Soviet leadership responded in kind by joining 
him in using an alternate version of the term.565  On March 16, both sides gave press releases 
announcing that Nixon’s visit to Moscow would start on May 22.566  One day later, Nixon 
assured the Soviet ambassador that the Moscow summit would be for “serious business” and 
informed him that “Kissinger was in complete charge of the summit,” as he was to instruct 
Dobrynin on what members of the bureaucracy should be responsible for individual aspects 
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of negotiations.567  This followed a March 10 discussion in which Kissinger reported that he 
gave Dobrynin a list of departments to contact about specific problems, attempting to prevent 
a “State Department monopoly” on critical talks with the USSR.568  In practical terms, they 
discussed the outlines of what would become the “Basic Principles of Relations between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” putting in formal 
terms the goals and nature of the new relationship that Soviet and American leaders hoped to 
build.569  After Kissinger threatened to follow through with a program for American 
submarine modernization, concrete discussions were held on limiting the numbers of nuclear 
submarines, something the Soviet side had previously resisted.570  They also came closer to 
agreeing on the number of ABM systems that each side would be permitted, though debate 
remained about whether each side could choose what to protect or if they would be required 
to protect the capital and one ICBM base.571 
Furthermore, Kissinger and Dobrynin began finalizing arrangements for the summit.  
For example, Kissinger broached the idea of the president visiting Poland in a meeting with 
Dobrynin on March 30, assuring the Soviet ambassador that they would not go to “embarrass 
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the Soviet Union.”  Dobrynin told Kissinger that he was “very moved” that Kissinger thought 
to ask, since the US did not have to coordinate its movements in Eastern Europe with the 
Soviet leadership.  He expressed certainty that the Kremlin would not object, and noted that 
it would make a good impression if they wanted to announce the decision until they received 
a formal reply.572  Dobrynin advised Moscow to approve the trip, stating that, while Nixon 
hoped the trip would bolster his election odds, it would be “useful” for the Polish and Soviet 
leadership, denoting implicit American acceptance of the Polish borders and taking away 
Romania’s “special status” as the only East European socialist state to receive a visit from 
the US president.573  Finally, in discussing American accommodations in Moscow, Dobrynin 
encouraged Kissinger to accept the Soviet offer to stay in the Kremlin, even if the entire 
American delegation could not be housed there.  As he said, it was “really an unusual honor 
and one which was above all designed to symbolize to the Soviet people that we were serious 
about establishing mutual ties.”  For overflow, Dobrynin suggested, they would use the 
Rossiia Hotel, located across Red Square.574  Thus, in the first few months of 1972, planning 
was well underway for the Moscow summit, as the trouble caused by the Indo-Pakistani War 
and Nixon’s visit to China did not substantially interrupt the progress started the previous 
year.  
 
 
                                                
572 “Memorandum of Conversation (US),” March 30, 1972, in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 
1969-1972, 633-34. 
573 “Memorandum of Conversation (USSR),” March 30, 1972, in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente 
Years, 1969-1972, 634-38. 
574 “Memorandum of Conversation (US),” March 30, 1972, in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 
1969-1972, 633-34. 
  269 
Vietnam Redux 
 From the end of 1969 until July 1971, Kissinger and Dobrynin rarely discussed 
Vietnam, but as the relationship improved in the summer of 1971, Kissinger again sought 
Soviet aid in ending the war.  On July 29, he reported that, while for the previous year and a 
half he “accepted the proposition” that the Soviet Union had little influence over Vietnam, he 
now “thought there was a useful moment for intervention.”575  Dobrynin seemed to agree to 
help Kissinger work on a resolution of the two remaining problems: the schedule for 
withdrawing American troops and the Thieu government in South Vietnam.  Dobrynin 
speculated that Nixon brought up this topic in the channel for the first time in years to show 
that “he does not want to seek a solution to the Vietnam issue behind our back” and that it 
could not be solved with Chinese aid alone, as there were divisions between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese positions that made it a messy process to orchestrate it through Chinese 
channels.576   
Although Dobrynin reentered the conversation on Vietnam, Soviet involvement did 
not lead to immediate results. The war escalated at the end of March 1972 with a North 
Vietnamese offensive into South Vietnam for the first time since 1968.  Informing Dobrynin 
of growing numbers of North Vietnamese troops across the border, Kissinger made another 
peace offer, in which the US would remove all military personnel from South Vietnam that 
year and end military aid to South Vietnam so long as the USSR stopped giving military aid 
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to North Vietnam.577  The North Vietnamese Easter Offensive began shortly thereafter in 
earnest, throwing a crisis into the backchannel just as the superpowers were attempting to 
conclude the agreements to sign in Moscow in May. 
Kissinger’s notes on meetings in this period often make it seem as if the backchannel 
partners spent the majority of their time together fighting about the Soviet role in the 
Vietnamese offensive.  In a phone conversation with Nixon on April 3, Kissinger reported, “I 
told [Dobrynin] what you said and he said, ‘Isn’t it amazing what a little country can do to 
wreck well-laid plans.’”578  At their next meeting, Dobrynin told him he was being too 
dramatic by declaring that the offensive was an “all-out attack.”  Kissinger responded that he 
“hoped so for their [the Soviets’] sake.”  Dobrynin then asked Kissinger if he really thought 
that Soviet leaders had a hand in planning the offensive.  Kissinger wrote, “I said there are 
only two possibilities, either they planned it or their negligence made it possible.  In either 
event, it was an unpleasant eventuality.”579  On April 12, Kissinger stated that, when 
Dobrynin assured him that the Soviet leadership was uninterested in seeing the conflict 
worsen, he responded: “Let’s be realistic.  You are responsible for this conflict.”  He asked 
what the Kremlin expected after signing two supplementary arms agreements with the North 
Vietnamese, giving them the wherewithal to launch an offensive.580 
Dobrynin’s notes on these conversations paint a different picture.  On April 3, he 
recorded Kissinger’s complaint that “Hanoi’s actions are unquestionably aimed at 
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complicating the situation on the eve of the Soviet-US summit.  That is the only possible 
conclusion.”  Yet Dobrynin’s comments to Moscow made it seem as if Kissinger’s approach 
was extremely conciliatory: “The President realizes that North Vietnam is an ally of the 
Soviet Union.”  He also suggested Nixon did not blame the Kremlin for the offensive.581  He 
observed that Nixon hoped that an American military response in this matter “will not 
negatively impact Soviet-US relations in other fields and in other parts of the world.”  
Dobrynin wrote that Kissinger also expressed regrets that far-flung developments threatened 
to derail détente.582  At the April 6 meeting, Dobrynin suggested that Kissinger’s argument 
remained the same, asking the Soviet leadership to exert a restraining influence over Hanoi 
and to not allow events in Vietnam to affect the summit meeting.  Dobrynin’s reports contain 
information unmentioned by Kissinger that the Soviet ambassador “bluntly delivered serious 
warnings against the bombing of [North Vietnam].”583  In general, it appears that, like 
Kissinger, Dobrynin attempted to smooth over this issue at home to ensure that the summit 
would go on, as planned. 
Dobrynin’s telegram to the Foreign Ministry the following day reflects the diplomatic 
tightrope he tried to walk between appearing tough on American aggression in Vietnam and 
encouraging the Kremlin to go forward with summit talks.  He observed that developments in 
Vietnam were “aggravating the overall international situation and our relations with the US, 
and will further aggravate them in advance of the Moscow meeting.”  Although he cited the 
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value of Soviet arms shipments to North Vietnamese successes in the war, he expressed the 
hope that “the Soviet Union’s political stature and prestige could . . . play an important role 
of its own in preventing the events in Vietnam from escalating into a major international 
crisis.”  He proposed an initiative to end the fighting and perhaps even chart a path to peace, 
releasing a statement about the need to end the bombing and resume talks.  In doing so, he 
used the most recent American proposals as a basis for convincing the North Vietnamese 
that, given their recent military success, the time was ripe to seek a political solution.  This 
would give the USSR a stronger position at the summit to solve Vietnam and other 
international problems, while preventing US public opinion from producing a very negative 
reaction.  In other words, Dobrynin hoped to have his cake and eat it, too, keeping the 
Chinese government out of the picture, forcing the US to rely on Soviet support for peace 
initiatives, and bringing about a successful summit with agreements that would gain approval 
from the US Senate.584   
The differences between Kissinger’s and Dobrynin’s respective reports on these 
conversations are stark.  On April 9, Kissinger noted that Dobrynin declared the April 24 
meeting to be “extremely crucial” in developing a resolution to the war, as the Soviet 
government had contacted Hanoi to ensure that the meeting would take place.  He asked 
Kissinger if the US side was prepared to “talk and fight at the same time,” and the national 
security advisor gave a negative response, stating that “it would not be acceptable to us any 
more to talk while the fighting was going on.”585  Dobrynin observed that, while it would be 
difficult to resume official talks in Paris before fighting stopped, the American side 
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“evidently would not object to getting a reaffirmation of the [North Vietnam]’s intent to have 
the planned secret meeting with Kissinger in Paris” or in Moscow.586  Moreover, during the 
April 12 conversation, Kissinger wrote that, after his lecture to Dobrynin about the Soviet 
role in Vietnam, the Soviet ambassador attempted to bring up other topics.  Kissinger shot 
him down, telling Dobrynin that he was “not authorized to discuss any of the other subjects 
with him.”587  Dobrynin’s memo, however, suggested that they had a brief discussion of 
various issues, including the ratio of defensive systems permitted under the ABM treaty, 
submarine limitations, the Middle East, the draft communiqué that would end the summit, 
and the president’s upcoming visit to Poland, where he turned down a meeting with Cardinal 
Stefan Wyszyński to avoid an unfavorable reaction from the Polish leadership.588   
The most prominent topic about which Kissinger and Dobrynin’s reports differed is 
the organization of Kissinger’s pre-summit visit to Moscow.  On November 18, Dobrynin 
surveyed Kissinger’s interest in visiting Moscow before the summit, stating that the matter 
was made more urgent since Rogers had asked twice to be invited to Moscow.  Dobrynin 
underscored that the Soviet government had little interest in a visit by Rogers, but keen 
interest in one by Kissinger.  By his own account, Kissinger told Dobrynin that he “did not 
see too much point” in visiting Moscow, since the backchannel was working well and he did 
not want to give the impression of colluding with the Soviet government.589  In contrast, in 
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Dobrynin’s report, Kissinger “intimated that he would very much like to visit Moscow” 
before the summit, indicating that late January might work best.  Kissinger asked that Soviet 
officials keep quiet about this suggestion.590  On December 1, in the midst of the Indo-
Pakistani conflict, the Soviet side proposed that Kissinger visit in January, but Kissinger 
implied that the barriers seemed too great at the moment to go forward with this plan.591   
Following the conclusion of the Indo-Pakistani War, the backchannel picked up on 
the theme of a pre-summit visit once again.  According to the Soviet memo of the January 21 
conversation, Kissinger thanked Dobrynin for the earlier invitation and suggested that it 
could take place in the second half of March.592  Kissinger’s memo contained no mention of 
this.593  By March 9, Dobrynin reported Kissinger’s claim that he most likely would not be 
able to make a pre-summit trip to Moscow because he “would not want to pour oil on the 
fire” of the bureaucratic rivalries in Washington by visiting Moscow,594 yet Kissinger’s 
memo demonstrated no sign of this conversation.595  A week later, Dobrynin asked Nixon, 
“Our friend Henry is very modest.  Is he or is he not coming to Moscow?”  The American 
record of conversation records Nixon’s response that such a visit was “impossible,” as it 
would “break too much china in the bureaucracy.”  Besides, the sole reason Kissinger had 
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visited Beijing was that “there was no Chinese Dobrynin in Washington,” making face-to-
face negotiations a critical aspect of the Sino-American rapprochement.596    
Despite Nixon’s statement on the impossibility of the visit, by mid-April, both 
Dobrynin and Kissinger sent recommendations for a pre-summit trip to their respective 
leaders.  During their April 12 discussion, Kissinger noted Dobrynin’s recommendation that 
“a visit to Moscow was more urgent than ever.”  The Soviet ambassador stated that Kissinger 
could use the opportunity to discuss Vietnam and “accelerate preparations for the summit.”597  
After a phone conversation confirming Nixon’s approval and the confirmed details of the 
trip, Dobrynin wrote back to Moscow giving credit to the American side for requesting the 
meeting.  Dobrynin suggested accepting this formulation, as it would provide a basis for 
solving some of the problems facing the superpowers in advance of the summit.  Kissinger 
requested completely secrecy, and they finalized the details.598   
The explanation for the disparity in these transcripts lies in the differences in attitudes 
about détente between the participants in the backchannel and the leadership in the center.  
Nixon felt that they should take a tougher line on the Soviet leaders, threatening the future of 
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the summit as long as the North Vietnamese offensive continued, while Kissinger felt 
strongly that the summit should take place.  As a result, Kissinger tailored his memos to fit 
Nixon’s worldview, acting as if he had been much tougher on Dobrynin about Vietnam than 
the Soviet memos indicate.  Similarly, Dobrynin tailored his memos to a divided Politburo, 
with some members—particularly Minister of Defense Marshal Andrei Grechko—actively 
opposing a summit or a SALT agreement during the Vietnam War.  Therefore, Dobrynin 
needed to seem as if he had taken a tougher line with Kissinger and assure the Kremlin that, 
regardless of what happened in Vietnam, the American side would remain on board with the 
summit. 
Remarkably, as a result of backchannel diplomacy, the 1972 North Vietnamese 
offensive failed to overwhelm plans for the summit.  As Robert Dallek wrote, “The striking 
feature of Kissinger’s conversations with Dobrynin in early April was not Henry’s harping 
on the dangers to Soviet-American relations from North Vietnam’s offensive, despite 
Nixon’s wishes, but the extent to which they continued to find common ground for a Summit 
and improved relations.”599  Indeed, in their telephone conversations in April and May, 
Kissinger and Dobrynin rarely discussed Vietnam, and when it did, they used humor to 
defuse any potential tensions.600  On April 16, for example, they faced logistical problems in 
arranging for the delivery of a Soviet note on Vietnam to Nixon.  After finally getting 
everything arranged, Kissinger joked, “The problem Anatol is I’m not used to dealing with 
you in crises.”  Dobrynin laughed, “Well I think we will handle it after all,” and Kissinger 
                                                
599 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 373. 
600 Haig-Dobrynin Telephone Conversations, April 14, 1972, 11:10 AM, 11:30 AM, and 12:00 PM, NSArch, 
Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. 
  277 
responded, “We certainly should.  We’ve got too much we ought to do together.”601  Here, 
the personal relationship maintained by Dobrynin and Kissinger provided a useful tool to 
move on with summit talks in a period of great tension. 
Of course, these personal relationships also could be used to manipulate the opposing 
party.  At a ceremony for the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention, Nixon passed 
on a request from the First Lady, Pat Nixon, to meet with Dobrynin’s wife Irina for tea, and 
Nixon mentioned that she hoped to discuss “women’s aspects” of the trip.602  When 
Kissinger called to finalize the arrangements for the affair, both he and Dobrynin sounded 
thankful for the meeting.603  On April 11, Nixon called Kissinger to tell him that, after 
conversation about gifts for the summit, Mrs. Nixon brought up Vietnam.  According to the 
president, she said, “I just hope it won’t hurt the visit, and Mrs. Dobrynin squeezed her hand 
and said with almost tears in her eyes, ‘I hope not, I hope not.’”  Nixon responded with deep, 
devious laughter: “So we got that message across.”  Surprised, Kissinger asked, “She 
mentioned Vietnam?”  Nixon retorted, “Oh, hell yes, that’s what she talked about! . . . You 
know how she’d do it, right on the nose.”604   
In May, following Kissinger’s pre-summit visit to Moscow, tensions over Vietnam 
brought the summit to the brink of collapse, as the US began a bombing campaign over 
Hanoi and Haiphong on May 1 and dropped aerial mines into North Vietnamese harbors on 
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May 8.  Tensions rose on May 9 and 10 when American bombers struck Soviet merchant 
vessels.605  Nixon remained steadfast about the need for the summit in conversations with 
Kissinger.606  On May 6, when Kissinger mentioned he had been talking to Dobrynin about 
SALT, Nixon lectured, “I just don’t want you to do it too much right now Henry. . . . I think 
you have been gracious to them and everything but you understand what I mean.  I don’t give 
a damn about SALT.  I just couldn’t care less about it and I just think right now we better get 
all of our troops together and pull ourselves together.”607  After a May 11 backchannel 
meeting, Nixon and Kissinger debated the chances of the Soviet leadership canceling the 
summit; Kissinger rated it at less than fifty-fifty.  If they scrap it, Nixon said, “they’re 
gambling on somebody else winning the election,” as he would “turn on them hard.”  Nixon 
noted that he’s “not all that hot” for the summit because he feels their options are good, either 
way.608  While Nixon may have understood the benefits of retaining the summit, he 
frequently told Kissinger that he did not care if he visited Moscow or not, so long as Vietnam 
was finally settled.  In this context, Kissinger’s ability to persist in talks with Dobrynin “as if 
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nothing were happening,” as he put it in a memo, remains a testament to Kissinger and 
Dobrynin’s will to negotiate in the midst of crisis. 
Zubok offers one possible analysis of the difficulty Brezhnev confronted in the 
Kremlin in garnering support for the summit.  Facing opposition from Politburo members 
such as Podgorny, Shelest, and Grechko, Brezhnev received support from Kosygin and 
Gromyko, allowing him to move forward with talks.  As Zubok argues, “The winning 
argument was that the North Vietnamese should not be allowed to exercise a veto over Soviet 
relations with the United States.  For the moment, state interests prevailed over ideological 
passions.”  As opposition to the summit mounted, Brezhnev won out in an impassioned 
speech to the Politburo.  He asked Defense Minister Grechko, “If we make no concessions, 
the nuclear arms race will go further.  Can you give me, the Commander-in-Chief of Armed 
Forces, a firm guarantee that in such a situation we will get superiority over the United States 
and the correlation of forces will become more advantageous to us?”  When Grechko 
muttered a negative reply, Brezhnev shot back, “Then what is wrong?  Why should we 
continue to exhaust our economy, increase military expenses?”  Brezhnev called a plenary 
session of the Central Committee to lend support to his decision to go ahead with the summit, 
and he received support from Kosygin, Gromyko, Suslov, and Andropov, allowing him to 
move forward with the plan.609  In this sense, both the American and Soviet sides overcame 
reservations of leading officials to pull off the summit, and some portion of the credit should 
go to Kissinger and Dobrynin, who kept the backchannel active in this period.  
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“That is Your Secret Weapon” 
 In 1972, top American officials made two separate trips to the Soviet Union to 
conclude the agreements negotiated through the backchannel.  First, on April 20 to 24, 
Kissinger made a secret trip to Moscow to meet with Brezhnev, discuss the situation in 
Vietnam, and iron out most of the wrinkles in the agreements that would be signed a month 
later.  Then, Nixon, Kissinger, and an array of State Department and White House officials 
arrived in Moscow for a summit that lasted from May 22 to 30.  There, Nixon and Brezhnev 
participated in direct negotiations, and the superpowers signed several agreements, including 
SALT I and the ABM Treaty.  The personal relationships between the superpower leaders 
shared many of the qualities of the backchannel relationship.  Not only did they build a 
relationship around friendly banter, accentuated by Brezhnev’s propensity for telling long 
anecdotes, but the topics covered by this small talk tended to mirror the backchannel themes 
as well. 
 The preparatory notes developed by each side reflect this development.  For example, 
Dobrynin informed the Foreign Ministry that Kissinger “speaks freely and more candidly in 
more intimate settings, without a large number of participants.”610  Most of the meetings in 
Moscow, then, were smaller gatherings, in which only Brezhnev and Gromyko had a major 
speaking role.  They also plied Kissinger with round after round of baked goods and 
chocolates during talks, along with offers of alcohol, tea, and water.  Conscious of the nature 
of the backchannel with Dobrynin, Nixon warned Kissinger that “Brezhnev is simple, direct, 
blunt and brutal,” rendering ineffective “the sophisticated approach we used with the 
Chinese.”  Having read a draft of the planned opening remarks, he advised Kissinger to avoid 
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spending too much time on “general philosophy,” the nature of the president, and the 
“historic opportunity” presented by the summit.611  Both sides saw the parallel to the 
backchannel in the relationships between top officials, and they sought to take advantage of 
this situation. 
 The personal relationships among Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev mirrored the sense 
of conspiratorial togetherness in the backchannel, including a mutual disdain of the 
bureaucracy.  When Kissinger promised to cut through the American diplomatic 
bureaucracy, Brezhnev told him, “That is very very good.  If you get rid of the State 
Department then we will get rid of the Foreign Office.”  As Gromyko and Brezhnev joked 
about whether they should burn down the Foreign Ministry building, Kissinger jumped in, 
“With all respect, Mr. General-Secretary, we have made more progress in abolishing the 
State Department than you have in abolishing the Foreign Office,” leading to laughter among 
the Russian delegation.612  Speaking informally on a balcony overlooking the Moscow River, 
Brezhnev declared, “You and I can accomplish much together between the two of us.  Maybe 
we should just abolish our Foreign Offices.”  Kissinger agreed, “We on our side have already 
taken steps in that direction.  Now we need a reduction of Gromyko,” who often served as 
the butt of Brezhnev’s jokes on this topic.613  Noting their “fruitful talks,” Brezhnev told 
Kissinger that “if we left it to Gromyko and Rogers, they would be talking for two 
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months.”614  In another instance, Kissinger and Gromyko joked that the foreign minister 
looked so similar to the president that they would try to fool the guards and sneak him into 
the White House during his next visit to Washington.  Brezhnev complained, “If President 
Nixon will be like Gromyko, I am horror-stricken.  It is impossible to talk to Gromyko.  It 
will mean a lot of grief.”615 
When Kissinger reminded Brezhnev of his description of the “Byzantine 
requirements of our bureaucracy,” Brezhnev launched into an anecdote about one professor 
who claimed that, in a department of 1,000 employees, “they can do nothing except serve 
their own needs.”  He followed with the punch line, “Therefore I try my best to keep my 
departments down to 999!”  After the laughter subsided, he said more seriously: “You’d 
certainly be mistaken to show it to lawyers.  As soon as you ask the lawyers, then you are 
finished.”  Kissinger promised to keep the finalized agreements private in the White House 
until they arrived in Moscow and then give the lawyers twenty-four hours to work out the 
details.  Brezhnev responded wryly, “Twenty-four minutes.”616 
This theme continued during Nixon’s trip to Moscow a month later.  When Nixon 
arrived at the Kremlin, Brezhnev pulled him aside for a private conversation in his office that 
came as a surprise to both the American side and the Soviet side, with Podgorny, Kosygin, 
and Kissinger livid, waiting outside for the two men and their translator to emerge.617  They 
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bonded over their mutual disdain for bureaucracy, with Nixon saying, “If we leave all the 
decisions to the bureaucrats we will never achieve any progress.”  Brezhnev agreed, “Then 
we would simply perish,” with Nixon adding, “They would simply bury us in paper.”  They 
agreed to meet the challenge of bureaucracy by limiting the most important negotiations to 
their meetings, leaving the less complicated issues to diplomats lower down the chain.618  
Like Kissinger and Dobrynin, Nixon and Brezhnev reveled in their work to outmaneuver the 
bureaucracies, especially on the American side.  Nixon and Brezhnev discussed the 
importance of the Basic Principles agreement that Kissinger and Brezhnev worked out during 
the secret trip to Moscow.  As if referencing Kissinger’s description of himself as a “movie 
director” two years earlier, Brezhnev concluded by assuring Nixon, “But now we will follow 
the script.”619  Kissinger, of course, groused about the American bureaucracy while in 
Moscow, complaining in one meeting with Gromyko that they had to retain one particular 
phrase in the joint communiqué because it was “the one contribution the State Department 
has made to this document, literally.”620  Brezhnev not only agreed to participate in Nixon 
and Kissinger’s subterfuge, but seemed to enjoy it.  The jokes they made about this issue 
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reflect the spirit evident in Kissinger and Dobrynin’s backchannel discussions.  
Similar to the backchannel, jokes about nepotism permeated the conversations in 
Moscow.  In his pre-summit meetings, Kissinger joked that Dobrynin read more notes from 
North Vietnam to the US than the Secretary of State.  Brezhnev responded, “Maybe Rogers’ 
post should be abolished,” to which Kissinger shot back, “Maybe Dobrynin should be given 
an official function” in the American government.621  During the summit, Kissinger recited 
the number of concessions he made on the communiqué, saying that when he was “run out of 
Washington,” he wanted a guarantee that he could get an advisory position in the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry.  Gromyko gave an affirmative, and Dobrynin laughed, “He can be our 
American specialist!”622   
The top Soviet officials also enjoyed this sort of back and forth joviality.  Brezhnev 
reminded Nixon that broader trade relations between the US and the USSR could solve 
American problems with gas, oil, and lumber in a way that served the interests of both 
parties.  Kosygin jumped in, “Not to mention vodka.”  This devolved into a lively discussion 
about the relative worth of various American and Russian vodkas. Brezhnev pontificated 
about life as a venture capitalist in the alcohol business, “If someone in the US were given a 
monopoly to produce our vodka, he would become a millionaire immediately.  Maybe 
Kissinger and I should take that up. . . . The two of us could split the profits somehow.”  
Nixon cracked, “He earns enough money as it is.”623  Two days later, Kosygin talked about 
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the ease of life as an Academician in the USSR, where a man gets paid whether or not he 
works. Nixon jumped in, “That’s why he [Dr. Kissinger] wants to come here.”624  Even 
though none of it was serious, this conversation reveals the extent to which Soviet and 
American leaders could relate to each other based on the unique problems posed by the work 
of governing superpowers. 
 Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev likewise joked about the growing power of the 
executive branch, which seemed to the general secretary to control the entirety of US foreign 
policy.  When Kissinger arrived for the pre-summit visit, Brezhnev requested that their aides 
should be permitted to speak if they wanted to say anything.  Kissinger proclaimed, “I don’t 
run my staff as democratically as you, Mr. General-Secretary.”  Brezhnev snickered and said 
with apparent glee, “I’m a great democrat, a great democrat, a great democrat.”625  While 
Brezhnev found this hilarious, he displayed less understanding of the complexities they faced 
in navigating the American political system than Dobrynin in the backchannel.  For example, 
Brezhnev asked Kissinger to have Nixon say a favorable word about the ratification of the 
West Berlin agreement, which was caught up in the ratification process.  When Kissinger 
said that Nixon could not control the German elections, Brezhnev suggested that Nixon could 
do something and that if he were the American president, he would force it through.  If it 
worked out, Brezhnev jokingly promised to give the American side credit, but if it failed, he 
would pin the blame on Kissinger.626  Later, when Kissinger tried to explain that the White 
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House could make some economic decisions, while others fell to the Congress, Brezhnev did 
not buy it.  Hoping for immediate trade concessions, he said, “But you yourselves write the 
laws.  It is for you to change them.”627  The American political system remained a mystery to 
most Soviet politicians, including Brezhnev.  Experienced with situations in which they 
could move quickly and independently to pursue initiatives, Politburo officials had difficulty 
understanding why agreements could not proceed more quickly. 
 The top superpower leaders further connected in their handling of the press and 
domestic opponents.  For example, they made several jokes about student protests in the US.  
In the first meeting of his pre-summit trip, Kissinger told the general secretary that domestic 
opposition did not phase the Nixon administration: “upper middle class students are not good 
revolutionaries,” even if they “make a lot of noise” in America, to which Brezhnev 
laughed.628  At the end of the summit meetings, Nixon promised Brezhnev that, when he 
came to visit the US the following year, “the demonstrators will be for you and against me—
that’s the way our system works.”629  The media also served as a punch line for the top-level 
negotiators.  Gromyko joked with Kissinger, “We have a more advanced social system.  We 
don’t have problems with the press.”  Kissinger, no fan of the press, shot back, “You are 
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making it more and more attractive.”  He did complain, though, that he kept getting clipped 
out of Pravda’s pictures of summit signings.630 
 Like Dobrynin and Kissinger, both the American and the Soviet primary negotiators 
complained about third countries that they claimed sought to disrupt the summit, reflecting 
their shared position as superpower leaders.  Kissinger, for example, grumbled that North 
Vietnam sought to destroy the possibility of summit agreements, telling Brezhnev that “a 
little country whose heroism derives from a monomaniacal obsession with local problems” 
intended to send Soviet-American relations “in a direction which neither of us wants.”631  
Brezhnev even seemed to sympathize with the Americans at times, expressing a restricted 
understanding of the American need to maintain “prestige.”  He said at one point, “We do 
believe the President really wants to end the war.”632  Brezhnev continued to press Nixon and 
Kissinger to find a solution to the war, but from the Soviet perspective, even perfunctory 
expressions of understanding the Nixon administration’s point of view on Vietnam seem 
shocking, a demonstration that, at least to a certain extent, Brezhnev and Nixon could 
commiserate over their common roles as superpower leaders. 
For the Soviet side, China represented the most pressing danger to the summit, a 
matter that Brezhnev broached with Nixon after several drinks.  Brezhnev “repeatedly 
referred to himself and the President as Europeans and said it was very difficult for 
Europeans to really know what was going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership.”  He 
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also complained about Mao’s personality cult and referred with disgust to the “so-called 
cultural revolution,” specifically mentioning public beheadings and “dozens of ‘camps’ 
where people were being ‘re-educated.’”633  Brezhnev even attempted to combine the China 
problem with anti-Nixon elements in the US, something he knew would find resonance with 
Kissinger.  He maintained that the American opposition press wrote “in unison” and “in 
parallel” with the Chinese press, hoping “to prevent, to block the summit between the Soviet 
Union and the United States.”  To drive the point home, Brezhnev discussed the various 
deaths the Chinese had planned for Soviet leaders, ranging from Kosygin, who was to be 
hanged, to Mikoyan, who was to be boiled alive.  Brezhnev feigned relief in finding out that 
he was to be shot, which he wryly described as “an honorable death.”634  In the descriptions 
of the Soviet leadership at the summit, the Chinese regime was barbaric and distinctly 
“eastern,” disconnected from the values of European civilization that tied the US and the 
USSR together.  There is little evidence that Nixon and Kissinger accepted this argument, but 
it represents a Soviet attempt to emerge victorious in the game of triangular diplomacy by 
driving a wedge between the US and China.  These comments also distinguish Brezhnev’s 
perspective from the backchannel conversations, as Dobrynin did not display the overt 
racism expressed by the general secretary.  
 Allies could pose as much of a problem for superpower leaders as enemies, and here 
Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev found greater room for common ground.  For instance, when 
discussing the European Security Conference, Nixon emphasized that “smaller nations are 
very sensitive” about superpower relations, since they “object to having their fate decided by 
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larger ones.”  Brezhnev shot back, “It should not offend them.”  Nixon again advised caution, 
“We must be careful not to irritate our friends—all our friends, we consider all Europe our 
friends.  For example, we wouldn’t want to anger Albania.”  The other officials laughed 
about this, and Rogers cracked, “We don’t want to make Luxembourg mad,” referencing a 
previous comment by Brezhnev, who described Luxembourg’s forces as “90 policemen.”  
Earlier in the conversation, Kosygin lamented the influence of alliances, asking Nixon, “Do 
you think the time will come when there are no allies on your part or on ours, that we are 
common allies?”  Nixon, taken aback, answered: “Surely, It will take time.”635  If Nixon did 
not find the Albania comment funny, as he had hoped to use the desires of their respective 
allies to slow down progress in talks for a European Security Conference, the others in the 
room, including Rogers, certainly did. 
 Negotiations between Kissinger and Gromyko on the Middle East further demonstrate 
this point.  The two men discussed the status of Sharm el-Sheikh, a coastal city at the 
southernmost tip of the Sinai Peninsula that Israel hoped to retain as a base in any deal 
ceding the land back to Egypt.  Gromyko and Kissinger debated the possibility of 
temporarily stationing UN personnel in the city, with Gromyko emphasizing, “Temporary, 
not until the Second Coming of the Christ!”  Kissinger laughed, “An interesting formulation 
to put to the Jews and the Arabs.” Later, they joked about the way that they negotiated these 
details without the participation of the regional leaders.  Gromyko asked, “Can you imagine 
if we showed this now to the Syrians, what would they do?”  Kissinger responded, “Both of 
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us are terrified of what our allies would do.  This is the best guarantee of secrecy.”636  At the 
tail end of the summit, Nixon acknowledged that both sides would consult with their allies 
about the results of the meetings, but assured Brezhnev that the American side would be 
“extremely circumspect in our consultations and will maintain confidentiality in all matters 
concerning our bilateral relations,” with Brezhnev agreeing to do the same.637  Again, the 
sense of conspiratorial togetherness, secretly planning agreements that would shape the 
future of millions of people, created a certain thrill for the top leadership in the US and the 
USSR, giving them a sense of a common position in the world, even if their negotiating 
stances were different. 
Perhaps the most shocking example of the American and Soviet leaderships bonding 
over their mutual status as superpowers came during Kissinger’s pre-summit visit to 
Moscow, when he repeated a compliment he made to Dobrynin in 1969 on the Soviet 
handling of the Prague Spring.  This time, he mentioned this fact in the context of Vietnam.  
Telling Brezhnev that “bombing is very painful for us,” Kissinger nonetheless maintained 
that “when a leader has necessities and a country has necessities, he must take painful steps 
which he doesn’t like to do.”  Then, he implicitly compared this decision to Soviet action in 
the Prague Spring, telling the general secretary that “when you have acted, I have been 
impressed that you have done so massively, without looking back.”  Brezhnev responded that 
Kissinger proved himself an “astute lecturer” by “hinting at Czechoslovakia,” and Kissinger 
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assured Brezhnev that he made this comment to Dobrynin “in a spirit of understanding, in a 
complimentary way, not critically.”638  Kissinger thereby prodded Brezhnev to empathize 
with the American plight in Vietnam, demonstrating that the superpowers faced similar 
challenges and needed to use similar methods, no matter how unfortunate they might seem, 
in managing their respective empires.   
 The top leadership followed the backchannel representatives’ precedent of coming 
together through humor about the antagonistic relationship between the US and the USSR in 
the Cold War.  Kissinger’s birthday took place during the Moscow summit, and he joked, “I 
received more presents from the Soviet Foreign Ministry for my birthday than from the US 
State Department.”  Gromyko made a pun about the typical Soviet request that the US not 
interfere in its internal affairs, “I will say nothing on the US Foreign Office because non-
interference is one of our principles.”639  At a later point in discussions, Brezhnev, picking up 
on Cold War themes of espionage and intelligence, told Nixon that Kissinger “should be kept 
under constant surveillance. . . . Nobody knows where he really spends his time.”  When 
Gromyko tried to defend Kissinger, saying that he has kept good watch over the national 
security advisor, Brezhnev protested, “You and Kissinger have had a long and dubious 
record of contacts,” suggesting that perhaps they were in on the mischief together.640  In 
another conversation in St. Catherine’s Hall in the Kremlin, Kissinger raised the Russian 
tradition of spycraft, joking that Ivan the Terrible probably invented the secret camera in the 
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chandelier.  Complaining about the hall’s temperature, Gromyko fired back, “No, Ivan the 
Terrible invented the air conditioning in this room!”641    
 Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev also carried on the long tradition of the backchannel 
participants mockingly suggesting that one diplomat was taking advantage of the other.  In 
the first meeting of Kissinger’s pre-summit visit, Brezhnev already picked up on this tactic.  
When Kissinger mentioned that he was aware of the fact that Brezhnev favored his visit to 
Moscow, Brezhnev responded, “You haven’t told me anything and I am giving away all my 
secrets.  I’m losing all of my advantages now because I am so kind.”642  Later, when 
conceding to a Soviet position on the number of acceptable nuclear submarines, Kissinger 
told Brezhnev, “I will show you what a bad diplomat I am.  Gromyko wouldn’t do this.”  
Brezhnev responded that this demonstrated he was a “strong diplomat,” claiming that the 
Foreign Ministry would not do this because of “how bad it is.”  Gromyko defended himself, 
saying that he “would have waited at least three minutes” before making the concession.643  
When Nixon arrived in Moscow, he got in on the act, joking with Brezhnev about 
Kissinger’s supposed proclivity for making concessions: “The trouble was that he gave 
everything away to the General Secretary [on his previous trip to Moscow] and now I will 
have to take it back again.”644  Reflecting the real criticism of hawkish Americans and Soviet 
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defense officials, these jokes brought together Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev through their 
mutual plights. 
As in the backchannel, top Soviet and American diplomats rooted their discussions in 
historical topics.  At their first pre-summit meeting, Kissinger announced, “Our intention is 
to recapture the spirit of the Roosevelt period,” when the US and USSR established official 
relations and defeated the Axis powers in World War II.  Brezhnev agreed, but he added a 
caveat on the ways that the war divided the superpowers, “I am sure, God forbid, if your 
people had had to suffer anything like the Russian people did, the post-war American foreign 
policy would have been different.”645  This theme would return during the summit, with 
Nixon using the experience of the war to highlight the importance of top-level personal 
relationships.646  Brezhnev also told Nixon, “I believe if the US had suffered the way the 
Soviet people had, then perhaps you would look at matters about Vietnam differently than at 
present, but of course God forbid that you ever have to suffer what the Soviet people suffered 
in World War II.”647  This demonstrates the ways in which the Soviet historical experience 
affected Brezhnev’s evaluation of the US, as he understood the Vietnam War through the 
prism of the Soviet experience in World War II.  Occasionally, more recent history came to 
the fore, including the Kitchen Debate between Nixon and Khrushchev.  Brezhnev promised 
Kissinger that he had “no intention of arguing with Nixon about whose kitchen is better.”648  
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If history did not have the same intrinsic interest for Brezhnev and Nixon as it did for 
Kissinger and Dobrynin, it still allowed them to root their present summit in previous 
encounters.   
Even Kissinger’s sexual exploits and the entirely male composition of the diplomatic 
cohort served as the basis for bonding among the superpower elite.  On Kissinger’s birthday, 
Antonov, the KGB general in charge of security, surprised the national security advisor by 
interrupting negotiations by having a woman bring in a cake.  Antonov declared, “And on 
behalf of our girls, for the American delegation, she will kiss you.”  The woman kissed 
Kissinger and blushed, with Antonov exclaiming, “And not on orders!”649  SALT 
negotiations between Kissinger and Soviet representatives paused on the evening of May 25 
to take in a performance of Swan Lake at the Bolshoi Theater as part of the summit 
pageantry.  As they reconvened at 11:30, Kissinger was late returning to the negotiating 
table, and when Gromyko asked him where he had been, Kissinger responded that he was 
“looking for the ballerina,” lamenting that there was not sufficient time to spend with her.650  
Brezhnev also got in on the action, making fun of Kissinger’s supposed sexual prowess.  In 
the pre-summit meetings, Kissinger informed Brezhnev that he could stay through Monday, 
if necessary, but “if I don’t get home by Monday night, they will all think I have a new girl 
friend.”  Brezhnev joked that this was not so bad, and, in fact, “if that were happen to me I 
would get a medal.”  He took this anecdote one step further, stating that “after 65, one gets 
the ‘order of the badge of honor’ for one’s ability,” referring to one’s sexual life as a senior 
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citizen.  Kissinger quickly changed the subject.651  Having learned of Kissinger’s reputation 
with women, the Soviet side attempted to stroke his ego at every turn, buttering him up for 
the next round of talks. 
Finally, like Dobrynin and Kissinger, the top leadership could simply enjoy one 
another’s company in a lighthearted manner.  Kissinger asked for Brezhnev to say something 
on the limitation of nuclear submarines, and Brezhnev responded, “Nothing.”  When 
Kissinger asked for clarification, Brezhnev joked: “Be patient.  What can I say about them?  
They travel under water, we can’t see them, they’re silent.”  Delighted, Gromyko clumsily 
called out in English, “Puzzle!  Puzzle!”652 A rich banter also developed around the plentiful 
foodstuffs available in Soviet negotiations.  When Brezhnev offered Kissinger plums dipped 
in chocolate, Kissinger responded, “I just started a diet before I came here, which has already 
been destroyed in 12 hours in Moscow.”  Later, Brezhnev offered the Americans pie, and 
when Kissinger seemed to be slowing down, he said, “Please eat up.  You will certainly have 
to report back to the President.”653  In a later conversation, Kissinger would joke, “That is 
your secret weapon.”  Brezhnev agreed, and Gromyko chimed in, “A conventional 
weapon.”654   
The banter between Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev mirrored the jokes in the 
backchannel.  Of course, no one could mimic Brezhnev’s bombastic, “quintessentially 
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Russian” negotiating style, in Kissinger’s words, as the general secretary could exhibit 
“crudeness and warmth” at one moment, and be “brutal and engaging, cunning and 
disarming” at the next, with a seemingly endless array of odd and funny anecdotes that could 
easily beguile an opponent in talks.655  Still, many of the themes remained parallel to those 
present in the backchannel, and the attempt to build personal diplomacy through common 
interests saw success in Moscow as it did in the backchannel.  Similar to the backchannel, the 
banter between top leaders did not reflect an honest friendship, but rather the purposeful 
construction of a personal relationship that both leaders understood could be useful in future 
talks.   
 
Conclusion 
 In his memoirs, Kissinger addressed Dobrynin’s role in the pre-summit visit to 
Moscow, frequently checking in on the American to make sure that everything was 
progressing as planned.  He wrote, “Dobrynin was, I am convinced, sincerely dedicated to 
the improvement of US-Soviet relations; he was eager that nothing unforeseen should derail 
the product of his devoted labors.”656  Yet Dobrynin’s practical role in the pre-summit visit 
and the summit itself was fairly limited.  He sat in on meetings between Nixon, Kissinger, 
Brezhnev, and Gromyko, sometimes asking questions, making points about previous 
negotiating positions, or cracking jokes at Kissinger’s expense.  Once in a while, Dobrynin 
would substitute as a translator or attend to the American representatives during their visit.  
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Generally speaking, though, Dobrynin receded to the background and allowed his bosses in 
Moscow and his partners in Washington to conclude the negotiations. 
 However, Dobrynin’s imprint on these talks was indelible.  Those who point to 
Kissinger’s role in setting the tone in these conversations are not mistaken, but it should be 
stressed that it was an ill Dobrynin who invited Kissinger to his living quarters for their first 
meeting.  It was Dobrynin who insisted that they refer to each other by their first names in 
talks, and Dobrynin who proposed the private telephone line connecting their offices.  
Dobrynin spent time reading celebrity gossip rags to provide the material for his jokes about 
Kissinger’s sex life.  Dobrynin reported to Moscow on Kissinger’s personality type.  In short, 
although Kissinger may have come to office with the goal of using personal diplomacy with 
his principle partners, Dobrynin implemented this technique, having already refined it over 
the previous seven years working with other diplomats.  That Kissinger proved more 
receptive to Dobrynin’s advances, willing to return his gestures in kind, speaks to the unique 
relationship they had in the context of Cold War diplomacy.   
Kissinger and Dobrynin bonded over a number of issues, all of which were tied to 
their status as male diplomats representing the only two superpowers in a secret backchannel.  
As a result, they had plenty of things in common, ranging from difficult allies to Cold War-
era espionage to sex.  As Kissinger told Dobrynin after the 1972 elections, “I don’t know 
whether one can have a feeling of personal friendship with a Communist diplomat but I have 
it.”657  Still, the power of this personal diplomacy to overcome conflict between the 
superpowers had its limits, as they would discover in subsequent years.  Neither Dobrynin 
nor Kissinger forgot that they represented the two most powerful countries in the world, and 
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both understood that their relationship—no matter how much they actually enjoyed the 
banter—was primarily a tool to conduct diplomacy, smoothing things over when conflict 
erupted and advancing negotiations when the time was ripe.  Thus, the inscription that 
Dobrynin penned in the copy of his memoirs that he sent to Kissinger makes for an apt 
explanation of the complexities of their relationship: “To Henry, opponent, partner, 
friend.”658   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE BACKCHANNEL 
Optimism among foreign policy leaders remained high in the wake of the Moscow 
summit.  On July 12, 1972, while on a business trip at the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, 
Dobrynin stayed at the Nixon’s home in San Clemente.  In California, “The president himself 
was at ease,” and “he spoke freely, joked, and was prepared to share his personal views on 
foreign policy with unusual candor” as the two looked forward to planning a summit in the 
United States in 1973.  Dobrynin recounts how: 
Business apart, Kissinger and I arranged for a short vacation of a day and a 
half.  We lay on the beach and even managed to get a couple of hours sleep 
right on the sand under the warm California sun.  The sight would have 
shocked the Washington diplomatic corps, to say nothing of Nixon’s right-
wing political opponents: the president’s assistant for national security and the 
Soviet Ambassador, wearing nothing but bathing trunks, sleeping side by side, 
with a security guard keeping a watchful eye on their papers and personal 
effects.  
 
Kissinger also introduced him to margaritas at a neighborhood Mexican restaurant.659  This 
moment symbolizes the level of trust that developed between the negotiators following the 
successful summit.  The reservations that each side felt about détente on the eve of the 
conference, each unsure of the other’s commitment to improving relations, melted away as 
the negotiators grew confident that they could work with their respective partners.  
 Yet within a few years, this optimism faded in the wake of a series of domestic and 
international crises that led to the collapse of détente and a period of retrenchment that some 
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have called the “second Cold War.”  Both Kissinger and Dobrynin have offered explanations 
in their memoirs for their view that détente was doomed to fail.  Kissinger blames his 
domestic critics for restraining the Nixon and Ford administrations’ range of action.  He also 
cites “the collapse of our executive authority as a result of Watergate, the erosion of the 
leadership structure even in the Congress, the isolationism born of the frustrations of 
Vietnam, and an emerging pattern of geopolitical abdication.”  As a result, Kissinger argues, 
the American government “ended up achieving the worst of all results” due to what he 
awkwardly referred to as the “constant pinpricks of the Soviet bear.”660  In his memoirs, 
Dobrynin similarly acknowledges the worsening atmosphere in Washington for détente, but 
contends that, above all, détente fell because of the existence of “contradictory concepts of 
détente” in each of the capitals.  In particular, the Soviet side understood détente through an 
ideological prism, seeking to facilitate socialism’s triumph over capitalism in the developing 
world while simultaneously avoiding nuclear Armageddon.  The American side, in contrast, 
viewed détente as a means of managing the Soviet Union’s rise on the world stage and as an 
alternate form of containment.  Neither side engaged in a philosophical discussion about the 
meaning of détente with the other, and consequently, neither understood the other’s 
motivations for setting policy.661 
 At the time, hawkish critics in the US cheered the demise of détente, criticizing 
American officials for engaging in it in the first place and Soviet leaders for trying to exploit 
the naïve American willingness to negotiate by increasing arms stockpiles and embarking on 
a revolutionary crusade in the developing world.  Meanwhile, doves in the American foreign 
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policy establishment blamed the hawks for spoiling the otherwise prudent policy of 
rapprochement with the USSR.  The hawks, they argued, used scare tactics to push the 
American public away from détente, persuading Ford to ban the word from his 
administration’s public statements and describing any pursuit of détente by Carter as a sign 
of weakness.  Soviet commentators in the same period contended that American 
policymakers had abandoned détente because they refused to accept strategic parity and the 
equality of the USSR on the world stage.  Instead, they felt that the US pursued a course of 
confrontation and military buildup in a desperate attempt to stave off decline.   
 Historians, focusing on the American perspective, have continued this discussion of 
why détente failed.  In 1984, Harry Gelman helped open the historiography on the collapse of 
détente by claiming that the Brezhnev Politburo continuously sought “incremental gains” in 
the international arena “within the scope of available opportunities and the limits of prudent 
risk.”  The Politburo based its decisions on a belief in the incompatibility of US and Soviet 
interests as well as a pervasive sense of vulnerability, both in the Soviet international position 
and in the Brezhnev Politburo’s domestic legitimacy.  In this sense, the Politburo, 
increasingly dominated by hawkish voices, was at fault for the collapse of détente, although 
Gelman openly criticizes inconsistencies in American policy.662   
 More recent scholars have shifted the blame elsewhere.  Betty Glad, the foremost 
expert on the Carter administration, has suggested that Carter bears considerable 
responsibility as he accommodated hawks in the American foreign policy community by 
pursuing a more aggressive Soviet policy.663  Vladislav Zubok acknowledges that domestic 
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politics, ideology, and bureaucratic structures impacted the collapse of détente, but concludes 
that Soviet and American leaders’ personalities was the most important factor.  Mirroring his 
argument that the personalities of Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev served as the driving 
engines of détente, he suggests that “had Brezhnev still been willing to make a determined 
effort to maintain a political partnership with the American leadership,” détente would have 
persisted.664 
 Raymond Garthoff provides the most complex and comprehensive explanation for the 
collapse of détente.  Similar to Dobrynin, he states that the most important reason for the 
failure of détente was the “fatal difference in the conception of its basic rule by the two 
sides.”  While both parties recognized the need for improving relations, the Americans hoped 
to manage Soviet influence in the international arena, whereas the Soviet side aimed to 
ensure stability while socialism gradually overtook capitalism.  In identifying the reasons for 
the collapse of détente, Garthoff also points to the superpowers’ failure to collaborate to 
ensure collective security, to build a common code of conduct on the world stage, to 
accurately perceive each other’s motivations, to control the arms race, and to comprehend the 
relationship between domestic and foreign policies.  Garthoff emphasizes that there was 
never just “détente” or “confrontation,” but rather a mix that continued to exist through the 
1980s.665 
 Building on Garthoff’s work, this chapter examines several of the crises that derailed 
détente.  I argue that the Soviet Embassy’s failure to handle myriad domestic and 
international problems proved to be one of the major contributing factors in the collapse of 
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détente.  The complexities of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus impeded the embassy’s 
efforts to ameliorate the crises, as the officers on the ground who best understood the 
American political context were kept ignorant of Soviet actions in the developing world until 
they saw them in the headlines of American papers.  Therefore, they could not advise the 
center about how conflicts in the developing world would be received by the American 
leadership, and they had difficulties explaining the importance of places such as Angola and 
Afghanistan to the Kremlin, whose leaders did not understand that American policymakers 
viewed Soviet actions in the developing world as a serious affront to bilateral détente.  
Moreover, Soviet policymakers could not grasp how issues such as Watergate or Jewish 
emigration from the USSR could hamstring a presidential administration’s actions, especially 
after years of being told by Nixon and Kissinger that they held the keys to any policy 
initiatives in Washington.  With the embassy, the most effective tool for improving bilateral 
relations, sidelined by developments in American and Soviet domestic and foreign policies, 
détente withered from 1973 until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when it finally ceased 
to function.   
 The source base for this period in the backchannel’s history is more limited than for 
earlier years. The transcripts of Kissinger-Dobrynin telephone conversations exist only up 
until the end of the Ford administration in January 1977.  The full set of Dobrynin’s 
messages to the Politburo has not been released beyond the May 1972 summit, although 
some critically important individual memos have been declassified.  Consequently, this 
chapter will draw on the available files, as well as memoir accounts to explain how the 
backchannel changed from the first Moscow summit to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. 
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1973 Summit and Vietnam 
 During the period from June 1972 to the spring of 1973, Nixon turned his gaze to 
winning the 1972 presidential election, and Kissinger focused on resolving the Vietnam War.  
As Robert Dallek has argued, these processes were not always complementary.  On the one 
hand, Kissinger wanted to end the war for both strategic and electoral reasons, believing that 
there would never be a better time to end the conflict.  In his view, the trifecta of the opening 
to China, the Moscow summit, and an end to the Vietnam War would guarantee Nixon 
victory.  On the other hand, Nixon feared that hawks would accuse him of abandoning South 
Vietnam to communism or that his opponent, Senator George McGovern, would receive an 
invitation from the North Vietnamese government to visit Hanoi, where they might reveal a 
plan to turn over American POWs, weakening Nixon’s position in the election.  Moreover, 
Nixon had grown increasingly jealous of Kissinger’s expanding profile since his initial trip to 
China.  Every time Kissinger spoke to the press about progress in talks with North Vietnam, 
Nixon worried that this would take public attention away from his own work.666   
 Despite Nixon’s reservations, Kissinger continued to meet with North Vietnamese 
diplomat Le Duc Tho in Paris in an attempt to secure a settlement.  Following their 
September 15 meeting, Kissinger reported that they were close to concluding negotiations 
and that a settlement should be completed within a month.  Nixon attempted to slow the 
progress of talks by reiterating to Kissinger several times that they could not abandon South 
Vietnamese President Thieu.  When Kissinger returned to Paris for additional talks in 
October, he settled all negotiating decisions without seeking Nixon’s direct approval, 
frustrated by possibility that even if he concluded negotiations, the president might “louse it 
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up.”  Sure of an agreement, Kissinger returned to Washington on October 12 and proudly 
declared, “Well, you’ve got three for three, Mr. President,” referring to the opening to China, 
the Moscow summit, and Vietnam.  By October 26, Kissinger boldly told the press, “We 
believe peace is at hand.”  Yet Nixon remained pessimistic, showing no interest in the details 
of the agreement. When Kissinger returned to Paris and reported that the details were nearly 
worked out, Nixon cautioned him that the deal still had to receive approval in Saigon, where 
Kissinger was told that he could not force the agreement on Thieu.  The South Vietnamese 
president, enraged by a stipulation that left North Vietnamese troops on South Vietnamese 
soil, rejected the plan in any form.  On October 24 and 25, the North and South Vietnamese 
leaderships released the details of the talks.  Kissinger told the press on October 26 that “we 
believe that peace is at hand,” but as Dallek concludes, Kissinger “found himself waging a 
two-front political war for peace against Saigon and the White House.”667   
 Following Nixon’s victory in the November 7 elections, the president recommitted 
himself to ending the conflict before the start of his second term, but Thieu resisted Nixon 
and Kissinger’s efforts to push him toward the settlement, and the North Vietnamese 
leadership proved unwilling to make concessions that satisfied Saigon’s concerns.  To try to 
force the North Vietnamese leadership to give ground and persuade the South Vietnamese 
officials that the US would continue supporting Saigon, even after extracting its forces, 
Nixon ordered a massive bombing campaign on Hanoi and Haiphong to begin on December 
18, when Congress was in recess, so he did not have to face questions from House and 
Senate leaders.  The campaign, described by The Washington Post as “the most savage and 
senseless act of war ever visited, over a scant ten days, by one sovereign people over 
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another,” brought North Vietnam back to the negotiating table, but failed to reassure Thieu of 
American intentions.  In early January, Kissinger returned to Paris under instructions to end 
the war at any cost, and he hammered out an agreement with Tho under less-than-friendly 
conditions.  Meanwhile, Nixon persuaded Thieu to accept the terms, making clear that he 
would sign the agreement regardless of Saigon’s concerns.  On January 23, Nixon announced 
to the American public that finally he had secured “peace with honor.” The Paris Peace 
Accords were signed four days later, ending the war.  Privately, Kissinger doubted the 
agreement would hold water for very long, but at least the Nixon administration could claim 
that America’s long national nightmare was finally over.668 
 During this period, the Vietnam War officially remained a thorn in the side of Soviet-
American relations.  On May 17, the same day that Pravda confirmed President Nixon’s 
upcoming visit to Moscow for a summit with Brezhnev, Soviet newspaper Literaturnaia 
gazeta printed a series of poems by Evgenii Evtushenko, the famous Soviet poet, America-
72.  The first of these poems, “A Vietnamese Man in Disneyland,” uses a theme park as a 
metaphor for the United States, where people of all different nationalities, portrayed as 
children, play “in an attraction that some call ‘the kind uncle,’” a reference to Uncle Sam, or 
the US government.  Although the ‘children’ could potentially wield power, Evtushenko, 
muses, “this kind uncle plays deceitful games with the tiny children.  The skillful swindler of 
children’s innocent peace would like to use a special device on the young ones: ‘Close your 
eyes to peace!’”  In Evtushenko's words, the US government hides all of the terrible things 
happening in the world from its people, particularly when the US is involved, telling them 
instead to close their eyes and have fun in the park.  Before he closes the poem by having 
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Mickey Mouse remove his mask and drowsily request a double-shot of whiskey, Evtushenko 
writes: 
The America of Lincoln, of Whitman and of Disney, of children, of students, of 
squirrels and of spaceships, I love you with all of my heart, but my heart aches: the 
Vietnamese man from the cartoon is a stone grown heavy.  No, the world is not so 
rosy, where someone’s children are under the death penalty, where the little countries 
are somebody’s merry shooting gallery.  Stand up, youngsters of Vietnam, Russia, 
and America, do not give the right to bomb to the killers, but give peace.”669   
 
This critique of American politics and culture paints an image of the American government 
as the wicked purveyor of a Vanity Fair, using fun and games to blind an otherwise decent 
people to the painful realities of the world. Equally important, it appeared in a major national 
newspaper for millions of Soviet citizens to read. 
Behind the scenes, though, the superpower relationship in the final months of the 
Vietnam War seemed fairly constructive, as the Soviet side worked to help remove this thorn 
from the side of détente.  The development of Nixon and Brezhnev’s personal relationship at 
the summit helped the negotiating parties deal with the war in a relatively friendly manner.  
Noting that he “certainly support[ed] President Nixon’s idea of ending the war,” Brezhnev 
stated, “Of course, it was not President Nixon who started the war. But of course it’s up to 
the United States to extricate itself somehow from it.”670  In this way, Brezhnev separated his 
criticism of the war from his feelings about Nixon.  While he needed to support his 
Vietnamese ally, Brezhnev could not alienate his negotiating partners in the United States, so 
he did his best to encourage negotiations between the US and North Vietnam without 
offending Kissinger.   
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The backchannel successfully ensured that the US would cease bombing in Hanoi and 
Haiphong and reduce US air traffic over North Vietnam in June 1972, while Podgorny 
visited with North Vietnamese leaders, presented the American position, and tried to identify 
a point of compromise.  The trip did not accomplish much, other than giving the North 
Vietnamese the opportunity to tell Podgorny that Tho would return to the negotiating table 
shortly, but it displays the extent to which the Soviet leadership sought to demonstrate its 
commitment to détente to Nixon and Kissinger in the months after the summit.  Hoping to 
encourage future Soviet aid in Vietnam, Nixon thanked the Soviet side for its efforts, and in 
backchannel talks, Kissinger attributed Tho’s more cordial approach in Paris to Soviet 
intervention.671  In his memoirs, Dobrynin suggests that the American decision to end the 
Christmas bombing and return to the negotiating table followed a backchannel meeting in 
which the Soviet ambassador lectured Kissinger on the ineffectiveness of bombing in 
conducting peace talks.  A few hours later, Kissinger called Dobrynin to say that he informed 
the president of the Soviet position and that the American side accepted a North Vietnamese 
proposal to meet again in Paris and would cease bombing North Vietnam tomorrow.672  
While Soviet leaders tried to push Hanoi toward a settlement, Kissinger frequently 
shared his notes on meetings in Paris with Dobrynin, and in turn, Dobrynin provided 
Kissinger with whatever memos the North Vietnamese leadership sent to Moscow.673  
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Dobrynin complained in his memoirs that the American side informed Soviet representatives 
“far more fully and confidentially” than the North Vietnamese side, much to the chagrin of 
Hanoi.674  This reflects Kissinger and Dobrynin’s capacity for bonding over their mutual 
status as superpower diplomats, along with all of the headaches of dealing with small powers 
in the developing world. 
Moreover, Dobrynin proved to be an important confidant for Kissinger to vent about 
the conduct of all parties.  For example, on June 30, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed how 
best to phrase a transmission from the Soviet leadership to the North Vietnamese leadership, 
impressing upon them the need to take talks seriously, keep points of discussion confidential, 
and move beyond propaganda and talking points to find a mutually-acceptable solution.  
When Kissinger grumbled that the North Vietnamese leaked information on talks to sway 
American public opinion and pressure Nixon to make concessions, Dobrynin sympathized 
with Kissinger’s position: “I mean, if they are really going to tell everything to all the people 
who come to them having nothing to do with the Administration and just give out publicly, 
then there is no sense to negotiate.”675  On October 7, Dobrynin told Kissinger that, based on 
a recent transmission from Hanoi, he felt confident that they were ready to settle.  They 
discussed Kissinger’s strategy for presenting American conditions for the schedule to end the 
war.  Dobrynin recommended that he wait until the next meeting to reveal his position, to 
which Kissinger agreed, noting that he planned to hint about the sorts of concessions Tho 
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could attain if he yielded on the points most important to the American side.676  By 
November, Kissinger, who had grown tired of going between Saigon and Hanoi to identify 
common ground, kvetched to Dobrynin that he did not want to meet with either North or 
South Vietnam’s leadership again “without having the other one under control.”677  On 
December 15, Dobrynin told Kissinger that Tho had just arrived in Moscow.  Kissinger 
cracked, “Just crying on your shoulders, huh?” and they laughed.”678  In fact, they made fun 
of both North and South Vietnamese officials.  Dobrynin proved especially eager to joke 
with Kissinger about Tho and the North Vietnamese leadership, which gave Kissinger space 
to vent his frustrations to his Soviet counterpart.  
Kissinger and Dobrynin even commiserated over the behavior of the American side.  
On August 21, for example, Dobrynin wrapped up the conversation by reviewing the 
questions he would ask the Soviet leadership in preparation for their next meeting.  The 
Soviet ambassador asked, “What else do I owe you?” and Kissinger shot back, “A settlement 
of the Vietnam War.”  When Dobrynin promised that they could settle this issue over coffee 
the following day, they laughed, and Dobrynin brought up the fact that Secretary of State 
Rogers and his wife appeared with the Nixons on vacation in Miami Beach, leaving the 
impression that the war was settled.  Kissinger joked that Dobrynin was “cruel” for bringing 
up Rogers, a person whom they both found irritating.  Dobrynin pointed out that Kissinger 
did all of the heavy lifting, and suggested that, even if the American side did not recognize 
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his efforts, he would be sure to secure a signed certificate to Kissinger from the Politburo that 
the American diplomat did his best.  They laughed and concluded their plans to meet the 
following day, though Kissinger jokingly threatened that because he brought up Rogers, 
Dobrynin would not be given caviar.679  In sum, while the embassy could provide only 
limited support in bringing the Vietnam War to an end, the backchannel conversations show 
how the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship remained central to détente, even during a break in 
SALT negotiations, as it remained a useful conduit for gauging the behavior of allies and 
solidifying détente.  
This atmosphere of optimism and a belief in the potential for negotiations to improve 
Soviet-American relations characterized backchannel talks in advance of the US summit, 
when Brezhnev visited the United States from June 17 to June 25, 1973.  Negotiations for a 
new round of agreements began only after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords. 
Brezhnev wrote to Nixon on January 28, the day the ceasefire began, that peace in Vietnam, 
“will in many ways facilitate the healthening of the entire world situation.”680  Exchanging 
several messages in this period, Brezhnev and Nixon set the agenda for talks, with Brezhnev 
pushing for an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons by the US and USSR against 
one another.681  He initially proposed this to Kissinger at their pre-summit meeting in 
Moscow in April 1972 and followed up with an official draft proposal submitted through the 
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backchannel in May.682  Brezhnev also raised a joint settlement on the Middle East.  With 
superpower encouragement, once Israel withdrew the territories it took in the 1967 war, 
Brezhnev felt that other issues could be resolved quickly, including the “security and 
independent existence of Israel” and Arab countries, the establishment of demilitarized 
zones, guaranteed freedom for Israeli ships in regional waters, and the Palestinian 
question.683  Brezhnev wrote again a month later, recommending a visit from Kissinger to 
Moscow in April followed by the summit in the US in June and arguing for a long-term 
agreement on exchanges, contacts, and cooperation, rather than the current system in which 
agreements needed to be renegotiated every two years.  Brezhnev included mention of the 
start of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and mutual 
reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe.684 
Because such an ambitious project called for immediate action, Dobrynin returned 
early from consultations in Moscow early, allowing the backchannel diplomats to meet on 
the evening of March 6, before Kissinger left for vacation.  During their telephone call earlier 
that afternoon, Kissinger offered to expedite Dobrynin’s travel approvals, and they joked 
about the Soviet side relinquishing missiles for nothing but “good will” and Kissinger’s 
vacation plans.  They informally agreed to work on the assumption that Brezhnev’s visit to 
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the US would be followed by another trip by Nixon to the USSR, with Dobrynin proposing 
that the president travel throughout the country.  Despite these positive feelings, Kissinger 
and Dobrynin both recognized the limitations posed by the immediacy of the June summit.  
Kissinger emphasized that given Brezhnev’s lofty goals, they would have “a hell of a lot of 
work to do” in the next two months.  Dobrynin agreed, stating that the two months would 
barely be enough time for the official SALT negotiators to get to know one another, leaving 
much of the work up to the backchannel.  Kissinger reiterated that he was “under instructions 
to see to it that the visit will be a notable success,” concluding that they would have to “work 
like dogs” to succeed.685 
Brezhnev’s proposal for a non-use of nuclear weapons agreement posed the most 
problems for American policymakers.  During the Moscow summit, Nixon and Kissinger 
procrastinated on dealing with this issue, believing, as Nixon told Brezhnev, that it would 
pose a “very serious problem” to their allies, who might view it as an abandonment of the 
NATO alliance.686  Noting the general secretary’s description of such an agreement as “a 
peaceful bomb,” Kissinger was more forward in his memoirs: “That it was.  It would have 
produced an explosion in the NATO Alliance, in China, and throughout the world.  It would 
have been considered either a US-Soviet condominium or an American abdication.  I politely 
turned it aside.”687  After reviewing the initial draft, National Security Council Staff member 
Helmet Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger, further highlighting the fears of the administration.  
Sonnenfeldt stated that from the Soviet perspective, this issue was a “winner,” as “whatever 
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the outcome, the very nature of the subject may cast doubt on our Allied commitments or 
give the impression of a freer Soviet hand against China.”   
As a result, the American side circumvented any binding agreements in order to 
reassure its allies that it would not limit US actions in the event of a conventional war and to 
dissuade the Chinese government from assuming that the agreement would make them more 
vulnerable to attack from the USSR.688  Despite the concern that the Soviet side was using 
the proposal to weaken the American position in the world, recent historians, including 
Vladislav Zubok, have concluded that Brezhnev made this proposal spontaneously, believing 
idealistically that Soviet-American antagonisms rested mainly on a fear of nuclear war, 
which could be lifted by a simple agreement between top leaders.689  Perhaps based on the 
cultural image of Soviet-American relations engrained in Brezhnev’s memory—Roosevelt 
and Stalin meeting during World War II—Brezhnev assumed that all of the problems that 
faced superpower negotiators in the 1970s could be solved easily, with friendly banter and 
well-meaning words shared by top leaders cutting through decades of mistrust and real 
conflicts over strategic interests.  
 Kissinger and Dobrynin clashed over the American side’s attempts to weaken the 
language in Soviet proposals on nuclear non-use, but used their personal relationship to 
overcome their mutual aggravation.  On April 2, for example, Dobrynin called Kissinger, 
upset over changes made to the wording of Article I, which explained the superpowers’ 
mutual commitment to preventing the development of conditions that would lead to nuclear 
war.  Dobrynin described the phrasing as “a complete disappointment,” viewing it as “a step 
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back from what we already discussed.”  Kissinger told Dobrynin that the phrase was inserted 
to gain the support of the British, but he asked the Soviet ambassador to hold off on 
transmitting it to the Kremlin for a day, giving him a chance to consult with the president.690  
Kissinger then phoned Sonnenfeldt to discuss the situation, and they agreed that they should 
leave in the phrase.  The Soviet leadership might accept it, after all, and if not, it would 
provide the American side with proof that they went through “agony” to protect their British 
ally’s interests.  If necessary, they could cut the phrase in question from Article I, since it 
already existed in the preamble.691   
The next day, Kissinger called Dobrynin, asking him to send the original, implying 
that it was to make sure that British officials felt their interests were being taken into account.  
To calm the angry ambassador, Kissinger told him “on an informal basis” that Nixon would 
“look with great sympathy at counter-proposals” and would be “very receptive to deleting it 
from Article I.”  He concluded, “Anatole, we have never failed to complete an agreement and 
we will not fail this time.  We will not fail this early in the Administration and this late in our 
relationship.”  Kissinger also tried to defuse the situation, joking at the start of the 
conversation that he was winded from taking the stairs because he had “lost too many 
negotiations,” referring to one of the topics that they bonded over in establishing their 
relationship.692  In this way, Kissinger and Dobrynin used their personal relationship to 
smooth over difficulties in talks, reminding one another of their previous successes.  Thus, 
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unlike the backchannel talks in 1969 and 1970, these sorts of problems did not result in 
retrenchment on both sides, as the success of the Moscow summit generated confidence in 
both diplomats and the potential for the backchannel to overcome obstacles.  
 As before, relations between top American officials and Brezhnev mirrored the 
relationship in the backchannel.  Kissinger recalled that, during his pre-summit trip to the 
USSR in May 1973, Brezhnev displayed “a new familiarity that probably went further than 
he intended,” with heavier drinking and more jokes than in previous meetings.  He even told 
one anecdote that was somewhat anti-Semitic, and Kissinger wrote in jest that this perhaps 
indicated that he had been “promoted to an honorary equal.”  Brezhnev also extended 
Kissinger a great honor by holding the talks at Zavidovo, the Soviet equivalent of Camp 
David, which had previously been used only to host foreign leaders during visits of Yugoslav 
leader Josip Broz Tito and the Finnish president.  Brezhnev took Kissinger hunting for wild 
boar, much to the horror of Kissinger, who, unbeknownst to the general secretary, abhorred 
killing animals for sport.  Kissinger later admitted he found himself rooting for the prey.693   
Brezhnev’s trip included time in both Washington and Nixon’s San Clemente home, 
and it built on the foundation of personal diplomacy established in Moscow the year before.  
In Washington, Nixon gave Brezhnev a Lincoln Continental, and the Soviet leader, thrilled 
with the gift, insisted that they immediately go for a drive.  Brezhnev sped down the winding 
roads of Camp David with a terrified Nixon in the passenger seat and Dobrynin in the back 
seat.  At one point, Brezhnev was surprised by a sudden curve, and he hit the brakes so hard 
that they nearly hit their heads on the windshield.  Dobrynin later recorded, “Nixon was 
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shocked, but still managed to say tactfully, ‘Mr. General Secretary, you drive very well.’”694  
In San Clemente, Nixon threw a party for Brezhnev, inviting members of the Hollywood and 
California elite, including Ronald Reagan.  Brezhnev, though, was most excited to meet 
Western film star Chuck Connors, who presented Brezhnev with a cowboy belt and two Colt 
.45 revolvers he used in a film. He later shared a bear hug with Brezhnev on the tarmac prior 
to his departure from the US.  Thrilled with Connors’s gift, Brezhnev buckled on the belt and 
“like a boy dexterously manipulated the pistols, imitating the movie cowboys and amusing 
his staff.”695  The banquet toasts were effusive, the alcohol flowed freely, and Brezhnev and 
Nixon grew increasingly comfortable with one another.  As Kissinger concluded, “In the 
spring of 1973, Soviet-American relations were unusually free of tension.”696   
In many ways, the achievements of the 1973 summit were limited.  As early as March 
6, Kissinger and Dobrynin conceded that a SALT agreement would likely be impossible at 
this summit, given the time restraints, and Dobrynin told his American partner that Brezhnev 
viewed the 1973 summit as “a buildup” for the successful signing of agreements the 
following year.697  On March 8, Dobrynin explained that the Soviet military would drag its 
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feet on a new SALT proposal unless the American side “gave Brezhnev some excuse” to 
push a concrete American arms limitations proposal, which would require an agreement on 
the non-use of nuclear weapons.698  At the summit, the diplomats agreed on the Prevention of 
Nuclear War Agreement (PNW), a watered-down version of the non-use of nuclear weapons 
proposal presented by the Soviet side the previous year.  They also concluded ten agreements 
on agriculture, trade, transportation, science, education, and the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy.  Still, as Robert Dallek writes, “The PNW included no pledges against using nuclear 
weapons, and nothing in these agreements amounted to a fundamental change in 
relations.”699   
Although the 1973 summit marked the high-water mark of détente, the participants’ 
assessment of Brezhnev’s trip to the US varies.  Although Kissinger argues that “Brezhnev 
was sincerely prepared for a prolonged period of stability,” he stresses that “the impact of the 
1973 summit was almost certainly unfortunate—not for foreign policy reasons but because of 
the dramatic demonstration of America’s internal disarray” during the Watergate scandal.  
Kissinger concludes that, this show of domestic disorder “undoubtedly made them [the 
Soviets] less willing to expend capital on preventing adventures by friendly nations,” 
particularly in the Middle East.700  Dobrynin, in contrast, asserts that the summit “served to 
advance the process of improving Soviet-American relations,” with both leaders “sincerely 
prepared for an extensive period of stability and further cooperation.”  Moreover, “personal 
relations” between Nixon and Brezhnev “were consolidating,” and while “the Soviet 
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government began to understand [Nixon’s] serious difficulties,” they “still believed that he 
would overcome them, and that the process of consolidating [Soviet-American] relations 
would develop further.”701  Thus, while the personal relationship between the backchannel 
participants and top leadership was undoubtedly at its peak in June 1973, the meager 
practical results of the summit and the challenges forming in American domestic politics and 
the developing world hovered like storm clouds on the horizon. 
 
The October War 
The first of the storm clouds burst in the Middle East.  During the summit, Gromyko 
and Kissinger discussed the region on several occasions, but on his final evening in 
California, Brezhnev took matters into his own hands.  After excusing himself from dinner 
with complaints of jetlag, Brezhnev around ten o’clock at night demanded an immediate 
meeting with the president.  Kissinger describes this as “a gross breach of protocol” that “was 
then, and has remained, unparalleled.”702  During the meeting, Brezhnev pressed Nixon to 
finalize a list of principles on the Middle East, warning, “if there is no clarity about the 
principles we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up.”703  
Kissinger viewed this as “a transparent ploy to catch Nixon off guard and with luck to 
separate him from his advisers.” In his memoirs, Kissinger lectures, “It was the sort of 
maneuver that costs more in confidence than can possibly be gained in substance. 
Concessions achieved by subterfuge may embarrass; they are never the basis for continuing 
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action between sovereign nations because they will simply not be maintained.”  Kissinger 
describes the incident as an attempt by Brezhnev to browbeat the Nixon administration into 
accepting the Arab terms for a peace settlement without alterations, and when war erupted a 
few months later, Nixon and Kissinger were left to think that Brezhnev had carried through 
with his threat of renewed Arab offensives in the absence of an agreement on those terms.704  
Dobrynin, however, suggests that this meeting was an earnest attempt by Brezhnev to warn 
Nixon and Kissinger of the growing danger of an Arab-Israeli war.  After all, as general 
secretary, Brezhnev was accustomed to getting what he wanted when he wanted it, and he 
likely did not see an unannounced late night meeting, especially on such a critical topic, as 
particularly intrusive.  Since the Politburo felt it was increasingly difficult to restrain its Arab 
allies, Brezhnev believed that only closer Soviet-American coordination could prevent 
renewed armed conflict, and he sought to gain Nixon’s support in this endeavor.  
Unfortunately, given the “very obtrusive and clumsy manner” in which Brezhnev delivered 
the message, the American side was left to view this well-meaning message as a threat.705  
Four months after the summit, hostilities erupted in the Middle East.  On October 6, 
Egyptian and Syrian armies advanced on Israel from the ceasefire lines established at the end 
of the 1967 Six-Day War along the Suez Canal and Golan Heights.  While the Arab armies 
initially made gains, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, the Israeli army eventually halted the 
offensive, turned back the Arab coalition, and advanced into Syrian and Egyptian territory.  
On October 22, with joint American and Soviet support, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution No. 338, declaring an agreement on a ceasefire.  However, hostilities resumed 
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within a few hours.  The Israeli army took additional territory, coming within twenty-five 
miles of Damascus and sixty-three miles of Cairo before a second ceasefire took effect on 
October 25, effectively ending the war.   
As soon as hostilities began, the backchannel sprung into action.  Kissinger called 
Dobrynin from New York on October 6 at 6:40 a.m., waking him up to inform him that the 
Israelis anticipated an Arab offensive.  He implied that the Soviet authorities knew of these 
plans in advance, since Soviet officials stationed in the region were evacuating Soviet 
civilians from Damascus and Cairo.  Kissinger informed Dobrynin that they were contacting 
the Israelis, encouraging restraint, and Dobrynin promised to ask Moscow to make the same 
demands of their Arab allies.706  They spoke an additional thirteen times that day, 
emphasizing the importance of preventing the conflict from destroying the superpowers’ 
progress in détente.  Kissinger and Dobrynin both described the developments as “madness,” 
with Kissinger telling his counterpart, “We should, I think, use this occasion to first not to 
have everything we have achieved destroyed by maniacs on either side and after quieting it 
down to see what can be done constructively.”707 
Initially, Kissinger proposed restoring the 1967 ceasefire line and establishing a fact-
finding commission through the UN Security Council, then continuing the private 
discussions started by Kissinger and Gromyko.  He hoped to avoid a fight over who started 
the conflict to avoid the “hell of a mess” that would ensue if Soviet and American officials 
were compelled to defend their allies publicly.  Dobrynin described it as a constructive 
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beginning and promised to wire Moscow for confirmation.708  By the end of the day, the 
Soviet side agreed with the American side’s concerns about the conflict and promising a 
future message about the potential for joint action, but argued against holding an emergency 
session of the Security Council, which could lead to a public Soviet-American kerfuffle, as 
both sides rushed to defend their allies.709   
Dobrynin frequently gave short and tentative answers to Kissinger’s questions during 
these initial phone calls, reflecting both his disappointment with events in the developing 
world and his frustration with being kept out of the loop.  Dobrynin later described the attack 
as a “complete surprise,” and as with other examples of Soviet involvement in crises in the 
developing world, Dobrynin received no telegrams on the subject of growing military 
tensions in the Middle East.  He was not informed of the evacuation of Soviet civilians from 
Egypt and Syria or the conversation between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Soviet 
ambassador in Cairo in which Sadat hinted at the eruption of hostilities in the near future.710  
Left in the dark by his own government, Dobrynin had little information on the attitudes or 
policies of Kremlin officials, and he dealt with his shock over the outbreak of the war by 
remaining as noncommittal as possible in responding to Kissinger’s comments. 
On the evening of the first day of hostilities, Kissinger and Dobrynin shared a phone 
conversation indicating the extent to which the backchannel facilitated superpower 
cooperation.  In deference to Soviet concerns about putting the issue to the Security Council, 
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Kissinger agreed to delay the decision until the following morning, and he asked Dobrynin to 
explain Soviet intentions.  Dobrynin acknowledged that the conflict put the Soviet leadership 
in a “difficult position publicly.”  Since the Arab states believed that they were retaking land 
that been stolen from them by Israel in the 1967 war, the Soviet side could not simply tell 
them to retreat to the ceasefire lines.  By asking the Arab leaders to withdraw from land they 
previously controlled, Dobrynin told Kissinger that “it would look like we are trying to sell 
them out” or that the Soviet leadership was in collusion with the US and Israel.  Kissinger 
expressed his understanding of the Soviet situation and agreed with Dobrynin’s 
recommendation that due to these conditions, it should be the Nixon, not Brezhnev, who 
contacted the Egyptian leadership to keep this issue out of the UN General Assembly, where 
it would turn into a “bloodbath.”   
Still, Kissinger emphasized to Dobrynin that the military situation seemed to be 
tilting dramatically in Israel’s favor, meaning that the Arab states would be best off agreeing 
to a ceasefire, retreating to the 1967 lines, and using this outburst to reinforce their point that 
a solution should be brokered in the immediate future.  Dobrynin did not know how to make 
the surrendering of their own territory, even in a temporary sense, palatable to the Egyptians, 
and the pair agreed to work overnight on formulations that could lead to a resolution.  
Kissinger told Dobrynin that the results of the next few days would either serve as a 
validation of their work in the backchannel or as the event that destroyed détente.  He 
reminded the Soviet ambassador that they had handled these sorts of problems in private 
before and nothing prevented them from doing so again.711 
While talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin remained largely constructive during the 
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war, they also could be tense.  For example, on October 9, Kissinger read Dobrynin a 
message from Jordan, stating that its representative in the capital city of Amman told the 
Jordanian king that the Soviet leadership wanted all Arab states to enter battle as soon as 
possible.  Dobrynin called it an “unbelievable story,” and Kissinger suggested that, while the 
American side had not jumped to conclusions, the Soviet leadership should encourage calm 
in the region.712  An hour later, Kissinger was less charitable, and after reading another report 
confirming this story, he told Dobrynin, “I hope Moscow understands that if it turns out that 
you fooled us, you are going to pay a heavy price in your relationship with us.”713  The 
following day, Dobrynin protested a quote attributed to the State Department about “Russian 
irresponsibility” in handling the crisis.  Kissinger promised to instill greater discipline in his 
newfound position as Secretary of State.714  As talks for a ceasefire dragged on, Kissinger 
blamed the Soviet Union for slowing progress, angrily telling Dobrynin that the Americans 
planned to “wash our hands of it and let nature take its course.”715  A few hours later, 
Dobrynin read a telegram from Moscow blaming the US for the lack of a settlement, pointing 
to the ways in which their insistence on waiting for British and Australian support slowed 
progress to a halt.  The Soviet airlift of supplies to the Arab states and the American airlift to 
Israel each provoked heated responses from the backchannel partners.716   
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During a visit to Moscow between October 20 and 22, Kissinger brokered a deal with 
the Soviet leadership on a ceasefire that became UN Security Council Resolution 338.  
However, several violations of the ceasefire led to unprecedented tensions between Dobrynin 
and Kissinger. The use of UN peacekeeping forces quickly emerged as a main issue.  The 
Soviet side pushed heavily for introducing peacekeeping forces on October 24, but Kissinger 
threatened to veto any such resolution.  Dobrynin complained that the Politburo had “become 
so angry” that they demanded the introduction of troops, since the US “allowed the Israelis to 
do what they wanted,” callously violating the ceasefire agreement.717  Later, Dobrynin 
forwarded a telegram from the Kremlin demanding the introduction of troops and warning, 
“if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the 
necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.”  
Kissinger was outraged by what he interpreted as an ultimatum and an implicit threat to use 
force unilaterally.718  He angrily responded to Dobrynin, telling him that such an action 
would lead to a “very serious response.” He urged, “Don’t pressure us!  I want to repeat 
again, don’t pressure us!”719 
With Nixon preoccupied by Watergate, Kissinger essentially made himself 
responsible for most of the important decisions during this crisis.  That evening, he held a 
meeting with several top security and intelligence officials in the US government, after which 
he decided to slow down the Kremlin’s timetable for introducing troops by pushing for 
additional talks.  This group decided that they should simultaneously back up their demand 
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with “some noticeable action” that conveyed the seriousness with which the Americans took 
the situation.  Therefore, they decided to raise the American alert level to DefCon III, the 
highest peacetime alert level, but did not directly inform the Soviet government of this shift, 
instead hoping that the noticeable change in alert levels would catch the Soviet leadership’s 
attention and bring them to the negotiating table.  Kissinger, in particular, believed that this 
was a critical moment in the crisis, as he hoped to prevent the introduction of additional 
Soviet troops to the Middle East at all costs.720  The alert lasted until the next day, at which 
point discussions were well under way on the composition of the group of UN observers that 
would take the place of peacekeeping forces. 
Dobrynin’s response to this maneuver represents a major break in the backchannel 
relationship, as, for the first time since 1969, the Soviet ambassador lashed out at his 
American partners.  First, on the evening of October 26, White House Chief of Staff General 
Al Haig called the Soviet ambassador to clarify some of Nixon’s comments at a press 
conference, in which the president, attempting to divert attention from the threats of 
impeachment over Watergate, suggested that Brezhnev backed down to the display of power 
in the defense alert.721  Dobrynin took the opportunity to describe why he found the alert so 
alarming.  He pointed out that he talked to Kissinger “every hour on the hour,” and he would 
have been perfectly fine with a firm response to Brezhnev’s telegram, allowing both sides a 
chance to communicate their concerns and attempt to find common ground.  Instead, without 
any communication with the embassy or over the hotline, the alert was raised, and the 
embassy discovered this only when it was announced on an American radio news program.  
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Dobrynin described this as an “artificial crisis,” complaining that it was designed to make the 
Soviet Union look like “weaker partners” in comparison to the “braver United States.”  This 
put the faction of the Soviet leadership that favored détente in a difficult position, and as 
Dobrynin concluded, it “damaged very much of what was done” to improve Soviet-American 
relations over the previous four years.722 
The next day, Dobrynin spoke with Kissinger, and he reiterated these themes.  At 
first, Kissinger attempted to defend his position, emphasizing, “We had the impression that 
you were planning a military move.  We did not invent this.”  Dobrynin criticized Kissinger 
for not contacting Brezhnev to express American concerns about introducing a peacekeeping 
force to the region.  Kissinger conceded that it was a “blunder,” but reaffirmed that the 
American side was convinced that the Soviet leadership was about to embark on a unilateral 
action.  Dobrynin cut him off, coldly stating that he could have waited an hour for additional 
information from Brezhnev, but Kissinger evidently “didn’t want to have it.”  Dobrynin then 
reminded Kissinger of Nixon’s comparison of the October War to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
exacerbating an already tense situation.  Kissinger protested, “Don’t remind me of that.  It 
was not well done.” Dobrynin fired back, “It was done badly.  It was unbelievable.”  
Kissinger pleaded, “Too much is at stake for us to be angry with each other.  Let’s not have it 
fester.  As a friend—” Dobrynin interrupted, noting that he had gotten over it after two days, 
but that the anger in Moscow remained palpable.723   
Indeed, Victor Israelyan, who served on an improvised group that took notes and 
prepared talking points for the Politburo during the October War, has written about how the 
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conflict exacerbated tensions in the Politburo over the future of détente.  As Israelyan states, 
most members of the Politburo wanted to take meaningful action.  Defense Minister Grechko 
and KGB Chairman Andropov proposed some form of mobilization and others requested an 
increased state of readiness.  Kosygin and Gromyko cautioned that such moves could lead to 
an escalation of the confrontation, and after two hours of fiery debate, Brezhnev suggested 
waiting, allowing Nixon to cool down, and reopening negotiations in Washington.724  This 
account illuminates Dobrynin’s comments about how Kissinger’s decisions caused problems 
in the Kremlin for Soviet supporters of détente, and it demonstrates how Kissinger’s actions 
made it harder for Brezhnev to promote détente, as it lent ammunition to those in the 
Politburo who would oppose future initiatives with the Nixon administration. 
Dobrynin continued his assault on Kissinger in the following weeks.  On October 27, 
Dobrynin complained about Kissinger’s protests when the Soviet Union sent 70 observers to 
the Middle East, noting that the US side already had more than 100 in place.  When 
Kissinger continued to hedge, Dobrynin suggested that Kissinger griped about the number 
“just to make a point that you are tough.”  After Kissinger asked that they not go from 
cooperation to contests over toughness in a week, Dobrynin pressed the matter until the 
secretary of state finally ended the conversation with a promise to call him back.725  Two 
days later, Dobrynin asked Kissinger to arrange an appointment with the president, since he 
had to deliver a message from Brezhnev about the “crisis of confidence” that now existed at 
the level of the two heads of state.  Dobrynin emphasized that he should deliver it personally, 
since he had spent so much time and energy in improving Soviet-American relations over the 
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previous decade, making the recent turn of events particularly difficult for him to swallow.726   
The following day, Kissinger proposed that they hold the meeting at Camp David, 
mirroring previous moments when the American side proposed a showier venue for talks to 
highlight the importance of the conversation.  Dobrynin agreed to the meeting with the 
president and dinner with Kissinger, but when the secretary of state proposed that he stay 
longer for a movie or additional socializing, Dobrynin told Kissinger that he would have to 
return by nine or ten in the evening.  Kissinger attempted to lighten up the mood with a joke, 
telling Dobrynin that the press release would suggest that they were taking him to Camp 
David to keep him as a hostage, but Dobrynin refused to play along, coldly stating, “If you 
like.”727  As Dobrynin later wrote, he was “rather angry” at Kissinger for the crisis that 
emerged following the DefCon III incident, since it was contrary to the spirit of détente and 
the provisions of the Basic Principles and the PNW.728  His frosty attitude in the weeks after 
the crisis reflects these feelings of betrayal, as the person with whom he had worked to put 
the superpower relationship on a new course demonstrated callousness in ignoring those 
agreements and placing it on rocky ground.  Dobrynin’s emotional response intimates 
genuine anger, as his negotiating partner in the backchannel flouted recent agreements and, 
perhaps more importantly, the spirit of their partnership. 
The October War brought the US and the USSR precariously close to conflict.  
Robert Dallek rated it at “possibly the most serious international crisis of Nixon’s 
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presidency.”729  Despite Dobrynin’s frustration with Kissinger in the aftermath of the war, 
the backchannel perhaps prevented the conflict from spreading.  Both diplomats consciously 
used the legacy of what they had done over the previous four years to encourage caution 
from their partners.  For example, on October 24, Kissinger tried to reassure Dobrynin, 
discussing the importance of preserving détente, “Now the important thing is for you and us 
to stay together having made this historic achievement . . . . We’ve got to stay together for 
the peace settlement.  That is the most important thing.”730  Two days later, Dobrynin 
emphasized these same feelings to White House Chief of Staff General Alexander Haig: “It 
is very important to keep the personal relationship as strong as it was before. . . . It is very 
important now to keep really everything as much as possible intact.”731   
Memoir accounts reinforce the point that the backchannel played a critical role in 
ameliorating tensions between the superpowers during the October War.  Sonnenfeldt, who 
was critical of the backchannel in many ways, proclaimed it to be a “good thing” in this case, 
as “it might not have worked out quite that smoothly” if negotiated through normal 
channels.732  Moreover, as Dobrynin concludes in his memoirs, “The Middle East War never 
grew into a direct military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States—in 
contrast to the Cuban crisis—precisely because of the remarkable new level of Soviet-
American relations.”733  Indeed, the personal relationship between Soviet and American 
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leaders motivated the two sides to broker a resolution to the crisis in order to prevent a 
breakdown in the relations they had worked so had to construct.   
Yet this crisis raised questions about détente in both capitals that eventually 
overwhelmed the backchannel’s ability to cope with crises.  Dobrynin wrote that the Soviet 
leadership began to question if the Nixon administration would cooperate “when it really 
mattered,” and they wondered if the US actually intended to begin a military campaign 
against the Soviet Union.  They feared the potential for crises in the developing world to 
derail progress in Soviet-American relations.  While they remained committed to détente, 
enthusiasm for future initiatives cooled and the war seemed to highlight the limits of détente 
rather than its strengths.734  Kissinger later reflected that he was pleased with the end result of 
the crisis, with Egypt drifting closer toward the US, which would then be in a position to 
broker a Middle East peace without Soviet interference.  Still, Kissinger’s anxiety over what 
he saw as Brezhnev’s unprecedented ultimatum is palpable in his memoirs, suggesting that 
even he saw this as a foreboding development in superpower relations. 
 
Watergate 
If Brezhnev truly believed that the threat of nuclear conflict could be eliminated, as 
he claimed in his televised address to the US public at the 1973 summit, his hopes were soon 
crushed, as the Watergate scandal eventually limited the administration’s ability to control 
foreign policy.  The scandal began on June 17, 1972, when five men were arrested for 
breaking and entering into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee in the 
Watergate building complex in Washington.  The men carried money that the FBI quickly 
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traced to the “slush fund” of Nixon’s personal campaign organization, the Committee to Re-
elect the President (CREEP).  Despite this information, the public did not suspect that top 
administration officials were involved in planning the operation until early 1973, when one 
of the convicted burglars implicated the White House and campaign leaders to the judge, 
who quickly passed it on to the Erwin Committee, established by Democratic senators 
investigating the campaign’s behavior.   
By mid-March, Nixon spent most of his time attempting to cover up his involvement 
in the scandal, as White House officials started talking to the Erwin Committee and the 
Justice Department.  On April 30, Nixon announced the resignations of Chief of Staff H. R. 
Haldemann and counsel John Ehrlichman and the firing of counsel John Dean, who had been 
in charge of the cover-up.  Dean’s testimony, in particular, became a public sensation, as he 
described the various measures taken to hide the White House and the Nixon campaign’s 
involvement in the burglary.  In mid-July, testimony revealed that Nixon had been taping all 
conversations in his offices, with the logbooks showing entries on key dates in the Watergate 
chronology.  Nixon fought to keep the tapes out of the investigation, claiming executive 
privilege, but from April to August 1973, Watergate dominated the headlines, leaving Nixon 
a nervous wreck struggling to fulfill the duties of the presidency.735   
The controversy came to a head in October 1973, in the midst of the Arab-Israeli 
War, when the appeals process ended and Nixon was ordered to turn over the tapes.  The 
president attempted to work around the order to limit what would be released to the 
investigation and the public.  Nixon also ordered his attorney general to fire the special 
prosecutor in charge of investigating the scandal.  The attorney general and his deputy 
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resigned rather than fulfill the order and, while the special prosecutor was eventually fired, 
the so-called “Saturday Night Massacre” of October 20 destroyed Nixon’s credibility.  Most 
Americans believed that, if Nixon would go to such lengths to prevent the release of the 
tapes, he must have been much more involved than previously imagined.  When Nixon 
finally submitted the tapes to the authorities, eighteen and a half minutes of key sections were 
missing, setting off a new media firestorm implicating Nixon in the cover-up.  
Ultimately, the House organized impeachment hearings. 736  Through the winter of 
1974, several tapes were released to the public, revealing what historian William Bundy has 
described as “the President’s endless discussions with his aides of ways to put pressure on 
people and corrupt them.”  The White House appealed to the Supreme Court for a ruling on 
executive privilege, hoping to avoid turning over the remainder of its tapes, but its appeal 
failed on July 24, with all eight judges ruling that executive privilege existed but did not 
supersede a subpoena based on the need to gather materials for a criminal investigation of 
senior officials in the executive branch.  Between July 27 and 30, the House approved three 
of the five articles of impeachment against the president, and White House lawyers reviewed 
the tapes and determined that a “smoking gun” implicated Nixon.  Nixon yielded to 
Republican pressure on August 7 and agreed to resign.  He left the White House two days 
later.737    
Until late 1973, Dobrynin avoided reporting extensively on the Watergate scandal, 
misreading it as a minor blip in presidential affairs that would soon pass.  In April, five days 
before the firing of Ehrlichman and Haldemann, Kissinger raised Watergate in a telephone 
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conversation, joking that Nixon had been “occupied with domestic matters.”  Dobrynin 
promised Kissinger that he had been playing it down in his reports.738  In May, Kissinger 
brought up Watergate for the first time, assuring Dobrynin that Nixon would not resign, and 
Dobrynin showed his support by complaining to Kissinger about the sensationalist press 
coverage of Watergate.739  Following his pre-summit trip to Moscow, Kissinger told Nixon 
that Dobrynin did not care about Watergate, as he complained only about “the 
amateurishness of the guys who did it” and asking why it was done out of the White House.  
Kissinger assured Nixon that the Soviet leadership’s only concern was the Democrats, whom 
they perceived as the major stumbling block to détente.740  Kissinger even reported to Nixon 
in July 1973 that Dobrynin found it “incomprehensible” that “a country could do to itself 
what we have been doing,” especially considering what seemed to him to be a minor offense.  
The Soviet ambassador merely requested that he explain to Moscow that Nixon intended to 
stay, which Kissinger gladly confirmed.741  Dobrynin would not have been alone in 
underestimating the extent of Watergate as late as the summer of 1973, with other experts 
still believing the Nixon would hold on to office.  Still, his vehement defense of the Nixon 
administration reflects his desire to stroke Kissinger’s ego, assuring the egotistical American 
diplomat that his opponents were in the wrong and that the Nixon administration would 
overcome this challenge.  
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By the October War, Dobrynin displayed a more acute awareness of the problems 
posed by Watergate, especially after Nixon’s disastrous press conference on October 26.  
During Dobrynin’s phone call with Kissinger the following day, when the Soviet ambassador 
began his assault on the secretary of state for his behavior during the crisis, Kissinger 
attempted to explain that Nixon’s performance could “only be explained in terms of 
emotional stress over a domestic situation.”  In this sense, unlike Haig, who tried to tell 
Dobrynin the previous evening that the poor performance simply came as a result of a bad 
choice of words, Kissinger emphasized the impact that Watergate had on Nixon’s psyche, 
effectively allowing him to throw a wrench into Soviet-American relations.  Dobrynin 
explained that he understood this problem, but remained steadfast in his condemnation of the 
speech.742   
A letter from KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov to Brezhnev confirms the Soviet 
ambassador’s conclusion that Nixon’s behavior during the October War was directly tied to 
Watergate.  Andropov speculated that, as the threat of impeachment became more real, the 
Jewish lobby in Congress could limit Nixon’s actions and his capacity for implementing 
agreements reached with Soviet authorities.743  In response, Brezhnev included a supportive 
statement in reference to Watergate in his letter to Nixon on November 10, as the Soviet and 
American leaderships struggled to come to grips with the legacy of the October War.  
Brezhnev emphasized that he and his colleagues viewed “with understanding” the 
“complexities” faced by the Nixon administration in establishing détente.  Furthermore, 
Brezhnev wrote, “We would like, so to say, to wish you in a personal human way energy and 
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success in overcoming all sorts of complexities, the causes of which are not so easy to 
understand at a distance.”744  Brezhnev never addressed Watergate directly, but he 
demonstrated a surprising degree of support for the president, indicating Brezhnev’s 
understanding of détente as something that relied on top-level personal diplomacy. 
Brezhnev’s letter denotes that he appreciated how the pressures of Watergate helped spur the 
October War breakdown, and he sought to ameliorate that problem and bolster détente by 
expressing personal support for Nixon’s cause. 
By January, Watergate became an impediment to the ability of the White House to 
conduct foreign policy on its own.  Kissinger reassured Dobrynin in several backchannel 
conversations that the new vice president, Gerald Ford, asked him privately to continue as 
secretary of state in the event that he succeeded Nixon, ensuring the extension of détente.  
Moreover, Kissinger suggested at that point that he was coming to grips with the probability 
that Nixon would have to leave office, and he complained of Congressional interference in 
his work.745  By March, they found themselves dealing with questions about the integrity of 
the backchannel.  In particular, Kissinger informed Dobrynin that somebody told him that the 
only person in the Soviet government left with faith in Nixon and Kissinger was the Soviet 
ambassador.  Dobrynin called it “nonsense,” and Kissinger assured him that he believed 
this.746  Kissinger demonstrated his resolve in the backchannel up to the very end of the 
Nixon administration.  On July 13, the week before Dobrynin left for a long vacation that 
kept him out of Washington during the final weeks of Nixon’s presidency, Kissinger 
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informed him that he would stay in Washington for the summer, vowing to “restore a little 
discipline” and “show some of my opponents in this town that I did not survive for five and a 
half years by being a pushover.”747 
Even when the Nixon presidency seemed doomed, the backchannel retained its 
characteristic humor and cooperative attitude.  In July, for example, Kissinger pointed to a 
rumor that Dobrynin would be returning to Moscow to take the position of Foreign Minister.  
Dobrynin chided Kissinger for having poor sources, and Kissinger cracked that they would 
have to take the wiretap off the Kremlin, with Dobrynin joking that the White House should 
fire whoever makes them, since they were not good enough.  The discussion briefly took a 
more earnest tone, with Kissinger stating that he would be “torn” by such a development.  
Dobrynin would receive a more important position, but Kissinger said he would “hate to lose 
a personal friend here.”748  This conversation played on many familiar themes, including 
jokes about the American and Soviet bureaucracies, Cold War espionage, and even the topic 
of wiretaps, referencing the Watergate scandal. 
 Ironically, the Watergate scandal managed to bring Nixon and Brezhnev closer 
together.  The two leaders opened a channel of personal communication about Watergate, 
creating what Zubok has described as an “increasingly surreal” situation, as “the isolated 
president began to view partnership with the general secretary as a peaceful island in the 
storm-tossed sea of the Watergate scandal.”749  The Soviet general secretary, believing “that 
the scandal was being used against Nixon by opponents of détente,” provided a sympathetic 
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ear.  In Zubok’s words, Brezhnev was “Nixon’s staunch friend and supporter, probably the 
last he had among the leaders of great nations, including his own.”750  With Nixon’s morale 
at a low, Brezhnev sent him a letter on May 28, 1974, designed to bolster Nixon’s self-
esteem before the summit that Dobrynin describes as “unprecedented in the history of 
[Soviet-American] relations.”  Brezhnev praised Nixon’s resilience and his decision to push 
forward with improving the Soviet-American relationship.  He wrote: 
This is the only way for a statesman confident in the correctness of his chosen 
course and well aware of the weakness of those who, for their narrow 
purposes or for reasons of shortsightedness, come out against his policy.  In 
such cases you really need stamina and spiritual strength.  Surely there are 
people in the United States and elsewhere who expect Richard Nixon to give 
way and break down.  But, as we note with satisfaction, you are not going to 
please them in that respect.751 
 
Dobrynin notes that the president was “clearly moved” by the message, and that the irony of 
the situation was that, at the twilight of his presidency, Nixon, “the old cold warrior,” 
appeared to warm to the Soviet Union, becoming “frank, direct, and cynical” in talks, 
perhaps spurred by the growing isolation he experienced during the Watergate scandal.  He 
believes that the personal relationship with Brezhnev helped considerably, writing, “after all, 
we are all human.”752  Perhaps more accurately, Nixon and Brezhnev were both figures who 
valued strong individual leadership in government, believing that personal diplomacy could 
break through many of the roadblocks to progress in superpower talks, and neither fully 
grasped how a scandal like Watergate could bring down a president. 
Therefore, during the Watergate crisis, the leadership of both superpowers viewed 
closer relations as important.  While Nixon sought greater support from abroad as a means to 
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counterbalance his increased “isolation” at home, Brezhnev drew closer to the president in an 
effort to preserve Soviet gains in détente, fearful that American opponents of détente would 
use the crisis to stop SALT II negotiations and rekindle the Cold War.  This development, 
Brezhnev understood, would discredit his approach to foreign policy at home, weaken his 
arguments for détente, and require additional defense spending that the Soviet Union could 
not afford.  By August 9, 1974, when Nixon resigned, his relationship with Brezhnev was the 
closest it had ever been. 
 This attitude was reflected in the Soviet press at the time, which Brezhnev ordered to 
avoid anti-Nixon themes.753  Pravda developed three tactics to deal with Watergate.  First, it 
ignored the crisis, choosing instead to cover other scandals happening around the world.  
Those included an Italian “Mail Scandal,” reported five days before Nixon’s resignation, a 
drought in the US, and inflation, which Pravda described as “problem number one for the 
USA.”754  Second, it focused on Nixon’s second trip to Moscow in June 1974, which Fraser 
J. Harbutt describes as “a third showy summit spectacular” organized by the Soviets to help 
the president counter his crumbling image at home.755  In fact, little was accomplished at the 
summit, as the White House wanted to dodge criticism from the Right for being weak on 
foreign policy issues and Kissinger hoped to avoid publicity that could drag him down the 
“political whirlpool” of Watergate.756  Three days before Nixon’s resignation, Pravda printed 
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a retrospective on the warming of Soviet-American relations since Nixon took office, and the 
newspaper placed special emphasis on the third summit.  The article states, “Wide circles of 
the world public give high marks to the work accomplished during the negotiations.  The 
third Soviet-American summit . . . began an important stage in the cause of eliminating the 
danger of war and improving the international political climate on the whole.”757   
 Finally, when the scandal reached a boiling point, the newspaper defended Nixon’s 
innocence.  For example, when an August 3 article reported that the House “came to a 
preliminary agreement to begin debate on the question of impeachment of the president on 
August 19,”  Pravda stood by the president. “A representative of the White House again 
announced that the president is confident of the fact that if the members of the House of 
Representatives carefully and impartially weigh the facts, they will come to the conclusion 
that the charges advanced by the commission do not hold up, the article said.”758  Once 
Nixon’s resignation became imminent, the newspaper assured its readers that détente would 
carry on regardless.  The August 9 article that predicts the president’s resignation that day 
also includes quotes from Kissinger and Democratic Senate Majority Leader Michael 
Mansfield confirming that détente would continue.759  The next day, when the paper 
announced Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s rise to the presidency, it repeated these 
assurances.  Even the seven-sentence biography of Ford notes, “In his address, G. Ford stated 
his opinion in support of the policy of the normalization of Soviet-American relations and 
favorably appraised the results of the Soviet-American summits.”760  
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 A focus on the Soviet Embassy’s activities reveals that the Watergate scandal 
represented one of the few cases in which Dobrynin’s reporting to the Kremlin failed to 
convey the gravity of the situation.761  Dobrynin’s supportive comments to Kissinger, 
trashing the media frenzy around Nixon’s fall and the allegations against the administration, 
can be dismissed as examples of Dobrynin buttering up his negotiating partner to put him in a 
more cooperative mood.  Still, Brezhnev and the rest of the Soviet leadership remained 
woefully clueless about the real reasons behind Nixon’s fall, as their own experience in 
authoritarian government led them to believe that a strong president, such as Nixon, could 
effectively overcome any challenges posed by Congress.  As Dobrynin later conceded: “The 
Kremlin still believed that the real source was some conspiracy by anti-Soviet and pro-
Zionist groups trying to scuttle Nixon’s policy of good relations with Moscow.  Even 
Gromyko held that opinion.”  Dobrynin insists that he attempted to explain Nixon’s 
violations of American law, but the Soviet leadership refused to listen, as “they never even 
thought possible such a thing as the criminal prosecution of the highest authority.”762 
 Yet Dobrynin’s memoirs also reveal subtle hedging on his claim that he successfully 
communicated the situation to Soviet authorities.  When explaining that Soviet authorities 
did not believe that Nixon’s resignation was a possibility as late as April and May 1974, he 
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concedes that he was “cautious” in predicting such an event in writing to the Kremlin, even if 
he recognized the possibility.763  By the end of the 1974 summit, roughly a month before 
Nixon’s resignation, Brezhnev remained convinced that Nixon would finish out his term, 
while Gromyko predicted that he would hold out for a year.764  Dobrynin explains that 
Nixon’s resignation came as “an unpleasant surprise” to the Soviet leadership, who still did 
not understand how “a powerful president could be forced into resignation by public pressure 
and an intricate judicial procedure based on the American Constitution.”765  Overall, these 
sources suggest that Dobrynin’s reporting on this matter failed to explain to the Kremlin the 
significance of the issue.  Moreover, they highlight the mental divide between the embassy 
and the Kremlin, as Dobrynin found himself unable to explain something with no analogous 
examples in Soviet politics to Soviet bureaucrats with little to no experience in American 
affairs.  Finally, Dobrynin’s reporting on Watergate reflects his own cultural biases, as even 
he had difficulty understanding how this scandal could bring down Nixon until spring 1973, 
despite his extensive experience working in the US.  Never before had Dobrynin witnessed 
Congress threaten the executive branch’s authority in such a direct manner, and perhaps 
relying on Soviet images of an imperial presidency or accepting Kissinger’s claims that the 
White House could single-handedly make foreign policy, the Soviet ambassador failed to 
anticipate the potential consequences of Watergate.   
 
 “Things Will Continue as They Were” 
The discussions between Kissinger and Dobrynin at the start of the Ford presidency 
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reflected the optimism that, without the weight of Watergate, a return to the glory days of 
détente would be possible.  Dobrynin ended his vacation on the Black Sea a month early, 
sharing his first phone call with Kissinger three days after Ford took office.  Kissinger joked 
that he just told Ford earlier in the morning that Dobrynin would likely return early, so 
Dobrynin was making him look like a “great man” in front of his new boss.  Dobrynin 
laughed and shot back that he came back to Washington only because Brezhnev thought that 
being with Kissinger would prove more relaxing for the Soviet ambassador than lounging on 
the Black Sea coast.  Kissinger agreed to arrange for a presidential meeting to allow 
Dobrynin to deliver a personal message from Brezhnev, and, expressing delight at the Soviet 
ambassador’s homecoming, he declared, “I need not tell you that things will continue as they 
were.”766  Meeting with Ford two days later, Dobrynin came away from the meeting with “a 
favorable impression” of the president and the conviction that Kissinger would control 
American foreign policy.767 
Indeed, the initial months after Ford took office showed great promise.  In his first 
meeting with Dobrynin, the new president proposed a meeting with Brezhnev in Vladivostok 
devoted to a friendly, if preliminary review of the problems facing Soviet and American 
policymakers, as well as a discussion of a future SALT agreement.768  Kissinger visited 
Moscow for talks in October, setting a new basis for SALT II.  During the Nixon-Brezhnev 
summit four months earlier, negotiations followed on the basis of “offsetting asymmetries.”  
For example, the American side would agree to trade a Soviet advantage in launchers for an 
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American edge in warheads.  In order to avoid controversy at home, though, where critics of 
détente liked to point to the asymmetries and claim that the American side accepted a 
disadvantage, Ford demanded that Kissinger attempt to achieve equal aggregates, with the 
Soviet and American sides receiving identical ceilings in launchers and missiles.   
SALT II was also the first set of negotiations covering multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), single ICBMs and LBMs with multiple warheads that 
could strike several targets at once.769  Ford arrived for the “mini-summit” in November, and 
on this basis, managed to achieve an agreement with common ceilings for launchers and 
MIRVed missiles for the next ten years.  Dobrynin described this as a real victory for détente, 
noting that “the Vladivostok agreement became a significant starting-point for all subsequent 
nuclear disarmament talks. . . . Regardless of its technical merits or deficiencies, the 
Vladivostok summit provided a sense of continuity to the SALT process.”770  In other words, 
Ford picked up where Nixon left off in his meetings with Brezhnev, producing a viable 
SALT agreement in his first four months in office and ensuring that détente could continue. 
Personal relations between superpower diplomats remained cordial.  In the 
backchannel, for example, Kissinger and Dobrynin casually discussed various health 
concerns, with the secretary of state recommending Vice President Nelson Rockefeller’s 
osteopath when Dobrynin complained of a bad back.771  When Kissinger requested additional 
accommodations for American journalists in Vladivostok, he joked about Vladivostok’s 
status as a closed city and a military base, noting that if there was not enough space in the 
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normal facilities, the Soviet side could place them near the military airport or the harbor, 
where they could take pictures of Soviet ships.  Kissinger also proposed that the Soviet side 
could choose between adding ten journalists or accepting a ceiling of 100 fewer ICBMs.  
Dobrynin shot back that Kissinger always provided such difficult options to choose from, and 
he promised to telegram Moscow and get back to him the following day.772   
Relations between Ford and Brezhnev also seemed to begin well at Vladivostok.  In 
their first conversation, they mentioned their desire to build a relationship with similar 
warmth to that shared between Nixon and Brezhnev, and they traded plenty of banter.  At one 
point, Brezhnev noted Kissinger’s love of pirozhki, or traditional Russian baked or fried buns 
with meat or vegetable filling.  Kissinger joked that he had gained twenty-five pounds due to 
détente by eating so much food during talks.  Ford quipped that the sugar shortage in 
America was solely due to Kissinger’s eating habits.773  Like the breakthrough in SALT that 
led to the success of the Vladivostok summit, the development of friendly personal relations 
suggested that positive breakthroughs in Soviet-American relations could still be achieved, in 
spite of the Watergate scandal and the loss of Nixon.  
This optimism proved fleeting.  Soon after their first meeting at Vladivostok, when 
Ford and Brezhnev retired to separate cabins for rest, Brezhnev had the first of two seizures 
that would strike him during this trip to the east.  Not only was the general secretary under 
considerable stress, having flown 7,000 miles for a summit that still had questions to be 
settled in top-tier negotiations, but he also began to suffer from atherosclerosis, which 
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produced moments of asthenia after strain.774  His progressively debilitating illness, along 
with his habit of popping sedatives, left Brezhnev less capable of running the day-to-day 
affairs of government and managing crises.775  Dobrynin recalls that things went downhill 
from here, arguing that Brezhnev’s illness slowed the summit process, ensuring that personal 
diplomacy at the highest level could not overcome the various stumbling blocks that faced 
superpower diplomats.  To his credit, Brezhnev not only stuck through negotiations, but also 
wielded his authority as general secretary to put down opposition from Defense Minister 
Grechko when he had to make further concessions to complete the SALT agreement.776  Still, 
over time, Brezhnev’s condition grew weaker, and his ability to control the different factions 
of the Politburo dwindled. 
Furthermore, a resurgent Democratic majority in the Senate, emboldened by the 
Watergate scandal, sought to reclaim a role in foreign policy.  The main protagonist of this 
story, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, represented a unique blend of pro-New Deal 
Democrat and Cold Warrior, and he found détente to be a “perversion and a strategic 
mistake.”  As journalist Gal Beckerman writes in his history of the Soviet Jewry, Jackson 
believed that “the greatest sin of détente was that it let America turn a blind eye to the 
internal character of the Soviet Union while making an illusory peace.”  Two and a half 
months after the 1972 summit, The New York Times published an article explaining that the 
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Soviet Union instituted a new system of exit visas for Soviet Jews who wanted to emigrate to 
Israel ostensibly to pay for their state education.  The fees were tiered by level of education, 
with 11,000 rubles ($13,200) for a university degree and up to $22,000 rubles ($25,400) for a 
Ph.D.  This attempt by the Soviet government to discourage emigration and prevent the 
resultant “brain drain” of top scientists provided Jackson and his young aide Richard Perle 
with the perfect issue in the battle against détente.  They publicized the cause of Jews in the 
USSR, copying Kissinger’s linkage by making the granting of MFN to the USSR contingent 
upon the elimination of the “diploma tax” and increased Jewish emigration. Introduced in 
October 1972 as an amendment to the Trade Reform Act, it finally passed through the House 
on December 11, 1973.777   
Jackson attempted to broker a deal with the White House to ensure passage of the bill 
and Soviet easement of emigration restrictions.  Kissinger served as a go-between to 
determine rates of emigration that would appease Jackson and be acceptable to the Soviet 
side. At a White House ceremony on October 18, 1974, Jackson signed a letter outlining 
Congress’s demands, and Kissinger signed a letter vouching for Soviet promises.  During a 
subsequent press conference, Jackson described the signing of the agreement as a “historic 
understanding in the area of human rights.”  The Soviet side, though, reacted poorly to 
Jackson publicizing the letters, and they felt as if the numbers in the letter did not reflect their 
positions.  Gromyko submitted a new letter to Kissinger cancelling any deal on the 
amendment, but Kissinger hid the letter, hoping to push through the trade bill and deal with 
the Soviet side’s objections later.  On December 13, the morning of the Senate vote, the 
Foreign Ministry released a copy of the letter to the public, but both Jackson and Kissinger 
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remained calm, and the bill passed five days later, with Ford signing the bill on January 3, 
1975.   
The publication of the letter ultimately mattered little, since the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, along with the Stevenson Amendment, which capped the amount of credit the 
Soviet government could receive from the US Export-Import Bank at a mere $300 million, 
pushed the Soviet leadership to pull out of the 1972 Trade Agreement.  Jackson could still 
claim victory, insofar as Congress obtained influence in foreign policy and human rights 
concerns were now forever tied to concessions to the Soviet Union, but in the end, the Soviet 
Union did receive MFN or credits, and Kissinger could no longer claim to his negotiating 
partners that he had free reign in brokering deals, as his ability to back up his words with 
actions came into question.  Moreover, the loss of Jackson’s carrot of MFN status meant that 
the ambitious senator could not influence Jewish emigration from the USSR.778  
Kissinger expressed his frustration with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment privately in 
meetings with his staff of State Department Soviet experts, saying, “But what bothers me 
about all of this is that the Soviets are getting nothing out of détente. We are pushing them 
everywhere and what can I deliver in Moscow?”  Vowing to “have a public brawl” with 
Senator Henry Jackson, the primary sponsor of the Trade Bill amendment, he continued, 
“The same sons of bitches who drove us out of Vietnam and said it would be immoral for us 
to tamper with the North Vietnamese internal system now try to destroy détente and assert 
that it’s our moral obligation to change internal Soviet policies.”  He concluded, “Every 
stinking, God damned bureaucrat in this town has reservations about cooperation with the 
Russians.  I am not asking about their reservations.”  He repeated, “I am not asking about 
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their reservations. I am asking what they can do.”779  Increasingly surrounded by unfriendly 
bureaucrats and politicians who hoped to cripple his ability to negotiate unilaterally, 
Kissinger was left to pursue his policies of détente in a world that became less receptive to 
his work each day.   
Kissinger’s frustration with restraints on his foreign policy colored his diplomatic 
conversations with Brezhnev in Moscow in 1974.  Although a meeting on March 25, 1974, 
began with the usual pleasantries, with Kissinger joking about how Brezhnev’s cigarette 
holder looked like a MIRV, the initial cracks in détente’s armor soon appeared.  Brezhnev 
first discussed the “good foundation” that they had laid, promising that he would “not now 
speak of those who want to shake or destroy that foundation” and emphasizing his belief that 
“when those people become more mature they will apologize to their own people for the 
harm they are trying to do.”  He later added: “I have never seen President Nixon disappointed 
with what we have done.  Only [Senator] Jackson. . . . And he is not America.”780  At this 
point, however, the two men could still joke about the matter.  Two days later, for example, 
Brezhnev discussed his fears of the growing sentiment in America that the US needed to 
build a larger nuclear arsenal as a display of strength.  The general secretary stood up, 
imitating the gestures of a campaigning politician, stating that if he gave a campaign speech 
and called for the Soviet Union to become stronger than America, “the military men [would] 
say, ‘Give us the money.’”  Kissinger laughed, “If you said that, Senator Jackson would give 
you wide publicity in America.” Amused over the number of times the senator had come up, 
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Brezhnev exclaimed, “Senator Jackson again!”781 
But the Jackson-Vanik Amendment did not remain a laughing matter for long. In a 
meeting on October 24, seven months later, Brezhnev attacked the American approach to 
détente.  Regarding most favored nation status, Brezhnev lectured: 
Everything was agreed and crystal clear two and one-half years ago. Yet we do not 
see any part of that agreement fulfilled. Several days ago, I read that the United States 
had decided to accord MFN to several countries including China. But, regarding the 
Soviet Union, MFN would be accorded only as a special favor and only for 18 
months.  Let me say frankly that we cannot accept that ‘gift’ (hits table with hand). 
We see it as a discriminatory practice that we cannot agree to. I wish to emphasize 
that!782 
 
Brezhnev loudly complained about many facets of American foreign policy, including 
conflicts in the Middle East, cancelled contracts in grain sales, and restricted access of Soviet 
business representatives to American factories, but he soon returned to the trade bill and a 
series of letters between Jackson and Kissinger that discussed a Soviet promise to allow 
60,000 Jews to emigrate from the USSR to Israel.  After asserting that “the Soviet Union has 
not given an obligation in terms of numbers,” Brezhnev concluded, “We have said we would 
not erect barriers. . . . The import of this is that Jackson has won a great victory over the 
White House and that he has managed to extract certain concessions from the Soviet Union.” 
Kissinger, left speechless, simply said, “What burns me up is that a lot of what the General 
Secretary has said is true.”783 
When given the opportunity, Kissinger defended his policies.  He explained that his 
relationship with President Ford was “at least as close as that with his predecessor.”  He 
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assured Brezhnev that he and Ford were “both determined as soon as the election is over to 
have a showdown with the Congress on who controls foreign policy.”784  Later, the issue of 
MFN drove Kissinger into a frenzy. “[Senator Jackson’s] manner is as humiliating for me as 
it is for you (hits table with hand),” he said.  “The press is saying that Kissinger has been 
defeated by Jackson.  I’m as angry as you are.”  Following this tirade, Kissinger left the room 
for three minutes to regain his composure, returning with a joke that Gromyko’s proposal for 
a lunch break was “ending this discussion in the middle of [his] most eloquent speech.”785  
Despite the jokes, Kissinger’s limitations as secretary of state left him incapable of managing 
his system of diplomacy.  With Kissinger now working in a secretarial position instead of as 
a presidential advisor, he was open to congressional oversight, and, as a result, could no 
longer secretly pursue negotiations through the backchannel.  Moreover, with Congress 
inserting moral concerns into détente, Kissinger seemed less credible to his Soviet 
negotiating partners, making personal appeals to the Soviet leadership far less effective.786  In 
sum, Congress, reacting to the Watergate scandal, struck at the very heart of Kissinger’s 
negotiating strategy by passing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  The move discouraged 
Soviet policymakers and stalled détente. 
As Dobrynin summed up in his memoirs, “Probably no other single question did more 
to sour the atmosphere of détente than the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet 
                                                
784 Ibid., 337. 
785 Ibid., 341. While to some extent Kissinger’s tirade was simply a performance designed to convince Brezhnev 
that he still supported the policies of détente, taken it in combination with Kissinger’s private outburst with his 
Soviet staff seven months earlier, it suggests a certain level of honesty in the secretary’s frustrations. 
786 “Trials of Détente: Washington-Moscow, 1974-1975,” in The Kissinger Transcripts, ed. William Burr (New 
York: The New Press, 1999), 323-24. 
  352 
Union.”787  The Soviet government felt as if it could no longer trust Kissinger’s linkages 
when negotiating détente, since his guarantees for MFN status fell through, and they felt 
betrayed by his handling of the letters with Jackson.  The Soviet leadership exhibited 
concerns that American initiatives in détente, for the first time, attempted to interfere with 
what they perceived as Soviet domestic affairs.  This episode also demonstrated that 
Kissinger could no longer construct and implement foreign policy on his own, without 
participation from the Congress and input from American public opinion.  Dobrynin 
concludes that, during the Ford administration, it was evident that Kissinger looked back on 
the earlier period “with nostalgia,” wishing he could regain that sense of independence.788  
This posed serious difficulties for the backchannel, which had always been premised on the 
notion that Kissinger and Dobrynin could pursue policy solutions in secret, without the 
pressures applied by a free press or elected American officials with different sets of interests.  
With the awareness that any agreement they made could be contested by outside bodies, the 
backchannel lost much of the luster that it previously held. 
Meanwhile, broader cracks in the foundations of détente began to make themselves 
clear, thanks to the Angolan Civil War.  The Soviet side supported the Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), with the nationalist and anticommunist National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA) backed by the CIA and the nativist national unity group, 
National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), aided by China.  Until April 
1974, these groups were preoccupied with fighting the Portuguese colonial regime and, when 
that fell in April 1974, they turned on one another.  The Soviet leadership, aware of the 
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increase of CIA covert support for the FNLA in January 1975, sought to strengthen the 
MPLA, which had serious divides as a result of poor organization and communication, so 
that it could serve as the dominant partner in governing the country.  The Soviet Union’s 
Cuban allies, who had close ties to African revolutionary movements, pushed the Soviet 
government to intervene with military advisors, transport planes, and Cuban troops on the 
ground, but the Soviet leadership hesitated, understanding how military intervention could 
negatively impact détente.  Prodded by the more ideologically-minded International 
Department, Moscow eventually provided aid, with the stipulation that it be used primarily to 
counter invading South African troops.  Without Soviet consent, Cuba introduced ground 
troops in the conflict.  By spring 1976, the MPLA overcame its opposition, with many in the 
Kremlin unprecedented in their optimism for Soviet Third World policy, believing that “the 
world was turning in our direction.”789    
As a member of the “Americanist” camp of the Foreign Ministry, Dobrynin found the 
superpower conflict in Angola alarming, defining it as the most important disagreement in 
pushing Ameicans away from détente.  In his view, the American public and the Ford 
administration viewed Angola as a “test” of détente and, while he tried to warn the Kremlin 
of this fact, his “reports and arguments fell on the deaf ears of the morally self-righteous.”  
He met with Boris Ponomarev, the head of the International Department, who argued that the 
US was involved in many conflicts in the developing world, including the toppling of the 
socialist government in Chile in 1973, and the USSR should not acquiesce to “American 
arrogance.”  Later, Dobrynin spoke with Brezhnev, who claimed that the USSR was simply 
“helping local patriots and internationalists,” not following the American pattern of 
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establishing military bases around the world.   
Neither Ponomarev nor Brezhnev proved receptive to Dobrynin’s explanation that the 
American side viewed Angola, rightly or wrongly, as a violation of détente, empowering 
anti-détente forces in the American government and putting Ford on the defensive.  In the 
end, Dobrynin claims, this demonstrates the disparity between Soviet and American ideas of 
détente.  The American side believed that détente precluded the expansion of Soviet 
influence in the developing world, while Soviet side overestimated the permanence of 
détente in the American political scene.  Both sides failed to predict the weakness of putting 
so much weight on SALT alone in defining détente between the superpowers.790  Thus, 
Dobrynin was caught between a rock and a hard place, trying to explain to a skeptical 
American contingent that the USSR remained interested in détente, while simultaneously 
attempting to warn the Soviet leadership that actions in the developing world would have an 
impact on American interest in détente.  Ultimately, neither side cared to listen to his 
warnings, cutting the embassy out of the discussion. 
In this environment, Ford found it difficult during the 1976 presidential campaign to 
strike a balance between the pro-détente message recommended by Kissinger and appeasing 
conservatives in both the Republican and Democratic parties, especially California Governor 
Ronald Reagan, who ran against Ford in the primary.  Noting the poll numbers against his 
administration and the strong critiques from the right, Ford stopped using the word “détente,” 
ostensibly because it was foreign, in order to follow a policy of “peace through strength.”  He 
did not abandon the agreements signed at Vladivostok, but he began to take a stronger 
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posture against the USSR to appease the shifting public tide against détente.791  Furthermore, 
the final rounds of SALT discussions took place in January, with follow-up high-level 
correspondence in March, tabling any progress that could be made in backchannel talks to 
further the Vladivostok agreement.792  Dobrynin argues that, after Vladivostok, Ford was 
posed with two choices in his electoral campaign.  He could have turned the Vladivostok 
agreement into a formal SALT II treaty for approval by the Senate, or he could have rejected 
this option and disowned his one major foreign policy achievement.  Because he appeased 
the Right and abandoned détente, Dobrynin contends, Ford lost the election.793      
On November 2, 1976, Democrat Jimmy Carter won the presidential election, making 
Ford a lame-duck president.  The day after the election, Dobrynin offered Kissinger his 
condolences, “I just wanted to say to you that I am going to miss you – in the future, I mean.” 
Promising to “stand outside the government for what [he] stood for inside,” Kissinger 
responded, “I will miss you, too.  If it is possible to have a Marxist friend. . . . ” After 
lamenting that the completion of a SALT II agreement probably would have led to a different 
electoral outcome, the primary negotiators of the back channel diplomacy hung up their 
phones and went their separate ways.794  They would remain close after Kissinger’s departure 
from government, meeting whenever they were in the same city.  On January 17, 1989, 
Kissinger even discussed with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev the possibility of 
restarting the backchannel under the newly elected American President George H. W. Bush.  
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Kissinger confirmed that Dobrynin would serve as the Soviet contact, and he would work 
through American National Security Advisor and Kissinger protégé Brent Scowcroft.  
Kissinger, of course, volunteered his services to help set it up and implied that he wanted to 
be involved.795  This attempt to reboot the backchannel seems to have gone nowhere, though, 
bringing the Kissinger-Dobrynin partnership to an end. 
 
Jimmy Carter and the Dissidents 
If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the Angolan Civil War tested the superpower 
relationship during the Ford administration, then Jimmy Carter’s presidency (1977-1981) 
coincided with the rapid decline of Soviet-American relations.  The backchannel, frozen by 
Ford’s turn to the right in the presidential elections, collapsed under Carter, as the 
superpowers became entrenched in antagonistic positions.  The Carter administration’s 
posturing during SALT and pursuit of the dissident issue, as well as new conflicts in the 
developing world, proved to be more than the embassy could handle, as it tried to find 
common ground with the new president.  
During the 1976 electoral campaign, Dobrynin’s network of contacts came into play, 
as Averell Harriman agreed to secretly serve as a go-between for Democratic Presidential 
candidate Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev.  Dobrynin and Harriman first discussed this idea at a 
private dinner party at the end of July.  In response, Harriman wrote on July 30 that he would 
visit Moscow as a private citizen in order to make an informal exchange of views.796  
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Dobrynin quickly arranged for Harriman to meet with Brezhnev and Aleksandrov-Agentov 
for nearly three hours on September 20.797  Some minor conflicts are evident in Harriman’s 
report on the conversation.  For example, Brezhnev complained about the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, American behavior in Africa, and the turn against détente in the American 
presidential elections.  Harriman attempted to explain Carter’s rhetoric, promising Brezhnev 
that it was just a consequence of electoral politics and that Carter favored détente.  Most 
importantly, Brezhnev asked if Carter supported the Vladivostok agreement, which Harriman 
assured the general secretary that the president elect, in principle, did.  Harriman concluded 
that, while both sides said “some tough things,” the overall tenor of the meeting was 
positive.798  The exchange went on until Carter’s inauguration, becoming official on 
November 16, with Harriman receiving permission from Carter and Dobrynin from Gromyko 
to begin talks before the president assumed office.799   
The most alarming trend to come from these initial exchanges was the hint that Carter 
would not be “bound by previous negotiations,” suggesting to the Soviet leadership that 
Carter might renege on the agreements reached at Vladivostok.  According to Dobrynin’s 
report, Harriman stated that Carter “would like to reserve for himself the right to express 
certain possible new thoughts or correctives” while finishing up a SALT treaty.  This was 
unacceptable to the Soviet side, which felt that the Vladivostok agreement was finalized.  
The Soviet leadership did not want to permit Carter to alter the agreement, as they would be 
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put in the position of renegotiating SALT every time a new administration took office.800  
Still, Dobrynin used the channel to forward Carter a copy of Brezhnev’s January 18, 1977, 
speech at Tula, in which the general secretary announced the Soviet government’s support 
for détente and his personal readiness to work with the new administration.  It also served as 
the clearest definition for détente ever given by Brezhnev, explaining it as “an overcoming of 
the Cold War,” a willingness to resolve differences and conflicts at the negotiating table, and 
a recognition of the superpowers as equal states with equally legitimate interests powering 
their actions.801  Whatever caution the Soviet side felt was tempered by their optimism that a 
new presidential administration could produce fresh momentum for détente.   
The selection of Carter’s foreign policy team, in many ways, suggested the problems 
that the backchannel would face in the coming years.  National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, a Polish émigré and Columbia University political scientist, had a long reputation 
among Soviet authorities as an outspoken critic of the Soviet Union and its policies.802  For 
example, in a July 1971 conversation with Harriman, Dobrynin referred to Brzezinski as an 
“emotional Polish nationalist,” a critical evaluation that Harriman apparently shared.803  
Kissinger even told Dobrynin after the election that he tried to caution Carter against 
appointing his campaign foreign policy advisor Brzezinski as secretary of state, since he was 
“excessively emotional and not able to think impassively in the long term.”804  Dobrynin and 
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Brzezinski still developed a friendly relationship, bonding over chess, and Brzezinski invited 
Dobrynin’s family to his house for social occasions.805  
Brzezinski played less of a role in direct negotiations, though, than Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, who became Dobrynin’s primary partner in superpower talks.  In an 
unprecedented move, Kissinger held a lunch with Vance and Dobrynin, in which the 
outgoing secretary of state explained the benefits of the backchannel to the incoming 
secretary of state and encouraged the two to continue with the backchannel system.806  
Usually, these initial meetings between new diplomatic partners are friendly, without 
controversy, but in this case, Vance raised the issue of his personal commitment to human 
rights, to which Dobrynin snapped back that personal convictions were fine, so long as they 
were not brought to bear on superpower relations.  Kissinger had to jump into the 
conversation, urging Vance not to bring this into the public conversation.  However, 
Dobrynin left feeling certain that the secretary of state would raise it again.  At their first 
meeting after Carter’s inauguration, Vance further hinted that Carter would demand 
additional cuts in the Vladivostok limits, giving Dobrynin concern for the future of SALT.  
Dobrynin eventually developed a close relationship with Vance, praising the secretary of 
state in his memoirs for his preparation, meticulousness, reliability, and unbiased approach to 
the Soviet Union.807  Most importantly, these meetings demonstrated to Dobrynin that the 
backchannel would no longer be conducted on the basis of secret diplomacy, with a 
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confidential channel that allowed its participants to sound out different proposals without the 
scrutiny of the public or the American political establishment.   
Following his inauguration, Carter exchanged a series of letters through the 
backchannel with Brezhnev, which revealed the cracks that existed in their relationship 
before negotiations even began.  With regard to SALT, Carter requested that the Soviet side 
allow some of the items that they deemed settled during the Kissinger period be reconsidered 
in negotiations, detaching a deal on American cruise missiles and the Soviet “Backfire” 
bomber from the Vladivostok agreement.808  Brezhnev was infuriated because, as Zubok has 
argued, he “paid with his own health” to obtain Politburo support for the Vladivostok 
agreement, spending a tremendous amount of political capital in the process.809  He 
responded to Carter eleven days later in heated fashion, stating that the Soviet side would 
“firmly reject” such an approach as a sign that the American government hoped to make “the 
conclusion of the agreement more complicated or maybe even impossible.”810  Carter 
protested the “moderately sharp tone” of Brezhnev’s previous letter, which he felt did not 
give adequate credit to his “good intentions,” declaring that the issues of cruise missiles and 
“Backfire” had not been settled in Vladivostok.  Forcing an agreement in this round of 
SALT, then, would only lengthen negotiations, delaying the agreement even further.811  
Brezhnev wrote back that he did not understand Carter’s comments, since his previous letter 
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was “business-like and respectful,” and demanded that cruise missiles be included in the final 
arrangement, since doing otherwise would indicate a return to the initial positions in 
discussions and a rehashing of the negotiating process.812    
Vance, who was scheduled to fly to Moscow for negotiations with Brezhnev and 
Gromyko on March 28-30, met with Dobrynin before his trip.  Vance informed the Soviet 
ambassador of his plan to enter the meeting with two SALT proposals.  Carter’s preferred 
option was a “comprehensive” approach with deep cuts in the limits agreed upon at 
Vladivostok, and if the Soviet leadership rejected that proposal, Vance would propose a 
“limited” option, based on the Vladivostok agreement, but excluding the cruise missiles and 
Backfire bomber.  Dobrynin wrote in his report on this conversation that this would entail 
major reductions, mostly at the expense of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and he described it as 
“completely obvious” that the American side sought “a one-sided advantage.”  Vance 
planned to propose that the Soviet side place strict limits on its heavy ICBMs, while the 
American side would merely promise not to develop its own heavy ICBMs.  Dobrynin 
appealed to Vance to take Brezhnev’s letters into account, understanding why these positions 
would not be acceptable to the Soviet side before traveling to Moscow.813  As Dobrynin 
wrote in his memoirs, “It is exceedingly rare for an ambassador to tell a secretary of state so 
bluntly that his trip will be a failure if the president is going to insist on his proposals, but I 
also knew too well what he faced in Moscow.”814   
Carter and his foreign policy team did not heed Dobrynin’s warnings, and the 
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Moscow meetings between Vance, Brezhnev, and Gromyko were a disaster.  Before Vance 
came to Moscow, Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Andropov met at Brezhnev’s dacha to 
review these new positions, vowing to “teach the Americans a lesson.”  When Vance arrived, 
they interrupted the secretary of state and did not even allow him to present the second, more 
limited option.  They insulted Carter personally and, in a specially convened press 
conference, Gromyko denounced Carter’s proposals.  Vance later stated at a conference of 
former diplomats on the collapse of détente, “We got a wet rug in the face, and were told to 
go home.”815  By this point, the feelings of optimism for a potential breakthrough in Soviet-
American relations on both sides of the Iron Curtain at the start of the Carter administration 
had dissipated. 
The Carter administration’s new focus on human rights issues further complicated 
this situation from the Soviet perspective.  Dissident issues were nothing new in Soviet-
American relations during détente.  For example, in 1970, the Nobel Prize for Literature was 
awarded to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the prominent Soviet dissident and author of several 
books critical of Soviet authority, most prominently, The Gulag Archipelago.  The American 
and Soviet presses began a battle over Solzhenitsyn.816  The new twist in this discussion 
during this period, though, is that the Carter administration involved the presidency in this 
fight, while the Nixon and Ford administrations had been satisfied to discuss it in the 
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backchannel behind closed doors.817  As a result, the Soviet leadership felt that Carter’s 
human rights campaign served only to make cheap political points in the press at the expense 
of the Soviet Union, rather than it being a sincere expression of Carter’s beliefs, bolstered by 
the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which guaranteed protections for human rights on 
the European continent.818  As early as February 1977, after the State Department protested 
the arrest of prominent dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg for alleged currency violations, the 
Kremlin instructed the embassy to meet with Vance and hit hard against Carter’s human 
rights accusations.  It complained that the US did not have the right to meddle in another 
country’s domestic affairs.  For their part, the Soviet leaders did not link their country’s 
relations with the US to issues from their moral compass, such as American support for right-
wing dictatorships in the developing world or “multi-million unemployment, deprivation of 
rights of ethnic minorities, race discrimination, unequal rights for women, the violation of 
citizens rights by the state organs, the persecution of people with progressive convictions and 
so on.”  The Soviet leadership also charged that members of the American press and the 
American Embassy in Moscow were involved with the dissidents.819  In this sense, by taking 
the question of human rights and the dissidents out of the backchannel, the Carter 
administration set off a negative reaction in Moscow, where it was perceived that Carter was 
engaging in an anti-Soviet smear campaign in the press, particularly given the different 
conceptions of human rights that prevailed in each country’s ideological discourse.   
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This situation was complicated by the lack of understanding in the Foreign Ministry 
of the importance of the issue to the American president.  In September 1977, Gromyko 
visited the White House for talks with Carter.  The president raised the issue of Anatolii 
Shcharanskii, the dissident who gained notoriety, both in the US and Moscow, for attacking 
Soviet human rights violations.  In what Dobrynin believed to be a brilliant diplomatic 
maneuver, Gromyko feigned ignorance, asking, “Who is Shcharanskii?”  The president, 
somewhat bewildered, moved on to another topic.  When the Soviet diplomats returned to 
their car, Gromyko turned to Dobrynin and asked, “Who really is Shcharanskii?”  Dobrynin 
concluded, “It was my turn to be amazed.  It emerged that he knew little indeed about the 
Shcharanskii case, because he had instructed his subordinates in Moscow not to bother him 
with what he called such ‘absurd’ matters.”820  In this sense, Soviet and American diplomats 
talked past one another on the issue of human rights, with neither side understanding the 
other’s motives or desires. 
 Events in the developing world also demonstrated the growing weakness of the 
backchannel and the fragility of Soviet-American relations.  First, in the Horn of Africa, the 
superpowers again found themselves involved in a proxy war, which American policymakers 
argued created a crisis in Soviet-American relations.  In 1974, the American-backed 
Ethiopian emperor was overthrown in a coup, a situation that Soviet-backed Somalia 
exploited in order to take Ogaden province, a contested territory. Feeling emboldened by the 
success of the Angolan venture, the Soviet leadership, especially the International 
Department, pushed for additional Soviet intervention in conflicts in the developing world.  
The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the leftist rebels in Ethiopia who engineered the coup, 
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helping to prevent further Somali incursions into Ethiopian territory.  Soon, the US provided 
support to the Somali government, and hostilities ensued in 1978.821   
The consequences for détente were catastrophic.  The Soviet leadership 
underestimated the extent to which these interventions shaded the ways that American 
officials viewed the prospects for détente.822  Vance and Brzezinski argued bitterly over this 
issue.  The secretary of state contended that Soviet actions in Ethiopia, no matter how 
appalling they may be, should not alter plans for the more significant SALT negotiations.  
Brzezinski, however, claimed that “they must understand there are consequences in their 
behavior.”  Indeed, as he later wrote, “SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden.”823  
Dobrynin was stuck in the middle, attempting to explain to Moscow that these campaigns 
riled American officials, undermined détente, and required action through the backchannel, 
while he told the American side that these were local conflicts and not designed as a test of 
Carter’s will.  Given the rising fears about each other’s intentions, he failed.  Dobrynin 
concludes that the Soviet authorities “made a serious mistake” in getting involved in these 
African campaigns, writing:  “Our supply of military equipment to these areas, the activities 
there of Cuban troops, and especially our airlift to get them there, persuaded Americans that 
Moscow had undertaken a broad offensive against them for control over Africa.  Although 
that was not really the case, these events strongly affected détente.”824   
Even twenty years later, Brzezinski and Dobrynin locked horns over this issue.  
Brzezinski remained convinced that this was a central component of Soviet foreign policy 
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and a test of Carter’s will, while Dobrynin argued that it was largely driven by the 
International Department and a matter of relatively minor importance to Soviet leaders when 
compared with détente.825  Indeed, Dobrynin insists in his memoirs that Gromyko, as the 
head of the Foreign Ministry, was above all a cautious person, who opposed maneuvers that 
would lead to a confrontation with the US.  The developing world was “not his prime 
domain,” as he believed that minor proxy conflicts in Africa could hardly affect Soviet-
American relations in the final analysis.  The International Department, chaired by Boris 
Ponomarev, maintained contacts with the leaders of liberation movements in the developing 
world, and it pushed the revolutionary agenda.  Gromyko and Ponomarev “despised” one 
another and rarely coordinated, exacerbating the differences between these bureaucracies.   
The “pragmatist” core of the Foreign Ministry, especially “Americanists” such as 
Dobrynin, were uncomfortable with the consequences these crusades in the developing world 
had for détente, but struggled to articulate this message, especially in memos that had to 
respect the ideological guidelines of the Party.  Moreover, as much as Dobrynin tried to 
explain to American policymakers that these actions did not constitute a “grand plan to 
deliberately undermine the world positions of the West,” he failed, given American popular 
perception of the expansion of Soviet power in Angola, Ethiopia, and eventually 
Afghanistan.826  In this sense, the complex bureaucratic rifts in the Soviet foreign policy 
apparatus placed the embassy in a difficult position, attempting to encourage détente with the 
American side while outlining to Soviet leaders how adventurist policies in the developing 
world could ultimately undermine this effort. 
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By the time the US and the USSR finally came to an agreement on a SALT II treaty 
at a 1979 summit in Vienna, based largely on the Vladivostok agreement, détente was too 
weakened by these various confrontations to survive.  As the treaty came up for ratification 
in the Senate, a round of challenges emerged from Congress and in the press, most notably as 
a result of the Cuban Brigade scandal in 1979.  As part of the agreement to end the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union was secretly permitted to keep a military detachment 
of between 2,000 and 2,600 men in Cuba for the purpose of training Cuban soldiers to use 
Soviet military equipment.  This information was leaked to the public in 1979 for reasons 
that are not clear, although Dobrynin speculated that it may have been a calculated leak by 
American intelligence services.  Regardless, it caused a political scandal, with Frank Church, 
chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, shutting down deliberations on the SALT II treaty 
ratification.  Dobrynin, then in Moscow to attend to his father’s funeral and his dying mother, 
returned to meet with Vance in Washington.  There, the secretary of state laid out the 
American complaints, to which Dobrynin replied that these were the same troops who had 
been there for nearly twenty years.  After weeks of meetings and public statements by the 
Carter administration, prepared with the aid of Dobrynin, they managed to move past this 
incident, but Dobrynin, understandably bitter, later wrote that he missed his mother’s funeral 
“for what was at best a stupid mix-up and at worst a political ploy based on false or distorted 
information.”827  Years later, he told historians and other former diplomats at a conference 
that this was the moment at which détente died with no potential for return, as it seemed to 
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Soviet policymakers to be a deliberately manufactured crisis designed to humiliate the Soviet 
Union.828 
The election of Carter had caused a serious decline in the prospects for détente, and 
by June 1978, Brezhnev grimly declared in a speech to the Politburo that “a serious 
deterioration and exacerbation of the situation has occurred,” with Carter apparently “intent 
upon struggling for his election to a new term as President of the USA under the banner of 
anti-Soviet policy and a return to the ‘cold war.’”829  With the end of Kissinger’s tenure in 
the State Department in 1977, the personal tone of negotiations at the top level changed 
dramatically.  The backchannel was pushed to the side, and Soviet and American 
policymakers assumed the worst about one another, stalling détente.  
 
Conclusion 
 On December 27, 1979, after months of deliberation in the Politburo, Soviet forces 
entered Afghanistan, attempting to prop up the communist regime in Kabul in what they 
hoped would be a short, cheap, and relatively easy conflict.  The American side responded by 
calling the invasion “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.”  Carter 
canceled grain sales to Moscow, restricted Soviet fishing rights in US waters, and postponed 
submission of the recently-concluded SALT II nuclear arms limitations treaty to Congress.  
He also announced that the US would boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, with 
over sixty other nations following suit.  Détente ended, and constructive superpower talks did 
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not resume until President Ronald Reagan’s second term.830  The backchannel had also 
completely deteriorated.  Dobrynin, in a Moscow hospital at the time, had not been told about 
the invasion plans, and therefore had no opportunity to warn Soviet leaders of the 
consequences their actions might have for Soviet-American relations.  When he returned to 
the US, he joined Vance for informal discussions on how to relieve tensions in the midst of 
war, but, given the emotional reaction of the Carter administration to the Afghan War, fueled 
by the paranoia about Soviet intentions that formed during the African campaigns, this 
proved impossible.831   
Overall, the complex bureaucratic nature of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus and 
the embassy’s position in Washington left it in a vulnerable position in negotiating détente.  
Dobrynin did not have access to all of the information he needed to clarify to the Soviet 
government how proposed moves in the developing world would affect superpower relations.  
The Soviet ambassador had difficulty explaining the magnitude of Watergate and the shift in 
the public discourse against détente, and once Kissinger left the White House, he no longer 
had the personal rapport with American policymakers to explain the Soviet position and 
“think out loud” in seeking a mutually acceptable solution.   
While Soviet foreign policy in this period seemed unclear to American leaders trying 
to identify the Soviet government’s grand strategy, the reasons for contradictions become 
more apparent when considering the bureaucratic chaos in Moscow, especially as Brezhnev 
became increasingly infirm and unable to successfully coordinate strategy.  The lack of 
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lateral clearances between different bureaucracies with a stake in foreign affairs, as well as 
the insular nature of bureaucracies that functioned in a patronage system, did not allow for 
the kind of discussion necessary to develop such a grand strategy.  The seemingly 
contradictory nature of the Kremlin’s decisions gave Washington fits, as it came to the 
assumption that the Foreign Ministry’s support of détente was a mask to shield American 
eyes from its true aggressive intentions.   
 
 
 
 
 
PART II: A CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY’S CULTURAL DEPARTMENT 
 
Détente did not consist only of backchannel talks on the global conflict between the 
superpowers.  Rather, new cultural offensives undertaken by both the US and the USSR 
played a critical role in framing détente for their respective populations, as Soviet and 
American citizens received unprecedented information from both foreign and domestic 
sources that challenged stereotypical thinking on how to view the opposing superpower.  
With expanding tourism, cultural exchange programs, and trade deals, as well as growing 
person-to-person contact, détente represented a new cultural phenomenon that impacted the 
lives of civilians on both sides of the Iron Curtain.   
Statistical evidence documents the dramatic expansion of cultural exchanges of this 
time.  Five hundred and sixteen Soviet citizens visited the US through exchange programs in 
1958, the first year of official exchanges.  This number increased to 1,000 by the mid 1960s, 
and, after a brief lull in the late 1960s due to the Soviet reaction to the Vietnam War, rose to 
roughly 1,500 in 1972.  By 1977, the total number of Soviet visitors under exchange 
programs grew to 4,615.832  Regarding tourism, in 1969, approximately 20,000 Americans 
visited the Soviet Union and, at the height of détente in 1976, official figures suggested that 
over 65,000 Americans went to the USSR, although the US tourism industry put the number 
at 100,000.833  Similarly, in trade, American exports to the Soviet Union rarely amounted to 
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more than $100 million a year before 1971.  In that year, they jumped to $162 million, then 
$550 million in 1972, and an astounding $1.195 billion in 1973.  As a grain deal expired, 
exports fell to $607 million in 1974, but they rebounded to $1.833 billion in 1975 and $2.3 
billion in 1976.834 
A number of dramatic episodes in US-Soviet cultural relations illustrate the extent to 
which détente affected everyday life in both the US and the Soviet Union.  The 1975 Apollo-
Soiuz Test Project, the first example of Soviet-American collaboration in space, witnessed 
the docking of the Soviet spacecraft Soiuz with the American spacecraft Apollo.  Broadcast 
live on television in both countries, it was largely viewed as a positive sign of the cooperative 
possibilities opened by détente.835  Other cultural moments displayed the lingering distrust 
between the superpowers, including the 1976 hockey game between the Stanley Cup 
champion Philadelphia Flyers and the Soviet Red Army team.  The Flyers won 4 to 1, 
utilizing a brutal style of play that compelled the Soviet team to leave the ice in the middle of 
the game, refusing to return until the NHL informed Soviet officials that they would not be 
paid for the tour unless they finished the game.  Examining the reactions of the Soviet and 
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American press, historian John Soares concluded that the match in Philadelphia “advertised 
the darker side of détente.”836   
If Apollo-Soiuz demonstrated the strengths of cultural diplomacy and the Flyers-Red 
Army match displayed its weaknesses, the trade agreement concluded by the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and PepsiCo CEO Donald M. Kendall stands as a more ambiguous case.  
This agreement allowed Kendall to produce and sell Pepsi in the USSR in exchange for 
importing Stolichnaya vodka and Soviet wine and champagne to the US.  In the USSR, Pepsi 
sales were limited at first to Moscow and the Black Sea resorts, and a New York Times report 
on Soviet vacationers at the Black Sea noted that Pepsi’s “exotic appeal” made it one of the 
“particularly chic ways to spend money along the Black Sea coast.”837  In the US, 
Stolichnaya’s popularity grew quickly, gaining 65 to 70 percent of the deluxe vodka market 
by 1980.838  Stolichnaya became a target, however, when the superpower relationship hit 
roadblocks.  To protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, for example, liquor stores 
boycotted the brand and destroyed cases in the street.839  As late as 1988, William F. Buckley 
reflected negatively on the deal, complaining that economic diplomacy was ineffective at 
restraining in Soviet power, and he asked whether Kendall had “put in for Pepsi concessions 
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in Gulag.”840  Thus, in the American imagination, Stolichnaya could represent both improved 
superpower relations and the evils of the Soviet Empire.  
These anecdotes demonstrate the critical importance of the cultural dimensions of 
détente in shaping the ways that both American and Soviet civilians experienced the period.  
The next two chapters explore the myriad questions posed by cultural diplomacy.  The goal 
of these chapters is to step back from top-level diplomacy to provide a case study of how 
embassy diplomats operated on the ground level.  I explain how cultural officers stationed at 
the embassy understood their work and their contributions to détente, and I argue that 
embassy diplomats focused their efforts on developing ties with mainstream organizations in 
an attempt to portray the USSR as a safe and dependable negotiating partner and mainstream 
power.  Moreover, for all of their strengths, embassy cultural diplomats confronted 
challenges that resemble those faced by Dobrynin in top-level talks, with bureaucratic 
divides, unpredictable curveballs from conflicts in the developing world, and shifting public 
opinion in the US impeding their work. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SELLING DÉTENTE:  
SOVIET CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN THE US, 1969-79 
 
An important function of the Soviet Embassy in this period was to manage the 
explosion of new mainstream cultural exchange opportunities that emerged as a result of 
détente.  Following the first cultural exchange agreement of 1958, the superpowers entered a 
phase that former State Department official Yale Richmond described as “exchange 
tourism,” in which both sides sent leading specialists to examine the other’s activities.  These 
cultural exchange agreements lasted for two years and led to a modest growth in travel 
between the US and the USSR.  By the early 1970s, the second phase of “cooperative 
activities” began, thanks in large part to a new cultural exchange agreement, signed at the 
1973 summit, which lasted six years and guaranteed greater continuity and permanence.  
Moreover, in 1967, the Soviet institution previously responsible for cultural exchanges, the 
State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, was abolished, and its 
responsibilities shifted to the Foreign Ministry’s Cultural Department, which appeared to 
most American diplomats to have greater incentive to expand cultural exchanges.  The Soviet 
government also began working with the American private sphere for the first time to 
organize new cultural exchanges that had to be identified and explained to Moscow by 
embassy officials.841  
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Soviet-American cultural relations in the first two decades of the Cold War have 
received some scrutiny from historians;842 however, Soviet cultural diplomacy during the 
Brezhnev period remains relatively unexplored in the historiography.  One author who 
examines this period, Yale Richmond, himself advocated for an active cultural diplomacy 
program during the Cold War, and, in his later work, has explored the ways in which 
American public diplomacy aided the collapse of the Soviet Union.843  Richmond’s 
arguments heavily influence my thinking on this topic, but he focuses mainly on exchanges 
and American public diplomacy initiatives, not the work of the Soviet Embassy.  Robert D. 
English has addressed similar questions in his study of how contact with the West shaped the 
“new thinking” of the generation of Soviet leaders who rose to prominence in the 1980s.844  
Robert F. Byrnes, who managed American academic exchanges with the Soviet Union for 
nearly twenty years, argued that these early cultural exchange programs had positive and 
negative consequences for both sides.  The US sent students to the USSR to experience life 
in the Soviet Union, but American academic institutions had to accept interference from the 
                                                
842 See, for example, Nigel Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," Diplomatic History 27, 
no. 2 (2003); Rosa Magnusdottir, "Keeping Up Appearances: How the Soviet State Failed to Control Popular 
Attitudes Toward the United States of America, 1945-59" (Ph.D. Diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 2006); Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961; Amanda Wood 
Aucoin, "Deconstructing the American Way of Life: Soviet Responses to American Information Activity in the 
Khrushchev Years" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Arkansas, 2001); and Vladimir Pechatnov, "Exercise in 
Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945-47," Cold War History 11, no. 2 (January 
2001): 1-27.  David Caute occasionally addresses the post-Khrushchev years, though he largely focuses on the 
first two decades of the Cold War.  David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy 
during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).  VOKS, one of the primary institutional 
predecessors to SSOD, has received some attention from scholars, most notably in Michael David-Fox, 
Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
843 Richmond, US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-86: Who Wins; Yale Richmond, Soviet-American Cultural 
Exchanges: Ripoff or Payoff? (Washington: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 1984); Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); and Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold 
War Odyssey (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008). 
844 English, Russia and the Idea of the West. 
  377 
US government in organizing exchange programs demanded by the Soviet regime.  While the 
Soviet government provided its technical students with experience in superior American 
laboratories and production facilities, it also exposed its students to American freedoms, 
consumer goods, and economic strength, undermining Soviet propaganda on the absolute 
weakness and deficiencies of American society.845  I spend less time addressing the long-
term impact of American foreign policy, focusing instead on the ways in which lower-level 
diplomats conceptualized détente and implemented their programs.   
Since cultural exchange involved dozens of bureaucracies in Moscow, I concentrate 
on the American Department of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries, or SSOD.846  From 1961 to 1976, this department was 
known as the Institute of Soviet-American Relations, or ISAO.  It rebranded itself as the 
USSR-USA Society in 1976.847  On the surface, the ISAO/USSR-USA Society consisted of 
social activists, scientists, cultural figures, and others who supported the development of 
better relations between the USSR and the US in the spirit of peace and mutual 
understanding.848  Prominent Soviet citizens who belonged to the official leadership of the 
organization included Nikolai Blokhin, a renowned oncologist and president of the Academy 
of Medical Sciences, who served as president of the ISAO/USSR-USA Society; Georgii 
Arbatov, the director of the Institute of the USA and Canada; Georgii Zhukov, the political 
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columnist for the newspaper Pravda; A.B. Iakovskii, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper 
Literaturnaia gazeta; and Valerii Kubasov, a famous cosmonaut.  In practice, however, a 
group of bureaucrats with ties to the Communist Party and especially the Foreign Ministry 
ran the organization’s day-to-day activities.849  During détente, the leaders of the 
ISAO/USSR-USA Society included Gennadii Fedosov, who served as secretary general until 
1972 and again in 1979, and Aleksei Stepunin, who led the USSR-USA Society from 1973 to 
1978.850  In addition to the secretary general and his deputy, the ISAO/USSR-USA Society 
typically had three secretaries who handled most of the correspondence and worked with 
American delegations sent to the USSR. 
The ISAO/USSR-USA Society employed representatives stationed at the Soviet 
Embassy who reported to Moscow on the cultural organizations’ activities and helped plan 
and execute cultural exchange programs.  These representatives also served as the Foreign 
Ministry’s cultural affairs officers, indicating the close ties between the Foreign Ministry and 
SSOD.  The heads of the cultural affairs office during détente included Stepunin, who 
finished his tour at the embassy in 1969; Valerian Nesterov, who served from 1969 to 1972; 
Fedosov; and Vladimir Zolotukhin, who served through the rest of détente. 
While many of the files from the Foreign Ministry’s Cultural Department remain 
classified, the SSOD files are available to researchers.  For this reason, studying SSOD 
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provides key insight into how embassy cultural diplomats understood their work and what 
they hoped to accomplish during détente.  SSOD defined itself as a nongovernmental 
organization (NGO), and the cases forwarded to SSOD by the Soviet Embassy typically 
matched this profile as well.  Thus, this chapter focuses on groups such as the YMCA, or 
private social organizations that sought exchange programs with the USSR. 
 
The “Sharpest Weapons” of the Cold War 
In a long memo to the Foreign Ministry on March 15, 1970, Ambassador Dobrynin 
set forth his proposals for developing Soviet propaganda at the start of détente.  Although he 
devoted some space to discussing propaganda against American policies, including “the 
uncompromising fight with bourgeois, imperialist ideology” and the need to expose the 
“aggressive foreign and reactionary domestic course of American ruling elites,” Dobrynin 
spent most of the memo addressing the need for “comprehensive positive propaganda on the 
domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government.”  To push the 
American government to positions at the negotiating table favorable to the Soviet leadership, 
Dobrynin hoped to develop “the potential of friendly—or at least non-hostile—feelings of 
many Americans toward the Soviet Union” by focusing on “basic, cardinal issues of 
international relations” in which the interests of the Soviet Union lined up with public 
opinion in the US.  In particular, he cited American polls suggesting that the public wanted 
the superpowers to come together on strategic arms limitations, expand trade and cultural 
exchanges, and resolve conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.   
The goal of this propaganda campaign was to encourage support for “the 
normalization and improvement of relations with the USSR,” a critical aspect of Soviet 
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propaganda in the US that Dobrynin described in its current state as “weak.”  Emphasizing 
that Soviet propaganda in the US should come off as “clear” and “positive,” Dobrynin said 
the effort should focus on the potential for improvement in Soviet-American relations to 
encourage progress in the early stage negotiations for détente.  Furthermore, Dobrynin 
recommended campaigning against Nixon’s attempt at reconciling the US and the PRC.  By 
highlighting the dangers of negotiating with the Chinese—the brutality of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, the volatility of the Chinese regime, Mao’s willingness to resort to war 
in the nuclear age—Dobrynin hoped to convince the American public that in the era of 
triangular diplomacy, the US would be better off dealing with the USSR, a more dependable 
Great Power that shared Western cultural values.851 
A 1975 speech given by a representative from the embassy’s cultural office 
confirmed Dobrynin’s attitude.  The representative emphasized that the embassy was focused 
on “stabilizing the positive achievements in the development of Soviet-American relations” 
and countering the forces in the US that opposed the development of détente.  It used the 
openings provided by détente to establish ties with “the most representative and influential 
organizations” possible, including groups such as the YMCA, the World Trade Center in 
New Orleans, and other mainstream American organizations that advocated for détente.  This 
made possible a more widespread distribution of Soviet propaganda through delegations 
visiting the US, lecture tours by embassy staff, and media coverage, all of which allowed 
diplomats to highlight the Soviet government’s interest in better US relations.  Most 
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importantly, the representative claimed that the embassy’s work helped “demonstrate the 
mutual benefits and usefulness of the expansion of Soviet-American relations.”852 
During détente, the Soviet Embassy became a critical center for US-Soviet cultural 
relations, as Soviet diplomats specializing in cultural and economic affairs played a major 
role in improving superpower relations.  They explained the changing landscape to officials 
in Moscow, initiated contact with potential partners, conducted the bulk of talks with 
American cultural agencies, and concluded agreements with various organizations.  They 
accompanied delegations of prominent Soviet citizens on trips throughout the US and gave 
lecture tours across the country.  Without embassy diplomats serving as liaisons between 
American organizations and the Moscow elite, the tremendous growth of cultural programs 
would have been nearly impossible.  In fact, the head of the Citizen Exchange Corps, one of 
the major private exchange organizations, perhaps put it best, calling Soviet cultural officers 
“one of the sharpest ‘weapons’ in our particular form for the fight for peace.”853   
To accomplish the goals set by Dobrynin to publicize détente, the diplomats in the 
Cultural Department of the Soviet Embassy traveled the country, meeting with 
representatives of the American business community and mainstream American cultural 
organizations.  Nesterov, who served as the head of the Cultural Department from 1969 to 
1972, is a prime example of a Soviet diplomat who excelled under these conditions.  In July 
1971, Stephen James, the head of the Citizens Exchange Corps, wrote Ambassador Dobrynin 
to praise Nesterov for “help[ing] us walk the tightwire of Soviet-American amity without 
once slipping off in the past two years during the continuing oscillation between love and 
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tension between our two countries.”  He singled out one of Nesterov’s best performances: 
giving the introductory speech at the traveling Leningrad children’s art exhibition.  James 
states that Nesterov’s skills “somehow reached a new peak in the most unlikely place of all—
the ‘heartland’ of America’s ‘silent majority,’ Lincoln, Nebraska.”  Nesterov apparently used 
his “spontaneous wit” to charm the crowd and the local press.  Indeed, Nesterov handled the 
press so deftly that James remarked he was “second to none” in this “delicate area of 
diplomacy.”854  Lincoln’s mayor, Sam Schwartzkopf, confirmed this in a letter to Nesterov, 
in which he supported the continuation of the program, stating that it was a “real pleasure” to 
meet the Soviet cultural representative and that “the people in Lincoln were very impressed” 
by the exhibit.  Schwartkopf, evidently feeling the impact of Nesterov’s visit, further 
proposed an exchange of Soviet and Midwestern American mayors.855 
A year later, James wrote Dobrynin once more, this time because he heard of the 
possibility that Nesterov would be rotated back to Moscow.  He noted that “the depth and 
breadth of cultural and trade relations has increased pyramidally,” especially since the advent 
of détente, and losing an experienced and professional diplomat like Nesterov would prove 
disastrous.  He again complimented Nesterov’s ability, calling him an “unusually gifted man” 
whose “sense of the great range of American ‘styles’ and his ability to adapt to them, and his 
intuitive sense of the nuance of the American idiom are without parallel in my experience.”  
James concluded that, because of Nesterov’s “enormous energy, flexibility and wit it has 
been far easier than ever before to overcome many myths about the USSR that are so rife in 
American minds and so obstructive to our work.”  In short, Nesterov represented a new kind 
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of Soviet cultural diplomat, who James felt “facilitate[d] the proliferation of our work in 
ways which were never before possible.”856  
If James felt nervous about the veteran diplomat’s departure, he was most likely 
thrilled to learn that Nesterov’s replacement was Fedosov, who previously served as the head 
of the American Department for Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries (or SSOD) and ultimately worked as the head of the 
Cultural Department of the Soviet Embassy from 1972 to 1979.  Fedosov graduated from the 
Maurice Thorez Moscow State Pegagogical Institute of Foreign Languages in 1961 and 
completed his graduate education at the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations in 1969.  He later led the Cultural Department at the Soviet Embassy in London 
from 1985 to 1989, eventually serving as Soviet Ambassador to the Seychelle Islands and to 
Djibouti. 
Just before his appointment in Washington, Fedosov traveled the US, visiting 
Binghamton, New York, and other cities.  The local press was on hand for the visit, and one 
writer, Steve Hambelak of The Sunday Press, penned an article, “I’ll Never Forget Fedosov.”  
Reporting on a meeting between Fedosov, a Soviet academic, and undergraduates and 
graduate students in political science at the State University at Binghamton, Hambelak noted 
that the Soviet representatives spoke excellent English and “were friendly, not hostile.  They 
were at ease, not uncomfortable.  They were most polite, not boorish or argumentative.”  
Hambelak stated that he most remembered Fedosov’s “sense of humor, his incredibly fast 
wit.  He reminded me of William Buckley, who isn’t my political cup of cognac, but whom I 
admire as the wittiest spokesman the right wing has.”  The author listed the ways that 
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Fedosov used humor to extricate himself from uncomfortable lines of questioning.  At one 
point, for example, when asked about the American opening to China, he said that “he was 
no authority on ping pong policy, ‘nor an expert on panda bears.’”  Hambelak concluded that 
Fedosov was “a far, inaudible cry from the cliché type of Russian that most of us have come 
to know through books, movies, and live television reports from the United Nations.”  He 
contended that “it is hard picturing a Fedosov . . . visiting the US, say, during the Stalin era” 
and that he was “a breath of fresh air in the endlessly stale and stupefying Cold War 
atmosphere.”857  Through their wit, their fluency in English, their general understanding of 
American audiences, and their ability to deflect criticism with humor, diplomats such as 
Nesterov and Fedosov presented a more positive image of Soviet citizens to American 
audiences. 
 
Selling Détente  
Reports from embassy diplomats recount multiple levels of progress in outreach 
efforts to the American public.  In 1973, Fedosov helped the CEC to open a Soviet children’s 
art exhibit in Grand Rapids, a traditionally conservative region, which attracted 2,000 visitors 
in two weeks.  There, Fedosov gave two talks, along with а TV interview and a meeting with 
local businessmen.  The first talk, “The Development of Multinational Soviet Culture,” 
attracted a crowd of between 350 to 400 people at the Fountain Street Church.  The second, 
“Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet-American Relations,” drew 150 people at the local branch 
of the World Affairs Council.  Signs of Soviet-American animosity reared their head at both 
speeches.  The first audience asked “the traditional questions about the dissidents 
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Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and Panov,” and a group of Lithuanian immigrants interrupted the 
second speech to voice “an anti-Soviet declaration, which was condemned by the majority of 
those present.”  Still, Fedosov reported that the general tenor of the first question-answer 
period was “good-natured and indicative of the poor awareness of Soviet reality” in the US.  
In examining the trip, he concluded, “Even in relatively remote areas of the US, along with 
the persistently poor awareness and occasional ignorance about Soviet domestic and foreign 
policy, there are definite positive changes in public attitudes.”858   
Later in détente, as the Watergate scandal unfolded and Congressional support began 
to form for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the questions from the American audiences 
changed.  In March 1974, Fedosov attended the World Affairs Conference at the University 
of Colorado, where he delivered several speeches and participated in panels on Soviet-
American relations.  He wrote back that while “well-reasoned presentations” supporting the 
improvement of Soviet-American relations were “positively received by the audience,” the 
“questions from the audience reveal the negative effect of the American press, especially in 
connection with so-called ‘human rights’ and emigration from the USSR.”859  At an April 
1974 conference on Soviet-American relations at the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science in Philadelphia, Harry Schwartz, an editorialist for The New York Times who 
specialized in Soviet and East European affairs, gave a speech “couched in the spirit of the 
‘Cold War.’”  Schwartz’s speech, the embassy representative noted, “irritated the American 
audience,” which primarily wanted to hear about strategic arms limitations, trade, science 
and technology, and the exchange of ideas and people.  The Americans expressed concern 
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that Soviet-American relations had run into “serious difficulties” due to the “complex 
political situation in the US.”860  In other words, with Watergate crippling the presidency and 
the debate over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the conversation sometimes shifted from 
progress in détente to pessimism about Soviet-American relations and criticism of human 
rights violations.  The optimism expressed in earlier reports was noticeably more subdued. 
By 1976, public enthusiasm for closer superpower relations cooled, and human rights 
issues and superpower conflicts in the Third World dominated the question and answer 
sessions. Crowds became less receptive to the Soviet message.  One delegation wrote, “Our 
meetings with political and public figures in the US showed that the new wave of anti-Soviet 
hysteria in the US, partly connected to the current electoral campaign, causes hesitancy and 
apprehension” among “figures who, in the initial period of détente, actively lobbied for 
cooperation with the USSR.  At the same time, everywhere we receive a hospitable and 
warm welcome, and privately—‘off the record’—people express the warmest desires for 
friendship with our country.”861  The delegation noted that some mainstream organizations 
with connections to the American Department of SSOD held out hope that conditions would 
improve with the election of Jimmy Carter to the presidency, but a subsequent report in 1977 
stated that “the situation in the country after Carter’s arrival to the White House continues to 
be difficult.”862  
While the reports on lectures and conferences during this period struck an upbeat tone 
and almost always observed that the audiences supported détente in principle, they also 
acknowledged the growing critiques of Soviet policy.  During a 1976 trip to Boston, Fedosov 
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remarked that “the anti-Soviet rhetoric associated with the presidential campaign has a 
definite influence on the minds of youth.”863  He later reported on a conference in Portland, 
in which several prominent speakers—including historian Richard Pipes and Senator and 
Democratic Presidential candidate Frank Church—delivered speeches critical of the Soviet 
Union.  Pipes, in particular, gave an “explicitly anti-Soviet” speech, describing détente as a 
“Soviet invention” and a “one-way street” that would benefit only the Soviet Union.  
Fedosov recalled that the audience asked tough questions about Solzhenitsyn, Soviet 
intervention in the Angolan civil war, the Sino-Soviet split, and “civil rights” in the USSR, 
and one group even handed out fliers protesting Soviet whaling.864  Fedosov stated that one 
speaker at an Oklahoma conference on human rights and foreign policy argued that “of the 
European countries, the single biggest violation of human rights is taking place in the Soviet 
Union.”  The Soviet diplomat explained that the audience, while seemingly receptive to his 
speech, was “absolutely unfamiliar with the Soviet position on the question of human 
rights.”865  While cultural officials tried to put a positive spin on these lectures, signs of 
growing audience discontent still permeated their reports. 
There is no question that embassy representatives were conscious that Moscow 
evaluated their performance when they wrote their summaries, and that they had to present 
their efforts in a positive fashion.  Even Fedosov, who had previously served as the head of 
the American Department of SSOD, carefully avoided too much self-criticism.  Yet these 
memos reveal the focus of their work: outlining a positive view of Soviet society, defending 
Soviet foreign policy, deflecting criticism of Soviet domestic policy, and highlighting Soviet-
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American achievements or potential for joint agreement in strategic arms limitation, trade, 
science and technology, and conflict resolution around the globe.   
To accomplish these tasks, the embassy employed diplomats who had a strong 
command of English and thus could engage in difficult conversations with American 
audiences, using humor to defuse sensitive subjects and keep the mood positive, even when 
the questions were pointed or protestors interrupted the proceedings.  Since the embassy 
leadership called for expanding the reach of Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet sympathizers 
in the US, the diplomats visited universities, academic conferences, church organizations, 
world trade centers, cultural festivals, Rotary clubs, YMCA branches, and other mainstream 
institutions.  In these venues, Soviet diplomats hoped to convey the image of the Soviet 
Union as a modern, stable, and dependable negotiating power.  Above all, they sought to 
garner support for détente and the normalization of Soviet-American relations, eager to 
pressure the Nixon administration to the table with concessions favorable to the Soviet 
Union. 
 
New Work with Mainstream Organizations 
 Cultural officers at the Soviet Embassy attempted to broaden the reach of public 
diplomacy by including new types of agencies and individuals in their cultural programs.  In 
particular, they tried to take advantage of the flood of private mainstream organizations 
interested in starting exchange programs with the Soviet Union after the 1972 Moscow 
summit.866  One prominent example of this is the YMCA, which began working closely with 
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the embassy in early 1974.  Fedosov forwarded the SSOD leadership a report in March 
detailing two months of preliminary talks between the embassy and the YMCA, including 
two face-to-face meetings and several phone calls. Fedosov concluded that a change in 
leadership at the YMCA’s International Department made establishing a program with the 
organization easier.  The new group received permission from the National Board to organize 
exchanges with various Soviet organizations, including SSOD, and they made proposals on 
the basis of avoiding “internal bureaucratic barriers to the establishment of friendly contacts 
with the Soviet Union.”  This indicated to the Soviet diplomats the real potential for an 
expanded program, and Fedosov forwarded the reports to Moscow with a request for 
additional instructions.867 
 Embassy diplomats began taking an active role in courting the YMCA, attending 
events to discuss improving Soviet-American relations and the potential for a permanent 
program between Soviet agencies and the YMCA.  In December 1974, embassy cultural 
representative Metelkin traveled to COSMOS III, an international weekend held at 
Northwestern Michigan College and sponsored by the Michigan YMCA, where he “provided 
opportunities for discussing USA-USSR détente.”  On his way there, he stopped in Lansing, 
Michigan, to meet with several top state politicians and state YMCA executives. He appears 
in a photo with these figures in the YMCA newsletter, wearing a nice suit with slicked-back 
hair, smiling broadly.868  One of these officials, Jackie Vaughn III, traveled to Moscow 
shortly thereafter, with the embassy recommending that SSOD accommodate his requests, 
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given their desire to expand relations with the YMCA.869  Embassy representatives, led by 
SSOD official Vladimir Molchanov, escorted a SSOD delegation to a Los Angeles YMCA 
event in April 1975.  A photo shows Molchanov in the style of the time—with a plaid jacket, 
bushy hair and long sideburns—posing with his Russian colleagues.870  The initial 
memorandum explained that the YMCA volunteered to take on some duties for the upcoming 
Soviet-American Youth Forum.  It planned a barbecue at the Alexandria YMCA, inviting 
several representatives from the Soviet Embassy, cultural officials from the State 
Department, the YMCA committee that arranged the activities, and the host families and 
participants.871  In this regard, the embassy sent cultural officers to important YMCA events 
and involved the YMCA in its cultural programs to help develop closer relations and a more 
effective exchange plan. 
 The expansion of the embassy’s relationship with the YMCA reached its peak with 
the 1976 Statesmanship Project, which called for a delegation of thirty-five to forty-five 
people, half of whom would consist of “outstanding YMCA leaders” from around the 
country. The other half would come from “top representatives of the arts.”  Initially, the 
YMCA proposed in January 1975 that this group stay in the USSR for four weeks, traveling 
to Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine, Georgia, and, at the suggestion of the embassy, at least one 
of the Central Asian Soviet republics, and meet with top figures from Soviet artistic fields, as 
well as members of the Communist Party and Soviet government.872  Two months later, 
Fedosov contacted Stepunin with additional details worked out in meetings with YMCA 
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officials.  He explained that half of the delegate slots would go to cultural representatives and 
half to authorities in business, industry, and education.  This was an ambitious plan, and 
Fedosov recommended it to Moscow for consideration, noting “the importance of increasing 
contacts with prominent representatives of the American public” and the potential for 
receiving a group of senior representatives from “one of the largest and most influential 
organizations in the US.”873  In November, the YMCA said it would follow the embassy 
cultural representative’s advice and plan its trip through SSOD and the embassy.874  By 
December, Fedosov forwarded additional details, with the proposed dates of June 4 to July 5, 
1976.  He repeated his support for the program, although he emphasized that, given these 
dates, SSOD would have to respond to American bicentennial celebrations and counter the 
American propaganda with events celebrating the formation of the Soviet state and positive 
aspects of Soviet life.875 
 In the end, while SSOD files do not contain a Soviet summary of events during the 
Statesmanship Project, it appears that the YMCA at least viewed the program as a great 
success.  In August 1976, the chairman of the National Board of YMCAs of the USA wrote 
to the embassy and SSOD to thank them for their hospitality and hard work.  The group was 
received with “warmth and friendliness” wherever it went, he wrote.  The chairman also 
expressed satisfaction that the YMCA group, organized under the theme, “Two Hundred 
Years of US History Through Music, Song, and Dance,” was matched with equally 
outstanding Soviet artists.  He concluded that the program “gave all of us an opportunity to 
share the arts in a very informal way, as well as thoughts, ideas and personal human 
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experiences.”876  Thus embassy representatives helped the YMCA and SSOD produce an 
engaging program that opened new doors to Soviet influence in mainstream American 
culture.   
 If the budding relationship between the YMCA and SSOD demonstrates the 
expansion of cultural ties in their own right, the International House in New Orleans 
represents how the growth of Soviet-American trade relations in this period often deepened 
cultural ties.  Fedosov first investigated the potential for a partnership between SSOD and the 
International House in April 1974, when he visited and met with its leadership, local 
businessmen, politicians, the leadership of the New Orleans Port Authority, and the city’s 
mayor.  The International House, founded in 1943 as the first world trade center in the world, 
had a membership base of 2,500 businessmen from Louisiana and other southern states.  Its 
library contained more than 16,000 volumes, received 500 periodicals on trade, and hosted 
foreign language classes.  In addition, its leadership expressed an interest in receiving Soviet 
publications.  The International House’s officials regularly gave interviews on radio and TV 
and in professional publications, and the group produced a weekly half-hour program on 
local public television broadcast on 115 stations in the South.  Fedosov reported that both the 
business community and the public expressed enthusiasm for establishing a relationship with 
SSOD, provided the exchange programs did not have an overtly propagandistic character. He 
recommended that SSOD establish formal ties quickly.877  The International House offered a 
promising opportunity for cultural exchange, and Fedosov did not want to miss out on it. 
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 The program between SSOD and the International House did not blossom until 1976, 
after Fedosov made a return visit to New Orleans in March, again meeting with the 
International House’s officials and local leaders.  He emphasized the tremendous interest in 
improved Soviet-American relations in the city, since a high percentage of the goods 
exported by the US to the USSR, especially grain, left from the port of New Orleans.878  
Moreover, the Americans who visited the USSR in late 1975, such as the deputy director of 
the port authority, expressed great satisfaction with their trip, hoping that a return delegation 
to New Orleans could include Soviet businessmen and shipping experts.  A television 
reporter who joined the delegation released a series of fourteen segments on the local news 
that were seen by about 500,000 people and, while a few critics complained that the reporter 
had been “brainwashed in Moscow,” many viewers expressed great satisfaction with the 
coverage of Soviet life.  Furthermore, the newly offered Russian language courses at the 
International House flourished, with fifteen to twenty businessmen stopping by twice a week 
to receive instruction from an enthusiastic American teacher.879    
 In this environment, with increased trade generating good will in New Orleans toward 
the expansion of Soviet-American relations, Fedosov met with Rolland Golden, an award-
winning local artist with connections to the International House, to hold preliminary 
negotiations for displaying an exhibition of his works in Moscow.  Following the talks, 
Golden agreed to send fifty-to-sixty slides of his paintings to Moscow, where experts could 
choose the works to be displayed in the exhibition.  Then, Golden would ship the paintings to 
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Moscow, assemble a catalog, and pay for airfare to and from the Soviet Union, where he 
would travel with the collection.  Fedosov emphasized that the public fully supported the trip, 
which would include Moscow and one or two other cities, and he strongly recommended that 
SSOD move forward in organizing it.880  The program guide, which contained descriptions of 
fifty-one paintings, expressed a desire that this five-city tour of Golden’s work would be “the 
first such undertaking in what is hoped to become an annual exchange in the ‘visual 
détente.’”881  This reflected Golden’s stated goal, conveyed in a letter to Stepunin and 
Fedosov, to “help promote a better understanding between the peoples of our countries.”882  
While the final organization of the trip suffered from some miscommunications —the SSOD 
leadership expected Golden to send the paintings directly to Moscow, whereas Golden 
expected the Soviet side to pick up the crates when they arrived by ship in Odessa and ship 
them to Moscow—the show eventually opened in December 1976 to rave reviews, with three 
prominent American diplomats in attendance.883 
 Participants’ accounts described the Golden’s exhibition as a success.  In his letter to 
SSOD after the trip, Golden thanked Molchanov for being a “good friend” and attending to 
his “every need and desire,” praising the Soviet diplomat’s “honest, integrity and idealism,” 
as well as his sense of humor.  Golden lamented the “slow dissolvement [sic] of 
Christianity,” but celebrated “the vigor and warmth of the Russian people.”  Golden 
promised that the slides of the trip came out nicely and would be featured along with an 
interview with him in local television.  Telling Molchanov that he already missed Soviet soft 
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drinks “Rush-cola” and “Rush-up,” Golden joked, “If you ever decide to become a capitalist, 
we should go into business together and make Rush-cola an American household word.”  He 
remarked that he missed Fedosov during his most recent visit to New Orleans, but looked 
forward to the embassy secretary’s return so that they could get together and drink the bottle 
of Soviet vodka he brought back to the US.884   
SSOD’s new partnership with the International House provides an example of how 
positive developments in one area of Soviet-American relations could open room for 
progress in other fields.  Here, the favorable environment for Soviet-American relations, 
shaped by political factors such as the Moscow summit and Nixon and Kissinger’s eagerness 
to use wheat sales as a trading chip in détente, led to a growth in trade.  The resultant 
increase in Soviet-American business in New Orleans helped raise public interest in Russian 
language and culture in the city, making a cultural program between the International House 
and SSOD a priority.  Of course, this process was not universally smooth.  One problem 
arose when the Associated Press published a report about a Soviet television documentary on 
New Orleans produced during the visit of a SSOD delegation, narrated by famed Soviet 
diplomat and delegation member Valerian Zorin.  The documentary described the city as a 
place of “historic nostalgia, gaudy commercialism, extremes of poverty and wealth, racist 
exploitation, assassination plotting and jazz.”  The director of the International House 
responded by sending Fedosov a message, saying he was “embarrassed” and bombarded with 
protest letters from angry supporters, including the mayor.885  Still, cultural representatives 
from the Soviet Embassy correctly identified New Orleans as a site that was ripe for Soviet 
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cultural programs, thanks to political and economic developments in Soviet-American 
relations, and successfully pursued exchanges that promoted Soviet culture and détente. 
 One curious case in the expansion of ties to mainstream groups following a successful 
trade program came with Dana McBarron, who owned a cattle ranch in the state of 
Washington.  In 1974, thanks to the help of the head of the Agricultural Department of the 
embassy, McBarron completed a successful deal with the Soviet government and offered a 
bull named Bonny Boy as a gift to the Soviet people.  In turn, the Soviet government agreed 
to purchase an additional bull, two cows, and two calves, all of which would be sent to 
Vladivostok by train.  From there, they would travel to Moscow for an exhibition before they 
settled into their new home in the Altai Mountains bordering Mongolia and China.  At the 
ceremony celebrating their departure for the USSR, McBarron wore a kilt, while members of 
the Seattle Scottish-Boys Pipe Band played bagpipe music. McBarron gave red bandanas to 
the Soviet sailors and declared them “honorary cowboyskis of Cape St. Mary.”  Amid the 
festive atmosphere, McBarron told a reporter that the Soviet government was “dickering to 
purchase 150 more” cattle, but the purchase price “is my business.”  Soon after, he toured the 
USSR to help promote the exchange.886   
 The personal letters between McBarron and Soviet representatives at the embassy and 
in Moscow reveal the ways in which personal diplomacy remained a key aspect of SSOD’s 
work in the US.  The two men developed an intimate way of talking. The SSOD official in 
charge of their case, Molchanov, referred to McBarron as “father,” while the American 
businessman called his Soviet contact “son Vladimir.”  McBarron wrote remarkably personal 
letters to his Soviet friends, telling them about his local charity work, his vacation plans, and 
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his diet.  For example, in July 1976, two years after the cattle deal, McBarron wrote 
Molchanov to congratulate him and “Daughter Galina” on their recent wedding.  The 
American told Molchanov that he hired a man whose son has muscular dystrophy to run the 
sales division of his lumber company.  He also reminisced about his trip to Russia, wishing 
that he had access to the mushrooms at Angarsk and Molchanov’s mother’s recipes.  With his 
wife struggling with cancer treatments, he told Molchanov that they would be traveling to 
Florida over the holidays to see her family.887  Molchanov wrote back to “Father” McBarron 
expressing condolences over his wife’s illness and reminding him that even though he had to 
cancel preliminary plans to visit the Soviet Union that year, he would be welcome to visit 
Moscow anytime he wanted.888  When his son tragically died in November 1976, McBarron 
wrote a heart-wrenching letter to his friends at SSOD.  He said his son’s life was “enriched 
by your kindness—your compassion—your understanding—your hospitality—your 
friendship.”  McBarron then asked that Molchanov contact Father Valentine at Zagorsk to 
have a requiem mass said for his son, and concluded, “I write so immediately to share my 
grief—as this is your loss also!  I know Vladimir—you also as my son—his brother—both 
honor and mourn with me and with his mother.”889  It is unclear if Molchanov followed 
through with his “father’s” wishes, though the SSOD leadership sent a letter of condolence 
on the loss of McBarron’s son, the “magnificent Mark.”890   
SSOD diplomats maintained these sorts of personal relationships, formed through 
negotiations with the embassy and experiences with delegations, even after the completion of 
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the exchange.  In the McBarron case, this did not lead to palpable gains for publicizing 
détente, since the American was fairly old and soon faced an array of personal problems that 
distracted him from the promotion of détente.  Still, he met with a Soviet delegation in 1975 
and remained a friendly voice toward Soviet diplomats, even as détente weakened in the late 
1970s.891  In sum, the work in personal diplomacy performed by Soviet diplomats at the 
embassy and in Moscow left a lasting impression on the American participants in exchange 
programs and, for some, produced deep and lasting feelings of friendship.   
 
Idaho Dick 
Along with increased opportunities for exchanges with existing cultural 
organizations, new advocacy groups attempted to take part in the expansion of cultural ties 
that came with détente.  For example, Richard Kassatly formed the Institute for Soviet-
American Relations (ISAR) in 1973.  Kassatly, who gave himself the moniker “Idaho Dick” 
following his success in the potato business, was a burly, middle-aged son of Lebanese 
immigrants who drove around town in a Rolls Royce and was heavily involved in the 
Washington scene, working as a lobbyist, helping to found the Georgetown Club in 1966, 
and serving on the Board of Trustees of the local chapter of Goodwill.892  In a letter to 
Dobrynin introducing his agency in October 1973, Kassatly emphasized that the ISAR was 
an NGO involved with cultural, educational, and technical exchanges, claiming that “people 
who know and understand each other in these fields could better communicate in a non-
political way and could encourage further co-operation as time goes on.”  He stated that his 
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organization had connections and sources of funding that could make a positive impact on 
Soviet-American relations.  In particular, he cited the example of a recent visit to the US by 
three members of the Ministry of Justice, whom he took to a Washington Redskins football 
game. “Their love for sports proved a natural bond between our people and the ministers of 
Justice experiencing firsthand the spirit of the American spectators,” he wrote.  His proposals 
for exchange programs included one in the field of culinary arts, in which he hoped that 
Soviet culinary masters, such as the chef at the Soviet Embassy, would teach American chefs 
how to cut and arrange raw vegetables to resemble floral arrangements, along with other 
skills.893   
Perhaps Kassatly’s most unusual suggestion was his proposal for a Soviet wine 
tasting event.  Here, Kassatly described Brezhnev as “a connoisseur of fine wines and a 
patron of the culinary arts,” and suggested that his “fondest experiences” during a recent trip 
to the USSR came while drinking Soviet champagne with his lunches and dinners.  Kassatly 
wrote that “although [Soviet] champagne might not be of great vintage years,” they were 
“good all-around full-bodied” and “its taste was not to be passed by so lightly.”  He added, 
“it was priced in an area that never prohibited you from enjoying a bottle for lunch or dinner 
in the Soviet Union.”  Kassatly hoped the tasty inexpensive drink could be featured in a 
tasting at the Georgetown Club for Congressmen and Washington socialites, with Soviet 
wine, Armenian brandy, and food prepared jointly by the chefs of the club and the Soviet 
Embassy.894 
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Here, as elsewhere in his correspondence, Kassatly emphasized his connections with 
important figures in Washington.  He mentioned that the idea for the wine tasting came about 
during a discussion with Zane Hansen, chairman of the board and CEO of the Mack Truck 
Company.  Kassatly repeatedly referred to his ties to Senator Eugene McCarthy, the ISAR 
national chairman.  In one instance, Kassatly discussed this relationship at the Soviet-
American Youth Forum with Robert Rozhdestvensky, the famous Soviet poet, promising to 
arrange a joint poetry reading with the American senator.  In addition to McCarthy, Kassatly 
implied that a “very prominent American educator” who recently resigned from the Nixon 
administration would be signing on as ISAR’s chairman of education, perhaps referencing 
Sidney P. Marland, who had stepped down as assistant secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare a few weeks earlier.  Overall, Kassatly hoped to leave the 
impression that “men of the highest caliber” led the ISAR.895 
In the long run, the ISAR’s relationship with the ISAO failed to take root in 
subsequent years.  Kassatly visited Moscow in December 1973 as secretary general of the 
ISAR, and he invited Stepunin to visit Washington in early 1974 to create a program for the 
next two years.896  By February, when Fedosov met with Kassatly to discuss his progress, 
Stepunin had not accepted the invitation, and Kassatly had not yet secured funding to pursue 
a rigorous exchange program.  Kassatly informed the Soviet representative that he continued 
to have difficulty registering the ISAR as an NGO.  He griped that the State Department and 
Justice Department had been “constantly calling” and asking about “what the Institute did, 
whether he received money from the Soviet Embassy, whether he had been offered money in 
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Moscow, etc.”  Fedosov characterized Kassatly as cautious, perhaps as a result of these 
inquiries, as the American repeated several times that the ISAR would not take on political 
issues, including the question of Jewish immigration.  Kassatly, in fact, told Fedosov that he 
had “never seen official circles so nervous and demonstrating such suspicion in everything 
concerning the expansion of contacts between the USSR and US” in the cultural realm.  He 
expressed fear that, unless he took extreme caution to portray the ISAR as a purely neutral 
cultural and educational institution, the press would tar him as a “new tool of Communist 
propaganda.”897 
Furthermore, due to Kassatly’s inability to receive registration as an NGO, his 
promises of support from prominent Americans did not come to fruition, creating serious 
doubts about his credibility in the eyes of Soviet cultural officers.  During the meeting with 
Fedosov, Kassatly gave several “evasive answers” about who served on the Institute’s board 
of directors.  Finally, after Fedosov pressured him to come clean, he conceded that, apart 
from himself, he could only count on Senator McCarthy as a member of the board.898  During 
a March 5 meeting with Fedosov, McCarthy suggested that Kassatly, whom he met while the 
latter served as a lobbyist on Capitol Hill, proposed that the senator serve as the president for 
his cultural exchange organization.  McCarthy accepted Kassatly’s proposal, commenting, “I 
allowed him to use my name.”  Fedosov observed that, while McCarthy seemed generally 
interested in the progress of Soviet-American relations, he did not participate in the work of 
the ISAR in any practical way, trusting in Kassatly, who used McCarthy’s name for 
advertising purposes.899   
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In addition to the weakness of the organization, Fedosov pointed to Kassatly’s 
apparent financial motives as a second reason to be cautious in dealing with the ISAR.  He 
wrote in his February memo that, while the ISAR could be useful in displaying Soviet 
exhibits or meeting with Soviet delegations, it could not be depended on for more extensive 
work due to “some questions” concerning Kassatly’s motives.900  As a profile of Kassatly in 
the Saratoga Journal in October 1973 suggests, around the same time that he formed the 
ISAR, Kassatly started IDK (Idaho Dick Kassatly) Currency Arbitrators.  This brokerage 
facilitated trade between the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and American businesses, 
which frequently relied on barter.  Kassatly provided the example of an American firm 
attempting to sell manufactured goods to the Soviet government.  If the Soviet side offered 
lumber in return, but the American firm wanted plywood, Kassatly’s company would handle 
the logistics of shipping the lumber to Japan, having it made into plywood, and shipping it 
back to the US, ultimately taking a cut from the American firm’s profits from plywood sales.  
As the article argued, Kassatly “is getting in on the ground floor of a growing class of 
specialists who hope to parlay their knowledge of Soviet trading practices into high-paying 
businesses.”901  Fedosov recognized Kassatly’s motives in this regard, as the American 
informed him of his desire to help Arrow, Merrill Lynch, White Industries, and other 
companies establish a foothold in the Soviet market.  Fedosov recommended that the ISAO 
exercise caution in dealing with Kassatly: “There is no doubt that above all Kassatly is 
interested in receiving commissions from concluding deals between the Ministry of Foreign 
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Trade and various American companies.”902  Thus Kassatly’s maneuvering only confirmed 
Soviet stereotypes about wily capitalists looking to do whatever they could to exploit Soviet 
markets.  Kassatly’s contacts with the ISAO gradually disintegrated, but his business 
boomed, and he founded and chaired the National Association of Pension Fund Managers 
and served on President Ronald Reagan’s inaugural committee.  His business remains active 
today as IDK Gulf Street Merchant Bankers.903  In this sense, Kassatly might not have found 
success running the ISAR or improving cultural ties between prominent Soviet and American 
citizens, but he fulfilled his ultimate goal of developing his international business acumen. 
 
“This is Not Any Friendship Society” 
 The American Committee on US-Soviet Relations, later known as the American 
Committee on East-West Accord, represents a second and perhaps more successful cultural 
society that formed in the 1970s and worked closely with the Soviet Embassy to promote 
cultural exchanges.  Fred Warner Neal, an academic who founded the international relations 
program at Claremont Graduate School, led the American Committee at its founding in July 
1974, and in many ways he remained the Soviet Embassy’s primary contact at the committee, 
even after he was no longer technically in charge of it.  Neal had long advocated for better 
relations with the Soviet Union.  In fact, in November 1973, as opposition to Nixon mounted, 
especially on the Left, Neal felt compelled to defend the embattled president at the Reed 
College Lecture.  He lamented that he might “be fated always to be in the minority”: when 
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Nixon arrived on the scene, he was an anti-Nixon Republican; when Nixon became 
president, he was an anti-Nixon Democrat; and “now, when the momentum of public 
opposition against the President is reaching a crescendo, I find myself unable to join in.”  
Neal criticized “well-meaning liberals” and those who opposed Nixon on every issue, 
suggesting that by playing into Cold War fears, they merely guaranteed a return to poor 
superpower relations.  Although Neal viewed Nixon as “inept, venal, and even disastrous in 
many ways,” he ultimately decided the “achievement of détente is worth keeping Nixon in 
office.”  As he concluded, “It is ironic indeed that one has to turn to Nixon, the former Cold 
Warrior par excellence, as a guarantee against a return to Cold War policies, but that seems 
to be the situation.”904  For Neal, the end of the Cold War was the ultimate goal, and any 
politician who promoted détente, no matter how personally repugnant, would receive his 
support.  
These attitudes shaped Neal’s decision to assemble a bipartisan nongovernmental 
organization of prominent figures—intellectuals, scientists, businessmen, clergy, entertainers, 
and former politicians and diplomats—that aggressively waged a public campaign in support 
of détente.  Indeed, the American Committee’s roster included such luminaries as former 
ambassador and Harvard Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, PepsiCo CEO Donald Kendall, 
Harvard Chemist George B. Kistiakowsky, Senator Eugene McCarthy, President of the Mayo 
Clinic Dr. Howard P. Rome, Duke University President Terry Sanford, and actor Kirk 
Douglas.  Neal asserted that this was an independent organization, free from the influence of 
Moscow or Washington, with famous and influential voices calling for the amelioration and 
eventual cessation of the superpower conflict. 
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Unlike Kassatly, Neal successfully conveyed the impression to the Soviet government 
that he had sufficient support in the American government to influence policy.  On January 
18, 1974, when discussing the committee with Soviet cultural representatives, he claimed 
that Kissinger personally suggested the idea for the organization to Neal.905  In a November 
11 message to Stepunin, Neal enclosed a copy of a confidential letter from Ford.  The new 
president thanked Neal for his congratulations and good wishes, promised to work for the 
improvement of Soviet-American relations, and, most critically, expressed appreciation for 
the committee’s work to meet that objective.906  Even if these messages exaggerated Neal’s 
influence in Washington, they effectively convinced the ISAO leadership and embassy 
representatives that Neal could make an important contribution by defending détente at the 
top levels of government.   
 As a result, the Soviet Embassy and the ISAO played a central role in aiding the 
formation of Neal’s committee.  Neal met with Stepunin in Moscow in the early months of 
the winter to discuss the founding of the committee, and he wrote him on at least three 
separate occasions before the committee’s first meeting to update Stepunin on its 
development.907  Moreover, as Neal reported to Stepunin, he was in “close touch” with 
Fedosov and Dobrynin regarding all aspects of the planning process.908  Neal saw Dobrynin 
on the eve of the committee’s planning meeting, expressing a desire to receive an invitation 
from a Soviet organization to visit Moscow in September or October of that year.  He hoped 
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that the delegation would meet with representatives of the Soviet public, including Brezhnev, 
in order to “raise their prestige in the public eye of both countries.”909   
Neal also used these early connections with Soviet authorities to present himself as an 
expert on American politics and offer his advice on how Soviet policy initiatives would play 
with Beltway insiders.  For example, when visiting Moscow in early 1974, Neal bet Stepunin 
ten rubles that Nixon would not be impeached. This clever move gave Neal a reason to send 
Moscow periodic updates on his personal opinions regarding Nixon’s standing in 
Washington.  Thus, on March 20, Neal wrote that he wanted to scale down his bet from ten 
rubles to five rubles, given the increased likelihood of Nixon’s impeachment, though he 
maintained that the Senate would not convict the president.910  By April 30, he offered his 
analysis again, saying that he now would bet a small number of rubles that the House would 
convict Nixon and another small sum that the Senate would not convict him, complaining 
that this situation “complicates our problem” of promoting détente.911  Furthermore, on June 
18, 1974, Neal mentioned that he set up Gromyko’s son for lunch with Senator Walter 
Mondale, and he suggested that Soviet authorities should invite Mondale to the USSR and 
give him “the most posh treatment,” since Neal believed that the Minnesotan could be 
“wooed away” from supporting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.912  In this sense, Neal used 
the promise of the American Committee and loose connections with the Nixon and Ford 
administrations to gain access to Dobrynin and other Soviet leaders, presenting himself as an 
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open and reliable source of information for national politics and a motivated and innovative 
advocate for détente. 
 Neal’s ambition in the early days of the committee’s work is revealed in his 
communications with Soviet authorities, as he expressed hopes to bolster détente by 
fundamentally altering the state of superpower cultural relations.  Although he was more than 
willing to cooperate with friendship societies by hosting delegations, arranging meetings with 
officials, or giving his opinion on American policy or superpower relations, he always kept a 
careful distance from SSOD.  In his initial meeting with Dobrynin, for example, Neal 
requested that the invitation for the group’s trip to Moscow not come from SSOD, since the 
committee was not formally a friendship society motivated by a pro-Soviet ideology or a love 
of Russian culture.913  Neal further emphasized in the July 10, 1974, press release 
announcing the formation of the organization that “this is not any friendship society.”  
Rather, he stated, “We are for the closest cooperation between the USA and the USSR not 
because we love the Russians but because it is in our interest as well as theirs and everybody 
else’s.  We may be critical of both Washington and Moscow if we think their policies call for 
it.”914  By May 1976, he held the same line, telling a SSOD delegation visiting the US that 
his group did not want to be associated with the friendship society.915   
The ISAO’s internal documents reveal that Soviet officials explained Neal’s attitude 
as the result of the anti-détente political climate in the US.  The 1976 delegation, for 
example, connected his response to “the new spell of anti-Soviet hysteria in the US, partly 
related to the electoral campaign.”  Later, they reflected on “the complexity of the current 
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political situation,” predicting an increase in assaults against détente by “reactionary circles.”  
Indeed, the members of the delegation observed that these conditions caused apprehension 
not just for Neal, but also for others who “actively advocated cooperation with the USSR” 
earlier in détente.  As Neal lamented to the Soviet delegation, it was extremely difficult to 
form a “representative respectable organization” in the US in support of détente.916 
In reality, though, it appears that Neal attempted to do something more radical, as he 
hoped to form cultural organizations composed of nonpolitical pro-détente elites in each 
country.  When differentiating his organization from American friendship societies, Neal told 
the ISAO that the American Committee was a “lobbying firm” to promote the improvement 
of Soviet-American relations in the context of “American national interests” through “covert 
actions.”917  As part of this plan, Neal made the bold move of suggesting that the ISAO 
develop a new organization parallel to his committee.  He told SSOD leaders and embassy 
representatives that, “in the eyes of Americans,” the ISAO had a long history of working 
with “pro-Soviet” organizations, meaning that news of an ISAO-American Committee 
connection would produce skepticism rather than excitement in the US.  When he first 
proposed this in 1974, the SSOD leadership protested, arguing that the ISAO already existed 
for thirteen years and did not need to be replaced.  He then recommended that SSOD take a 
few members from the current leadership, perhaps joining up with other Soviet professional 
organizations like the Institute of the USA and Canada, and simply rename it.918   
Neal then took the brash and unprecedented step of suggesting that the ISAO include 
“so-called dissidents” in the new organization, as “this would impress American public 
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opinion.”  Neal specifically named Roy Medvedev, whose blustering critique of Stalinism, 
Let History Judge, had recently been published in English.919  Understanding that Neal’s 
decision to bring up dissidents in official circles could lead to serious difficulties for the 
American Committee’s program with the Soviet government, Fedosov explained the “faux 
pas” and encouraged Neal to write a letter retracting this idea after his return to the US.  Neal 
fell short of this, writing: “I realize the undesirability of this.  But I did want to shock people 
into thinking about some new ideas.”920 
Some prominent Soviet figures showed interest in forming this sort of organization, 
without the dissidents, and while it did not change much about the practical work of the 
American desk at SSOD, they made some effort to address Neal’s concerns.  Arbatov, head 
of the Institute of the USA and Canada, told Neal that a committee composed of figures 
“with positions as important in our society as your members have in yours” was under 
consideration in Moscow, even if “its mode of operation would be different than the 
American Committee.”921  Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR P. N. 
Fedoseev also wrote the SSOD leadership to support the embassy’s recommendation for 
close cooperation with the American Committee, suggesting that SSOD and the Institute of 
the USA and Canada could pick suitable board members for a new organization to parallel 
the American Committee.922  The decision to rename the ISAO the “USSR-USA Society” 
appears to have been partly inspired by these discussions, and while the practical changes to 
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SSOD’s activities in the US remained minimal, Fedosov reported to Moscow in June 1976 
that Neal seemed pleased with the new name and the opening of USSR-USA Society offices 
in cities throughout the USSR.923 
Despite Neal’s ambitions to change the way that cultural organizations advanced 
détente, the American Committee had weaknesses that ultimately hampered its efforts in 
early years.  First, Neal failed to garner the financial support needed to maintain an active 
program, and he frequently complained about money issues in conversations with Soviet 
diplomats.  During the initial planning for the American Committee, Neal repeatedly told 
SSOD leaders that he anticipated financial difficulties, to the point that the ISAO official 
who took notes on the discussions felt that Neal might have been fishing for financial support 
from the Soviet government.924  Shortly after the founding of the American Committee, Neal 
told an embassy representative that he believed a $50,000 annual budget would give them 
sufficient funds to run an effective program and he felt confident that he could raise that sort 
of money, although the embassy official noted that Neal was vague in explaining how he 
planned to accomplish this.925  A few months later, Neal wrote to Moscow that the finance 
committee was raising money “somewhat slowly,” but hoped that its fortune would improve 
with the opening of a permanent office in Washington.926  By 1976, it became clear that 
Neal’s initial optimism about fundraising was misplaced.  One delegation reported that two 
years after the founding of the American Committee, Neal had secured only $30,000 total, 
and all but $4,000 had been spent on a delegation to Moscow.  A far cry from the $50,000 
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annual budget that Neal predicted, most of this money was donated by wealthy members of 
the board, including Kendall and Galbraith. As the delegation lamented, Neal “constantly 
complained about financial difficulties,” which ultimately restricted the American 
Committee’s ability to lobby in favor of détente.927  
Second, Soviet officials expressed criticism of the diverse nature of the American 
Committee.  When visiting Moscow, Neal told SSOD authorities that the activity level of 
members often depended on their profession, with businessmen, public figures, and scientists 
more active than doctors or lawyers.928 In the end, as the delegation concluded, several 
members of the American Committee who could have made a substantial contribution to its 
efforts articulated concerns that being perceived as “pro-Soviet” would hurt them in business 
or in politics.929  In 1976, the USSR-USA Society summary for the American Committee 
noted that its members lived too far apart, and the interparty nature of the organization meant 
that there were often great differences between the opinions of individual members on any 
number of issues central to the defense of détente.930  In other words, the organization’s 
diverse members, who numbered between 100 and 130 by the mid-1970s, made it difficult to 
formulate a single program that satisfied the majority of people and allowed for mass 
participation.    
Third, Soviet officials assumed that stronger leadership might overcome these 
challenges.  As the 1976 summary argued, “A number of the problems rest on Professor 
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Neal’s lack of organizational skills.”931  Indeed, the delegation that year suggested that Neal 
could come up with only vague excuses for why the committee had not found success two 
years into its existence, noting that they failed to convince any number of influential people 
to serve as the chairman of the American Committee, a fact that several members used as a 
“specious excuse” to resign from the organization.  The report advised that the embassy 
should play a more active role in guiding the American Committee’s activities and that 
Soviet diplomats should use their connections in the American business community to 
identify a “reputable and well-known” person to serve as the chair.  More importantly, the 
delegation concluded that, while Neal was “friendly” to Soviet cultural authorities, he was 
also a “disorganized, constantly scattered person” who lacked the skills and the 
organizational activity necessary to manage the American Committee.  They recommended 
that he retain his leading role in the American Committee, but that Soviet diplomats persuade 
him to delegate organizational responsibilities to someone else.932 
The Soviet leadership’s impressions of Neal’s organizational incompetence in the 
early years of the American Committee’s existence intensified upon receiving reports from 
the Soviet Embassy following discussions with other members of the organization.  In 
particular, Carl Marcy, a former Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
who served as director of the American Committee in its initial years, met with Fedosov 
shortly after opening the American Committee’s office in Washington.  He complained about 
Neal’s “difficult character traits,” especially his “dictatorial tendencies.”  While Neal was an 
asset in persuading influential Americans to start the organization in the first place, after its 
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early expansion, Marcy believed that he had “neither the ability, nor the time and resources” 
to manage the American Committee.933  Although he later spoke of Neal favorably, this early 
impression of Neal reinforced the opinions of SSOD leadership.934 
Overall, Neal and the American Committee could not deliver on the full promise of 
the organization, and their attempts to influence politics at the highest level in the US did not 
succeed.  In 1976, for example, two members of the committee served as advisors to the 
Carter administration: Galbraith and Columbia University Professor Richard Gardner.  
Marcy informed an embassy representative, though, that Carter advisor Stuart Eizenstat 
instructed the American Committee members not to “provoke” Carter into making positive 
statements about Soviet-American relations, since “any statement on this issue could 
complicate his campaign.”935  Thus, even when American Committee members could secure 
a position close to an important politician, their suggestions for policies in favor of détente 
often fell on deaf ears.  As public support for détente deteriorated in the late 1970s, the 
American Committee had a more difficult time spreading its message, and its work with the 
USSR-USA Society declined as a result. 
This is not to say that the American Committee ran a completely ineffectual program.  
By the late 1970s, the organization’s finances stabilized somewhat, thanks in large part to a 
$10,000 donation from the UAW. They had three permanent employees stationed in 
Washington.936  George F. Kennan, one of the most famous American diplomats of the 
twentieth century and a vocal supporter of détente, agreed to serve as co-chair of the 
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American Committee, and several other prominent Americans signed on, such as former 
Senator Stuart Symington.937  Furthermore, the American Committee actively published 
works in support of détente, such as Détente or Debacle: Common Sense in US-Soviet 
Relations, which featured articles by Galbraith, Kendall, Kennan, Kistiakowsky, and political 
scientist Stephen Cohen.938  Neal and the American Committee also worked diligently to 
counter the rhetoric of the Committee on the Present Danger.  This group, founded in 
November 1976 to oppose détente, included luminaries such as California Governor and 
future President Ronald Reagan, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, top American 
strategist Paul Nitze, and historian Richard Pipes.939   In one instance, Neal informed 
embassy diplomats that he traveled to Washington to report at a conference convened by 
Congress in May 1977.  There, he countered arguments about the “Soviet military threat” 
articulated by Nitze and General George J. Keegan, the former head of US Air Force 
intelligence.940  These actions were not insignificant, and they signaled that a pro-détente 
voice remained in force, despite the shift in public opinion.  
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The Fishman Affair 
Despite Dobrynin’s work to coordinate the approach and activities of embassy 
personnel, disparities remained between different diplomats’ conceptions of détente.  For 
example, in 1975, the Citizen Exchange Corps, a nonprofit NGO dedicated to building 
cultural exchanges between the US and the USSR, opened negotiations with the embassy’s 
cultural affairs division for an exchange program with bilingual educators.  In October 1976, 
the Soviet delegation visited the US, and the program was judged an overall success, both in 
allowing for an exchange of ideas and pedagogical approaches and in creating positive press 
for détente.  The American delegation made plans to visit Moscow in December 1976 when 
the CEC received a phone call from the embassy eight days before the scheduled departure, 
stating that one delegate, Dr. Joshua Fishman, would likely not receive a visa. The CEC 
noted with frustration that Dr. Fishman had been included on the list of delegates as early as 
March 1976, about eight months earlier.  Eventually, embassy officials conceded that, while 
they might finagle a visa for Dr. Fishman in January, they could not do so before the 
scheduled visit, and the delegates refused to proceed with the trip without Dr. Fishman.941   
There are several potential reasons that Dr. Fishman’s visa may have been declined in 
advance of the trip, although SSOD’s files never provide a direct explanation.  One memo 
that discusses the Fishman affair contains a long complaint by Stepunin about problems in 
receiving American visas for cultural programs in the US.  He cites visas arriving at the last 
moment before the trip, including one instance in which the visa arrived two hours before the 
plane departed, and unprecedented restrictions on travel within the US under visas assigned 
to prominent Soviet visitors.  It is possible that Fishman did not receive his visa due to 
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retribution for these perceived slights to Soviet visitors, although this connection is not 
specifically made in the available documents.942  In their letter of complaint, CEC authorities 
speculated that the refusal probably resulted from Dr. Fishman’s affiliation with Yeshiva 
University and his status as an Orthodox Jew, given the Soviet Union’s general unwillingness 
to work with individuals with any ties to Israeli or Zionist institutions. Precedent exists for 
this sort of visa denial.  For example, in helping the Ministry of Higher and Secondary 
Specialized Education plan a visit of American scientists to the USSR for a conference in 
1972, Science and Technical Counselor E. Belov recommended that geneticist Seymour 
Fogel and astrophysicist Irwin I. Shapiro not receive invitations, the former because of a 
“telegram of Zionist character” that he sent to the embassy, the latter because of his 
participation in “Zionist activities.”943  Still, when directly questioned about this by CEC 
representatives, embassy personnel denied that Dr. Fishman’s ties to Israel posed a major 
problem, and the internal memos do not make reference to Israel.944  Regardless, embassy 
cultural officials seemed genuinely confused by the situation.  Thus, the Fishman affair likely 
arose as a result of a miscommunication between the embassy’s cultural office and consular 
division. 
American organizations reacted strongly to the Fishman affair and became more 
reticent to commit to exchange programs with the Soviet Union.  For example, Irving Hamer, 
Jr., trustee and coordinator of the CEC, wrote on December 24 that the organization was 
“shocked and disappointed” in the developments.  Hamer mentioned that a Soviet Embassy 
spokesperson described the obvious reasons that Dr. Fishman may have been denied a visa—
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his status as an Orthodox Jew, his affiliation with Yeshiva University, Soviet criticism of his 
work several years earlier—as “insufficient.”  Suggesting that “numerous other groups” also 
had visa problems over the previous months, Hamer declared that this was “extremely 
detrimental to public US-USSR exchanges,” which had to be based on “equality and 
reciprocity.”  Hamer complained that the credibility and finances of the CEC were at stake, 
since the CEC relied on public donors, and he lamented the fact that the CEC’s work to 
publicize the exchange backfired as a result of the Fishman affair and drew negative 
attention.  He wrote, “In the eyes of many, the Soviet Union appears to no longer wish to 
carry out its agreements in the area of exchanges and, in particular, this exchange, which was 
made in good faith and heretofore had been carried out with cooperation and to the advantage 
of both sides.”  Moreover, Hamer stated that this sequence of events brought the integrity of 
the ISAO into question.  He concluded ominously, “We have been working hard over the last 
few years to regularize and expand our relations with you.  Yet incidents like this suggest 
negative implications for the future of our relationships.”945   
David Bird, chairman of the New England branch of the CEC, echoed the sentiments 
of the Hamer and the national organization.  He assured Stepunin and the ISAO leadership 
that he was “really glad to be involved with Soviet-American goodwill and understanding” 
and did his best to produce “interesting and unconventional itineraries” for those delegations 
visiting New England.  That said, Bird noted he was “chagrinned and disappointed about the 
whole Fishman matter.”  He asserted that “if a competent professional group is organized to 
represent its profession on an exchange, and the Soviet government rejects one of the group, 
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that becomes a function of state control.”946  In other words, Bird bemoaned the perception of 
state control over what he felt should be matters handled by social organizations.  He felt 
that, if the US accepted a Soviet delegation of professionals without alterations, the Soviet 
government should follow suit.  In sum, like Hamer, he feared for the future of Soviet-
American exchange programs under these conditions. 
In internal communiqués to Moscow, Soviet Embassy diplomats defended their 
state’s actions in the Fishman affair, suggesting that the CEC sought to sabotage the progress 
made in previous years.  In his 1977 report on the USSR-USA Society’s activities after the 
conclusion of the Helsinki Accords, Stepunin described the Fishman affair as the result of 
anti-Soviet forces in the US government interfering in cultural programs.  He wrote that the 
CEC, influenced by the American special services, included Dr. Fishman, someone who was 
a “well-known anti-Soviet” who had been denied a visa multiple times in the past, in the 
delegation.  In response to the Fishman affair, the CEC “blackmailed” the USSR-USA 
Society, “threatened” a press campaign, flooded the Soviet officials’ mailboxes with letters, 
and refused to replace Fishman with another delegate.947  This memo not only laid the blame 
for the failed program at the feet of the CEC, but it also suggested that the cultural exchange 
organization had conspired with dangerous elements of the American government in an 
attempt to undermine Soviet authority.    
The Soviet Embassy’s notes on the Fishman affair do not contain references to the 
American special services, but they do attempt to defend the embassy from criticism at home 
while encouraging ties with the CEC.  In March 1977, embassy representative Fedosov 
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reported on recent work with the CEC to Andrei Ledovskii, the deputy chairman of the 
Presidium of SSOD and an accomplished diplomat who previously served as a high-ranking 
official in the Foreign Ministry and as the Soviet ambassador to Burma.  He stated that, since 
the Fishman affair, the CEC leadership not only refused to send the delegation for bilingual 
education, but also “attempted to organize the mass delivery of protest telegrams to Moscow 
and the embassy, as well as appearances in the American press.”  Fedosov reported that CEC 
leaders such as Jane Lombard and Grant Pendill “continuously return[ed] to the question of 
Fishman” in their meetings, demanding “an explanation and an apology” and declaring that 
they were “unlikely to send a delegation to the USSR this year if the question of Fishman’s 
trip was not reexamined.”  Furthermore, the Soviet representative stated that the CEC was 
actively cultivating ties with other Soviet organizations, specifically citing its work with the 
Stanley Foundation and the Center for Defense Information to arrange a trip by the deputy 
secretary of the Soviet Academy of Science’s Institute of Canada.  He noted that the CEC 
representatives “slipped hints” that it did not “get” that much from SSOD and might look to 
other Soviet organizations to continue their exchange programs.948  Given previous conflicts 
between the different Soviet bureaucracies over who had control over cultural diplomacy, 
Fedosov emphasized the need to retain power for SSOD and the Foreign Ministry and restrict 
organizations like the Academy of Sciences to a secondary role.   
Fedosov’s recommendations reflect both his attempt to outwardly deflect criticism 
and his belief that Soviet officials should put in the necessary work to bring the CEC back 
into the fold.  He concluded that the CEC “hardened its position to a certain extent,” due to 
“the changing circumstances in the country; the escalation of ideological attacks against the 
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socialist system, in general, and the Soviet Union, in particular; and the mass campaign 
directed toward US public opinion for the Western interpretation of the Final Act of the 
Helsinki Accords.”  Still, highlighting the positive results of programs with the CEC for 
Soviet cultural diplomacy, he recommended that SSOD “continue and deepen” its work with 
the CEC.  He suggested that the SSOD leadership meet with Lombard while she visited 
Moscow in April at the invitation of the Soviet United Nations Association, emphasizing to 
her that the CEC should move beyond the Fishman affair and embrace the challenge to make 
a “much greater effort to promote mutual understanding and trust between the American and 
Soviet publics.”949  In other words, he hoped that appealing to the CEC leadership’s passion 
for détente would revive its interest in USSR programs organized by SSOD. In that way, it 
would preserve the role of SSOD in organizing exchanges.  Fedosov emphasized that the 
CEC held the blame for the failed exchange, but encouraged the Soviet leadership to move 
forward in reopening talks with the CEC leadership.  
By May 1977, the CEC and Soviet representatives began to talk about future 
initiatives, and Fedosov continued to frame the situation in a way that presented the Soviet 
Embassy and the USSR-USA Society in the most positive light possible.  He wrote to 
Stepunin that “having probably perceived the incorrectness of its position with regard to the 
Fishman affair,” the CEC organization in Boston, which Soviet representatives viewed as 
more flexible in the wake of the Fishman affair than the New York branch, expressed its 
readiness to invite five Soviet lecturers on various topics to the US in 1977-78.  Fedosov 
suggested that, given the circumstances, it would be wise to move forward with the lectures 
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and revive SSOD’s programs with the CEC.950  Once again, Fedosov stressed that the 
disagreement was entirely the fault of the CEC, but he recommended reconnecting with the 
organization anyway to ensure the continuation of the exchange program.   
Thus, poor communication between the cultural and consular divisions of the 
embassy, as well as disagreement over what sort of delegates were acceptable in an exchange 
program, led to the scrapping of the program and bad press for the Soviet Union, the CEC, 
and the prospects for effective cultural exchange between the superpowers.  The embassy’s 
cultural representatives sought to ameliorate this situation by deflecting blame.  However, 
sensing the importance of cultural programs with the CEC and the need to protect the USSR-
USA Society’s prominent role in planning cultural exchanges, cultural representatives at the 
Soviet Embassy recommended continuing negotiations with the CEC, even when the 
American organization proved resistant to resuming normal relations in the wake of the 
Fishman affair.  While CEC relations with the embassy did rebound, carrying a significant 
portion of the cultural exchange burden as official state exchanges slowed in the 1980s, this 
story exemplifies the limits of cultural détente on a bureaucratic level by providing an 
important example of how even deep-rooted partnerships like the one that existed between 
the USSR-USA Society and the CEC faced increasing challenges in the late 1970s as détente 
collapsed. 
 
Conclusion 
 During his trip to the US from November 20 to December 4, 1977, Soviet sociologist 
G.V. Osipov faced a dilemma.  He was scheduled to give a lecture at Yale University when 
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he discovered that a series of workers’ strikes had erupted on Yale’s campus, lasting more 
than thirteen weeks.  In order to get to his lecture hall, members of the CEC would have to 
support him as he crossed the picket line and protect him from physical injury.  Osipov told 
the head of the CEC that he would not give the lecture so long as the strike continued.  The 
American protested, asking the Soviet sociologist why he came to the US. Osipov shot back 
that he did not come to the US to “interfere in internal American business,” but to give 
lectures.  Still, the trip went ahead, despite Osipov’s additional complaints about the 
conditions provided by the CEC.  As with most exchange delegations, the cultural officers at 
the embassy found themselves serving as translators and facilitators, and Osipov credited 
Fedosov with advising him during the fight with the CEC and ensuring the program’s 
eventual success: “Fedosov extended constant care and attention to me.  He is a highly 
responsible person.  I strongly request that his work be recognized.”951 
 Cultural affairs officers at the Soviet Embassy played a critical role in facilitating the 
flood of Soviet-American cultural exchange programs that came in the aftermath of Nixon’s 
trip to Moscow.  Having played a central role in organizing delegations, they were 
responsible for accompanying the visiting Soviet citizens and smoothing over the problems 
that they inevitably faced, as in Osipov’s situation.  They toured the country, attempting to 
convince audiences that were frequently critical of Soviet policy of the potential for détente.  
Embassy diplomats initiated contact with the American NGOs that seemed best suited for an 
exchange program with SSOD, and they performed the bulk of negotiations, developing 
programs that often succeeded in portraying the Soviet Union and détente in a positive light.  
They faced major obstacles in promoting détente, ranging from the limitations of their own 
bureaucracy to the developments in politics and the Third World in the mid-1970s that turned 
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many Americans against the normalization of Soviet-American relations. Their work under 
these less-than-ideal conditions still provided American citizens who were not necessarily 
friendly to the Soviet Union with additional exposure to the other superpower.  Overall, the 
Soviet Embassy’s efforts in expanding cultural relations reflected its desire to support top-
level diplomacy by presenting the Soviet Union as a mainstream power and reliable 
negotiating partner with rational leaders and a population that was open to the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
SYMPATHY FOR THE RED DEVIL:  
SOVIET-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES AND DÉTENTE  
 
This chapter investigates one failed aspect of détente: Soviet cultural authorities’ 
relationships with Soviet-American friendship societies.  These groups, formed by pro-Soviet 
leftist Americans in the interwar era to promote closer ties between the two countries, faced a 
number of challenges during détente, including empty coffers, dwindling membership 
numbers, and an inability to attract interest among radical youth or pro-détente activists 
outside of their ideological base, despite popular interest in détente.  Détente brought some 
new life to their program, particularly after 1975, with increased exchange opportunities and 
the addition of new regional societies.  However, despite progress on paper facilitated by the 
embassy, the friendship societies did not have a significant impact on Soviet-American 
relations, as they continued to suffer from many of the same deficiencies faced in previous 
decades.   
While American Cold War-era literature described them as such, friendship societies 
in this period were not Soviet fronts.  Although their members did occasionally receive aid 
from the USSR in the form of subsidized in-country travel during their visits, free 
propaganda, and souvenir merchandise to sell at special events, the Russian archives provide 
no sign of direct funding from Moscow.  In fact, the societies were constantly in dire 
financial straits. Further, although they received advice from the ISAO/USSR-USA Society 
to develop their programs, the friendship societies contained an independent leadership that 
  425 
did not take orders from the Kremlin.  On the contrary, at times, friendship society leaders 
expressed ambivalent or even critical opinions about Soviet foreign policy.  That said, the 
national director of the Soviet-American friendship societies acknowledged the importance 
of the embassy in maintaining an active program, writing that, the more he considered the 
programs proposed by Moscow, “the more I think that a fruitful outcome can only be 
possible if Gennady [Fedosov] is part of these deliberations.  With him rests the execution of 
the program here in the States.”952  Indeed, the heads of the cultural affairs department at the 
embassy, as well as their deputies, reported to Moscow on the friendship societies’ activities, 
negotiated proposals for exchange programs, and provided the friendship societies with the 
guidance and material support necessary to implement their programs, making them critical 
to this aspect of cultural relations. 
This chapter traces the history of the Soviet-American friendship movement in the 
US, focusing on how and why the Soviet Union invested resources in the relatively 
unsuccessful enterprise.  It sheds light on efforts by the Soviet Embassy to guide and expand 
friendship societies’ programs, but suggests that a dearth of enthusiasm from embassy 
officials helped contribute to their overall lack of effectiveness.  In the end, embassy officials 
preferred to focus their energies on exploiting new opportunities for closer ties with 
mainstream American cultural organizations.  They understood that these efforts yielded a 
greater positive impact on American public opinion, while the activities of friendship 
societies undermined their message about the Soviet Union’s position as a mainstream 
power. 
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From Madison Square Garden to Prison 
An American-Soviet friendship movement began in the United States with the advent 
of the Friends of the Soviet Union in the 1920s.953  Its overtly radical origins 
notwithstanding, the movement soon tempered, as professionals who were sympathetic to 
socialism formed organizations to promote American recognition of the USSR and better 
relations between the two countries.  In 1926, a group of these individuals—led by prominent 
Americans such as Smith College president William Smith, progressive educational reformer 
John Dewey, public health activist Lillian Wald, celebrated conductor Leopold Stokowski, 
and director of the Council of Foreign Relations Stephen P. Duggan—founded the American 
Society for Cultural Relations with Russia.  The society boasted more than 1,000 members 
by 1929, with branches in several major cities.  Changing its name to the New York 
American-Russian Institute in 1936, it promoted education and mutual understanding 
between the countries without serving the interest of any particular country or ideology.  The 
society’s efforts to remain unaligned helped it avoid controversies and maintain a high 
degree of professionalism.954   
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If the New York-based American-Russian Institute pursued a relatively neutral stance 
in dealing with the USSR, other friendship societies expressed a less nuanced endorsement of 
the Soviet state.  In 1932, professors from the University of California and Stanford 
University, supported by businessmen interested in breaking into the Soviet market, formed 
the San Francisco American-Russian Institute (ARI), which was unaffiliated with the New 
York organization.  Similar to the New York Institute, the San Francisco ARI worked closely 
with Soviet cultural organizations, hosting Soviet delegations and sponsoring exhibits on the 
USSR in San Francisco’s galleries and museums.  Yet, while the New York Institute 
operated on the belief that outward neutrality regarding political relations along with an 
emphasis on developing “objective” knowledge about the Soviet Union through cultural 
exchanges would produce mutual understanding, the leaders of the San Francisco ARI 
publicly advocated for closer political relations between the US and USSR.955   
By 1943, the ARI was led by Dr. Holland Roberts, a former Stanford University 
professor who held the title of president of the ARI from 1943 until his death in 1976. 
Roberts, born in Nebraska in 1895, labored as a factory worker, railroad worker, and seasonal 
farm hand before serving on the Western Front in World War I, according to Soviet sources. 
Upon his return to civilian life, he enrolled at the University of Chicago, completing 
advanced degrees in English and Education and attaining the rank of associate professor of 
Education for English teachers at Stanford University in 1939.  Roberts made his mark on the 
leftist movement in California while serving as president of the National Council of Teachers 
of English in 1937-38 and 1944. He agitated for the American Federation of Teachers, 
became a member of the ARI in the 1930s, and campaigned for the freedom of Tom Mooney, 
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a socialist leader imprisoned from 1922 to 1939 for his involvement in the San Francisco 
Preparedness Day Bombing of 1916.  These activities marked Roberts as a left-wing radical. 
In 1944, Stanford refused to renew his contract. Undeterred, Roberts persisted as an active 
member of the leftist community in San Francisco, joining the California Labor School as its 
educational director after his dismissal from Stanford.  He became director of the school in 
1949, remaining in that post until the government closed the school in 1957.956   
The National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF), an organization with 
a similarly pro-Soviet orientation, formed in New York in the 1940s.  Its roots can be traced 
to the National Council on Soviet Relations, founded in support of World War II to manage 
the 1942 Congress of American-Soviet Friendship, which attracted high-profile supporters 
such as President Franklin Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Vice President 
Henry Wallace.  Following the success of the congress, several members decided to establish 
the NCASF as a permanent organization to fight fascism by promoting closer relations 
between the US and the USSR.  The NCASF experienced tremendous growth during the war 
years, as local affiliates formed across the country, with prominent supporters such as Albert 
Einstein, Judge Learned Hand, Helen Keller, Charlie Chaplin, Aaron Copland, Benny 
Goodman, and Rockwell Kent.957 
During World War II, all three of these groups played a key role in drumming up 
support for the Soviet-American alliance. “The phone began ringing the day Hitler invaded 
the USSR and has not stopped,” a New York Institute official noted at the time.  The 
Associated Press, The New York Times, Time, Life, Newsweek, and other publications paid 
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retainers for its consulting services, and several major universities and corporations, 
including General Electric and Westinghouse, sought its help in establishing contacts in the 
Soviet Union. The institute’s library, which held over 13,000 volumes and 400 titles of 
Russian newspapers and periodicals, was described by one historian as “perhaps the public’s 
best source of information on contemporary Soviet affairs during the war.” Its language 
school enrolled as many as 180 students per session.958  The San Francisco ARI flew 
materials donated by architects, musicians, theater workers, and movie cameramen to 
Moscow using a Lend-Lease plane, while sending 6,000 books to Soviet libraries.  It 
organized a Shostakovich Music Festival, featuring lectures on his life and work, radio 
broadcasts of his compositions, an exhibit at the San Francisco Public Library, and a 45-
minute shortwave broadcast beamed to Moscow featuring his music and greetings from 
famous American musicians.959  The NCASF also sponsored various exhibitions on Soviet 
art, architecture, and daily life, but its most impressive contributions were a series of mass 
rallies held in Madison Square Garden in the period from November 1944 to November 
1945.  The second took place in celebration of V-E Day in May 1945, featuring a 
performance by famous African-American performer and activist Paul Robeson and 
messages sent by Henry A. Wallace, Harold Ickes, Eleanor Roosevelt, Soviet Ambassador 
Andrei Gromyko, and President Harry S. Truman.  The third rally in November 1945 
included messages from Truman, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Albert Einstein, and a 
keynote address from Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  These gatherings show that even the 
San Francisco ARI and the NCASF, which took a more pro-Soviet line than the New York 
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Institute, received support from mainstream American public figures.  
As the wartime alliance fell apart and the Cold War began, the friendship societies’ 
standing in the US quickly declined.  Trouble began for the New York Institute and the 
NCASF in August 1945, when the Hearst Corporation  condemned the groups as communist 
fronts that spread pro-Stalinist propaganda to children through their work in public schools. 
Soon thereafter, these friendship societies came under attack by an American government 
suspicious of any organization with ties to the Soviet Union.  The New York Institute was hit 
the hardest, after the US Attorney General’s Office listed it as a front organization in 1948 
and again in 1949, leading the Internal Revenue Service to revoke its tax-exempt status.  
Unable to overcome these circumstances, it closed in 1950.  The NCASF fared only slightly 
better.  On November 12, 1945—two days before Truman and Eisenhower sent messages of 
support and Dulles delivered his keynote address at the NCASF’s rally at Madison Square 
Garden—the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) questioned whether the 
group was loyal to the United States and ordered it to turn over a list of donors and 
expenditures. The Board of Directors refused, citing the organization’s ties to prominent 
citizens, politicians, and government agencies. The decision set off a chain of events that led 
to the opening of a formal investigation of the NCASF in 1946.  The following year, the US 
Attorney General’s Office added the NCASF to its list of subversive organizations, costing 
the group its tax-exempt status and severely limiting its ability to function.960     
Reverend Richard Morford served as the group’s executive director during this 
troubled time.  Morford’s tenure at the NCASF stretched from 1946 to 1981. Born in 
Onaway, Michigan, in 1903, Morford graduated from Albion College in 1925 and attended 
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Union Theological Seminary in New York.   As a Presbyterian minister, he participated in 
several leftist religious groups, organizing the Albany Area Council of Churches and serving 
as the pastor for the Friendship House, a church and community center for African 
Americans and poor whites.  In 1950, Morford was declared in contempt of Congress a 
second time for refusing to submit the NCASF’s membership and financial records to 
HUAC. He served three months in jail. Although the Supreme Court ruled in 1951 that the 
Attorney General acted illegally by placing the NCASF on the List of Subversive 
Organizations, the Subversive Activities Control Board maintained its attacks on the group, 
declaring it a communist front in 1954.961  Continued government harassment and the Cold 
War ravaged the friendship societies’ support base, and by the late 1960s, only the NCASF in 
New York and the ARI in San Francisco remained active. Other friendship councils in 
Chicago and Los Angeles continued to exist on paper, but their activities were extremely 
restricted.   
 
1969 and the “Moment of Truth” 
By 1969, the NCASF had deteriorated significantly, leaving it in considerable debt 
with shrinking membership rolls and limited opportunities to expand, raise money, or spread 
its message.  In his annual report to the NCASF’s Board of Directors in December 1968, 
Morford proclaimed, “The moment of truth has arrived for the National Council as it faces 
1969.”  He noted that the NCASF was $17,500 in debt, owed an additional several thousand 
dollars to creditors for printing costs, and had no major event on the horizon to bring it out of 
the red.  Reducing the NCASF’s personnel and cutting activities had not helped, and only 
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loans from Morford and the other members of the Board of Directors as well as the 
suspension of salaries to Morford and staff had kept the NCASF afloat.962   
While financial difficulties served as the most immediate cause for concern, Morford 
described three root causes of the NCASF’s failure to generate widespread public support.  
First, he cited apathy toward the NCASF.  He noted that people who were sympathetic to the 
NCASF’s mission chose to work independently of it because they believed the group’s close 
relationship with the USSR meant it could not reach as many people as mainstream 
publishers or cultural organizations.  “The image of the National Council in their minds, and 
they think in the mind of the entire public, is that of a pro-Soviet organization, and this image 
stands in the way of its effective operations,” he explained.  This problem came to the fore 
during the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution in 1967.  
Although 1,500 people attended the festivities in New York, Morford noted, the NCASF 
could not attract speakers from outside of its own inner circles, making it impossible to 
broaden its support base in the general public.963 
Second, although moderates in favor of détente found the NCASF too ideological or 
pro-Soviet, Morford observed that the organization also faced difficulties in generating 
interest among radical youth.  The NCASF had to compete with more popular movements, 
such as Vietnam War opposition groups and the black liberation movement.  Radical 
American students also increasingly turned to China, as many deemed China more 
revolutionary and therefore preferable to the Soviet Union.964  Another dimension of this 
problem, left unmentioned in Morford’s speech, was the advanced age of the NCASF’s 
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leadership.  Most of NCASF’s active members came from the Old Left, primarily socialists 
who joined in the 1920s or 30s. By the time of Morford’s speech, the active core of leaders 
was comprised primarily of senior citizens.965  This led to difficulties in developing a more 
active program, as geriatric leaders frequently lacked the energy or health to produce 
initiatives that could attract younger radicals.  Ultimately, for a youth generation in revolt, 
joining a radical organization dominated by aging fellow travelers was hardly an appealing 
option.   
Third, Morford discussed how the growth in general antipathy toward the USSR, 
resulting from Soviet foreign policy, led to conflicts within the NCASF that alienated its old 
supporters.  He claimed that the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was particularly troublesome, as the 
bulk of the NCASF’s financial support previously came from New York’s Jewish 
community, which expressed outraged over Soviet support for the Arab states.966  Although 
Morford publicly opposed the 1968 Soviet crackdown in Czechoslovakia, describing it in his 
yearly newsletter as a “serious wrong,”967 the NCASF didn’t release an official position. This 
disillusioned constituents who thought that the NCASF should take a more definitive stand 
one way or the other.  
This lack of support for the friendship society movement was further deepened by the 
fact that, rather than working together, the two most active friendship societies—the NCASF 
                                                
965 Perhaps the most telling examples of the leadership’s age come in its frequent complaints to Soviet officials 
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in New York and the ARI in San Francisco—functioned independently. The leaders of both 
groups saw themselves as the rightful head of the friendship society movement, and they 
competed for preferential treatment from Moscow and the Soviet Embassy. In sum, with no 
money in the bank, no ability to gain new support from the general public or radical youth, 
and increasingly elderly and disillusioned members, the NCASF faced serious threats to its 
very existence at the start of 1969.   
 
“We Are Together So Briefly” 
If Morford hoped to convince Moscow and the Soviet Embassy that the NCASF was 
in crisis on the eve of détente and required immediate action to organize profitable events 
and improve the NCASF’s financial standing, he would be greatly disappointed.  From 1969 
to 1975, the ISAO took advantage of improved Soviet-American relations to focus its 
resources on expanding ties with mainstream American groups.  Soviet officials felt that they 
would give greater reach to Soviet propaganda efforts than friendship societies, which the 
public generally distrusted as Soviet fronts.  The NCASF, which stood on precarious ground 
at the start of détente, was placed on the back burner. 
Although Morford and other friendship society leaders understood the importance of 
Moscow’s efforts to collaborate with mainstream organizations, they resented the fact that 
these new ties frequently led Soviet officials to ignore their societies’ needs.  In February 
1972, Morford wrote Moscow regarding a newspaper interview in which the ISAO’s vice-
chairman of the presidium noted that the ISAO had “good relations” with over one hundred 
US public organizations, leaving out the NCASF among the seven groups he specifically 
named.  Morford groused, “We would have thought that the National Council of American-
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Soviet Friendship might have been counted a ‘partner’ of equal standing with those 
named.”968  Moreover, one embassy official reported back to Moscow after a March 1975 
discussion that, although Morford expressed general satisfaction with the ISAO’s expanded 
relations with mainstream groups, he complained about the resulting lack of attention from 
Moscow and the embassy.  Specifically, he griped that, while the NCASF took the initiative 
to invite an ISAO youth group to the US, in the end, the YMCA was publicly given the title 
of “hosts.”969  In a follow-up letter to the head of the embassy’s Cultural Relations 
Department, Morford protested that the exclusion of the National Council from the program 
“clearly indicates that our Youth Division has been, or is in the process of being, read out of 
the picture of youth exchange,” and he balked at the lack of attention from the embassy. “We 
are together so briefly,” he wrote. “Now I am compelled to solicit your reaction by letter, 
which is most unsatisfactory.  I guess I shall have to wait for your coming again to review 
this matter.”970 
The NCASF’s failure to establish partnerships with mainstream organizations only 
compounded this frustration.  When discussing the ISAO’s growing work with such groups, 
Morford frequently noted the “limitations” presented by the NCASF, as its reputation as pro-
Soviet or pro-communist prevented it from developing ties with the mainstream 
organizations courted by Moscow.  He assured the Soviet representatives that he was 
“determined to overcome some of the limitations,” but plans to do so always seemed to fall 
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through.971  The YMCA exchange exemplified this problem.  Although the YMCA, most 
likely at the suggestion of the ISAO, invited the NCASF to cooperate in the exchange, 
Morford complained: “The program for their stay in New York is completely in the hands of 
the ‘local’ YMCA.  There appears to be no place for any functioning on the part of our Youth 
Division.”  Furthermore, while some level of cooperation between the friendship societies 
and the YMCA existed in Los Angeles, those in San Francisco and Seattle were shut out by 
the local branches of the YMCA.972  Despite exertions of time and energy and the support of 
the ISAO, the friendship societies could not establish cooperative programs with mainstream 
American organizations. 
While friendship society leaders faced continuing hardships and received little 
attention from Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in the early years of détente, they worked to 
expand the NCASF’s program using the means at their disposal.  If, in earlier periods, the 
friendship societies had primarily promoted political goals, they now focused almost entirely 
on developing cultural understanding and championing détente, disarmament, and the peace 
movement.  To this end, the NCASF commemorated American and Soviet holidays and 
exchanged professional delegations with the ISAO.  The friendship society leaders also 
created programs to attract American youth.  In 1969, the NCASF began to send a yearly 
delegation of American youth to the Soviet Union, where they toured Moscow, including 
stops at the metro, a “children’s railroad,” and the Pioneer’s Palace, before attending an 
international summer camp at Camp Artek on the Black Sea coast.973 Starting in 1971, the 
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NCASF sponsored an annual “Holiday Gala” to bring American students to the USSR during 
their winter breaks for ice skating, dancing, troika rides, “intimate conversation” with Soviet 
youth in coffee houses, and New Years parties in the apartments of their new Soviet 
friends.974   
The NCASF leadership carefully chose the individuals attending these events, 
specifically targeting groups that seemed most likely to yield future NCASF activists.  Many 
of the children were minorities to facilitate the NCASF’s goal of expanding its access to their 
communities.  Each year, one delegate came from the Harriet Beecher Stowe Intermediate 
School in Harlem, as the NCASF had close ties with Samuel F. Williams, principal of the 
predominantly African-American school.975  The ARI, primarily concerned with establishing 
in-roads into California’s Latino and Asian communities, made plans in 1974 to offer 
scholarships for minorities to attend the camp.976  Other delegates won slots due to their 
working-class background, such as a Minnesota girl whose father was fired from his mining 
job due to trade union ties and political activism and forced to haul pulpwood to make a 
living.  The NCASF also sought out children with familial ties to the radical Left.  Morford 
specifically mentioned that one child’s mother was an active member of the Communist 
Party, and the Native American delegate’s parents were militant Indian radicals.  Relatives of 
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NCASF members received preferential treatment, including Morford’s grandson, who took 
part in the Camp Artek trip in 1976.977   
The NCASF experienced only mixed success in using such programs to expand its 
reach to young people in the 1970s.  One delegate said, “I don’t think the trip convinced me 
about socialism any more than I was already,” but “I certainly did learn a bunch of stuff.”  He 
concluded, “Another reason I am elated about the trip is now when someone wrongly 
criticizes the USSR I can say, ‘No!  The people don’t fear their government.’  Maybe they’ll 
say, ‘How do you know,’ and then with a snicker, ‘I suppose you’ve been there or 
something.’  Of course I can answer ‘Yep.’”978  Others, though, did not express the same 
level of excitement.  Carletta Jackson, a sophomore at San Francisco State University, 
traveled to Baku as a member of an American delegation to the third annual America-Soviet 
Young People’s Conference.  Jackson, an African-American, described a trip to a local 
museum, which featured an exhibit on Angela Davis, the prominent African-American 
communist and activist who was put on trial for murder in the early 1970s.  She noted 
pictures of Davis and Lenin displayed side-by-side, with photographs and reports from the 
trial, and she stated that the Azerbaijanis expressed interest in Davis “because they think we 
(blacks) are carrying on some kind of heavy revolution here,” adding that she “didn’t know 
about that.”  While Jackson criticized the US—expressing some interest in socialism, saying 
“with so much poverty in this country, freedom of speech is often an abstract notion”—she 
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concluded, “It wasn’t heaven there either.”979 Overall, of the ten to twenty young people per 
group per year that the NCASF sent to Camp Artek, the Holiday Gala, and other events, few 
became active members of the NCASF and some came away with mixed impressions of the 
Soviet Union.  
Moreover, as former diplomat Yale Richmond writes, by the 1970s, the Soviet 
Embassy grew unhappy with the quality of meetings arranged by the local chapters of the 
NCASF for Soviet delegations.  As a result, they asked the State Department to help it take 
over the friendship societies' former responsibilities by scheduling appointments between the 
Soviet delegations and mainstream American organizations.980  The embassy's shift in 
attention to mainstream organizations left the friendship societies struggling to assemble a 
successful exchange program. 
 
Planning Regional Expansion 
In response to an increasingly chilly reaction from mainstream organizations 
beginning in the mid-1970s, embassy representatives paid more attention to expanding the 
ISAO’s program with the NCASF.  The stage was already set, as the old Chicago and Los 
Angeles societies renewed their activities in the early 1970s and allies of the ARI established 
friendship societies in Washington State in 1972 and San Diego in 1974.981 Discussions for 
expansion of the NCASF first appear in a comprehensive report written for the ISAO in late 
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1973, when Morford broached the idea of “attempt[ing] local organizing efforts,” with 
Boston, Philadelphia, and Detroit listed as immediate targets.982  In March 1975, embassy 
representative Vladimir F. Zharkov brought up the potential expansion of the NCASF when 
finalizing exchange plans for 1975 with Morford.  Zharkov suggested that they consider 
adding some cities to the plans of Soviet tour groups that had not been visited in recent years, 
including places that did not have friendship society branches.  Morford agreed, proposing 
Denver, Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, New Orleans, Des Moines, Minneapolis, and Atlanta, 
arguing that the NCASF had connections in several of these locations, especially 
Minneapolis and Detroit.  In his report to Moscow, Zharkov noted that trips to these cities 
would also be helpful in fulfilling the plan to establish new “sister cities” in the US or 
agreements among cities in different countries for cultural and economic ties.983  Thus the 
expansion of the NCASF came as the Soviet Embassy pushed for tour groups to travel to new 
areas in the US as an alternative to the rotation of New York, Washington, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and Chicago that had been typical in previous years.   
Morford and the ISAO representatives acted on their plan to expand the friendship 
societies’ programs and geographic reach later in 1975, with the friendship societies’ 
celebration of Victory Day.  They arranged a stage show that featured Soviet film actors 
portraying war heroes, two top dancers from the Bolshoi Theater performing an Adagio from 
Spartacus, an array of Soviet speakers that included a general, and several American public 
figures.  Although he had trouble getting the media to cover the show, Morford reported that 
more than 2,400 of the 2,800 seats in Carnegie Hall were filled, a vast improvement over 
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recent efforts.984  The acts were repeated for the friendship societies in Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco, and the ISAO sent members of the delegation to visit 
Minneapolis and St. Paul.  There, Morford assembled a group of sympathetic Americans with 
connections to the NCASF and, following their meetings with the delegation, they 
established the Minnesota Council of American-Soviet Friendship.985  This began an 
expansion process, driven by Morford and the ISAO’s representatives at the Soviet Embassy, 
which led to new friendship societies in Milwaukee, Washington, D.C., and St. Petersburg, 
Florida.  By 1979, the NCASF claimed that nineteen friendship societies operated on US soil, 
with nine more in development.  
In a May 1977 letter, Morford outlined some of the general circumstances he viewed 
as ideal for establishing a new regional affiliate of the NCASF, using the Oregon Council of 
American-Soviet Friendship as a model.  First, Morford emphasized the importance of 
exploiting existing connections with prominent social figures in the target city.  In Portland’s 
case, the NCASF had long-established ties with Reverend Mark Chamberlin, who previously 
led the Oregon Chapter of the Methodist Federation for Social Action, an unofficial social 
education and action group of the United Methodist Church.  Although Morford was a 
Presbyterian minister, his background was in the Methodist Church, and he served on the 
Executive Committee of the Methodist Federation, headquartered in New York.  Morford 
corresponded with Chamberlin, not only about the Methodist Federation but also regarding 
the promotion of Soviet-American relations, and Chamberlin occasionally donated money to 
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the NCASF. When the NCASF began making plans to expand into Portland in early 1977, 
Morford contacted Chamberlin, acknowledging his recent contribution to the NCASF and 
asking him to reach out to the community to identify people sympathetic to the friendship 
movement’s cause.  Morford also suggested that Chamberlin contact a number of individuals 
whom he knew rather well, including members of the NCASF who had moved to the West 
Coast, children of NCASF members, and graduate students who were known friends of the 
NCASF.986  Thus Morford employed preexisting connections with prominent figures in 
potential regions for expansion, allowing the agents on the ground to pool together people 
sympathetic to the cause of better Soviet-American relations.  
Second, Morford promoted the gradual development of the fledgling society by 
avoiding overreliance on well-known pro-Soviet leftists.  In Portland, Morford asked 
Chamberlin “whether they thought there could be a fairly broad basis for organization in 
Portland” and whether they could “reach out into the wider community and attract people and 
bring about their involvement in the Movement who are not necessarily progressive and not 
necessarily of the Left.”  Chamberlin responded by contacting members of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom and the World Affairs Council, as well as 
university professors and high school teachers who had traveled to the Soviet Union.  
Chamberlin contacted two leaders of the local Communist Party, who enthusiastically 
supported the establishment of a friendship society in Portland. The leaders intended to use 
the opening of a new leftist bookstore in Portland as an opportunity to hold an organizing 
meeting for the new friendship council.  Morford intervened, stressing to Chamberlin the 
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need for a broader base of support to start the society, with representatives from the 
organizations previously contacted by Chamberlin as well as trade union leaders, youth, 
African-Americans, and other minorities.  As a result, Chamberlin convinced the two 
communists to put the official pronouncement on hold.987  Young schoolteachers Bill and 
Sara Tattam eventually assumed leading roles in the organization.  Embassy representative 
Metelkin observed that Bill possessed organizational skills and the ability to relate to people 
– strengths that would aid in the development of the society.988   
Third, Morford underscored the importance of Soviet involvement in energizing new 
regional societies.  He reported the development of the Portland organization to the Soviet 
Embassy and Moscow, and the Soviet leadership “took the cue very well,” altering the 
schedule of the second Soviet delegation of 1977 to include a trip to Portland “to help us with 
this organizing effort.”   This energized Chamberlin, who assembled a reception committee 
comprising businessmen, an insurance agent, a few teachers, and a transportation expert with 
ties to the African-American community, many of whom stayed on as members of the 
permanent committee for the new Oregon council.  They developed ties with local lawyers 
and medical professionals, who provided a counterpart to the lawyers and doctors visiting 
with the Soviet group.  They also contacted the city government to plan a meeting between 
local officials and the Soviet visitors.989  In this sense, a visit by a Soviet delegation and 
support from the Soviet Embassy could energize the potential constituents identified by the 
NCASF’s allies on the ground, motivating potential leaders to broaden contacts with the 
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community and build organizational bodies that would become the basis for the future 
management of the council.    
Finally, Morford argued that the NCASF’s national leadership should provide 
guidance to the fledgling council, while avoiding the impression of being overbearing.  
Morford traveled to Portland during the delegation’s stay, but he did not want to interfere 
with the time that the Portlanders spent with the Soviet representatives.  Rather, he planned 
to attend only a luncheon and an evening meeting with the group of people selected by 
Chamberlin and other local leaders who would serve as the basis for the permanent council.  
When it came to declaring the official formation of the organization, Morford emphasized 
that he would not “push it down their throats,” since “they won’t want anybody from New 
York telling them what to do.”  However, since no one in the fledgling society had 
experience running a friendship council, Morford planned to discuss “the tremendous 
possibilities there are program-wise for promoting American-Soviet friendship in their area.”  
He concluded, “Perhaps I can excite them with all these possibilities.”990 
 
The Greater Boston Committee of American-Soviet Friendship 
To explore the development of new regional friendship councils, I offer case studies 
of the two early additions, in San Diego and the state of Washington, as well as two post-
1975 additions, in Boston and Sacramento.  I discuss them not in chronological order, but 
from most to least successful, starting with Boston and San Diego, and concluding with 
Washington and Sacramento.  The Greater Boston Committee of American-Soviet 
Friendship was founded in April 1976, following several months of preparatory work by 
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Morford and the embassy.991  Embassy representative Metelkin, who attended the 
organizational meeting of the committee on April 29, described how the group organized a 
Russian film festival in just six weeks. About 1,500 people, including students from Yale 
University and Boston University, attended the festival, allowing the committee to build a 
strong base of support in the student community.992  Moreover, a Soviet delegation visited 
Boston in April 1976, generating excitement and prompting the creation of a reception 
committee, under the auspices of Morford, which served as the basis for the future permanent 
committee.993 
Vali Buland served as the secretary-treasurer of the Greater Boston Committee from 
its inception, proving to be one of the most competent regional leaders in the NCASF during 
détente.  In contrast to the elderly fellow travelers who led the NCASF, the ARI, and many of 
the regional societies, Buland was only twenty-three years old.  She graduated from college 
with a B.A. in Political Science the previous June.  Soviet records suggest that she belonged 
to the local chapter of the Young Workers Liberation League, a Communist Party youth 
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on the April 29 organizational meeting of the Greater Boston Committee, noting that the preparatory work had 
begun about two months earlier, with the NCASF and local leaders of the CP USA in the lead.  Given the other 
documents, though, it seems that plans for the Greater Boston Committee were in development for a longer 
period of time.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 132-33.   
992 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 132-133. 
993 Fedosov proposed that the delegation be sent to Boston to help with the formation of the committee in a 
memo to Stepunin on February 18.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1601, ll. 22-23.  ISAO secretary 
Molchanov wrote about the reception committee and the excitement generated by the visit in his report on the 
trip.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1204, ll. 1-3. 
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organization.994  Unlike many of her contemporaries, Buland was a full-time employee of the 
NCASF with a paid salary, allowing her to dedicate her attention to the development of 
Soviet-American relations.995  According to Soviet reports, Buland displayed tremendous 
energy in quickly putting together a comprehensive program. She attracted local youth to the 
committee’s activities, as evidenced by the Russian film festival before the official 
establishment of the society.996   
Soviet observers also took note of Buland.  Following the organizational meeting, 
Metelkin stated that “she makes a good impression,” and when Buland traveled to Moscow 
for the first time with a delegation of regional NCASF representatives, Stepunin reported to 
Morford: “Your delegation was a rather good one.  Specially [sic] I liked the girl from 
Boston, she seems to be a devoted person to the Course and undershands [sic] the problems 
deeply.”997  Fedosov observed that the successful launch of the Greater Boston Committee 
took place primarily due to the serious approach taken by Buland in recruiting cadres.998  
Buland’s dynamic personality served as a dramatic contrast to the septua- and octogenarian 
fellow travelers who led other societies. 
Buland’s work had immediate and long-lasting effects on the Greater Boston 
Committee.  Fedosov visited Boston in November 1976, less than seven months after the 
                                                
994 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 132-133. 
995 Molchanov and Fedosov both mention Buland’s employment status in their reports.  See GARF, f. R-9576, 
op. 20, d. 1204, ll. 1-3, and GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 211-215. 
996 ISAR Secretary Molchanov took specific note of the large numbers of young people at the organizational 
meeting, claiming that this demonstrated that the other societies were doing “insufficient work” to appeal to 
youth.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1204, ll. 1-3. 
997 For Metelkin’s report, see GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 132-133.  For Stepunin’s letter to Morford, 
see GARF f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1208, ll. 130-31. 
998 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 211-15. 
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establishment of the society, to meet with the leaders of the Greater Boston Committee and 
discuss important questions related to its activities.  He claimed that the committee 
“energetically” pursued its agenda, largely due to Buland’s full-time employment as 
secretary-treasurer, holding regular meetings, showing Soviet films, and organizing exhibits 
of photographs, children’s art, and graphic arts.  Moreover, the Boston Committee gathered 
in support of détente, featuring representatives from different strata of New England society, 
including local university students.  The committee had 400 members at the time, with 80 
who regularly paid dues.  The following year, the committee had plans to expand to 1,000 
members, and Fedosov noted that they sought aid from the USSR-USA Society in 
developing Russian language courses.999  By the fall of 1976, the Greater Boston Committee 
released a newsletter, advertising a meeting on September 23 in which State Representative 
Mel King and Dr. Mark Solomon of Simmons College spoke about “What Détente Means to 
Us.”1000  Unlike most friendship societies, which took several years to develop a continuous 
program, the Boston Committee quickly implemented an ambitious array of activities and 
aggressively pursued new members.   
Fedosov also described the Greater Boston Committee’s advantage in recruiting new 
members while suggesting ways to extend membership beyond traditional leftist circles.  On 
the one hand, he pointed to the leadership of the Greater Boston Committee’s strong 
connection to leftist circles.1001  Indeed, Metelkin’s report states that around 50 percent of the 
people present at the council’s organizational meeting in April 1976 were members of the CP 
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USA, a higher percentage than in the friendship societies of most other cities.1002  On the 
other hand, Fedosov pointed to the necessity as well as the possibility of expanding the 
Greater Boston Committee beyond the bounds of the leftist movement.  In his remarks to the 
leadership, he “emphasized the importance of escaping isolation, carrying on work with the 
intelligentsia and establishing contacts with different American organizations that advocate 
the development of Soviet-American relations.”  Fedosov stressed that the committee should 
work to bring prominent American scholars into the fold, even suggesting that they search 
among the twenty Nobel Prize laureates living in the Boston area to see if any would serve as 
honorary president.  Fedosov felt this sort of expansion was possible, owing to existing ties 
with local labor unions and academic institutions, as several members of the Board of 
Directors taught at local universities.1003  These recommendations represent an attempt by 
Fedosov to push the fledgling friendship societies in a more mainstream direction, away from 
their traditional reliance on leftist support that hampered their efforts to influence politicians 
and garner support from moderate Americans. 
While the Greater Boston Committee’s work impressed Fedosov, its most dramatic 
contribution to the friendship movement came in 1977.  The genesis for this program seems 
to have come from Fedosov, who, as Morford put it in a letter to Stepunin, visited regional 
councils throughout the country in late 1976 through early 1977, “indicating in no uncertain 
terms his expectations of considerably expanded programs.”1004  Fedosov reported that, 
                                                
1002 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 132-33. 
1003 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 211-15. 
1004 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1603, l. 12.  In this letter, Morford also describes how Fedosov urged him to 
push the councils toward a more comprehensive program.  As a result, for the first time in years, Morford hired 
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during his November 1976 visit to Boston, he proposed a spring festival of Soviet culture as 
part of a year-long celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.  The 
festival would include various informational booths, Soviet films, the sale of literature and 
souvenirs, and presentations from Soviet delegations or artists traveling through Boston.1005  
Following a ten-day trip to the Soviet Union designed to energize young leaders of regional 
societies, Buland wrote to Stepunin on December 29, announcing the Boston Committee’s 
intentions to make the festival the highlight of their first year of activities.1006   The theme 
would be “Détente, Peace, Trade and Understanding.”  In addition to the earlier suggestions 
made by Fedosov, Buland expressed a desire to incorporate a seminar on trade and cultural 
entertainment, with Soviet journalists and trade representatives from the embassy available to 
meet with local businessmen and journalists.  She listed a variety of themes that the festival 
would cover, including the nationalities question, women, youth, tourism, language 
instruction, development in Siberia, the 1980 Olympics, and Soviet achievements in culture, 
medicine, science, and space exploration. 1007   
In her letter, Buland emphasized that the Boston Committee would follow Fedosov’s 
guidance, making outreach to the broader community a critical component of the spring 
                                                                                                                                                  
again wrote to Stepunin, explaining that Fedosov had read him “a list of expectancies” for the expanded 
program, potentially sent from Moscow.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1603, ll. 23-25. 
1005 Ibid. 
1006 Describing the trip, Buland wrote to Stepunin: “The wonderful experiences that I had in my 10 day visit to 
the S.U. have remained an inspiration to me and by extension to our society.  We have gained new 
understanding and new ideas for our work and I of course had a real vacation in the process.”  See GARF, f. R-
9576, op. 20, d. 1602, ll. 5, 9.  Fedosov proposed that representatives from the three newest regional councils, 
including Buland, be sent in the delegation to the Soviet Union.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1205, ll. 179-
80.  Morford mentioned to Stepunin that he agreed with this proposal, since the older societies had been 
represented in a delegation the previous fall.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1207, l. 118.  The Soviet report 
on the trip spoke of Buland positively.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 816, ll. 78-81.  Stepunin echoed these 
sentiments in a follow-up note to Morford.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1208, ll. 130-31. 
1007 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1602, ll. 5, 9. 
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festival.  She stated that the committee planned to hold the festival at one of the local 
universities to allow students easy access to the exhibits.  Furthermore, she mentioned an 
endeavor to arrange a sister-school relationship between high schools in Boston and the 
Soviet Union, highlighting her efforts to sponsor a relationship between the Pushkin Institute 
and the Russian departments of local high schools and colleges, which would be bolstered by 
a Pushkin Institute exhibit at the festival.  Buland emphasized, “All our activities are being 
coordinated with the embassy in Washington.”1008 
Indeed, as in all other major events carried out by the friendship societies, the 
embassy played a key role in supporting the spring festival.  The embassy served as the 
Boston Committee’s best advocate in petitioning the USSR-USA Society for materials for 
the festival.  For example, on January 21, 1977, Fedosov wrote to the USSR-USA Society 
leadership, requesting exhibits on Soviet photography, children’s art, folk art, stamps, 
posters, Soviet books published in English, American books translated and published in the 
USSR, literature on the Soviet Union and the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, and an 
art exhibition “America through the eyes of Soviet artists.”  Fedosov asked for a series of 
Soviet films and various souvenirs and other items, totaling 250 to 300 rubles, to be sold at a 
gift stand.  He argued that these materials, along with a delegation that included lecturers and 
three or four artists, would be necessary for the success of the festival, and he stressed that 
they could be used throughout the year by other societies celebrating the anniversary of the 
revolution.1009  The embassy also supplied the Greater Boston Committee with materials it 
                                                
1008 Ibid. 
1009 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1601, ll. 4-6.  The USSR-USA Society made a significant commitment to 
fulfilling these requests.  The leadership’s initial response indicates its promise to send a significant 
contribution, but not as many exhibits as Fedosov requested.  It included three photo exhibits on the themes 
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already had in Washington.  By March 7, Fedosov had passed along eight photo collections, 
a graphic arts exhibit, posters, and various other materials that the Cultural Department had 
on hand.  Moreover, Novosti Press Agency’s representatives in the US agreed to provide one 
or two high-quality photo exhibits, and that trade representatives at the embassy planned to 
send an array of photographs and advertisements to the festival.1010  Morford wrote Moscow 
that the Greater Boston Committee pursued the festival without any money of its own, 
indicating that, without the embassy’s material support, the festival could not have gone 
forward.1011   
In addition to material aid, the embassy provided critical advice and encouragement 
in helping the Greater Boston Committee put together the most effective event possible. 
Fedosov kept tabs on the Greater Boston Committee’s activities, ensuring that they went as 
planned.  On February 16, Morford explained to Stepunin that, following Buland’s recent 
visit to New York, when she complained of problems with launching the festival, Morford 
directed her to “get herself down to Washington, pronto,” as per Fedosov’s instructions, to 
work out details with him and the trade representative at the embassy.1012  Three weeks later, 
in a follow-up letter, Morford wrote that Buland and another Boston representative took the 
trip to Washington to discuss the festival.  Fedosov “promised them a considerable amount of 
help,” handing over several exhibitions and agreeing to provide further counsel during his 
lecture engagements in Boston later that month, when, Morford noted, Fedosov planned “to 
                                                                                                                                                  
weeks later, the USSR-USA Society wrote to Vali Buland, suggesting that there would be additional exhibitions 
on youth, preparations for the 1980 Olympics, and construction in Siberia.  See GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 
1602, l. 7. 
1010 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1601, ll. 33-35. 
1011 GARF. f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1603, ll. 23-25. 
1012 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1603, ll. 14-15. 
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push Vali Buland still harder.”  He concluded that, as a result of the embassy’s support for 
the festival, “I think they will have something big and quite useful there that will get public 
attention,” both in terms of attendance and local media coverage.  Inspired by the plans for 
Boston, Morford began to explore the possibilities for expanding the festivals to other cities, 
initially embarking on “serious discussions” with the friendship society in Chicago to hold a 
festival with movies, an exhibition, and public meetings, and reserving Milwaukee as a 
backup.1013  In sum, the embassy frequently wrote to the USSR-USA Society to update the 
leadership on progress in planning the festival, and it constantly pushed the Greater Boston 
Committee and the NCASF to expand the festival’s program and outreach by providing all 
available material aid. 
Both NCASF and Soviet reports cast the spring festival as successful.  Following 
months of planning, festivals were held in Boston, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Chicago, and 
New York.1014  Morford made note of the Greater Boston Committee’s use of the festival to 
expand its outreach.  State Senator William Owen, the mayor of Cambridge, and Dr. Ewart 
Guinier, the first head of Harvard University’s Department of Afro-American Studies, made 
appearances at the festival, demonstrating the Greater Boston Committee’s ability to expand 
its activities into the broader community.  In the same vein, Morford highlighted the Greater 
Boston Committee’s newfound partnership with the Harriet Tubman Center, established at 
the festival, which he described as “a first solid step” in developing roots in the African-
American community.1015   
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Soviet officials also considered the events successful, since they facilitated the 
activities of the friendship societies and expanded membership rolls.1016  Milwaukee, in 
particular, adapted the Greater Boston Committee’s plans, hosting embassy trade 
representative O. E. Tishchenko, who presented on Soviet-American trade relations and the 
benefits they allocated to the American worker.  Although “local Zionist organizations” 
attempted to disrupt the event, it continued with limited interruption, and local media covered 
the event positively, with representatives from the Soviet Embassy giving interviews for TV, 
radio, and newspapers.1017  The Minnesota Council showed four Soviet films as part of its 
spring festival, the first Soviet films shown in the region in five years.  However, Fedosov 
suggests that the local press “intentionally ignored” the festival, due to the anti-Soviet 
political climate in the country.1018  Thus, the Greater Boston Committee, with support from 
the Soviet Embassy and the NCASF, developed an effective program for the spring festival 
that was successfully copied by other regional societies.  
Despite Buland’s efforts, the Greater Boston Committee shared several of the 
weaknesses of other friendship societies.  First, it lacked the financial resources necessary to 
sustain its activities.  Fedosov admitted that, from its establishment, the Greater Boston 
Committee received extensive financial support from the NCASF.1019  For example, since 
Buland was unemployed at the founding of the Greater Boston Committee, the NCASF hired 
her as a full-time employee.1020  In late 1976, Will Keenan, chairman of the Greater Boston 
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Committee, complained to Moscow of money problems.  Keenan requested a photo exhibit, 
noting that they hoped to charge money for the entrance, and he emphasized, “Money is our 
biggest problem.  Anything we do must not lose money.”1021  By the following year, the 
Greater Boston Committee paid Buland’s salary on its own, but its financial situation had not 
improved and the leadership attempted to pursue spring festival plans without spending any 
money.  This was quite a feat.1022  Morford summarized the Greater Boston Committee’s 
difficulties when describing their spring festival plans:  
The problem of finance is not an easy one to solve.  Boston has accumulated a fairly 
impressive record of activities since they first began with the reception of the Soviet 
Delegation last May.  A record on which they ought to be able to raise funds in the 
wider Boston area but they do not seem to be able to receive much and are having 
difficulty in maintaining Vali’s services.  This is very distressing.1023 
 
Even though it had enacted a more active program than most other regional societies, the 
Greater Boston Committee found itself unable to increase its income, leaving it dangerously 
close to bankruptcy and losing Buland. 
Second, Soviet authorities in Moscow did not always respond to the committee’s 
ambitious plans.  In her December 29 letter, Buland informed Stepunin of plans to send a 
local artist to the USSR for an exhibition of his works.1024  Buland forwarded the official 
letter on January 9, indicating that George Gabin, a member of the Greater Boston 
Committee, would lead the delegation of three artists.  She suggested that they travel to the 
Soviet Union for a month during one of the academic breaks, meeting with counterparts and 
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1022 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 20, d. 1603, ll. 23-25. 
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students, displaying their works, and preparing articles on the experience to be published 
upon their return home.  The artists would pay for their own transportation, but would require 
aid in shipping their works to the Soviet Union.1025  Morford, apparently enthusiastic about 
the plan, wrote to the USSR-USA Society on February 16, requesting that the USSR-USA 
Society respond to Buland’s letter as soon as possible.1026  Despite Morford’s interest and the 
economical and well-planned nature of the proposal, the USSR-USA Society, in a February 
18 response, said the artist exchange was “impossible” as “our 1977 plan of exchange is 
overloaded and is very extensive in connection with the 60th Anniversary.”1027  The USSR-
USA Society could not or chose not to tackle many of the programs proposed by the Greater 
Boston Committee. 
Finally, despite its larger membership rolls, the Greater Boston Committee could 
not produce cooperative programs with most mainstream organizations due to its reputation 
as a pro-Soviet organization.  For example, following the Fishman affair in December 1976, 
when the Soviet Embassy experienced a falling out with the national leadership of the Citizen 
Exchange Corps, the cultural affairs representatives at the Soviet Embassy frequently 
attempted to work with the CEC’s regional office in Boston, which they felt took “a more 
constructive position” on Soviet-American exchanges.1028  Despite their impression that the 
Boston office was more accommodating, the Soviet representatives could not convince its 
administrators to work with the Greater Boston Committee.  Fedosov raised the question of 
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cooperation with both parties during his 1976 visit.  While the CEC office did not reject the 
proposal outright, the leadership suggested that they would pursue joint programs only with 
great reluctance.1029  Then, in March 1977, Fedosov attempted to convince officials from the 
Boston office to get involved in the spring festival planned by the Greater Boston 
Committee.  Although Buland stated that some members of the CEC’s Boston office 
participated on their own, Fedosov reported that they “categorically refused to cooperate with 
the local friendship society [on an official basis] . . . because they could not support a ‘pro-
communist’ and ‘political’ organization.”1030  Similarly, the Greater Boston Committee asked 
the mayor of Boston to participate in the 1977 spring festival.  He then contacted the State 
Department, which told him to avoid the spring festival, as it was organized by a “pro-
Soviet” organization.1031 
In spite of these weaknesses, the Greater Boston Committee continued to have one of 
the most active friendship societies during détente.  Buland remained secretary-treasurer, and 
in 1978, the committee received permission to use a 200-seat conference room once a month 
in the newly-built McCormack Building in downtown Boston.  The committee used this 
space to expand its program. In January, it hosted a meeting on Soviet medicine that included 
reports presented by American doctors who visited the USSR under the auspices of the 
USSR-USA Society. In March, the Greater Boston Committee planned a seminar on Soviet 
women, with aid from embassy diplomats.  The spring festival became an annual event for 
the friendship societies, and in May, as part of the festival, the committee scheduled an 
evening on the theme of “The History of Soviet-American Relations,” focusing on the 
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anniversary of the 1972 Moscow Summit.1032  Other regional societies never matched this 
high level of activity, leaving the Boston group as the most successful example of the 
NCASF’s expansion efforts in the mid-1970s. 
 
The San Diego Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union 
Although the San Diego Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union could 
not compete with the Greater Boston Committee’s membership numbers or level of activity, 
it represents another relatively successful regional society.  Dr. Harry C. Steinmetz, founder 
of the San Diego Society, received degrees in psychology from Purdue University, the 
University of Maryland, the University of Southern California, and the University of 
California at Berkeley, and he accepted a teaching position at San Diego State College in 
1930.  Active in local politics, Steinmetz ran on a socialistic platform for mayor in 1935 and 
Congress in 1948, but failed to win office.  He worked as an officer in labor organizations 
and participated in local protests.  First in 1936, and then in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
conservative elements in San Diego attacked Steinmetz for his radicalism, and in 1954, 
Steinmetz was dismissed from his job at the university for refusing to divulge to HUAC 
whether he belonged to the Communist Party.  He spent the following years practicing 
psychology in San Diego and Los Angeles, traveling through Europe, and teaching in 
Canada, Michigan, and Georgia, before retiring to San Diego in the late 1960s.1033  Another 
septuagenarian leader of the friendship movement, Steinmetz served as president of the San 
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Diego Society from its founding on February 10, 1974, until his death on February 15, 1981, 
at the age of 82.1034 
From the start, the San Diego Society confronted several challenges that nearly 
crippled its activities.  One of the main problems faced by regional societies involved a lack 
of direct communication with Moscow or the Soviet Embassy.  For instance, in 1974, 
Stepunin wrote a letter to Roberts, requesting information on the activities of the regional 
friendship societies in Chicago, Seattle, and San Francisco.  Specifically, he asked Roberts to 
include contact information, indicating that the ISAO did not even have their addresses on 
file to start a direct correspondence.1035  Roberts responded with details on the leadership and 
activities of the regional friendship societies, including San Diego, describing Steinmetz, a 
person whom Roberts had known for over twenty-five years, as a “capable thinker” devoted 
to the cause of Soviet-American friendship and peace.1036  Simultaneously, Steinmetz wrote 
to Moscow, announcing the formation of the San Diego Society, and Moscow responded 
with congratulations, promises to look into his material requests, and directions to contact 
their representatives at the Soviet Embassy for additional guidance.1037   
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Soviet authorities paid such little attention to Steinmetz, likely because San Diego 
remained a closed city to Soviet visitors, that the ISAO mailed literature to the San Diego 
Society at the wrong address for several years.  Apparently, rather than sending the materials 
to Steinmetz’s home address on Union Street, Soviet authorities forwarded his packages to a 
certain A.G. Steinmetz of University Avenue, a commercial travel agent in San Diego with 
no connection to the friendship society.  On July 30, 1975—eighteen months after the 
founding of the San Diego Society—Steinmetz composed an exasperated response to 
Stepunin, stressing that he had written Moscow over a dozen times during the past four years 
to correct this mistake.  Furthermore, Steinmetz reported the mix up to the embassy, the 
consulate in San Francisco, Morford, Roberts, and representatives from Soviet publishers 
stationed in Moscow and Washington.  He even sent messages with Soviet travelers who 
promised to forward them to the appropriate officials, but to no avail.  Steinmetz described 
Moscow’s indifference to correcting this mistake as “increasingly embarrassing.”  Regarding 
the ISAO’s lack of responsiveness in arranging cultural exchanges, he concludes: “I am 
devoted as I always have been to peace, détente, and cultural exchanges, and if, in the future, 
I receive no answers to the above, perhaps I should address my inquiries to Mr. L. I. 
Brezhnev.”1038 
Even when representatives at the ISAO sent letters to the correct address, the long 
turnaround time frustrated Steinmetz.  Throughout 1975, Steinmetz complained several times 
about this problem.  In late December 1974, Steinmetz contacted the ISAO and embassy 
representatives to discuss plans for an upcoming tour of the USSR for the San Diego Youth 
Symphony Orchestra.  He notes that “unless you answer our letters, the friendship business 
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droops, we become discouraged, and no generous hospitality can take place.”1039  The 
response to this letter—dated March 18—did not reach Steinmetz until April 3, and on April 
5, Steinmetz wrote back, asking that his “Moscow Chaperone” let him know when his letter 
arrives and pleading that he not wait “nearly four months” to get back to him.1040  In summer 
1975, Steinmetz complained again that he had seen “very little evidence that my letters to 
you are read by any one” and reemphasizing his belief that “the success of détente depends a 
lot upon satisfactory communication.”1041  The ISAO replied in September, assuring 
Steinmetz that they read his letters and greatly appreciated his work to improve Soviet-
American relations.  Steinmetz remained skeptical.1042   
Following the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Steinmetz authored a 
comprehensive report to the Soviet General Consul in San Francisco, outlining the San Diego 
Society’s activities and sharply criticizing the lack of support received from Soviet 
authorities.  Beginning with assurances of his “faith in the future of your socialism since 
1917,” he emphasized that the primary problem they faced “is with our Soviet friends,” as 
they did not respond to letters, answer questions, send sufficient information about upcoming 
delegations, or provide the friendship societies with appropriate answers to the burning 
questions about the Soviet Union that dominated the public discourse.  He concluded:  
I never criticize my Soviet friends to Americans, but to you I must confess utter 
bafflement by a seeming lack in your friendship societies and agencies of secretarial 
help.  Détente begins and ends in communication, but you seem unprepared for it.  
Really I think your whole public relations program, if you have one aside from your 
vast publishing houses, needs overhauling.  I’d like to recommend a weekend in some 
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dacha in the woods of Baltimore or near San Francisco of a half dozen Soviet PR folk 
and a half dozen Americans.1043 
 
The General Consul passed this scathing critique on to the ISAO leadership, but the ISAO 
took no action to placate Steinmetz.  Rather, it seems that Steinmetz cut down on his letters 
to Moscow, instead focusing his energy on developing his program with limited aid from 
Morford and the embassy. 
 Remarkably given this lack of support, Steinmetz built a relatively successful 
friendship society in San Diego.  With literature and movies from the embassy and the ARI, 
Steinmetz sketched out plans in July 1975 for a center with a small store and an area to watch 
Soviet films, and he hoped to put together several peace activities.1044  He also released his 
fourth newsletter, an unusual feat for friendship societies at this time.  It contained updates 
on the San Diego Society’s activities, and it offered literature for sale, including, “The Ghost 
Behind Solzhenitsyn,” a pamphlet that promised to reveal the secrets of “this cancerous & 
paranoid chap,” available for ten cents.1045  By 1977, Morford described the San Diego 
Society as “one of the most accomplished outfits at this point,” noting that Steinmetz had 
three or four women assisting him in producing a program that had significant outreach.  
Morford seemed surprised that the San Diego Society had developed so quickly and that the 
council received coverage from a local university’s campus newspaper, as they solicited 
signatures for a petition to President Jimmy Carter in favor of strengthening détente and 
ending the arms race.1046  Soviet observers noticed this growth, as well.  Following the 1978 
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celebration of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, a representative from the Soviet 
Consulate in San Francisco stated that the San Diego Society now had seventy-five members, 
with fifty people in attendance at the party.1047  According to the embassy, on March 25, 
1978, Steinmetz opened a permanent center for the San Diego Society, complete with a 
library, two rooms for holding meetings and rallies, twice-weekly classes in Russian 
language, and monthly meetings of the friendship society.  At least one of its activists 
worked at the center every day, ensuring that anyone who stopped by could meet with 
someone to learn about the activities of the council.1048  While it did not have the same 
drawing power as the Greater Boston Committee or the more established societies in New 
York and San Francisco, the San Diego Society’s growth was unexpected.  
 Like other friendship society leaders, Steinmetz was concerned that the San Diego 
Society should include more mainstream backers of détente, though he seemed more critical 
of leftist participation.  As he wrote to the General Consul in San Francisco: 
In devotion to USA-USSR relations I am maintaining only a friendly fellow-traveler 
relationship with the CP USA because although sought since 1958, I have received no 
constructive guidance from it, because this devotion seems to me to require 
maintenance of a most representative and not minority character, and because locally 
the CP leadership is primitive, infantile, and isolated.1049 
 
Thus, Steinmetz expressed concerns that the CP USA’s leadership could not aid the 
friendship movement.  Moreover, allying with the CP USA would hinder efforts to give a 
more mainstream face to the friendship society, thereby preventing it from increasing its 
membership rolls and influence.  Above all, Steinmetz understood the expansion goals set by 
Morford and the embassy and, rather than forming an organization stocked with a few 
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ideologically-friendly fellow travelers, he hoped to create a group with mass appeal.  The San 
Diego Society’s expansion succeeded, in part, due to such efforts to reach out to the 
community, though it differed greatly from the Greater Boston Committee, which had more 
participation from members of the CP USA.   
 
Friendship Societies in Washington State and Sacramento 
While the Greater Boston Committee and the San Diego Society represent examples 
of relatively successful regional societies, the Washington Institute for Cultural Relations 
with the Soviet Union had much more trouble in establishing a regular and active program.  
Frank L. Batterson and John Baker founded the Washington Institute in March 1972, with 
support and guidance from Holland Roberts and the ARI, after a visit to the Soviet Union.  
Batterson, a former Peace and Freedom Party candidate for Congress and a World War II 
veteran who lost a leg and spent fifteen months in a Nazi prison camp, assumed the 
presidency of the new organization, and Baker served as secretary.1050  Particularly in its 
early years, the organization’s activities mostly centered on driving Baker’s Dodge station 
wagon to San Francisco, filling it with 1,000 pounds of literature from the ARI and driving it 
back to Washington for distribution.  In a 1974 letter to the ISAO leadership, Baker 
explained that they had taken six such trips to San Francisco thus far, delivering literature to 
90 percent of the high schools, colleges, universities, and public libraries in the state from 
September 1972 to May 1973.  Baker asserted that, starting in September 1973, they received 
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new, larger packages from San Francisco, and they were dutifully taking these packages to 
the same institutions as before, with plans to finish by summer 1973.1051   
Baker noted in a letter to the Republican Mayor Richard E. Olson of Des Moines, 
Iowa, that they “invaded” Oregon in 1974, expanding their activities to cover most of 
Oregon’s colleges and universities and about two-thirds of the high schools.  He emphasized 
that they traveled about 25,000 miles a year in his station wagon to distribute literature, with 
additional miles put on Batterson’s camper, which they used for travel and accommodations 
on longer trips.  As part of this push for distribution, they had received more than 400 titles 
by mail from the Soviet Embassy, including subscriptions to publications such as Soviet Life, 
Moscow News, and magazines from Kiev and other Soviet cities.1052    
Despite their ability to distribute a large amount of propaganda, the weaknesses in the 
Washington Institute’s model started to make themselves apparent.  At the founding of the 
organization, Batterson and Baker were sixty-three and seventy-three years old, respectively, 
and they had not aged well, leaving them incapable of doing much more than delivering 
literature and showing the occasional film.  Moreover, in 1975, Batterson began making 
changes to the Institute’s structure that alienated Baker and weakened the organization.  First, 
in 1975, following a conference of friendship societies in Moscow, Batterson decided to 
rebrand the organization as the Washington Council of Soviet-American Friendship, 
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indicating a move away from the ARI, toward a closer relationship with the NCASF.1053  
This appears to be part of a broader centralization effort that took place in the mid-1970s, 
with the expansion of the NCASF.   
On July 24, Baker sent a letter to both the Soviet Embassy and the ARI, indicating 
that the Washington Council was disbanding and would no longer require shipments of 
literature.1054  Roberts wrote to Batterson on July 31, expressing concern over the “disturbing 
letter,” emphasizing that there “should be no step backward in your good work and a 
consistent effort to move forward in the favorable climate of opinion which is now 
developing.”1055  Batterson responded, indicating that the Washington Council was not 
dissolving.  Rather, Baker had resigned as secretary over a disagreement regarding the 
Washington Council’s office space.”1056  On August 14, Roberts wrote again, expressing 
concern over reports from Seattle about the split between Batterson and Baker and reminding 
Batterson: “Unity is the word as we all know.  Détente is the aim.  Victory lies ahead.”1057   
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The circumstances of the schism remained unclear in Washington until the Soviet 
Embassy took charge of the situation, contacting both Batterson and Baker to clear things up.  
Embassy representative Metelkin confirmed that the office relocation had caused the split.  
Baker saw the abandonment of the office as proof of the imperative need to reorganize the 
society, since it was represented by a diffuse Board of Directors who carried out no work, 
undermining the activities of the council.  Batterson, however, stressed the financial 
difficulties of the council in explaining its decision.  Although he did not understand Baker’s 
decision to resign, he speculated that it had something to do with Baker’s advanced age and 
unfortunate circumstances in his personal and family life.  Given these great disparities in the 
interpretations provided by Baker and Batterson, the report concludes, “One gets the 
impression that Baker’s decision to leave the society is also connected to difficulties in his 
relationship with Batterson.”1058  Batterson hinted at the validity of this theory, telling 
Roberts, “I don’t want to get into personalities, unless I have to,” before explaining that he 
sided with the board against Baker in the decision to move the offices.1059  Indeed, personal 
conflicts developed over the three years of travel together seem to have overcome Batterson 
and Baker’s common ideology and desire to pursue improved Soviet-American relations. 
Metelkin’s encouragement of reconciliation between the two men did not bear fruit.  Their 
partnership, which at the very least served as an effective means of distributing pro-détente 
literature in the greater Seattle area, came to a close. 
Baker’s resignation from the Washington Council coincided with a number of 
tragedies in his personal life.  Apparently, Baker had formed a taxi company with his son and 
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daughter-in-law and, when the business began to collapse, his son and daughter-in-law fled, 
leaving him with a stack of bills and forcing him into bankruptcy.  Around the same time, he 
separated with his wife, and Baker was left in dire financial straights without the support of 
his family or the fellow travelers at the friendship society that he helped found.1060  Roberts 
described his condition at this time as a sort of “neurosis,” as he “is always expecting some 
one to hit him again.”1061  Baker eventually relocated to San Diego, though his relationship 
with the local friendship society seems unclear, as he attempted to work as a “field man,” 
paying his own expenses and independently distributing literature.1062  In a letter to Morford, 
Roberts writes that he and Steinmetz tried to “help [Baker] understand that the USSR works 
through organizations rather than individuals but he doesn’t seem to grasp the fact and tries 
to work as a loner.”  Moreover, Roberts described Baker’s behavior as erratic, stating that he 
would arrive in San Francisco to pick up literature without warning, resulting in smaller 
bundles.  Roberts expressed hope that “time and patience may bring him around,” but 
underscored that Morford should take a more active role in reining in Baker’s activities, as 
“he looks to you for leadership and I am sure you can help him.”1063  The embassy 
disconnected from the situation, allowing Morford and Roberts to deal with the rogue Baker. 
While the Washington Council continued to exist without Baker’s activities, its 
program remained limited.  Given his disability, Batterson could not do the physical work 
necessary to haul large packages of literature, thereby ending the council’s efforts to stock 
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libraries in the Northwest with Soviet literature.1064  More importantly, the office location 
presented a problem for years, as the Washington Council moved from the Smith Tower, a 
skyscraper in downtown Seattle, to Frank Batterson’s cottage in Everett, a small city with a 
population of around 50,000 people.  This limited the council’s access to potential members, 
as well as its ability to develop a comprehensive program.  By late 1975, the Washington 
Council moved back to Seattle.1065  This move, however, did not bolster the Washington 
Council’s program, as Morford reported in 1977:  
It was a small setup, providing one room in which perhaps twenty-five to thirty 
people could sit down—jammed close together—to view the movies that they 
intended to show.  Another portion of the room provided a little office space.  But 
before I had arrived, they had discovered that this new location was precisely, 
‘nowhere.’  Not a location to which anybody was likely to come even on invitation to 
view movies.        
 
Morford explained that the Washington Council promised to seek out new headquarters 
closer to the University of Washington, where they would be able to attract support from 
students, but from December to March, he lamented, “they have been doing very little.”1066  
Moreover, the event seemed to widen the rift between Morford and the Washington Council 
and, in a follow-up report, Morford remarked that the leaders of the Washington Council 
“have been somewhat on the outs with me since I tried to push them too hard at an earlier 
time this year concerning their own program which wasn’t very large.”1067  Batterson ignored 
Morford’s advice and did not relocate the office.  
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 The failures of the Washington Council were further exacerbated by its inability to 
stave off competition from other groups in sponsoring Soviet delegations that visited Seattle.  
The 1978 delegation, for example, featured challenges to the Washington Council from both 
mainstream organizations and more moderate leftist groups.  Representatives from the Soviet 
Embassy designated People to People, a mainstream cultural exchange organization, as the 
principal hosts of the delegation in Seattle without consulting with the NCASF.  In a March 
21 letter to Morford, Batterson expressed dismay at having been “shunted off to the side” in 
activities with the delegation by People to People. “Now, we of course have no objections to 
the Soviet delegations being sponsored by broader organizations,” he wrote.  “But until we 
ourselves have broadened out a great deal more than we so far have been able to, we are apt 
to take a beating, if we have to ‘compete’ for Soviet delegations with the elite of bourgeoise 
[sic] society.”1068  Thus, in having to battle with mainstream organizations for attention from 
Soviet delegations, the Washington Council failed to attract support from people other than 
the old fellow travelers that currently sponsored its program. 
Following the delegation’s visit to Seattle, Batterson complained to Morford about his 
group’s treatment at the hands of the People’s Coalition of Peace and Justice, a broad alliance 
of leftist antiwar, antipoverty, pro-labor, and antiracism groups founded in 1970.  He claimed 
that the Washington Council invited the People’s Coalition to join them in sponsoring an 
evening with the Soviet delegation.  The People’s Coalition seems to have done most of the 
preparatory work for the visit, booking a venue and advertising the event.  At first, the 
People’s Coalition did not mention the Washington Council in its publicity for the delegation 
and, after much prodding from Batterson, it added the Washington Council only as a 
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“supporting organization,” not a co-sponsor.  The leader of the People’s Coalition also 
refused to allow Batterson to address the public reception, and she “curtly told [Batterson] 
that she would cancel the whole thing” if he continued to push for an opportunity to speak.  
Batterson explained, “The reason given for the strange stand they took was that, among some 
of the broadly-based peace-groups they are associated with, we are looked upon as being too 
far to the left. . . . So our problems on this particular occasion was not so much with the 
traditional right as with the former left!”1069   
Morford submitted Batterson’s complaints to Moscow and asked that they review the 
case, emphasizing that mainstream organizations such as People to People tried to avoid 
working with friendship societies, since they regarded them as pro-Soviet and communist.  
The regional societies, in turn, regarded People to People as “nabobs” who refused to accept 
the rank-and-file people from “the ‘movement.’”   He declared, “Our people have always 
believed that they are the hosts when Society USSR-USA send a Mission,” and he 
disparaged the ways in which the Soviet Embassy gave People to People authority to serve as 
the principal hosts of the delegation without consulting with the NCASF.  Morford 
concluded, however, by seemingly justifying the approach taken by the Soviet Embassy and 
Moscow in prioritizing mainstream groups over friendship societies: “In any event I quite 
accept the position of the Cultural Division in Washington and, presumably, of you in the 
Moscow society: namely, that there are limits and it is important, therefore, to have the 
cooperation of other groups in various cities that are accepted in official and broader 
circles.”1070  In other words, at least in his messages to Soviet leaders, Morford recognized 
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the limitations of friendship societies in garnering widespread public support, and he 
understood that, at times, friendship councils would have to play second fiddle to mainstream 
organizations in sponsoring Soviet delegations. If the Soviet Embassy was changing 
direction, he argued, it could at least offer an explanation to longtime fellow travelers.    
 Overall, the Washington Council never garnered much support or backing from the 
New York leadership or the representatives at the Soviet Embassy, and when Roberts’s 
health began to decline in 1975, the Washington Council lost its strongest ally.  Moreover, 
Batterson and Baker never put together a comprehensive program to attract any kind of 
public interest.  Their advanced age contributed to this difficulty, as petty squabbles over the 
direction of the council and personal conflicts, exacerbated by Baker’s personal problems, 
tore apart their partnership.  Finally, the problems associated with the office crippled the 
Washington Council’s activities.  Unable to afford rent in central Seattle, they settled for an 
office in a poor location, without the facilities or exposure necessary to build an effective 
program or public support.  Competition from other organizations and a lack of aid from the 
embassy only served to exacerbate these weaknesses.    
The most dramatic failures in the NCASF’s expansion came on the rare occasions 
when NCASF and the USSR-USA Society representatives were not critical in selecting 
potential new friendship societies.  In 1976, they allowed an interested group to form the 
Sacramento Society for US-Soviet Friendship, quickly listing it in their reports as a new 
friendship society.1071  Shortly thereafter, the founder and president of the Sacramento 
society began mailing the USSR-USA Society representative propaganda for the One World 
Family Commune, a religious cult that believes, among other things, that “the Liberty Bell 
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was cracked and recracked by the Lord’s space ship.”1072  The founder and president of the 
friendship society sent a cover letter with this propaganda indicating her desire to schedule a 
delegation to visit the USSR and meet with “our brothers and sisters of the world communist 
movement.”1073  Evidently realizing that they had permitted a UFO cult to be registered as a 
friendship society, the USSR-USA Society representatives did not respond to the One World 
Family’s messages, and Sacramento was not cited as a friendship society in future reports.  
A number of general observations can be made following these case studies.  First, 
despite Cold War-era claims that the friendship societies were Soviet fronts dominated by the 
CP USA, these societies show that Communist Party involvement varied by region.  If the 
Greater Boston Committee built a relatively successful organization with a strong core of 
Party members, then the San Diego Society accomplished a similar feat without heavy Party 
representation.  Second, while the older generation still dominated the national organization, 
regional expansion allowed younger friends of the Soviet Union—such as Buland in Boston, 
the Tattams in Portland, and others—to assume prominent roles.  This proved important later 
in the 1970s, when the younger generation sought additional influence in shaping the national 
agenda.  Third, the personality of regional leaders played a dramatic role in shaping each 
society’s fate.  On the one hand, in Boston and San Diego, where energetic and engaged 
people directed friendship societies, they experienced general growth, even in closed cities 
such as San Diego.  On the other hand, in the state of Washington, where Batterson and 
Baker did not develop a comprehensive program and fought over personal issues, the 
friendship society struggled to attract members.  Fourth, support from Moscow, the Soviet 
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Embassy, and the NCASF or the ARI proved decisive, as each regional society required 
external support to survive.  When sufficient assistance came from Soviet authorities, as seen 
during the Greater Boston Committee’s spring festival, the friendship societies could produce 
programs with popular appeal, at least in leftist circles.  When support was more intermittent, 
though, as in most cases, the programs generally failed or struggled.  Finally, despite the 
expansion efforts undertaken by the NCASF and the Soviet Embassy in the mid-1970s, the 
regional societies continued to face debilitating roadblocks to achieving stability and 
effectiveness.  Even Boston, which undertook the most expansive program of any regional 
society, could not break even financially, and none of the societies could establish working 
relationships with mainstream organizations that could attract supporters from outside of 
their traditional base.   
 
“Tired Old Communists and Fellow Travelers” 
During this period of expansion, the NCASF experienced many of the same 
difficulties that had impeded its work in previous years.  For example, despite efforts to 
reduce the limitations of the NCASF, the organization remained isolated, unable to develop 
ties between the friendship societies and mainstream groups.  As the 1976-1978 plan for the 
US Department of SSOD stated:  
Whereas the American societies for friendship with the USSR have limited access to 
the US public because of the authorities’ prevailing hostile relations toward them as 
pro-Soviet and pro-communist organizations, the USA Department and the ISAO, 
through the SSOD representatives in the US, will directly develop their business ties 
and contacts with a variety of other American organizations that support the 
expansion and improvement of US relations with the USSR and détente.   
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The report lists the CEC as an ideal candidate for developing ties with the friendship 
societies.1074  As seen with the relations between the Greater Boston Committee and the 
Boston offices of the CEC and the Washington Council and People-to-People, this endeavor 
did not prove to be successful.  A report the following year cited these difficulties, lamenting, 
“The State Department and other official American agencies, despite the fact that the label of 
‘subversive organizations’ was removed several years ago, continue to relate to them with 
great suspicion and constantly interfere with their work, intimidating those Americans who 
want to participate in their activities.”1075 
 An exchange between Morford and Fred Warner Neal, head of the American 
Committee on US-Soviet Relations, a neutral organization of prominent Americans that 
lobbied in favor of détente, further reveals the divide between the NCASF and mainstream 
organizations.  On May 17, 1977, Morford wrote to Neal regarding an article he penned, 
“The Salvagers of Détente.”  Although Morford complained of Neal’s description of 
friendship society members as “tired old communists” and “fellow travelers,” he nonetheless 
praised Neal’s work, writing, “these are minor considerations in a very fine article.”  Noting 
that he has followed the American Committee’s activities “with appreciation,” Morford 
praised Neal’s efforts to “employ [his] influence with the authorities in Washington on the 
side of détente.”  He highlighted the NCASF’s recent petitions to President Carter to pursue 
arms limitations, emphasizing that the NCASF took a moderate position by asking that 
“concessions be made on both sides.”  Morford expressed a desire to meet Neal “one of these 
days” and proclaimed, “The way is open for an even stronger influence on the part of those 
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enrolled in your Committee and I hope you will pursue what you can do best more 
aggressively. . . . Please do everything you can to push forward the work of the American 
Committee on US-Soviet Relations.  It could count mightily.”  Throughout the letter, 
Morford describes how each organization should do “its part” to make “a constructive 
contribution” to détente, indicating his understanding that the NCASF and the American 
Committee worked in separate spheres toward the similar goal of promoting détente.1076   
 While Neal’s response, written on May 25, is friendly in tone, it contains a clear 
message that cooperation between the American Committee and the NCASF would be 
impossible.  Neal assured Morford that he was not among the “tired old communists” 
mentioned in the article, and he described the NCASF’s work as “very positive,” claiming 
that he was “pleased” to work toward the same objectives as Morford.  Neal discussed the 
“very harsh pragmatism” that guided his actions, even leading him “to the point of 
supporting Nixon.”  Citing his close relationship with several members of the NCASF Board 
of Directors, he wrote that it has been “a source of unhappiness” to him that “because of the 
hard political realities” he has “been forced to eschew collaboration” with the NCASF.  He 
continued, “I read your letter correctly, you can appreciate the considerations which lead to 
this decision.  To the extent that we can have any influence at all, the name of the game—our 
game—must be ‘super-respectability.’  I may be wrong in this evaluation but given the deep 
and pervasive cold war psychology in the country, I don’t think so.”1077  In other words, Neal 
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could not consider cooperation with the NCASF for fear that it would destroy the American 
Committee’s neutral public image. 
 On June 9, Morford forwarded this exchange to Moscow, and his comments in the 
cover letter indicate his understanding of Neal’s predicament.  A number of NCASF 
members had written him, asking, “What do you say to the appraisal of the National Council 
of American-Soviet Friendship in this article?”  In particular, several members of the Board 
of Directors read the article and demanded that Morford draft a public response.  He 
informed Moscow: “I have not permitted myself any written replies to these queries.  And I 
have no intention of circulating this letter exchange.”  In other words, Morford did not want 
to publicly criticize Neal’s article due to his sympathy for Neal’s position as a “neutral” party 
and his belief in the importance of Neal’s work.  He also could not show the letter exchange 
to the other members of the NCASF, as they would have criticized him for allowing Neal to 
slam the NCASF without public reprisal in the name of preserving the reputation of an 
organization that did not share the same ideological approach as the friendship societies.  
Thus Morford demonstrated his understanding and acceptance of the NCASF’s primary 
limitation: the inability to develop meaningful partnerships with mainstream organizations 
due to its reputation as a pro-Soviet or procommunist organization.   
Furthermore, the expansion of the friendship councils only escalated the rivalry 
between Morford and Roberts, leading to a power struggle that eventually displaced Morford.  
When Alexei Stepunin, who formerly served as the SSOD representative at the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington, D.C., took control of daily operations of the ISAO as Secretary 
General in 1973, Morford wrote to him:  
I know your apprehension about the San Francisco Institute. And on November 7, in 
conversation in Washington, [embassy representative] Gennady [Fedosov] spoke to 
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the point, too, and told me how anxious he was to push San Francisco along and yet 
how delicately the matter had to be handled with Holland [Roberts].  Gennady did not 
tell me that he was going to San Francisco almost immediately but now I am told he 
was in San Francisco only three days ago.  So if he has given strong nudge to 
Holland, what more can I do.  Nevertheless I do feel a strong sense of responsibility 
concerning the three West Coast groups and Chicago and I think you want me to 
prosecute this responsibility.”1078 
 
Although the source of Stepunin’s “apprehension” of the ARI is not made clear in the 
available materials, Morford’s statement highlights his fear that with the expansion of the 
friendship councils—especially outside of the East Coast—the ARI would use its increased 
influence to gain preferential status over the NCASF in deciding the direction of the 
friendship movement.   
These sentiments reappeared in 1975, when Morford forwarded a letter from Roberts 
to the ISAO that mentioned an upcoming meeting between friendship society representatives 
and Soviet delegates.  In a handwritten attachment to the letter, Morford wrote to the ISAO: 
“Very good to be helpful—one society to another.  Yet there is some implication: let us get 
together as regional societies—Holland’s idea of a ‘federation’—apart from the National 
Council of American-Soviet Friendship.  Holland nurtures this idea.”1079  In other words, 
Morford had concerns that the NCASF’s influence over the friendship movement and its 
ability to shape relations with Moscow would be diluted by the expansion of the friendship 
councils in the mid-1970s, and that Roberts would use the regional societies to seize control 
of the movement.  Roberts’s work to organize the new councils—especially in Washington 
and San Diego—did nothing to calm Morford’s fears. 
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With Roberts’s declining health and eventual death in October 1976, Morford took 
control and led the councils for a few years until the regional heads of friendship societies 
banded together to limit his authority.  Generational and geographical concerns drove this 
conflict, as the younger regional leaders hoped to gain some control over the development of 
the national program from the elders in New York.  Early signs of trouble emerged by 1976, 
when the regional heads of the friendship councils, using their positions on the Board of 
Directors of the NCASF, began calling for a national convention of friendship societies with 
the aim to vote for a radical reorganization along more democratic lines, giving the regional 
societies greater authority to shape the national program.1080  In September 1977, a national 
conference met, voting to make the Board of Directors an elected body and establishing an 
Executive Committee to oversee the NCASF’s activities.  The following year, Morford 
explained the new system to the USSR-USA Society, noting, “the Societies now really run 
the show here.”  Emphasizing the prominent role of the Executive Committee in setting the 
NCASF’s agenda, Morford informed the USSR-USA Society:  “Do not sell me short!  I, too, 
assert leadership, in most instances decisively, but it cannot be as ‘high-handed’ (to quote the 
critics) as it was.  The truth is that I cooperate with the ‘bosses’ at every point.  They do not 
intend to give me full rein as did the old Board who agreed to whatever I proposed and then 
said ‘You do it!’”1081   
The practical consequences of this reorganization were felt when a special committee 
was formed, including Morford and three representatives from the regional societies, to 
develop a platform for a new exchange agreement with the Soviet Union in 1978.  Morford 
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stated that the regional representatives used this opportunity to express “vociferous and 
unwarranted criticism” of recent Good Will Missions, resulting in a meeting with Fedosov, 
who attempted to resolve the dispute.1082  This clash again revealed itself in August 1978, 
when the four representatives traveled to Moscow to conclude the 1978-1980 agreement on 
exchanges.  Expressing frustration with the regional representatives and characterizing the 
negotiations as “rather tense,” the Soviet report states that the regional representatives 
demonstrated a lack of familiarity with the nature of the USSR-USA Society-NCASF 
partnership, insisting that programs reserved for technical exchanges with the US be included 
in their cultural exchange agreement.  Technical exchanges traditionally were organized 
through other American organizations, with the NCASF strictly handling cultural exchanges.  
In addition, the other Americans in the delegation repeatedly attempted to prevent Morford 
from assuming a prominent role in talks with the Soviet leadership.  The Soviet report states 
that they “tried in every possible way to belittle the experience, knowledge, and abilities of 
Morford.”  When Soviet authorities nonetheless treated Morford as the leader of the group, 
the other Americans repeatedly pointed out that the delegation consisted of four equal 
members.  When negotiations ended, the other delegates demanded that all four 
representatives be allowed to sign the agreement, leaving the USSR-USA Society in an 
extremely awkward position, as only the Moscow leadership, and not representatives from 
other Soviet cities, would be present at the ceremony.  The report concludes, “The SSOD 
leadership attempted to point out their improper conduct.  However, they did not heed the 
advice, and in one of the most heated moments of the discussion of the program, they even 
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threatened that they would not sign the agreement.  Expect long and painstaking work when 
dealing with the new members of the leadership of the American friendship societies.”1083   
Morford’s position in the NCASF did not improve following the signing of the new 
joint program.  In January 1980, the Board of Directors appointed a new Executive 
Committee to administer the NCASF’s activities, this one more powerful than any with 
which Morford had previously worked.  Soon after, the Board of Directors formed a special 
committee to choose Morford’s replacement as executive director.1084  On October 27, 1980, 
Morford wrote a letter to the Board of Directors introducing his replacement, Alan Craft 
Thomson, an ordained minister of the United Presbyterian Church with a doctorate in 
Theology from Union Theological Seminary.  Morford expressed some reservations about 
Thomson, who was currently directing the final campaign efforts of Joelle Fishman, a 
candidate for Congress from New Haven who ran on the Communist Party ticket.  Always 
conscious of the negative consequences of NCASF's image as a procommunist organization, 
he wrote, “Personally I cannot be happy about this in terms of National Council concerns, but 
perhaps publicity will not extend much beyond New Haven borders or the left press.”  
Although it does not appear that Morford was thrilled with the choice of Thomson, he 
explained that Thomson would serve as his “special assistant” for about a month to learn the 
ropes. In January 1981, Morford stepped down as executive director.1085   
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Conclusion 
As the USSR-USA Society’s 1977 annual report to the SSOD leadership concludes: 
The membership of the US friendship societies is small, the social base is narrow, few 
prominent Americans participate in its work, and the material base is weak.  This is 
primarily due to the fact that the US Government is still clearly adverse to them as 
pro-communist organizations.  The leadership of the friendship societies belongs to 
the absolute oldest generation of friends of the Soviet Union.  They do not have 
enough energy or initiative, and they are often unnecessarily cautious.  Their work 
suffers from all of these things.”1086   
 
Thus, despite the campaign to expand the friendship societies in the mid-1970s, they 
remained unprofitable, unable to attract new members, and dominated by an inflexible, 
elderly cohort.  The removal of Morford in January 1981 allowed a new generation to take 
the reins of the friendship movement.  This might have resulted in a period of renewal with a 
younger, more active leadership, but these events coincided with Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979, which crippled cultural relations through the early Reagan 
years.1087  
As discussed in the previous chapter, Soviet cultural diplomats portrayed the USSR 
as a dependable Great Power and a safe and reliable negotiating partner.  In this sense, the 
existence of Soviet-American friendship societies, with their perceived—and frequently 
real—connections to the Communist Party, undermined this message. This put Soviet 
diplomats in the difficult position of presenting a “mainstream” image of the Soviet Union 
while maintaining close ties to a potentially subversive set of organizations.  Considering the 
relative unpopularity of the friendship societies by the 1970s, as well as their ineffectiveness, 
why did Soviet authorities not simply abandon them? 
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Internal Soviet reports show that the friendship societies primarily served to distribute 
information about the Soviet Union.  As the 1976-78 plan states, the societies “represent an 
essential and permanent channel of disseminating accurate information about Soviet reality 
to the American public, because they stand firmly for the improvement of Soviet-American 
relations and the strengthening of the process of détente.”  The report discusses the 
importance of stocking the NCASF’s libraries, film collections, audio recordings, and 
resources for teaching the Russian language.1088  The NCASF provided an American 
mouthpiece that Soviet diplomats could depend upon to deliver the Soviet messages of the 
day in exactly the manner that they would prefer.  Although the establishment of permanent 
libraries, safe from potential negative shifts in Soviet-American relations, may offer a partial 
reason for the maintenance of the friendship societies, it does not provide a complete 
explanation.  For example, as evidenced in the previous chapter, by the 1970s Soviet 
diplomats came to the conclusion that discussions with mainstream audiences were more 
effective at improving the Soviet Union’s image than speeches to the wholly-friendly crowds 
offered by the friendship societies.  In this sense, maintaining a permanent source of 
ineffective propaganda seems less crucial than exploiting a more unpredictable, but effective, 
method of public relations.  
There are several additional factors that help explain continued aid to the friendship 
societies.  First, they provided welcoming committees to greet Soviet delegations throughout 
the country. The expansion of the regional societies roughly corresponded with the dozens of 
new cities visited by Soviet delegations throughout the 1970s.  Large groups of Americans 
greeting Soviet visitors in cities around the country provided opportunities for propaganda, 
both at home and abroad, and impressed visiting Soviet delegations.  Similarly, the 
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continuation of the friendship societies allowed Soviet authorities the opportunity to invite 
American delegates to international conferences of friendship societies, which served as a 
valuable source of propaganda.  Second, there were limited opportunities for these officials 
to travel to the US in the 1970s.  Maintaining the friendship societies allowed for SSOD and 
friendship society leaders to keep the channels open for their own travel opportunities to the 
other country.  Finally, bureaucratic momentum extended the friendship societies’ lifespan.  
Soviet authorities had spent the previous fifty years keeping friendship societies afloat, with 
many of the same leaders that served in the NCASF through the end of détente, and at a 
certain point, it became difficult to cut loose ideological allies who had worked tirelessly for 
improved Soviet-American relations, even going to prison for the cause.  Owing to this 
history of partnership with the friendship societies, Soviet diplomats worked to make them 
relevant once again, even if they realized the futile nature of the endeavor. 
Although the leaders of the friendship societies hoped to make a major contribution to 
détente, ultimately, they were not up to the task.  The Soviet Union, sensing this weakness, 
saw them as a secondary option, relying on them only when avenues for mainstream cultural 
programs narrowed.  With such lukewarm backing, the friendship societies could not resolve 
the issues that hindered their efforts prior to détente, despite their expansion into new 
metropolitan areas.  In the end, studying the Soviet Embassy's management of the friendship 
societies sheds light on the priorities held by Soviet diplomats in the field of cultural 
relations, as they sought to dispel the Soviet Union's image as a radical and dangerous threat 
to American society, instead suggesting that the Soviet Union was a mainstream power that 
the American public could trust.  
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 On January 29, 1981, following Ronald Reagan’s presidential inauguration, Dobrynin 
drove to Foggy Bottom to meet Secretary of State Alexander Haig for their first official talks.  
During Kissinger and Vance’s tenures at the State Department, Dobrynin entered at the 
public gate if it was an official meeting.  More frequently, though, the meetings were held in 
secret, and Dobrynin had special permission to park in the State Department’s private garage.  
His aide called the State Department in advance for clarification about where to enter, and 
the secretary told him that it would be “as usual.”  Dobrynin’s car approached the private 
garage, but was turned around by a security guard, who informed him that his private parking 
privileges had been canceled.  Haig described this incident, which received significant 
attention from the press, as a “misunderstanding,” blaming it on an assistant who should have 
told Dobrynin about the “new procedure” in advance.  Dobrynin was skeptical: “It was by 
then clear to me that all this had been a staged political show.  It did not increase my 
confidence in the new secretary of state.”1089   
During the Reagan years, the backchannel system that Dobrynin cultivated over the 
previous eighteen years collapsed, with no hope for a revival through Reagan’s first term.  
Dobrynin attempted to make contact with National Security Advisor Richard Allen, the man 
nominally in charge of Soviet affairs in the Reagan administration, but he directed the Soviet 
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ambassador to regular State Department channels.1090  Allen’s successors, William P. Clark 
and Robert C. McFarlane, followed this precedent and deferred to the State Department, as 
well, and Richard Pipes, the White House Soviet expert, refused to meet with Dobrynin or 
any other Soviet diplomat.1091  Dobrynin attempted to open a dialogue with longtime friends 
in the Reagan administration, including Undersecretary of State William J. Stoessel, whom 
Dobrynin had known since 1952, when he was a counselor at the Soviet Embassy.  Stoessel 
sympathized with Dobrynin, but informed him that, given the administration’s mood, 
professional diplomats would have to follow orders from above and wait before reengaging 
in negotiations to improve Soviet-American relations.  Sometimes, when he ran into 
administration officials at parties, they would blame the state of relations on the Soviet side, 
with Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger sarcastically saying that they did not want to 
plan a summit only to have the Soviet Union invade Poland a few months later, referring to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coming on the heels of Carter and Brezhnev’s meeting in 
Vienna.  Still bitter about the Reagan administration’s initial approach to Soviet-American 
relations, Dobrynin complained, “Weinberger impressed me sadly with his primitive 
approach to our relations and his incompetence, something characteristic of the whole 
Reagan administration at that time.”1092   
Shut out from the halls of power, Dobrynin resorted to meeting Haig periodically and 
complaining bitterly to friends such as Averell Harriman.  Five months after Reagan’s 
inauguration, Dobrynin was so frustrated that he asked Harriman for his opinion of the 
potential for a Democrat to unseat the president in the 1984 presidential election.  Dobrynin 
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complained that the administration was “consciously very unfriendly,” and he described Haig 
as “badly prepared and badly informed.”  Dobrynin seemed exasperated that the White 
House would employ Pipes, who gave advice that Dobrynin evaluated as “completely 
erroneous.”1093  The following year, Dobrynin told Harriman that US-Soviet relations were as 
bad as they had been at any other time during his twenty years as ambassador, and in his 
opinion, they would get only worse.1094  Small steps to improve relations began in 1983, 
when new Secretary of State George Shultz received permission from Reagan to start a series 
of private discussions with Dobrynin to explore the possibilities for changing the dynamic of 
the Soviet-American relationship.  Still, Reagan remained reluctant to use the confidential 
channel, and while Dobrynin and Shultz worked to relieve tensions, progress stalled until 
after Dobrynin left the embassy in 1986 to take over the International Department in 
Moscow.1095  
 Soviet cultural relations were also dealt a blow after Afghanistan.  The Carter and 
Reagan administrations allowed the 1973 Cultural Exchange Agreement to expire after 1979, 
placing the burden for exchanges in the private sphere, where some organizations, such as the 
CEC, continued to press for improved relations.1096  Many found it difficult, though, to argue 
for increased cultural ties in such a political environment.  Raymond Garthoff writes that, 
during this period, the burden was on advocates for closer cultural ties to explain why a 
program still should be pursued, not on those who felt it should be canceled.  Those who 
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normally advocated for these programs either were sincerely angry at the Soviet invasion or 
fearful of being called soft on communism.  As such, no one spoke up in favor of going 
forward with the planned exhibition of paintings from the Hermitage in the National Gallery 
of Art.  Garthoff concludes, “Not only did the [Carter] administration go overboard in tossing 
almost everything movable onto the sacrificial bonfire of sanctions, but it tied the whole to 
the obviously unattainable maximum aim of getting the Soviets to withdraw from 
Afghanistan.”1097 
 In many ways, the old Pullman house represented the older style of diplomacy, never 
so masterfully used as under Dobrynin, in which the ambassador had a personal approach 
and a central role in shaping relations.  During the tsarist period, the building hosted the 
ambassador, one counselor, two secretaries, a driver, and some servants.  When Dobrynin 
arrived, the embassy had a staff of one hundred, making it necessary to rent out space in 
other buildings to fulfill housing and office demand.  Almost immediately after he arrived in 
Washington, Dobrynin began searching for an appropriate site for a new building.1098  
Finally, the Nixon administration offered the Soviet government a parcel of federal property, 
and the Soviet government followed with an offer for property for a new American Embassy 
in Moscow.  Construction began, but the discovery of listening devices in the half-built 
American Embassy resulted in both structures being unused until the 1990s.1099  Since 1994, 
when the new Russian Embassy complex opened, the former embassy building has served as 
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the residence of the Russian ambassador to the US.  On a broader level, the transfer 
represented the end of the Dobrynin era, in which, for nearly three decades, Dobrynin’s name 
had been synonymous with the embassy. 
 This dissertation has examined the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., during 
détente, the embassy’s most productive period, when it functioned as the center of 
negotiations for strategic arms limitations, trade deals, and cultural exchange programs, all of 
which played a central role in the improvement of relations in the 1970s.  Without the 
embassy, which housed officials who could “translate” between the two systems, 
coordinating action in both the Soviet bureaucracy and the American government or private 
organizations, little could have been achieved on any level.  Dobrynin needed to explain 
American actions to Soviet leaders who did not understand democratic governance and 
believed that the president could single-handedly govern all aspects of foreign policy, as well 
as Soviet decisions to an American government that too often viewed the Kremlin as a 
monolith driven by ideology to conquer the world.  Similarly, cultural diplomats such as 
Nesterov and Fedosov had to put a human face on Soviet-style socialism, joking with crowds 
who viewed them as spokesmen for a country that they had been taught to fear. 
A representative of the “pragmatist” generation of Foreign Ministry officials, 
Dobrynin believed that private diplomacy, supported by a friendly personal relationship with 
the other party, could achieve breakthroughs in relations that could not be attained in formal 
talks.  Dobrynin’s central aim to strengthen the Soviet position on the world stage, and he 
considered a friendlier relationship with the US to be the most essential component of 
reaching that goal.  As a result, he brought a new culture to the embassy that encouraged 
Soviet diplomats to engage with American society.  These individuals, changed so much by 
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their experiences that many had difficulty reintegrating into Soviet society, brought a 
perspective to Soviet-American relations that was less ideological and more practical.  
Eventually, as Robert English has argued, several of the diplomats trained at the “Dobrynin 
school” became torchbearers for the “new thinking,” the foreign policy initiative of the 
Gorbachev years that did not aim merely to end East-West hostilities, but to push the Soviet 
Union to join the liberal international community from which it had been separated for the 
majority of the Soviet period.1100  Détente also gave these diplomats important experience in 
connecting with Western officials that would prove crucial in the latter half of the 1980s, as 
they endeavored to achieve rapprochement on a permanent basis. 
Much has been made by historians about whether the backchannel was the most 
appropriate or effective means for conducting top-level diplomacy in this period.  
Backchannel diplomacy was a slow, but effective process, taking years to produce real 
results.  At times, the backchannel, which was ostensibly designed to simplify negotiations, 
complicated the process, with Dobrynin and Kissinger struggling to protect the 
confidentiality of backchannel talks and managing the complex process of a two-tiered 
negotiating system.  Kissinger and Dobrynin found success administering the backchannel 
because, particularly from 1971 to 1973, they developed a personalized diplomatic language 
based on flattery and bonding that aided the negotiating process.  While certain aspects of 
this language were certainly contrived or manipulative, when faced with moments of crisis or 
potential breakthrough, Kissinger and Dobrynin could draw on their relationship, using this 
language to find common ground or push toward a resolution.  After 1973, when the October 
War tested Dobrynin’s trust in Kissinger and when a variety of domestic concerns began to 
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eat away at Kissinger’s authority, this process was challenged.  Moreover, with a diminished 
confidential channel, less commitment from the respective national leaderships to détente, 
and without this sort of personal connection, Dobrynin had a harder time producing 
successful partnerships with Vance, Brzezinski, and Reagan’s foreign policy advisors. 
Moreover, rather than providing Soviet and American policymakers with significant 
new insight into the attitudes and operations of the other party, the backchannel tended to 
reinforce previously held cultural stereotypes that impeded progress in improving 
superpower relations.  For example, with Kissinger’s repeated assurances to Dobrynin that all 
American policy could be directed through the White House, top Soviet policymakers 
remained convinced that a determined executive branch could overwhelm domestic 
opposition in the US and return the superpower relationship to its World War II glory days.  
They were unprepared for the calamity of Watergate, and had difficulty understanding how 
Congress could reign in Kissinger’s freedom to maneuver during the Ford administration.  
Similarly, despite Dobrynin’s repeated warnings about the complexity of the Soviet 
policymaking apparatus, Kissinger and his successors in the Carter administration struggled 
to accept that Soviet policy was not monolithic in nature, seeking evidence of a grand 
strategy even when Soviet maneuvers were driven by more immediate concerns.  
The embassy’s place in the history of détente also reveals some of the divisions that 
crept into the Soviet foreign policy apparatus by the 1970s.  The disparity between the 
Foreign Ministry and the International Department in outlook is striking, and it explains 
many of the difficulties faced by Dobrynin in the late 1970s.  As a representative from the 
Foreign Ministry, Dobrynin came from a bureaucratic culture that paid little attention to the 
developing world.  Its leader, Gromyko, largely concerned himself with Great Power politics, 
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deferring on questions in other regions to the International Department and his rival 
Ponomarev.  With little coordination between these bureaucracies, the Soviet government 
had a difficult time identifying the sort of “grand strategy” anticipated by American leaders, 
who interpreted each Soviet move in Africa as a sign of a socialist conspiracy to smash 
American interests.  The top Soviet leadership at first did not understand how supplying 
weapons and advisors to revolutionaries in the developing world could damage détente, and 
then grew indignant at a perceived American double standard.  Dobrynin was left in the 
awkward position of defending Soviet maneuvers that he did not necessarily agree with in 
conversations with American diplomats, and trying to explain to an increasingly aggravated 
Soviet elite why the US found these actions so upsetting.  Furthermore, given the rift 
between Moscow and the embassy, the Soviet ambassador rarely received information about 
these decisions before they occurred, and, as a result, the Soviet Union’s foremost expert on 
the American political scene could not advise the Soviet leadership on the potential impact of 
its actions. 
These rifts played out in other aspects of the embassy’s work as well.  The Defense 
Ministry and the military held secret all information on Soviet strategic arms, even as the 
Foreign Ministry negotiated SALT.  As a result, the embassy received minimal data from 
Moscow on the composition of Soviet forces, and Dobrynin had to rely on American 
research on Soviet stockpiles and weapons capabilities in backchannel talks.  Furthermore, 
the Defense Ministry and the military stood as constant roadblocks in negotiations, as they 
opposed limiting Soviet arms and attempted to thwart progress in the Politburo.  While 
Brezhnev gathered enough top-level support to overcome these naysayers and conclude 
SALT I and II, their influence was felt at every stage in negotiations.  Thus the Soviet 
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government’s intentions in entering détente remain difficult to pin down, as various groups in 
the Soviet bureaucracy had different and sometimes conflicting ideas about what détente 
would entail.  If the Americanists hoped to stabilize the superpower relationship and solidify 
the Soviet Union’s claim to superpower status, then the International Department worked to 
spread communist revolution to the developing world, and the Defense Ministry tried to limit 
arms control to retain its budget and standing in the Politburo.      
In this sense, studying détente from the Soviet perspective reiterates the elusiveness 
of the term.  If Garthoff persuasively argued that détente ultimately failed because the Soviet 
and American sides had different understandings of what it would entail, this dissertation 
underscores how conflicting voices in the Soviet government complicated the process of 
determining Soviet goals and strategies in this new period of negotiations with the West.  Not 
only did Soviet and American authorities have difficulty identifying a definition of détente 
that they both could agree upon, but various constituencies in each government struggled to 
form a consensus about what détente would mean.  American historians have long 
understood that this problem existed in the US, with officials such as Kissinger, Jackson, 
Vance, Brzezinski, and Nitze all approaching the era of summitry and superpower 
agreements with different agendas and separate ideas of what the US should aim to 
accomplish in Soviet-American talks.  The Soviet side remained largely unexplored beyond 
the top leadership, though, and this dissertation serves to discuss how one institution in the 
Soviet bureaucracy experienced these Soviet struggles to define détente.    
The case study of the embassy’s Cultural Department reveals how lower-level 
diplomats understood their work to promote détente.  The embassy leadership and its bosses 
in Moscow tasked them with depicting the Soviet Union as a reliable power and dependable 
  493 
negotiating partner.  The Soviet Union shared cultural roots and had common interests with 
the United States, and, as superpowers, they could learn from each other and cooperate on the 
world stage.  Most importantly, perhaps, these cultural diplomats interacted with groups of 
Americans by telling jokes, shaking hands, and following up on their encounters with letters 
and personal diplomacy.  When the opportunity presented itself during détente, they shifted 
their gaze toward mainstream cultural exchanges instead of the more traditional exchange 
programs with ideologically-compatible friendship societies, understanding that a successful 
event with a mainstream group that was not composed of mostly pro-Soviet elements would 
have a greater impact than a fete with leftist organizations that did not expand Soviet 
outreach to new groups. 
Overall, the embassy represented one of the most unusual and most essential 
components of détente.  Few, if any, ambassadors in the postwar era had the power that 
Dobrynin wielded in this period to shape policy, and the Soviet Embassy in Washington had 
an institutional culture that allowed for greater interaction with American society.  The 
pursuit of improved Soviet-American relations required a uniquely skilled diplomat like 
Dobrynin, who had more experience in the US than any other Soviet official.  Dobrynin 
made a lasting impression on superpower relations during détente, and his legacy, in the form 
of the diplomats who served in Washington under his watch, continues to be felt in Russian 
foreign policy today. 
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